# Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

### **Public Opinion Poll NO (27)**

# PA and PLC Performance, Democracy, Armed Attacks, Local Councils and a Permanent Status Plan, April 1997

These are the results of opinion poll #27, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 10-12 April 1997. The poll deals with performance of the PLC, PA Cabinet, the President, etc., the peace process and armed attacks, democracy and corruption, local government, and a permanent status plan. The total sample size of this poll is 1334 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 824 in the West Bank and 510 in the Gaza Strip.

The margin of error is  $\pm$  3%, and the non-response rate is 3%.

#### Main Results

#### 1. The Peace Process and Armed Attacks:

The poll found that support for the peace process has declined sharply from 73% a month ago to 60% in April; and support for suicide armed attacks has almost doubled in one year from 21% in March 1996 (see CPRS Poll #22) to 40% in April 1997. Support for the peace process reached its highest point of 81% in June 1996. The current level of support is the lowest since the Baruch Goldstein massacre in Hebron in February 1994 when 39% opposed return to negotiations and only 17% supported an unconditional return.

The sharpest decline in support for the peace process occurred in the Gaza Strip where it declined from 81% in March 1996 to 60% now. This sharp decline in the level of support for the peace process in Gaza is even more serious because it is accompanied by a dramatic increase in the level of Gazan support for suicide attacks. The latest bombing attack in Tel Aviv received 44% support in the Gaza Strip (compared to 38% in the West Bank); while the suicide attacks of last February-March 1996 received only 17% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 24% in the West Bank).

Another interesting finding from Gaza indicates that Hamas has gained more support there increasing its share in public support from 7% in March 1997 (<u>CPRS Poll 26</u>) to 11% in this poll. These findings, while inconclusive, may indicate that the trend in Gaza toward "moderation", which started about 18 months ago, may be ending.

Support for the Tel Aviv bombing attack is high among students and the young (45%). It is also higher in refugee camps (45%) compared to cities (36%); among females (45%) compared to males (36%); and among Hamas supporters (60%) compared to Fateh supporters (39%).

### 2. Abu Mazin-Beilin Plan for the permanent settlement:

Support for a Palestinian version of the so-called Abu Mazin-Beilin Permanent Status Plan reaches 43% in April 1997 compared to 20% support for an Israeli version of the same plan in March 1997. Respondents were informed of the components of the two versions, but were not told in this and the previous poll that they were being asked about the so-called Abu Mazin-Beilin Plan. The components of the two versions of the Plan were obtained from Palestinian and Israeli newspapers and other sources.

The highest level of support went to the component on the settlement of the refugee problem, in the Palestinian version, receiving 55% support (compared to 44% support to the Israeli version). The establishment of a sovereign but disarmed state in 95% of the West Bank and the whole Gaza Strip received a majority support of 52%. The Israeli version of this component spoke of a sovereign but demilitarized state in most of the West Bank and Gaza and received only 16% support in our March 1997 poll. Israeli annexation of settlements in the form of land exchange of 5% of the territory of the West Bank received only 32% support. The Israeli version of this component did not specify the size of territory and received only 18% support.

The third component of the plan did not have significant differences in the two versions; the Palestinian version spoke of settlers remaining as individuals under Palestinian sovereignty and law and received 42% support. The Israeli version also received 42% support. The fourth component dealt with refugees and differed from the Israeli version in that it explicitly stated that while refugees do not return to their homes inside Israel, they do not renounce the principle of their right of return. The fifth component of the Plan dealt with security arrangements and Israeli military withdrawal form Palestine. The Palestinian version spoke of agreed upon, limited and temporary Israeli presence and joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols along the Jordan River and received 42% support (compared to 8% support for the Israeli version). The last component dealt with Jerusalem and the Palestinian version received 27% support while the Israeli version received only 9% support. The Palestinian version spoke of a united Jerusalem under Israeli control (not sovereignty) but with the understanding that the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would revert to Palestinian sovereignty at a later stage. It also spoke of a Palestinian capital in an Arab Jerusalem neighborhood outside the current boundaries of the city municipality and of Palestinian sovereignty over Muslim and Christian holy places in the old city.

High support for the Palestinian version of the plan is found in Ramallah (59%) compared to Jenin and Hebron (31% and 34% respectively); in cities (45%) compared to Refugee camps (40%); among Fateh supporters (50%) compared to Hamas'(37%).

