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أصدر المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية التقرير النهائي لمبادرة "اليوم التالي": إمكانيات ونتائج إنهيار السلطة الفلسطينية والتداعيات السياسية لذلك. يستكشف التقرير إمكانيات ونتائج انهيار أو حل السلطة الفلسطينية ملخصاً النتائج الرئيسية للمبادرة وذلك بالاعتماد على الأوراق البحثية التي أعدها خبراء في عدة مجالات وعلى ورش العمل والمقابلات التي أجريت لهذه الغاية.

قام المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية، في بدايات عام 2013، بتنفيذ مبادرة لدراسة الآثار المترتبة على حل أو انهيار السلطة الفلسطينية على مختلف القطاعات في فلسطين ومنها السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية والحياة الاجتماعية، وذلك بالتعاون مع مشروع الشرق الأوسط للولايات المتحدة (USMEP) و المركز النرويجي لمصادر بناء السلام (NOREF). انطلقت المبادرة التي سميت "باليوم التالي" من احتمالية انهيار السلطة الفلسطينية أو اتخاذها لقرار بحل نفسها في المستقبل القريب وذلك تحت وطأة أعباء الضغوط المالية والسياسية المختلفة، ومن الإيمان بأن هناك حاجة للفلسطينيين لتباحث الآثار المترتبة على مثل هذا التطور على ظروف معيشتهم وعلى نضالهم من أجل الاستقلال وبناء الدولة.

وقام المركز،  لما يزيد بقليل عن ستة أشهر، بتشكيل عشرة فرق  يتألف كل منها من ثلاثة خبراء وأكاديميين وكبار رجال الأعمال، ووزراء سابقين وحاليين وشخصيات عامة، حيث أعدت الفرق عشر ورقات تتناول عشرة قطاعات أو قضايا مختلفة. وكانت معظم القطاعات التي تم بحثها ذات صلة بالخدمات، منها على سبيل المثال الصحة والتعليم. وتناولت الأوراق أيضا بناء المؤسسات والأمن ونظام العدالة والعلاقات بين فتح وحماس ومستقبل حل الدولتين. ونوقشت أهداف المبادرة والأوراق الـعشرة في 12 ورشة عمل شارك فيها مجتمعة حوالي 115 شخصا من الخبراء والشخصيات السياسية والأكاديمية. وقدمت هذه  الأوراق باللغة العربية وتمت ترجمتها إلى اللغة الإنجليزية.

هدفت المبادرة إلى فحص نتائج انهيار السلطة أو حلها  على مجموعة من القضايا المركزية التي تهم الفلسطينيين وذلك من خلال انتاج سلسلة من الأوراق التي تبحث التحديات الرئيسية التي ستواجه الفلسطينيين في حياتهم السياسية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية والأمنية.توجد ثلاثة سيناريوهات قد تؤدي إلى خلق وضع لا تتمكن فيه السلطة الفلسطينية من القيام بأداء واجباتها. (1) قد تقوم إسرائيل الولايات المتحدة بفرض عقوبات مالية وإدارية وسياسية عليها. (2) قد تصل القيادة الفلسطينية ومنظمة التحرير إلى استنتاج بأن حل الدولتين لم يعد ممكناً وأن الأفضل البحث عن وسائل نضالية أخرى وأن وجود السلطة الفلسطينية لم يعد ضرورياً . (3) قد تتفاقم الأزمة المالية والسياسية الفلسطينية وقد يتبعها إضرابات ومظاهرات شعبية ضد السلطة مما قد يضعف السلطة ويشجع إظهار  تحديات ضدها  من أطراف مختلفة قد تعود المجموعات المسلحة للظهور علناً مما قد يؤدي إلى إضعاف السلطة بحيث قد لا تستطيع القيام بوظائفها المتوقعة منها.

 للمبادرة ثلاثة أهداف: 1) تحديد مغزى انهيار السلطة وتوقفها عن العمل من خلال- تحديد طبيعة المشكلة المحددة (حسب الموضوع المخصص للورقة)، وتحديد حجم وخطورة المشكلة، وتحديد طبيعة التحديات التي يخلقها كل ذلك للمجتمع الفلسطيني وللقيادة والحركات الفلسطينية. 2) تحديد مجموعة من الخيارات السياسية  التي يمكن اللجوء إليها لمواجهة التحديات وتقليص حجم المشكلة  أو احتوائها. كما تتناول الخيارات مدى الاستفادة الممكنة من الأزمة لخدمة أغراض العمل الوطني الفلسطيني. 3) وضع مجموعة من التوصيات الموجهة لمنظمة التحرير للسلطة الفلسطينية وللحركات والأحزاب وفصائل العمل الوطني والإسلامي وللحركات والأطر الشعبية وللمجتمع والمنظمات غير الحكومية.

