Joint Palestinian-Israeli Surveys on Trust and the Peace Process:

Combined Report

May 2021
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These are the results of two Palestinian-Israeli joint surveys on trust and the peace process: A Joint Poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the MACRO center in Tel Aviv and with funding from the European Union (EU) in October 2020 and an earlier (August 2020) joint poll on the peace process, the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, conducted by PSR and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management at Tel Aviv University with funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP.

This combined report contains a summary, the Palestinian report, and the Israeli report. The reports are divided into four sections. The first section describes the methodology of the joint research. The second section examines the relationship between two variables: trust and support for peace. In this section, support for peace is treated as the dependent variable and trust is treated as the independent variable. Two composite indicators, each developed from the findings of various related questions designed for that purpose, are explored here. The section also highlights findings based on demographic variables, particularly age, in order to understand the attitudes of the youth. The third section describes the findings regarding three components that are believed to influence the level of trust in both societies: (1) daily life hardships, (2) exposure to violence, and (3) perception of education. Here too we use the data to build a quantitative composite indicator for each of these suspected sources of distrust. The section examines the relationship between the three components and trust in which these elements are treated as independent variables and trust as a dependent variable. The fourth section serves as a conclusion with policy implications driven by the findings.
(1) Methodology:

The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 12-26 August, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic 12 August and 3 September 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.

The joint poll on trust and the peace process: The Palestinian sample size was 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 29 October to 1 November, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 1201 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic on 12 August and 3 November 2020. The number of Jews interviewed is 1020 (of which 272 were youth) and Israeli Arabs 181 (of which 50 were youth). The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%.
Summary Report of the Joint Palestinian-Israeli Findings

This summary describe the Palestinian-Israeli findings of two joint surveys on trust and the peace process: A Joint Poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the MACRO center in Tel Aviv and with funding from the European Union (EU) in October and November 2020 and an earlier (August 2020) joint poll on the peace process, the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, conducted by PSR and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management at Tel Aviv University with funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP.

The summary is divided into four sections and a summary. The first section describes the hypothesis and methodology of the joint research. The second section describes our findings regarding support for peace and the relationship between two variables: trust and support for peace. In this section, support for peace is treated as the dependent variable and trust is treated as the independent variable. The section also highlights findings based on demographic variables, particularly age, in order to understand the attitudes of the youth.

The third section describes the findings regarding trust and the three components that are believed to influence the level of trust in both societies: (1) daily life hardships, (2) exposure to violence, and (3) perception of education on the other side. Here too we use the data to build a quantitative composite indicator for each of these suspected sources of distrust. The section examines the relationship between the three components and trust in which these elements are treated as independent variables and trust as a dependent variable. The fourth and fifth sections serve as a conclusion and policy recommendations driven by the findings.

(1) Hypothesis and Methodology

Part of a larger joint empirical research on mapping the sources of distrust in Palestinian-Israeli relations, this survey research has been guided by a basic hypothesis that public support for peace and compromise is influenced by the level of mutual trust prevailing in the two communities. Furthermore, the hypothesis identified three possible sources of mutual distrust: daily harsh life experience, exposure to violence and conflict, and negative perception of the educational system on the other side.

The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, August 2020: The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 12-26 August, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic 12 August and 3 September 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups.
in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.

The joint poll on trust and the peace process, October-November 2020: The Palestinian sample size was 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 29 October to 1 November, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 1201 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic on 12 August and 3 November 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%.

The questionnaire questions have been divided to different themes. Several questions assessed the extent of trust towards the other side and its leadership. Others questions measured experiences of violence related to the conflict and separately exposure to violence and conflict related incidences. As follows, we built different groups of questions, which when combined, helped us assess the impact of these main factors on trust and support of peace. The questions also examined the two sides perception of the educational system on the other side. In addition, we constructed a series of scales and indicators that measured the various variables of the study as well as psychological perception that respondents hold towards the conflict and the other side.

Main Findings

Israeli and Palestinian Support for Peace.

Our most unequivocal finding shows that trust is the most important predictor of support in the peace process among respondents from both sides.

On the Israeli side, we found additional socio-psychological variables such as ethos and stereotyping, which indicated that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he holds regarding Palestinians, the more he/she supports the peace process.

Another interesting and important finding regarding the Jewish sample was found while comparing the older and younger respondents. It reveals that in all the indices of the socio-psychological repertoire, younger Israeli Jews more commonly hold right wing political views compared to older Israeli Jews regarding Palestinians and the conflict. Specifically, younger Israeli Jews have less trust towards Palestinians, adhere more to beliefs of ethos of conflict, hold a stronger negative stereotype of Palestinians, tend more to delegitimize them, are less interested in initiating contact with a Palestinian, express somewhat stronger negative emotions towards Palestinians and express stronger opposition regarding the two-state solution than older Jews.
Among the Palestinians, we asked about support for the concept and details of the two-state solution. But peace has also been defined in term of support and opposition to an agreement based on many associated compromises as well as expression of attitudes consistent with that solution. For example, we examined attitudes regarding related topics: violence vs. diplomacy and perceptions of the other and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does. We also probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. These and other relevant questions informed our peace indicator building. The indicator of peace, has three levels: high, medium, and low. The peace indicators’ building exercise showed that support for peace is predominantly low in the two joint polls, but most significantly in the October poll, when an expanded set of 13 questions were used to build this peace indicator while only four were used to build the August indicator.