### 3. Public Perception of the Performance of the PLC, the President, and Other Institutions:

Palestinian public perception of the performance of the *PLC* has not changed since September 1996: now 48% consider its performance as good or very good compared to 47% in September 1996 and 50% in December 1996. Positive perception of the performance of the President remains very high at 79% compared to 72% in September 1996 and 76% in December 1996. The Cabinet receives a positive rating of 59%; security forces receive 77%; and the judicial authorities receive 55%. The performance of the opposition receives the lowest rating of 45%.

Despite the low overall rating of the PLC, its performance regarding the specific issue of defending Jerusalem receives a very high rating of 69% reflecting public appreciation of the

Council's role in defending Palestinian rights in Jabal Abu Ghnaim. On the other hand, the Council received its lowest rating of 42% for its performance in "solving people's problems" reflecting people's frustration with the inability of the Council to take effective and practical measures to address people's needs. Despite the relatively high rating of the overall performance of the Cabinet, it receives, nonetheless, the lowest rating of 25% for its performance in the economy and a low rating of 44% in the democracy and human rights field. It receives the high rating of 68% for its performance in providing public security.

### 4. Status of Democracy in Palestine and Other Countries:

Palestinian public perception of the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank and Gaza has improved somewhat with 50% expressing the belief that it is good or very good compared to 44% in December 1996. Compared to other countries, Palestine came after Israel (which received 77% in April and 78% last December), US (66% in April and 68% in December), and France (61% in April and 60% in December); it came before Jordan (38% in April and 34% in December) and Egypt (37% in April and 34% in December). A majority of 52% agree or strongly agree that the rule in Palestine is moving toward democracy and respect for human rights, but 26% disagree or strongly disagree with that. On the other hand, 22% agree or strongly agree that we are moving toward a dictatorship, while 54% disagree or strongly disagree with that.

Positive evaluation of the status of democracy in Palestine is strong in Gaza South (61%) and weak in Bethlehem (34%); among females (64%) than males (45%); among illiterates (58%) than university degree holders (48%), among farmers (60%) and housewives (55%)than students (45%); and among Fateh supporters (62%) than Hamas supporters (41%). Positive perception of Israeli and American democracies is evident not only among supporters of the peace process, but also among supporters of the opposition. For example, 80% of Hamas supporters evaluated Israeli democracy as good or very good, and 71% of the same supporters evaluated American democracy as good or very good.

## 5. Corruption in the Institutions of the Palestinian Authority:

The percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in the institutions and agencies of the PA has increased for the third consecutive time: it now stands at 57%; in December 1996, it was 51% compared to 49% in September 1996. Moreover, 53% of those who believe that corruption exits, also believe that it will increase or remain unchanged in the future. Last December only 42% believed that corruption will increase or remain the same, compared with 50% in September 1996.

The belief in the existence of corruption reaches 62% in Ramallah compared to 58% in Gaza city and 46% in Nablus. As in previous surveys, it is also higher among males (69%) than females (45%); among the young than the old with a difference of about 15 percentage points; among employees (77%) than laborers (60%) and housewives (42%); and among Hamas supporters (72%) than Fateh's (53%).

#### 6. Local Councils: Performance and Elections

A majority of 52% expressed satisfaction with the performance of their local councils labeling it good or very good. Only 27% said it was bad or very bad. The highest satisfaction went to the performance of the councils in providing electricity (79%), followed by performance in providing water (62%), building and maintaining roads (49%), and cleaning streets (47%). In the Gaza Strip, the high ratings went to Gaza City (62%) followed by Gaza north (54%), Middle Gaza (51%), and lastly South Gaza (44%). In the West Bank the high ratings went to local councils in the areas of Nablus (66%) followed by Ramallah (54%), Hebron (48%), Jenin (44%), Bethlehem (41%), Tulkarm (35%), Jerusalem (34%), and lastly Jericho (27%). These ratings are for all councils in the areas concerned and not only for city municipalities. When asked if they would vote for the existing mayors and other heads of local councils, 42% of all respondents said yes while 41% said no.

#### 7. Political Affiliation:

Support for Fateh dropped from 46% last month to 41% in this month. In the West Bank Fateh received 38% only, compared to 42% last month; in Gaza it received 46% compared to 52% last month. Support for Hamas increased in the Gaza Strip from 7% last March to 11% in this poll. There has been no change in the percentage of people who did not support any of the known factions and political parties.

