CPRS Public Opinion Poll 41

These are the results of opinion poll # 41, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 3-5 June 1999. The poll deals with Barak’s victory and the peace process, economic conditions and future outlook, perceptions of corruption, wasta, democracy, and freedom of the press, elections for the president and vice-president and political sympathy
The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 825 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. Barak’s Victory and the Peace Process

• 70% support the peace process and 27% oppose it; meanwhile 45% continue to support armed attacks against Israelis and 49% oppose it.
• 66% do not trust the peaceful intentions of a government led by Barak and 23% trust such a government. Meanwhile, 63% do not trust the peaceful intentions of the Israeli people and 29% trust them.
• A majority of 54% does not believe that Barak intends to implement the Wye River agreement, and 29% believe that he will.
• A majority of 57% does not expect to see a difference between Barak’s and Netanyahu’s settlements’ policy, while 15% believe that Barak’s will be worse.
• 55% believe that final status negotiations will not succeed in reaching a permanent settlement acceptable to both parties, while 36% believe that it will.
• 45% believe that the current peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, 27% believe it will not, and 29% are not sure.
• 54% oppose a postponement of state declaration by one year to May 2000, while 37% support it.
• A majority of 52% opposes the call to Palestinian workers to boycott work in Israeli settlements while 43% support it.

Poll results show that the electoral victory of the Israeli Labor candidate, Ehud Barak, did not cause a change in the positions and expectations of the Palestinians. The high level of support for the peace process remained as it was two months ago (70%) while a determined minority of 27% continued to oppose it. Similarly, the level of support for armed attacks against Israelis remained relatively high at 45% with 49% opposing them. Support for armed attacks increases in the refugee camps (49%), among the young (52%), holders of BA degree (52%), students (57%), unmarried (52%), and supporters of Hamas (66%) and PFLP (69%).

The results reveal that a majority of Palestinians (63%) does not trust the intentions of the Israeli people toward the peace process, but 29% do trust these intentions. This seems to explain why the outcome of the Israeli elections did not lead to an important change in the positions and expectations of the Palestinian street. Two-thirds of the street expressed lack of trust in Barak’s intentions toward the peace process, while only 23% trusted these intentions. Moreover, a majority of 54% believes that Barak will not implement the Wye River Memorandum, and 57% believe that his policy on Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza will not be different from that of Netanyahu. In fact, 15% of those polled believe that his settlements’ policy will be worse than that of Netanyahu. However, 23% believe that Barak’s settlements’ policy will be better.

The percentage of those who believe that Barak will not implement the Wye agreement increases among residents of refugee camps (59%), men (58%), the young (60%), holders of BA degree (65%), students (71%), unmarried (64%), and supports of Hamas (66%) and Islamic Jihad (64%). On the other hand, the percentage of those who believe that Barak’s settlements’ policy will be better than Netanyahu’s increases among farmers (36%), those employed in the public sector (30%), those with the highest income (43%), and supporters of Fateh (30%).

The results also show that a majority of 55% believes that it will not be possible to reach a mutually acceptable permanent settlement in the final status talks, while 36% believe that it will be possible to reach such a settlement. These percentages are almost identical to those obtained in the November 1998 poll conducted after the signing of the Wye River Memorandum. The percentage of those who believe in the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable permanent settlement increases among women (40%), holders of primary school certificate (43%), housewives (42%), farmers (42%), those with the highest income (43%), and supporters of Fateh (45%).