While Palestinian support for the concept of the two-state solution stood at 43% in August, in October, the question was modified with respondents having the option of selecting a middle position: neither support nor oppose. In this case, support stood at 25% only and opposition at 63%; 11% selected the middle position. Additionally, in August 2020, 18% of the Palestinians agreed that most Israeli Jews want peace, a significant decrease from 39% in June 2018 and much less than our findings in June 2017 when 44% of Palestinians gave this response. More than three quarters (76%) expressed the view that they do not think most Israeli Jews want peace. In October, the question allowed for a middle choice: “neither agree nor disagree.” In this version of the question, only 10% agreed with the statement that Israeli Jews want peace, 78% disagreed, and 10% selected the middle choice.

Palestinian support for peace is influenced by age. Youth, in our October poll, between the ages of 18 and 29, tend to show greater low support for peace (81%) compared to those whose age is 30 and above (72%). The gap based on age is lower according to our August poll (50% and 48% respectively).

When linking support for peace with trust level, strong positive correlation emerges: the higher the trust, the higher the support for peace and the lower the trust, the lower the support for peace. For example, with a high level of trust, support for peace in our August joint poll stood at 42% compared to only 24% when trust was low and 30% when trust was medium. While only 29% of those with high level of trust opposed peace, this percentage increases when trust is medium and low (48% and 50% respectively). These findings are confirmed in our joint October poll. Here too, a high level of trust (relying on the combined trust indicator #3) increased support for peace to 48%, medium level of trust reduced support for peace to 23%, and low level of trust reduced support for peace further to only 4%. Similarly, only 13% of those with high levels of trust opposed peace, 44% with medium level of trust opposed peace, and an overwhelming majority of 80% of those with low level of trust opposed peace.

Israeli and Palestinian Distrust:

In this section we explore mutual distrust and its sources.
On the Israeli side, the results indicate a low level of trust towards Palestinians, expressed by the Jewish samples. However, Israeli Arabs expressed somewhat a higher level of trust towards Palestinians. Both groups did not differentiate significantly in trust towards Palestinians in general and towards their leaders. The results of the Jewish sample in the survey study 2 show that most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the “Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews”.

Our hypothesis stated that (1) daily harsh life experience, (2) exposure to violence and conflict, and (3) negative perception of the other side’s educational system, contribute to diminished trust in the other side and that (4) the greater the trust, the greater the support for the peace process. The proposed hypotheses were partially confirmed. The findings of our research among the Israelis mildly support hypotheses 1-3, but provide very strong support of hypothesis 4. Among the Palestinians, the correlation for all three elements of the hypothesis were stronger than among the Israelis. The results for the entire Israeli Jewish sample as well as for older and younger Israeli Jews separately showed unequivocally that socio-psychological variables that represent the socio-psychological repertoire of the participants determine the levels of trust to a large extent.

The results indicate that Jewish respondents reported low levels of experienced violence related to the conflict. However, exposure to violence- through hearing or seeing it on media, shows a relative high level of exposure among Jewish respondents.

Israeli Jews tend to think that Israeli teachers present the Palestinians neither negatively nor positively. Also, not surprisingly, Israeli Arab respondents think that Israeli teachers portray Palestinians in a more negative manner. Regarding the way Jews are portrayed in the Palestinian educational system, the results showed that Israeli Jews believe it presents Israeli Jews negatively (between very negatively and negatively).

Israeli Jews: When we look at the effect of the psychological variables in the second major study, we find that the most important determinant of distrust is the negative stereotyping that Israeli Jews hold towards Palestinians. Viewing Palestinians as violent and hostile leads to high levels of distrust. Experiences of violence then serves as reinforcement of such believes rather than a main cause of distrust. The second most influencing variable on trust, is open mindedness. That is, closed minded individuals who are not ready to explore and exchange information with Palestinians also tend to distrust them. The next contributor to distrust is related to extreme negative stereotyping—i.e., delegitimization of Palestinians. Meaning that many respondents mentally deny Palestinians of their humanity, viewing them as an excluded group. The delegitimization variable appeared as the third most dominant factor in determining distrust among the Israeli Jewish population and the younger Israeli Jewish population. Among the older Jewish population, the third strongest determinant of distrust is political orientation, meaning the more right-wing a person is, the less trust he/she has towards Palestinians. Among Israeli Jews in general, only after political orientation comes the variable of exposure to violence and conflict, indicating that the more a person was exposed to conflict violence the less trust he has towards
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Palestinians. Then comes the variable of perception of the Palestinian educational system, indicating that the more this system is perceived as presenting Israelis negatively, the less trust Jews have towards Palestinians. Finally, comes ethos of conflict, age, and negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers in the Israeli schools- All significantly predict lack of trust.