# Appendix

Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip	
Unemployment	36.0	26.0	50.0
1. How often do you follow the news?			
1) Always	36.3	36.7	35.7
2) Often	14.6	15.8	12.5
3) Sometimes	43.4	41.4	46.7
4) Not Sure	5.7	6.1	5.1
2. Do you support or oppose the peace p			
1) Yes	60.2	60.0	60.6
2) No	34.4	33.7	35.5
3) Don't Know/ No Opinion	5.4	6.3	3.9
3. Generally, how do you evaluate the pe		0.5	3.9
1) Very Good	10.7	9.6	12.4
2) Good	37.3	38.1	36.1
3) Fair	26.2	24.4	29.0
4) Bad	10.2	10.3	10.0
5) Very Bad	6.6	5.6	8.2
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	9.0	12.0	4.3
,			7.5
<ul><li>4. How do you evaluate the performance</li><li>4-1 Defending human rights</li></ul>	of the PLC in the followi	ng areas:	
1) Very Good	12.5	10.7	15.3
2) Good	38.5	39.0	37.7
3) Fair	18.5	17.3	20.4
4) Bad	14.3	14.3	14.3
5) Very Bad	06.6	06.4	06.9
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	09.6	12.3	05.3
4-2 Defending land against settlements	07.0	12.5	05.5
1) Very Good	26.2	20.1	36.0
2) Good	37.9	40.4	33.8
3) Fair	11.8	11.1	13.0
4) Bad	11.2	12.8	08.6
5) Very Bad	06.2	06.8	05.3
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	06.7	08.8	03.3
4-3 Adopting laws that enhance democra	ncy		
1) Very Good	10.3	7.5	14.7
2) Good	37.2	35.7	39.7
3) Fair	15.3	13.8	17.7
4) Bad	14.5	14.9	13.9
5) Very Bad	05.9	06.8	04.5
6)Don't Know/ No Opinion	16.8	21.4	09.4
4-4 Relationship with the Executive auth	ority		
1) Very Good	16.2	11.2	24.2
2) Good	37.3	36.7	38.4
3) Fair	12.6	12.2	13.2
4) Bad	08.8	09.8	07.1
5) Very Bad	04.1	04.7	03.1
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	21.0	25.5	14.0
4-5 Defending Jerusalem			

1) Very Good	34.2	23.6	51.2	
2) Good	35.1	40.4	26.8	
3) Fair	09.5	09.7	09.3	
4) Bad	10.0	11.7	07.3	
5) Very Bad	04.8	06.5	02.2	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	06.3	08.2	03.3	
4-6 Prisoners				
1) Very Good	23.0	15.7	34.6	
2) Good	36.0	38.7	31.6	
3) Fair	11.8	11.2	12.8	
4) Bad	14.9	16.6	12.2	
5) Very Bad	07.7	08.6	06.3	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	06.7	09.3	02.6	
4-7 Negotiations with Israel				
1) Very Good	12.7	08.4	19.6	
2) Good	35.5	37.1	32.8	
3) Fair	16.9	16.2	18.1	
4) Bad	17.8	17.6	18.1	
5) Very Bad	06.9	08.1	04.9	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	10.2	12.6	06.5	
4-8 Resolving citizens' problems				
1) Very Good	10.2	08.9	12.4	
2) Good	31.5	32.3	30.1	
3) Fair	18.8	17.1	21.7	
4) Bad	20.1	20.9	18.9	
5) Very Bad	09.5	07.4	12.8	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	09.8	13.4	04.1	
5. Generally, how do you evaluate the Cabinet)?	he performance of the	Palestinian governm	ent (the Executive	
1) Very Good	15.3	12.6	19.5	
2) Good	43.4	43.9	42.6	
3) Fair	20.5	19.2	22.5	
4) Bad	08.1	09.1	06.5	
5) Very Bad	05.2	05.1	05.3	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	07.5	10.0	03.6	
6. How do you evaluate the perform	ance of the governme	nt in the following ar	eas:	
11-1 Education				
1) Very Good	24.2	13.9	40.6	
2) Good	39.2	39.9	38.2	
3) Fair	12.8	11.9	14.1	
4) Bad	14.0	19.6	05.1	
5) Very Bad	05.9	08.8	01.2	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	03.9	05.9	00.8	
6-2 Health				
1) Very Good	19.2	10.8	32.5	
2) Good	44.8	64.1	42.7	
3) Fair	13.9	14.1	13.5	
4) Bad	12.3	15.6	07.1	
5) Very Bad	04.5	05.7	02.7	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	05.3	07.7	01.4	
6-3 Economy				

