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بالنظر إلى حالة الجمود في عملية السلام والتوتر المتزايد والمهدد بالانفجار في العلاقات الفلسطينية-الإسرائيلية، قام المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية في فترة ستة أشهر بإجراء دراسات حول التوجهات المتاحة أمام الفلسطينيين للخروج من الوضع الراهن.  عملت هذه الدراسات على استكشاف طبيعة الحوار الفلسطيني الداخلي حول أفضل الوسائل للتقدم نحو تحقيق الأهداف الوطنية الفلسطينية. لهذه الغاية، تم كتابة خمس أوراق سياساتية من قبل أكاديميين  وخبراء فلسطينيين بارزين تناولت كل منها توجهاً محدداً مطروحاً للنقاش. تفترض كافة الأوراق أن الهدف الفلسطيني هو قيام دولة فلسطينية في إطار حل الدولتين وأن التوجهات المطروحة تهدف إلى حشد الموارد المتاحة لتحقيق هذا الهدف. حاولت الأوراق الإجابة على الأسئلة التالية:

  • كيف يمكن تصميم حملة شعبية سلمية مقاومة تكون الجماهير الفلسطينية مستعدة للمشاركة الواسعة بها وتكون السلطة والقوى السياسية قادرة على قيادتها؟ هل توجد لدى القيادة الفلسطينية قدرة ومصداقية كافيتين لقيادة حملة شعبية كهذه والسيطرة عليها ومنعها من الانزلاق نحو الفوضى؟
  • هل يمكن بلورة استراتيجية فاعلة لمقاطعة إسرائيل والاحتلال الإسرائيلي يكون الجمهور الفلسطيني والسلطة قادرين على تبنيها رغم التبعية شبه الكاملة للاقتصاد والإدارة الإسرائيلية؟
  • هل يمكن تعليق التنسيق الأمني مع إسرائيل وهل يمكن جعل ذلك مدخلاً للتخلي عن شروط أوسلو الأخرى التي لا تلتزم بها إسرائيل بكافة جوانبها السياسية والمدنية والأمنية والاقتصادية حتى لو أدى ذلك لانهيار السلطة أو حلها؟
  • كيف يمكن إعطاء التهديد بالتخلي عن حل الدولتين وتبني حل الدولة الواحدة مصداقية كافية لإجبار المجتمع الإسرائيلي على مواجهة تبعات استمرار الاحتلال؟
  • هل يوجد دور للمفاوضات الثنائية المباشرة مع إسرائيل في تغيير الوضع الراهن؟ ما هي الظروف التي قد تجعل من هذه المفاوضات آلية مفيدة للطرف الفلسطيني في إنهاء الاحتلال وقيام الدولة المستقلة؟

 

 

تعتبر هذه التوجهات الخمس جزءاً هاماً من الحوار الداخلي بين الجمهور بشكل عام والنخبة السياسية بشكل خاص. تصف كل ورقة التوجه الذي تناقشه وتشير إلى تأثيره الممكن على الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين وتوضح الدور الذي يلعبه في بلورة استراتيجية أكبر. وقد تم استعراض ومناقشة كافة الأوراق من قبل فريق عمل تكون من عشرين فرداً هم الكتاب الخمسة بالإضافة إلى خمسة عشر معقباً ومحاوراً. تمت مناقشة الأوراق في ست ورشات عمل مغلقة شارك فيها خبراء وسياسيون وأكاديميون ونشطاء. كما عقد مؤتمر في 29 شباط (فبراير) لإجراء مناقشة لكافة الأوراق.

يود المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية التقدم بالشكر لفريق العمل للوقت والجهد الذي أعطوه لهذا العمل. لكن في نفس الوقت يود الإشارة إلى أن محتويات الأوراق كافة تعبر عن رأي كاتبيها وقد لا تعبر بالضرورة عن رأي كل عضو في فريق العمل.

كذلك، يتقدم المركز بالشكر للمركز النرويجي لمصادر بناء السلام (NOREF) للدعم الذي قدمه لهذا العمل. ويُود التأكيد هنا أيضاً على أن هذا الدعم لا يعني بالضرورة الموافقة على محتويات الأوراق.