Israel Arabs: The analyses of Israeli Arabs’ respondents reveal a different tale. Examining the entire sample indicates that the most important predictor of distrust is the influence of the Palestinian media, meaning that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust, the respondents feel of trust in Palestinians increases. In addition, there are the following predictors: views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, stereotyping of the Palestinians, political orientation, openness, negative presentation of Palestinians by Israeli teachers in Israeli schools and importance of religion.

Among the Palestinians, findings of our two joint surveys indicate that the levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. A solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. For trust, the building of the indicator went through three steps: the first step was to build an indicator based on measuring direct questions about willingness to trust the other side. The second step was based on a set of indirect questions about trust. In the third step, we combined the two indicators into one. Findings show mostly low levels of trust for all three trust indicators, but more so in October. A large set of questions (15 direct and indirect questions) was used to build the October trust indicator while only five direct and indirect questions were used to build the August indicator.

In examining trust, we also asked more detailed questions about the potential antecedents of (mis)trust and how various social actors contribute to it. The answers to three sets of questions regarding the other side's perceptions and actions are strong potential antecedents of distrust: Palestinians believe that the other side does not want peace and that the other side’s education system is biased against them. Naturally, all of these perceptions could contribute to low levels of trust.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side:” 74% of Palestinians in August 2020 agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

When asked why they do not trust the other side, Palestinians focused on the political goals of Israeli Jews (42%) and on their religion and culture (24%). Other factors picked by Palestinians were the Israeli leadership (16%), negative personal experiences (10%), and incitement in the Israeli educational system (5%).

We examined the extent to which Palestinians believe that different social actors help foster or diminish trust among the two peoples. In our August poll, a vast majority of 78% thought that the “current Israeli leadership,” diminishes trust. In our October joint poll, 86% said the Israeli leadership diminishes trust and only 3% said it increases trust; 9% said it neither strengthens nor diminishes trust. When looking at the “current Palestinian leadership in the West Bank,” 34% of
Palestinian respondents in August thought it diminishes trust, 32% thought it neither diminishes or fosters trust, and 27% thought it fosters trust.

When asked about the role of Israeli and Palestinian press, 67% of Palestinians believed in the August joint poll and the 74% in the October joint poll that Israeli press diminishes trust, whereas 39% thought the same about the Palestinian press in August and 54% on October. Relating to the Israeli and Palestinian school curriculum, 67% of Palestinians believed in August and 73%% in October that the Israeli curriculum diminishes trust, whereas 33% in August and 47% in October believed the same about the Palestinian curriculum. Finally, when asking about Israeli and Palestinian social media, 44% of Palestinians in August and 55% in October said Palestinian social media diminishes trust, whereas 67% in August and 72% in October thought the same about Israeli social media.

Following the difficult reality of this protracted conflict, we examined the conflict-related experiences of the Palestinians and the impact of such experiences on the willingness to trust the other side. Findings show very low level of trust, reflecting the high levels of violence and hardships in the conflict and its negative psychological impact. We examined Palestinian findings regarding the three variables covered in our two joint surveys: (1) daily life hardships, (2) exposure to violence, and (3) perception of education.

The indicators’ building exercise produced the following findings: the hardships indicator was found relatively high in the August poll and relatively low in the October poll. Exposure to violence was mostly low in August and high in October, but the negative perception of education on the other side was predominantly high in both polls. Using these three indicators the findings from the August poll shows a somewhat limited correlation between trust and hardships and exposure to violence and strong correlation between trust and perception of education. These findings among the Palestinians are consistent with the research hypothesis in which these three elements contribute to greater levels of distrust in the other side:

1. A high level of hardship did produce a low level of trust standing at 78% while a low level of hardship produced a low level of trust standing at 74%; the higher the level of hardships, the higher the level of distrust.

2. Similarly, a high level of exposure to violence produced a low level of trust standing at 81% while a low level of exposure to violence produced a low level of trust standing at 75%; the higher the level of exposure to violence, the higher the level of distrust.

3. Finally, a negative indicator of perception of education produced a low level of trust standing at 80% while a positive indicator of perception of education produced a low level of trust standing at 60%; the more negative the perception of education, the more likely the level of distrust would be higher.

These findings among the Palestinians are confirmed in our joint October poll. Here too, a high level of hardships increases low trust to 89% while a low level of hardships reduces low trust to 80%. Similarly, a high exposure to violence increases low trust to 87% while a low a low level of exposure to violence reduces low trust to 79%. Finally, a negative perception of the Israeli
educational system increases low trust to 86% while a positive perception of that educational system reduces low trust to 73%.