1) Very Good	4.0	4.2	3.7
2) Good	20.6	23.9	15.3
3) Fair	17.9	15.3	22.0
4) Bad	30.3	28.7	32.8
5) Very Bad	22.0	20.2	25.0
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	05.2	07.7	01.2
6-4 Democracy & Human Rights			
1) Very Good	09.2	08.0	11.0
2) Good	34.4	33.0	36.5
3) Fair	18.9	17.3	21.4
4) Bad	19.0	18.9	19.3
5) Very Bad	10.2	10.5	09.6
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	08.4	12.3	02.2
6-5 Security of Citizens			
1) Very Good	24.4	14.5	40.4
2) Good	43.8	45.5	41.2
3) Fair	9.8	10.0	09.4
4) Bad	12.3	16.1	06.3
5) Very Bad	05.0	06.9	02.0
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	04.7	07.1	00.8
7. Generally, how do you evaluate the perf	ormance of the judic	cial authority and co	ourts?
1) Very Good	15.2	11.5	21.0
2) Good	40.0	40.3	39.6
3) Fair	13.6	11.0	17.6
4) Bad	09.0	09.0	09.0
5) Very Bad	04.5	04.9	03.7
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	17.7	23.2	09.0
8. Generally, how do you evaluate the perf	ormance of the Pales	stinian police and se	ecurity services?
1) Very Good	25.8	22.1	31.6
2) Good	50.7	52.0	48.6
3) Fair	11.6	11.7	11.4
4) Bad	04.8	05.0	04.5
5) Very Bad	03.9	04.8	02.4
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	03.3	04.4	01.6
9. If you want to evaluate the status of dem you would say it is:	ocracy and human	rights under the Pal	estinian Authority,
1) Very Good	11.2	08.1	16.1
2) Good	38.4	39.6	36.5
3) Fair	23.6	22.8	24.8
4) Bad	12.3	12.6	11.8
5) Very Bad	08.1	07.7	08.6
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	06.4	09.1	02.2
10. And what about the status of democrac	y and human rights	in other countries:	
10-1 America	5		
1) Very Good	43.2	36.1	54.7
2) Good	22.6	26.7	15.9
3) Fair	05.2	04.2	06.9
4) Bad	05.8	05.6	06.1
5) Very Bad	02.0	02.2	01.8
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	21.1	25.2	14.7
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10-2 Israel			
1) Very Good	51.1	43.2	63.7
2) Good	26.3	30.1	20.2
3) Fair	04.3	04.1	04.7
4) Bad	04.5	05.7	02.7
5) Very Bad	02.0	02.0	02.0
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	11.8	15.0	06.7
10-3 Jordan			
1) Very Good	09.9	06.5	15.3
2) Good	28.9	24.1	36.7
3) Fair	18.4	17.8	19.2
4) Bad	20.4	24.6	13.7
5) Very Bad	07.9	09.5	05.3
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	14.5	17.5	09.8
10-4 Egypt			
1) Very Good	10.0	05.5	17.1
2) Good	27.0	21.3	36.2
3) Fair	16.6	14.6	19.7
4) Bad	18.0	20.3	14.4
5) Very Bad	08.2	09.7	05.9
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	20.2	28.6	06.7
10-5 France			
1) Very Good	34.1	26.7	45.9
2) Good	26.7	27.6	25.1
3) Fair	02.8	02.2	03.7
4) Bad	01.9	02.5	01.0
5) Very Bad	00.8	01.1	00.4
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	33.8	39.9	23.9
11. In your opinion, what direction	is the government hea	ding toward?	
11-1 Democracy	<b>g</b>		
1) Strongly agree	11.3	10.0	13.6
2) Agree	40.2	40.3	40.1
3) Do not agree, do not disagree	14.7	13.5	16.5
4) Disagree	21.6	21.4	22.0
5) Strongly disagree	4.3	4.7	3.7
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	7.8	10.1	4.1
11-2 Dictatorship			
1) Strongly agree	5.1	5.2	4.9
2) Agree	17.3	17.1	17.5
3) Do not agree, do not disagree	13.6	13.2	14.1
4) Disagree	46.6	45.1	49.1
5) Strongly disagree	7.4	7.1	7.9
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	10.1	12.3	6.5
11-3 Combination of both			
1) Strongly agree	05.8	05.4	06.3
2) Agree	30.1	28.8	32.0
3) Do not agree, do not disagree	19.4	17.5	22.4
4) Disagree	28.4	29.6	26.5
5) Strongly disagree	04.3	03.8	04.9
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	12.1	14.9	07.9
., 1.0 opinion	<del></del>	- ***	U

<sup>12.</sup> Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the institution of the Presidency?