The results show that only 45% believe that the current peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the coming years. This percentage is identical with that obtained in the November 1998 poll. The percentage of those believing in the possibility of establishing the state increases among the holders of primary school certificate (56%), housewives (49%), merchants (54%), farmers (53%), and supporters of Fateh (55%). The low expectations regarding a negotiated statehood may have affected the level of support for a unilateral declaration of statehood. The results show that 54% oppose the postponement of that declaration by one year to May 2000, while 37% support it. Two months ago, only 43% supported a unilateral declaration of statehood on May 4, 1999 while 48% supported postponement. Opposition to the postponement increases among the young (59%), students (63%), workers (63%), unmarried (59%),and supporters of Hamas (62%), Islamic Jihad (64%), and PFLP (64%). The percentage of those supporting postponement increases in the Gaza Strip (41%), among residents of refugee camps (42%), holders of BA degree (40%), employees (43%), farmers (53%), and the retired (57%).

The poll shows that the call made last May by the National Conference to confront Settlements for the workers to boycott work in Jewish settlements did not receive the support of the majority with 52% opposing it and 43% supporting it. The percentage of support for the call increases in the areas of Nablus (50%), Hebron (49%), Jabalia (49%), and Rafah (48%), and among residents of refugee camps (48%), two-year college graduates (51%), employees (54%), specialists (73%), those employed in the public sector (56%), and supporters of Hamas (47%) and the PFLP (50%).

In brief, the Palestinian street is in a state of waiting before making a final judgement on Barak. The level of support for the peace process is still very high; but at the same time, supporters of armed attacks have not yet changed their position despite the fact that most of them support the current peace process. It is likely that the level of support for armed attacks will remain high until the Wye agreement is implemented. Based on previous trends, support for violence does drop to low levels only when major progress in the peace process is achieved and when settlements’ activities are stopped. The majority of those supporting armed attacks, like the majority in the street, believe at this moment, that Barak will not implement the Wye agreement and will not stop settlements' activities.

2. Economic Conditions and Future Outlook

• A majority of 54% describes its economic conditions as worse than they were before the peace process; only 11% say they have become better.
• Level of optimism stands at 61% and pessimism at 34%.

The results show that a majority of 54% describes its economic conditions today as worse than they were before the start of the peace process, while only 11% describe their conditions today as being better. The percentage of those describing their conditions as better increases among refugees (14%), employees (17%), those employed in the public sector (16%), and Fateh (15%).

Despite this negative perception of one’s own conditions, the majority (61%) looks optimistically at the future, while 34% feel pessimistic. The level of optimism stood at 59% last October, and pessimism at 38%. The percentage of optimism increases in the Gaza Strip (67%), and among women (65%), illiterates (70%), housewives (69%), specialists (68%), those with the highest income (67%), and supporters of Fateh (69%).

These results pose a question and answer it. The question concerns the reasons for the support for the stalled peace process despite the fact that the majority blames it for their personal economic difficulties. The answer is provided by the high level of optimism with regard to the future. The majority believes that overall Palestinian conditions will improve in the future and some may believe that peace dividends will arrive sooner or later.

3. Perceptions of Corruption, Wasta, Democracy, and Freedom of the Press

• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stays at 71%, while a majority of 66% believes that it will increase or remain the same in the future.
• A majority of 67% believes that employment is based on wasta, and only 4% do not think so.
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy stays at 27%, while Israel’s reaches 70%, Jordan’s 35%, and Egypt’s 29%.
• A majority of 57% believes that people, today, can not criticize the PA without fear.
• Only 20% believe that Palestinians have free press; 36% believe that they have it to some extent; and 36% believe that they do not have it at all.

The results show that the belief in the existence of corruption in PA institutions is still at the high level it reached two months ago, standing at 71%. This is the highest level since September 1996 when the question was first asked. At that time the percentage of those believing in the existence of corruption stood at 49%. The results also show that 66% believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.

Belief in the existence of corruption increases especially in Gaza City (78%), Jabalia (76%), Hebron (75%), and among men (79%), holders of BA degree (87%), students (86%), employees (83%), merchants (82%), specialists (96%), unmarried (82%), middle income people with monthly income between JD600 – JD900 (82%), and supporters of the PFLP (83%) and Hamas (78%).