التقرير النهائي لمبادرة "اليوم التالي" 

إمكانيات ونتائج انهيار أو حل السلطة الفلسطينية والتداعيات السياسية لذلك

  أوراق الخبراء:

Arabic

13-15 June 2013 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 June 2013. The period before the poll witnessed the resignation of the government of Salam Fayyad and the appointment of a new government headed by Rami Al Hamdallah, President of Al Najah University. The period also witnessed US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy in the hope of renewing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Earlier, Khalid Mishaal was elected as head of Hamas’s political bureau for a new term [More]Read more

Despite the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative (API) accepting minor territorial swaps, both sides display pessimism regarding the peace process and Israeli support for the API drops 
13 - 16 June 2013  
​These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

  • Israelis and Palestinians continue to display pessimism regarding the peace process despite efforts by US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and despite modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative: Only 27% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis think that the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop while 34% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue as well. On the other hand, 44% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will not stop and 21% of the Palestinians believe that the two sides will not return to negotiations but that violence will not resume.
  • Furthermore, findings indicate that each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence: 57% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 25% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 37% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 17% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

​The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 13 and 16, 2013. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 14 and 21, 2013. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Department of Communication and Journalism and Director of the Swiss Center for Conflict Research at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org
On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) Attitudes and expectations regarding the peace process

  •  The majority of Israelis (68%) and Palestinians (69%) view the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years as low or non-existent. A majority of Israelis (62%) supports a two-state solution while 33% oppose it. Among the Palestinians, 53% support and 46% oppose the two-state solution. 51% of Israelis think that the two-state solution is bound to fail because of settlements.  58% of Palestinians think that the two-state solution is no longer viable. At the same time, a majority of Israelis (63%) and Palestinians (69%) oppose the one state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality; while32% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians support this solution.
  • · 56% of the Palestinians support the Saudi peace plan and 41% oppose it, while 24% of the Israelis support and 67% oppose it. A year ago, in June 2012, 51% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 45% opposed it, while 36% of the Israelis supported and 59% opposed it. In other words, the Arab modification of the plan, by accepting territorial swap, did not positively change the views of the Israelis. On the other hand, the Arab modification did not negatively affect Palestinian support for the initiative. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194.  In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.
  •  As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of national identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 57% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 37% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 42% support and 56% oppose this step. In June 2012, 53% of the Israelis supported and 43% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (43% support and 55% oppose).

 (B) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

  •  Given the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative accepting minor territorial swaps, 27% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis think that the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop while 34% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue as well. On the other hand, 44% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will not stop and 21% of the Palestinians believe that the two sides will not return to negotiations but that violence will not resume.
  •  Among Israelis, 50% are worried and 49% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, this is similar to our June 2012 findings. Among Palestinians, 74% are worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In June 2012, perception of worry among Palestinians was identical.
  •  The level of perceived threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 57% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 25% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 17% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 36% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.  

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​*This joint survey was conducted with the support of  the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 
 

English

PSR has initiated in January 2013 a policy research project that aimed at exploring Palestinian conditions and options in the day after the PA ceases to function. The initiative sought to produce a series of expert papers focusing on the main challenging areas of the “day after” in Palestinian political, social, financial, economic, and security life.

The initiative’s point of departure is that the PA may collapse or may decide to dissolve itself in the near future under the heavy weight of various financial and political pressures.  Three scenarios are conceivable: (1) Israel and the US may impose on the PA severe or crippling financial and political sanctions; (2) the PLO leadership may conclude that the two-state solution is no longer practical and may begin a search for other means to gain Palestinian rights leading it to dissolve the PA; and (3) a series of economic, financial and political crises may lead to popular demands for change expressed in mass demonstrations against the PA and a widespread demand for regime change leading to chaos and eventual collapse.

The initiative goals are three: (1) explore the implications of such a development on various critical dimensions of Palestinian life and government, elaborating on the magnitude of the problems and challenges that might arise as a result of PA demise;  (2) debate various policy options to respond to such a development, to contain the damage, and to capitalize on potential benefits, if any; and, (3) recommend a course of action for Palestinians to pursue in response to the expected complications.

PSR has gathered a team of 30 experts in the areas of finance and economics, internal security and law enforcement, health, education, communication, justice system, local government, water and electricity, civil and domestic political affairs, and the future of the two-state solution. Experts have been asked to write brief papers in their various areas of expertise examining the implications and policy options for the PA. Each paper has been reviewed and critiqued by two experts. Drafts of the expert papers have been discussed in small specialized workshops attended by policy makers, parliamentarians, experts, and academics.

This final report is based on the expert papers, workshops/focus groups, interviews, and background research. The report explores the likelihood and consequences of PA collapse or dissolution, summarizes the main findings of the expert papers, and examines the overall policy implications for the PA.

This initiative has been organized in cooperation with the U.S./Middle East Project (USMEP) and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF). PSR is grateful for their support without which this project would not have been possible.

 

The Day After Final Report:
 

 

Day After Expert Papers:
 

English