1) 17	22.2	25.0	45.0	
1) Very Good	33.2	25.8	45.0	
2) Good	45.4	48.6	40.5	
3) Fair	09.0	09.8	07.7	
4) Bad	04.7	05.7	03.1	
5) Very Bad	03.0	03.8	01.6	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	04.7	06.3	02.2	
13. Do you think that there is corruption	n in PA instituti	ons? (if yes, go to the i	next question)	
1) Yes	57.0	57.3	56.7	
2) No	24.4	23.4	26.0	
3) Not Sure	18.5	19.3	17.3	
14. Will this corruption in PA institutio	ns increase, deci	rease or remain as it is	s in the future?	
1) Increase	43.6	41.4	47.3	
2) Remain as it is	09.4	08.2	11.4	
3) Decrease	33.4	34.8	31.1	
4) Don't Know/ No Opinion	13.6	15.7	10.2	
15. Concerning the armed attack against	st the Israeli Cat	fe in Tel-Aviv last moi	nth I ·	
1) Support	40.3	38.0	44.0	
2) Oppose	47.9	49.4	45.4	
3) Don't Know/ No Opinion	11.8	12.6	10.6	
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16. Generally, how do you evaluate the and factions?	periormance of	the Palestinian opposi	tuon parties, movem	ients
1) Very Good	11.4	10.9	12.0	
2) Good	33.9	32.1	36.8	
3) Fair	19.7	17.3	23.4	
4) Bad	18.5	19.7	16.7	
5) Very Bad	05.0	05.9	03.5	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	11.5	14.0	07.5	
17. Which political party do you suppor	rt?			
1) PPP	01.1	01.1	01.0	
2) PFLP	04.5	04.0	05.3	
3)Fateh	41.3	38.4	46.0	
4) Hamas	10.3	09.9	11.1	
5) DFLP	01.1	01.4	00.8	
6) Islamic Jihad	02.2	02.1	02.4	
7) Fida	00.3	00.2	00.4	
8) Independent Islamists	02.6	03.2	01.6	
9) Independent Nationalists	05.8	06.7	04.3	
10) None of the above	29.3	31.4	25.9	
11) Others	01.5	01.7	01.2	
18) In general, how would you evaluate	-	e of the local (municip	oal or village) counci	il, or
the refugee camp committee in your nei	_	14.0	14.6	
1) Very Good 2) Good	14.3 37.8	36.1	40.4	
3) Fair 4) Bad	18.1 14.2	17.3 15.1	19.2 12.8	
5) Very Bad	12.4	13.1	11.4	
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	03.2	04.3	01.6	
, <u>*</u>				
19) How would you evaluate the perform	mance of your lo	ocai councii in the 10110	owing areas:	
19-1 Providing water 1) Very Good	22.2	17.5	30.8	
1) very 0000	<i>LL.L</i>	17.3	30.0	

2) Good	39.9	41.4	37.1
3) Fair	10.7	08.0	15.7
4) Bad	19.3	22.8	12.6
5)Very Bad	06.2	07.4	03.8
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	01.8	02.8	00.0
19-2 Providing Electricity			
1) Very Good	28.6	26.0	33.2
2) Good	50.1	49.6	51.1
3) Fair	08.4	08.3	08.5
4) Bad	07.7	09.5	04.4
5)Very Bad	03.5	03.9	02.7
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	01.7	02.7	0.00
19-3 Building and maintaining Roads			
1) Very Good	15.4	12.9	20.1
2) Good	33.6	31.8	36.8
3) Fair	14.1	13.3	15.7
4) Bad	22.8	26.2	16.2
5)Very Bad	12.3	13.2	10.7
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	01.8	02.5	00.5
19-4 Cleaning Streets			
1) Very Good	11.9	08.4	18.4
2) Good	35.5	35.2	36.0
3) Fair	15.4	15.0	16.2
4) Bad	23.8	26.8	18.1
5)Very Bad	12.0	12.6	10.7
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	01.5	02.1	00.5

# 20-A If elections for local (municipal or village) councils took place today, would you be willing to elect the current head of your council?