Conclusions

The present study unveils the roots of distrust in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study shows that although exposure to violence related to the conflict, experience of violence and hardships, and negative perceptions of the educational system of the other side have clear effect on trust, particularly among the Palestinians who live under the harsh reality of military occupation, other sources, particularly among the Israelis, are also relevant, including socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that Israeli Jews are carrying. This repertoire includes beliefs, attitudes and emotions. These beliefs and attitudes of the conflict take the form of stereotypes and ethos of conflict and among Israeli Jews concerns about antisemitism and the holocaust. They lead also to cognitive closure, reflected in refusal to acquire information from the other side. It functions as an interpretive framework, influencing evaluations, judgments, predictions and conclusions drawn by both sides. This repertoire is the key determinant of trust.

What should be of great concern is the well-established findings showing that this repertoire is acquired at the very early age. This is unavoidable, as children learn this repertoire from all agents of socialization, including parents, leaders, television, literature, teachers, social media and schoolbooks. The beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict learned by children at an early age remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. Eventually, they could pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

Recommendations

Living under military occupation, Palestinians experience hardships and exposure to violence on daily basis. We suggest that these are some of the reasons for such strong distrust of Israeli Jews. On the Israeli Jewish side, some of these reasons also lies in the cultural-societal-political climate of the Israeli society, as reflected in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies. On the Palestinian side, changing the reality on the ground and restoring hope for peace and the two-state solution is essential for restoring some level of trust. On the Israeli Jewish side, a major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. On both sides, conflict supporting narratives need to be addressed before any trust can be restored.

1. Change the new reality on the ground: For Palestinians, the reality on the ground worsen by the day as land is confiscated, homes demolished, movement and access restricted, and settlers’ violence increases. The siege and blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip and the frequent eruption of massive violence and destruction of civilian infrastructure make
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the Strip a big prison for the two million Palestinians living in it. Israelis too, but particularly those who live in the south suffer the occasional barrages of rockets from the Gaza Strip while settlers who live in the occupied West Bank, face occasional violence and rock throwing. Although Palestinian and Israeli authorities coordinate with each other on essential civil and security matters, no dialogue takes place on how to ease daily living conditions, stop the building of settlements, or eradicate violence. To be effective in reducing distrust and hate, coordination between the two sides need to cover all these additional areas of daily friction and difficulties and search for ways to deliver security to both sides. It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation.

2. **Stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing:** Various formal and informal sources in Israel, present the Palestinian school textbooks, teachers, mass media and the leaders as inciting against Israel, Zionism (Jewish Nationalism) and as being anti-Semitic. This practice can be found also on the Palestinian side. It is exaggerated and augmented serving the struggle between the two contradicting and rival narratives.

3. **Contact between People:** Contact between members of the two societies is one of the most researched methods to change beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in order to improve the relations between them.

4. **Use of mass media:** Mass media is one of the most powerful agents that provides information and shapes public opinion. Mass media should stop presenting the other side in negative way and develop peace journalism. It can supply major information about the other group; it can supply major information about the culture of the other- with films, theatrical plays, or entertainment programs; it can enlighten in a balance way, the eruption of the conflict, its major events and costs that have been paid for continuation of the conflict.

5. **Education:** In the long run, education constitutes one of the most important methods for eradicating distrust. This method involves using the school system since this system is often the only institution of which the society can make wide scope use to change the psychological repertoire of society members. Education for building trust must begin at an early age and continue through the years of schooling. Also, it is possible to a establish joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to examine existing textbooks and curricula to eliminate any derogative expressions.

6. **Joint Projects:** Joint projects of various kinds, but particularly those that are less sensitive, can serve as a method for building trust. They can be in different areas such as health, agriculture, or science. Joint projects can foster links between members of the two groups at different levels of society, such as elites, professionals, as well as grass roots. This method provides opportunities for personal encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations.
Role of education, daily life experiences, and exposure to violence

PALESTINIAN REPORT

MAPPING SOURCES OF MUTUAL DISTRST IN PALESTINIAN-ISRELI RELATIONS:

(2) Trust and support for the peace process

In this section, we highlight the findings regarding attitudes on the peace process and the level of prevailing trust on the other side:

The Peace Process: In the August and October surveys, we asked about support for the two-state solution: 43% of Palestinians supported the concept of the two-state solution in August; 56% were opposed. In October, the question was modified with respondents having the option of selecting a middle position: neither support nor oppose. In this case, support stood at 25% only and opposition at 63%; 11% selected the middle position. In both cases, only the general principle was provided. As seen in Figure (1), Palestinian support has varied during the past five years: it fell from June to December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two-state solution in principle, rose to 52% in June 2017, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline in July 2018 and in September 2020.