 التقرير النهائي، د.خليل الشقاقي 

 التقرير النهائي الملخص، د.خليل الشقاقي

  وقف التنسيق الأمني،  هاني المصري

---- تعقيب: ناصر الدين الشاعر

 حل الدولة الواحدة، سام بحور

----تعقيب: راضي الجراعي و محمد دراغمة 

 العودة للمفاوضات، د. علي الجرباوي 

----تعقيب: د. أيمن دراغمة و د. عزمي الشعيبي 

المقاطعة، رجا الخالدي
----تعقيب: د. غسان الخطيب و فجر حرب 

المقاومة الشعبية،  سفيان أبو زايدة
----تعقيب: جمال زقوت و قيس عبد الكريم

Arabic

Given the current stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations and the potential for wide-scale escalation in the near future, PSR has conducted a 6-month policy research on new directions for the Palestinians. The research sought to explore Palestinian discourse on the best means to move forward. Five short policy papers, written by senior Palestinian experts and academics, explore various approaches and directions for the PA to take. All these directions are currently part of the Palestinian public and elite discourse. Each paper describes a specific approach, outlining its potential impact on the Palestinians and Israelis and exploring its contribution to a more effective Palestinian strategy to end the occupation. Each approach therefore represents a component in a larger proposed strategy. The five papers were reviewed and discussed by a task force, a core group of 20 made up of the five authors and fifteen reviewers and discussants. The discussion of the papers took place in six closed workshops attended by experts, policy makers, academics and activists. An open conference was organized on 29 February and was devoted to a discussion of all five papers.  See reports below.

The discussion among the members of the task force was very vibrant and insightful; for that, PSR wishes to express its appreciation for all members of the group for the time and effort they have devoted to this work. However, the discussion among the members of the task force indicated at times serious differences of opinion. In this light, it should be made clear that the papers do not necessarily represent the views of every single member of the task force. They only represent the analysis and the assessment of their authors. 

PSR is also grateful for the support of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) without which this project would not have been possible. But it should be made clear that this support does not in any way mean an endorsement, on the part of NOREF of the content of the five papers or the final report.  

 

 Final Report, Khalil Shikaki

 Peaceful Popular Resistance, is it a Feasible Option? Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida

----Comments by: Qais Abd al-Karim & Mr. Jamal Zakout

 Asynchronous and Inseparable Struggles for Rights and a Political End-Game Mr. Sam Bahour

----Comments by: Mr. Mohammad Daraghmeh & Mr. Radi Jarai 

 Making Negotiation Viable, Dr. Ali Jarbawi

----Comments by: Dr. Ayman Daraghmeh & Dr. Azmi Shuaibi

 The Prospect for Palestinian Economic Boycott of Israel: Forms and Difficulties, Mr. Raja Khalidi 

----Comments by: Mr. Fajr Harb & Dr. Ghassan Khatib

 Is It Possible to Suspend Security Coordination?  Mr. Hani al-Masri 
----Comments by: Dr. Naser al-Shaer & Dr. Husam Zomlot

English

13-15 June 2013 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 June 2013. The period before the poll witnessed the resignation of the government of Salam Fayyad and the appointment of a new government headed by Rami Al Hamdallah, President of Al Najah University. The period also witnessed US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy in the hope of renewing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Earlier, Khalid Mishaal was elected as head of Hamas’s political bureau for a new term [More]Read more

Despite the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative (API) accepting minor territorial swaps, both sides display pessimism regarding the peace process and Israeli support for the API drops 
13 - 16 June 2013  
​These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

  • Israelis and Palestinians continue to display pessimism regarding the peace process despite efforts by US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and despite modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative: Only 27% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis think that the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop while 34% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue as well. On the other hand, 44% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will not stop and 21% of the Palestinians believe that the two sides will not return to negotiations but that violence will not resume.
  • Furthermore, findings indicate that each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence: 57% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 25% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 37% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 17% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

​The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 13 and 16, 2013. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 14 and 21, 2013. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Department of Communication and Journalism and Director of the Swiss Center for Conflict Research at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org
On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) Attitudes and expectations regarding the peace process

  •  The majority of Israelis (68%) and Palestinians (69%) view the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years as low or non-existent. A majority of Israelis (62%) supports a two-state solution while 33% oppose it. Among the Palestinians, 53% support and 46% oppose the two-state solution. 51% of Israelis think that the two-state solution is bound to fail because of settlements.  58% of Palestinians think that the two-state solution is no longer viable. At the same time, a majority of Israelis (63%) and Palestinians (69%) oppose the one state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality; while32% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians support this solution.
  • · 56% of the Palestinians support the Saudi peace plan and 41% oppose it, while 24% of the Israelis support and 67% oppose it. A year ago, in June 2012, 51% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 45% opposed it, while 36% of the Israelis supported and 59% opposed it. In other words, the Arab modification of the plan, by accepting territorial swap, did not positively change the views of the Israelis. On the other hand, the Arab modification did not negatively affect Palestinian support for the initiative. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194.  In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.
  •  As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of national identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 57% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 37% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 42% support and 56% oppose this step. In June 2012, 53% of the Israelis supported and 43% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (43% support and 55% oppose).

 (B) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

  •  Given the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative accepting minor territorial swaps, 27% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis think that the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop while 34% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue as well. On the other hand, 44% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will not stop and 21% of the Palestinians believe that the two sides will not return to negotiations but that violence will not resume.
  •  Among Israelis, 50% are worried and 49% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, this is similar to our June 2012 findings. Among Palestinians, 74% are worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In June 2012, perception of worry among Palestinians was identical.
  •  The level of perceived threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 57% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 25% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 17% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 36% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.  

​___________________________________________________

​*This joint survey was conducted with the support of  the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 
 

English