	77.4.1	W D I	C
3) Don't Know/ No Opinion	17.4	16.6	18.7
2) No	40.6	44.7	33.2
1) Yes	42.1	38.7	48.1

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
20-B And what about the other local coun	ncil members, would y	ou elect them?	
1) Yes	35.7	33.5	39.5
2) No	42.7	46.0	36.7
3) Don't Know/ No Opinion	21.6	20.4	23.8

- 21) In recent months, newspapers published news stories regarding different plans for a permanent Palestinian-Israeli settlement. The following six items constituted one such plan:
  - 1. The establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with the right to self defense, but with restrictions on its armaments, and within 95% of the West Bank and the whole Gaza Strip.
  - 2. Mutual border adjustments are to take place whereby Israel annexes 5% of the West Bank in areas where there are settlements blocs and, in return, the Palestinian state would receive an equal area of territory from Israel.
  - 3. The remaining settlers inside the Palestinian state would live as individuals under Palestinian sovereignty and law.
  - 4. The refugees would have the right to return to the Palestinian state only, but a small agreed upon number would be allowed to return to Israel. Those not returning to Israel would be compensated for properties lost in 1948 and for material and non-material damages done to them. They are also rehabilitated. The Palestinian insistence on the right of return, as a principle, would not be given up.

- 5. Israeli forces withdraws from the territories of the Palestinian state, but a limited and agreed upon number of Israeli forces remains deployed in specified locations for a limited period of time. Joint Palestinian-Israeli patrols are allowed along the Jordan River.
- 6. Jerusalem becomes an open city to all the citizens of the Palestinian state, but it remains united under Israeli control, and the question of sovereignty over East Jerusalem remains suspended awaiting conclusion of negotiations in a special committee. The boundaries of the municipality of Jerusalem are expanded to include additional new Arab and Jewish areas, and a Palestinian municipality is established in the Arab neighborhoods of Eastern Jerusalem and is connected to the Palestinian authorities administratively, functionally and in security matters. This is done with the understanding that the Arab neighborhoods would revert later to Palestinian sovereignty. Meanwhile, a Palestinian capital is established within the expanded municipal boundaries but outside the current municipal boundaries. Islamic and Christian holy places are placed under Palestinian sovereignty.

If this plan as a whole was offered as perman-	ent settlement, wou	ıld you support or	oppose it?
1) Strongly support	04.7	05.1	04.0
2) Support	37.9	35.9	40.9
3) Oppose	39.7	40.0	39.3
4) Strongly Oppose	12.7	13.4	11.7
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	05.0	05.6	04.0
22. How would you view these items of the pla	an?		
22-1 Item No.(1) (Palestinian state on 95% of	West Bank and the	whole Gaza Strip)	
1) Strongly support	09.6	08.0	12.2
2) Support	42.0	42.2	41.7
3) Oppose	30.7	30.0	31.6
4) Strongly oppose	14.2	15.5	12.2
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	03.6	04.3	02.4
22-2 Item No.(2) (exchange of 5% of land)			
1) Support strongly	02.6	02.5	02.9
2) Support	28.9	27.6	31.0
3) Oppose	44.5	44.6	44.4
4) Strongly oppose	18.8	19.6	17.5
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	05.1	05.8	04.1
22-3 Item No.(3) (remaining settlers)			
1) Strongly support	05.2	05.0	05.7
2) Support	42.4	47.8	33.7
3) Oppose	32.5	28.5	38.8
4) Strongly oppose	16.4	14.5	19.5
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	03.5	04.2	02.4
22-4 Item No.(4) (Refugees and right of return	)		
1) Strongly Support	07.2	05.9	09.2
2) Support	47.3	44.9	51.1
3) Oppose	29.5	31.9	25.5
4) Strongly oppose	12.0	12.7	10.8
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	04.1	04.6	03.3
22-5 Item No.(5) (Israeli withdrawal and joint	patrols)		
1) Strongly Support	03.7	03.8	03.5
2) Support	38.6	37.8	39.8
3) Oppose	37.9	37.3	38.8
4) Strongly oppose	14.9	14.7	01.4
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	04.9	06.4	02.6
22-6 Item No.(6) (Jerusalem and the sovereign	ty question)		
1) Strongly Support	03.9	03.6	04.3

2) Support	23.5	21.0	27.3
3) Oppose	36.7	36.9	36.3
4) Strongly oppose	31.6	33.5	28.5
5) Don't Know/ No Opinion	04.4	05.0	03.5