Figure (1): Support for the concept of the two-state solution among Palestinians (2016-20)

In addition to attitudes regarding the two-state solution, we examined attitudes regarding a related topic: violence vs. diplomacy. In August and October, we asked Palestinians about four possible options regarding what should happen next in Palestinian-Israeli relations. The August findings
showed a significant difference between West Bankers and Gazans: West Bankers preferred to “reach a peace agreement” with the other side (49%). But the preference for this outcome declined to 13% among Gazans. Total Palestinian preference for a peace agreement stood at 34%. In October, only 29% of Palestinians selected the option of reaching a peace agreement: 37% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip.

Overall Palestinian preference for a second option, “waging an armed struggle,” stood at 37% (26% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip). In October, this option received similar support among Palestinians (35%). “Waging an unarmed resistance,” was chosen by 10% of the Palestinians in August, and 12% in October. Finally, in August, 13% of the Palestinians chose “maintain the status quo.” The October findings show a little increase in favor of the status quo to 18%. Also in October, in an answer to a question regarding the view that only “armed struggle” can end the occupation, 63% expressed agreement with that view; only 23% disagreed.

Trust: Findings of our two joint surveys indicate that the levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (90% - almost identical to a June 2018 finding), see figure (2) below.

When asked why they do not trust the other side, Palestinians focused on the political goals of Israeli Jews (42%) and on their religion and culture (24%). Other factors picked by Palestinians were the Israeli leadership (16%), negative personal experiences (10%), and incitement in the Israeli educational system (5%).

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 74% of Palestinians (compared to 71% in July 2018) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Figure (2): Palestinian perceptions of the other, 2017-2020

We asked Palestinian respondents about perceptions of the other and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side. We probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. The overall findings show a marked decline in perceptions of the other side’s commitment to peace and in the level of trust. We asked more
detailed questions about the potential antecedents of (mis)trust and how various social actors contribute to it. These assessments were already majority negative in our joint Palestinian-Israeli 2016-2018 polling series, but in 2020, mutual perceptions have sunk even lower.

In August 2020, 18% of the Palestinians agreed that most Israeli Jews want peace, a significant decrease from 39% in June 2018 and much less than our findings in June 2017 when 44% of Palestinians gave this response. More than three quarters (76%) expressed the view that they do not think most Israeli Jews want peace. In October, the question allowed for a middle choice: “neither agree nor disagree.” In this version of the question, only 10% agreed with the statement that Israeli Jews want peace, 78% disagreed, and 10% selected the middle choice.

When asked in October about the significance of Israeli continued settlement construction, an overwhelming majority of 87% said it clearly demonstrate that Israel’s goal is to perpetuate its control over the Palestinians. A similar percentage, 83%, said that Israel’s rejection of Palestinian peace efforts is a proof that its ultimate goal is to expel the Palestinians from their homeland. When asked to speculate about Israel’s long-term aspirations, 59% said in October that it wants to extend its state to cover the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel the Palestinians. Another 25% said it want to annex the Palestinian territories and deny the Palestinians their rights. Also in October, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (91%) thought that if a peace agreement is reached, Israel will not respect it; only 3% believed Israel would implement its commitment under such a peace agreement.

The answers to these and many other sets of questions regarding the other side's perceptions and actions are strong potential antecedents of mistrust: Palestinians believe that the other side does not want peace and that the other side’s education system is biased against them. Naturally, all of these perceptions could contribute to low levels of trust.

**Building peace and trust indicators:** For the analysis in this section, we have developed quantitative indicators for the two variables, trust and peace. For trust, the building of the indicator went through three steps: the first step was to build an indicator based on measuring direct questions about willingness to trust the other side. The second step was based on a set of indirect questions about trust. In the third step, we combined the two indicators into one. Although we have tested all three, the one based on the combined measures has been used throughout this report. As for our main dependent variable, support for peace, only one indicator has been developed. Peace is defined in term of an agreement based on a two-state solution and associated compromises as well as expression of attitudes consistent with that solution. For the indicators of peace and trust, three levels were developed: high, medium, and low, see the following box for details on the building of the two indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Indicator, October 2020:</th>
<th>Peace Indicator, August 2020:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>October 2020</strong> indicator for peace has three levels, assuming the following values:</td>
<td>The <strong>August 2020</strong> indicator for peace has three levels, assuming the following values:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low:</strong> from less than 0 to 0.39</td>
<td><strong>Low:</strong> from less than 0 to 0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The indicator represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 13 variables:

1. The solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution
2. Role of armed struggle in ending the occupation
3. Palestinians and Israelis are just as much victims of the conflict as the other side
4. The Palestinian need for a state does not contradict the right of the Jews for their own state
5. It is possible to find among the Jews/Palestinians a moderate segment that wants to end the conflict.
6. Views on the long-term aspirations of Israel
7. If Palestinians reject the two-state solution, they risk coming under Israeli sovereignty but without having equal rights to Israeli Jews.
8. Preference for what should happen next in Israeli-Palestinian relations
9. Beliefs regarding the preferences of the Israelis on what should happen next
10. Willingness to exchange views and information with Israeli sources regarding the conflict
11. Readiness to hear Israeli sources and receive new information about the conflict
12. Having a friend on the other side
13. Wanting to have an Israeli friend

