Report I: Domestic Balance of Power and Palestinian-Israeli Relations before and after October the 7th
Domestically, AB8 Shows most Palestinians did not support Hamas on the eve of October the 7th war; but the war led to a significant rise in Hamas’ popularity and a significant decline in the standing of the PA leadership among the Palestinians. The war also led to a significant rise in support for armed struggle in the West Bank. Nonetheless, after the eruption of the war, Hamas did not gain a majority support in either Gaza or the West Bank and support for the two-state solution did not decline 
28 September and 8 October 2023
Report II: Palestinian perception of international actors and international relations
Palestinians see the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine and their most preferred countries are Turkey, Qatar, and China. In a comparison between China's and U.S. foreign policies, the Palestinian public views China's policies more positively than those of the U.S. on all issues at hand. Wide-ranging opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remains as strong as it was two years ago, but most express optimism about the world's solidarity with the Palestinians, and the vast majority expresses opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
28 September and 8 October 2023
Report III: Palestinian perception of governance
On the eve of October the 7th, the Palestinian perception of PA governance was grim: trust in the PA leadership, PA public institutions, civil society organizations, and Hamas was low and declining; perception of corruption in PA institutions was overwhelming; and public assessed the performance of the government in providing security, keeping the prices down, and narrowing the gap between rich and poor as bad or very bad; but satisfaction with service delivery was mixed
28 September and 8 October 2023