The results also show that two-thirds of the Palestinians believe that employment is largely obtained through wasta, while the percentage of those who believe that there is no need for wasta does not exceed 4%.

The street’s perception of Palestinian democracy did not change compared to the situation two months ago with positive evaluation standing today at 27%, compared to 70% for Israel's democracy, 35% for Jordan’s, and 29% for Egypt’s. The percentage of those believing that people can not criticize the authorities without fear stands today at 57%, while the percentage of those who believe that there is free press in the Palestinian areas did not exceed 20%, with 36% believing that a free press exists to some extent.

The percentage of those believing in the existence of a Palestinian free press increases in the West Bank (23%), and among women (24%), those less than 48 years of age (25%), illiterates (30%), holders of primary school certificate (28%), housewives (25%), farmers (42%), and supporters of Fateh (25%).

These results reflect a bleak picture for Palestinian domestic conditions in the eyes of the man in the street with regard to all five areas under examination: corruption, wasta, democracy, the ability to criticize without fear, and freedom of the press. The results show that the percentage of those satisfied with the current conditions is less than one third and that two thirds are dissatisfied. These results came gradually over the past few years and are likely to presist in the absence of major changes in the Palestinian political system.

4. Elections for the President and Vice-President and Political Sympathy

• In presidential elections, Yassir Arafat receives the support of 45%, Ahmad Yasin 11%, and Haidar Abdul Shafi 10%.
• In elections for the office of vice president involving eight candidates, Haidar Abdul Shafi receives the support of 12%, Faisal al-Husseini 8%, Sa’eb Erikat 7%, Mahmud Abbas and Farouq Qaddumi 6% each, Ahmad Qurai’ and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), and Nabil Sha’ath (2%).
• In elections for the office of vice president involving the three top candidates only, Haidar Abdul Shafi receives the support of 39%, Faisal al-Husseini 28%, and Sa’eb Erikat 24%.
• In elections for the office of vice president involving the two top candidates only , Abdual Shafi receives 47%, and Husseini 43%.
• The category of nonaffiliated is the largest with 40%, followed by Fateh with 38%, the Islamists (17%), and the PFLP (3%).

The results indicate that Yassir Arafat’s popularity remains the same (45%) as it was two months ago. The same is true with regard to Ahmad Yassin’s (11%) and Haidar Abdul Shafi (10%). Arafat’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (50%), and among women (50%), the illiterates and holders of primary school certificate (50%), holders of preparatory school certificate (52%), housewives (52%), farmers (53%), those with the least income (48%), and supporters of Fateh (72%).

In a competition among eight candidates for the position of the vice president, Abdul Shafi received the highest percentage of votes (12%), followed by Faisal al-Husseini (8%), Sa’eb Erikat (7%), Mahmoud Abbas and Farouq Qaddumi (6% each), Ahmad Qurai’ and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), and Nabil Sha’ath (2%).

In a competition among the top three candidates for the position of the vice president, Abdul Shafi received 39% of the vote, followed by Husseini (28%), and then Erikat (24%).

When the competition was among Abdul Shafi and Husseini only, the first received 47% and the second received 43%. When it was among Abdul Shafi and Erikat, the first received 49% and the second 40%. When it was among Husseini and Erikat, the first received 44% and the second 37%. These results are similar to those obtained two months ago except for the changes in the popularity of Husseini which gained several percentage points. For example, two months ago he received 39% in a competition with Erikat and 33% in a competition with Abdul Shafi. This rise in Husseini’s popularity is probably due to his role in the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation over Orient House in the month preceding the poll.

The results show no change in Fateh’s standing with 38%, while Hamas’ dropped slightly from 12% two months ago to 10% today. This drop in Hamas’ popularity has been reflected in the overall standing of the Islamists who dropped from 19% to 17%. The PFLP remained stable at 3%, but the non-affiliated rose to 40% to become the largest group in all categories. Two months ago, the non-affiliated stood at 38%....More