The indicator represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 4 variables:

1. The solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution
2. A detailed peace package that addresses all aspects of the conflict
3. Belief in the zero sum dynamics: nothing can be done that’s good for both sides, whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side
4. The belief that the conflict can be resolved peacefully

Trust Indicator, October 2020

The October 2020 poll has three trust indicators and each has three levels, assuming the following values:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low: from less than 0 to 0.14</th>
<th>The August 2020 poll has three trust indicators, trust #1 indicator has two level while the others have three levels.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medium: from 0.15 to 0.49</td>
<td>Indicator #1 had two values: assuming the following values:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High: from 0.50 to 1.2</td>
<td>Low: from 0.0 to less than 0.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>High: from 0.80 to 1.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indicators #1 and #2 assume three values:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low: from less than 0 to 0.14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium: from 0.15 to 0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: from 0.50 to 1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trust indicator #1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Trust indicator #1</strong> represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following single variable; representing a direct question about perception of trust:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>represented the average sum of</td>
<td>1. Possibility of trusting Israeli Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support/opposition, agree/disagree</td>
<td>2. Possibility to trust Israeli leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variables; all representing direct questions about perception of trust:</td>
<td>3. View on possibility for Palestinian and Israeli Jews to build trustful relationship in principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Possibility of trusting Israeli Jews</td>
<td><strong>Trust indicator #2</strong> represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 4 variables; all representing indirect questions about trust:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Possibility to trust Israeli leaders</td>
<td>1. Belief in the peaceful intentions of Jews/Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. View on possibility for Palestinian and Israeli Jews to build trustful relationship in principle</td>
<td>2. Belief there is a partner on the other side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Belief regarding Israelis’ willingness to accept the existence of a Palestinian state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Belief regarding Israelis willingness to honor commitments in peace agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trust indicator #2** represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 3 variables; all representing direct questions about perception of trust:

1. Possibility of trusting Israeli Jews
2. Possibility to trust Israeli leaders
3. View on possibility for Palestinian and Israeli Jews to build trustful relationship in principle
Trust indicator #3 represented the average sum of indicators #1 and #2, representing the direct and indirect questions about perception of trust.

The indicators’ building exercise produced the following findings. As figure (3) below indicates, support for peace (peace indicator) is predominantly low in the two joint polls, but most significantly in the October poll, when an expanded set of 13 questions were used to build this peace indicator while only four were used to build the August indicator.

**Figure (3): Level of support for peace: three levels, two joint polls (August and October 2020)**

Support for peace is influenced by age. Findings from our October poll, as shown in figure (4) below, show that youth between the ages of 18 and 29 tend to show greater low support for peace (81%) compared to those whose age is 30 and above (72%). The gap based on age is lower according to our August poll (50% and 48% respectively).
Figure (4): Level of support for peace: three levels, two joint polls (August and October 2020), based on age groups

Similar findings are obtained when looking at the trust indicator. Here too, a larger set of questions (15 direct and indirect questions) was used to build the October trust indicator while only five direct and indirect questions were used to build the August indicator. As figure (5) below indicates, findings show mostly low levels of trust for all three trust indicators, but more so in October and in trust indicator #3 (the combined trust indicator).

Figure (5): Three levels of trust, two joint poll (August and October 2020)
Although the youth did not show in August lower levels of trust than the older age group, indeed showed slightly lower distrust, 73% and 79% respectively, our October findings did show the opposite, as shown in figure (6) below. The youth distrust, in Israeli Jews stood at 87% compared to 83% among the older group. In both cases, the combined trust indicator (#3) was used.

Figure (6): **Three levels of trust #3, two joint poll (August and October 2020), by age group**

Correlating support for peace with trust level: Using the indicators described above, the following figure (7), from the August 2020 poll, shows strong positive correlation between trust and support for the peace process: the higher the trust, the higher the support for peace and the lower the trust, the lower the support for peace. For example, with a high level of trust, support for peace stood at 42% compared to only 24% when trust was low and 30% when trust was medium. While only 29% of those with high level of trust opposed peace, this percentage increases when trust is medium and low (48% and 50% respectively).

Figure (7): **Relationship between trust and support for peace (August 2020)**
These findings are confirmed in our joint October poll, as shown in figure (8) below). Here too, a high level of trust (relying on the combined trust indicator #3) increased support for peace to 48%, medium level of trust reduced support for peace to 23%, and low level of trust reduced support for peace further to only 4%. Similarly, only 13% of those with high levels of trust opposed peace, 44% with medium level of trust opposed peace, and an overwhelming majority of 80% of those with low level of trust opposed peace.

Figure (8): Support for peace correlated by level of trust (October 2020)

These basic findings are confirmed, in our October poll, when using the other two trust indicators, as can be seen in table (1) below. Trust indicator #1 shows that the highest level of support for peace (42%) is found when trust level is at its highest and the lowest level of support for peace (5%) is found when trust level is at its lowest. Similarly, trust indicator #2 shows that the highest level of support for peace (55%) is found with the highest level of trust and the lowest level of support for peace (4%) is found when trust level is its lowest.

Table (1): Three indicators of Palestinian trust in Israeli Jews correlated with support for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, October 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Indicator</th>
<th>Trust Indicator #3</th>
<th>Trust Indicator #1</th>
<th>Trust Indicator #2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low trust</td>
<td>medium trust</td>
<td>High trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low support</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium support</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High support</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trust and different social actors: We examined the extent to which Palestinians believe that different social actors help foster or diminish trust among the two peoples. In our August poll, as indicated below in figure (9), a vast majority of 78% think that the “current Israeli leadership,” of prime minister Netanyahu and his Likud party, diminishes trust. In our October joint poll, 86% said the Israeli leadership diminishes trust and only 3% said it increases trust; 9% said it neither strengthens nor diminishes trust. When looking at the “current Palestinian leadership in the West Bank,” 34% of Palestinian respondents in August thought it diminishes trust, 32% thought it neither diminishes or fosters trust, and 27% thought it fosters trust. In October, the belief that the Palestinian leadership diminishes trust jumped to 58% and the belief that it fosters trust dropped by more than half to 12%.

Figure (9): Palestinian perception of the role of their own political leadership and that of the other side on fostering or diminishing trust (August and October 2020)

When asking about the role of Israeli and Palestinian press, 67% of Palestinians believed in the August joint poll and the 74% in the October joint poll that Israeli press diminishes trust, whereas 39% thought the same about the Palestinian press in August and 54% on October. Relating to the Israeli and Palestinian school curriculum, 67% of Palestinians believed in August and 73% in October that the Israeli curriculum diminishes trust, whereas 33% in August and 47% in October believed the same about the Palestinian curriculum. Finally, when asking about Israeli and Palestinian social media, 44% of Palestinians in August and 55% in October said Palestinian social media diminishes trust, whereas 67% in August and 72% in October thought the same about Israeli social media.

(3) Sources of Mutual Distrust:

Following the difficult reality of this protracted conflict, we examined the conflict-related experiences of both parties and the impact of such experiences on the willingness to trust the other side. Findings show very low level of trust, reflecting the high levels of violence and hardships in the conflict and its negative psychological impact. In this section, we describe the Palestinian findings regarding the three variables covered in our two joint surveys: (1) daily life
hardships, (2) exposure to violence, and (3) perception of education. It describes the method used to indicators for the three elements. These variables are believed to significantly contribute to the generation of mutual Palestinian-Israeli distrust.

*Findings of the August and October joint polls:* In our August joint poll, a majority (61%) among Palestinian participants said they have never participated in a violent political incidents or demonstrations. While 65% of respondents aged 18-34 replied so, the proportion among people older than 55 was lower (53%). However, when asked about participation of a close family member in such incidents, 53% responded positively. Similarly, 60% reported that they have never been hurt in violent incident related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but 61% said a close family member has been hurt once (22%) or more than once (39%). Here again, a meaningful gap was found between younger respondents aged 18-34 who reported never being hurt (67%) and older ones aged 55 and more (51%). A majority of Palestinian respondents (59%) said they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict once (20%) or more than once (39%). The proportions of those who have witnessed conflict-related casualties rose from 43% among the youngest group (18-24) to 65% among the oldest group (55+). When we asked Palestinians whether they have been detained for a long time on an Israeli checkpoint, 25% responded ‘never’, 35% responded positively, and 40% (all Gazans) said the question does not apply for them.

Our October joint poll showed similar results. A majority of 69% among Palestinian participants said they have never participated in a violent political incidents or demonstrations while 31% said they participated in few or many times. When asked about participation of a close family member in such incidents, 42% responded positively. When asked about the number of family members or friends killed in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 43% said none, 18% said one, and 39% said two or more were killed. An overwhelming majority (96%) said they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict either with their own eyes or when watching TV. When asked whether they have been detained or delayed for a long time on an Israeli checkpoint, 56% responded ‘never’, 30% responded positively. Among Gazans, 35% said the question does not apply for them. When asked about being prevented from traveling abroad, 69% said “never,” 14% responded positively; and 17% (mostly Gazans) said the question does not apply to them.

These findings indicate that living in a society that has experienced violent conflict for so long, the chances that individuals will have participated in the conflict as actors or victims increases over the years. Moreover, very large segments of Palestinian society experience the harshest consequences of the conflict directly or indirectly, which likely leaves an imprint on their conflict-related attitudes, most importantly the willingness to trust the other side.

The August 2020 joint poll examined also the levels of fear and worry among the Palestinians. Most (58%) expressed worry and fear that they or a member of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished or that they would be expelled or prevented from reaching their land behind the separation barrier or wall; 40% are not worried.
Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 81% indicated that it is worried or very much worried about the future of the Palestinian people.

The October 2020 joint poll found that 60% were worried that they or a member of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished or that they would be expelled or prevented from reaching their land behind the separation barrier or wall; 32% were not worried or where worried a little. As in the August poll, an overwhelming majority of 74% indicated that it is worried or very much worried about the future of the Palestinian people.

The August poll also examined which view of the other Palestinians think that their own education system and that of the other side promotes. When thinking about their own education system, 37% of Palestinians said it calls for seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels, with some interesting variations according to age: While 33% of people 55 and older replied so, the proportion among respondents aged 18-34 was 42%. Looking at the Palestinian sample as whole, 31% thought their education system is indifferent to Israelis, and 16% said it calls for seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights. When thinking about the education system of the other side, the answers were dramatically different: 72% of Palestinians said it calls for seeing the other group negatively.

The October poll findings were similar to those of the August poll showing that when thinking about their own experience with the Palestinian education system, 53% said it calls for seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels; 24% thought their education system is indifferent to Israelis, and 13% said it calls for seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights. When asked about the entire educational system of the other side, 71% said it views the Palestinians through negative stereotypes and labels; 13% said it views the Palestinians indifferently, and only 8% said it views the Palestinians positively as fellow human beings. When thinking about the curriculum in the education system of the other side, 79% said it calls for seeing the Palestinians negatively.

**Building indicators for hardships, exposure to violence, and education:** For the analysis in this section, we have developed quantitative indicators for the three variables believed to generate distrust, hardships, exposure to violence, and negative perception of education on the other side. For all variables, the indicators have three levels: high, medium, and low, see the following box for details on the building of the three indicators based on the findings of the two joint polls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of daily life hardships, October 2020</th>
<th>Indicator of daily life hardships, August 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The <em>October</em> 2020 indicator for measuring daily life has three levels, assuming the following values:</td>
<td>The <em>August</em> 2020 indicator for measuring daily life hardships has three levels, assuming the following values:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Indicator of exposure to violence, October 2020

The October 2020 indicator for measuring exposure to violence has three levels, assuming the following values:

- **Low**: from less than 0 to 0.39
- **Medium**: from 0.40 to 0.59
- **High**: from 0.60 to 1.2

The indicator represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 5 variables:

1. Worried about one’s own and family’s safety, or being expelled, or lose land or have my home demolished, or being prevented from reaching my land beyond the wall or separation barrier
2. Am worried about the future of the Palestinian people
3. Feeling of loss of hope for a better future
4. Experiencing detention for a long time at Israeli checkpoints
5. Could not reach my land beyond the separation wall or barrier
6. Denied from leaving Palestine, or land was confiscated
7. Family members and friends or acquaintances have been killed in violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

### Indicator of exposure to violence, August 2020

The August 2020 indicator for measuring exposure to violence has three levels, assuming the following values:

- **Low**: from less than 0 to 0.39
- **Medium**: from 0.40 to 0.59
- **High**: from 0.60 to 1.2

The indicator represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 5 variables:

1. Worried about one’s own and family’s safety, or being expelled, or lose land or have my home demolished, or being prevented from reaching my land beyond the wall or separation barrier
2. Worried about the future of the Palestinian people
3. Experiencing detention for a long time at Israeli checkpoints
4. Could not reach my land beyond the separation wall or barrier
5. Could not obtain a building permit from the Israeli side
1. Participation in violent political incidents or demonstrations
2. Participation of close family members in violent incidents related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
3. Seen videos on TV of a harm carried out by the Israeli Jews
4. Witnessing injuries or deaths related to the conflict
5. Witnessing harm inflicted by Israeli Jews against Palestinians

1. Participation in violent political incidents or demonstrations
2. Participation of close family members in violent incidents related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
3. Being hurt in violent incidents related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
4. Close family members being hurt in violent incidents related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
5. Witnessing injuries or deaths related to the conflict

### Indicator of perception of the role of the educational system, October 2020

The October 2020 indicator for measuring perception of the role of the other sides’ educational system in the conflict has three levels, assuming the following values:

**Low**: from less than 0 to 0.39

**Medium**: from 0.40 to 0.59

**High**: from 0.60 to 1.2

The indicator represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 7 variables:

1. Perception of the manner in which Palestinian teachers portray the other side: positively, negatively, or indifference
2. Perception of the Israeli school curriculum regarding the manner in which it views the Palestinians: positively, negatively, or indifference
3. Perception of the manner in which Israeli teachers present the Palestinians to Israeli Jewish students: positively, negatively, or indifference

### Indicator of perception of the role of the educational system, August 2020

The August 2020 indicator for measuring perception of the role of the both sides’ educational system in the conflict has three levels, assuming the following values:

**Low**: from less than 0 to 0.39

**Medium**: from 0.40 to 0.59

**High**: from 0.60 to 1.2

The indicator represented the average sum of support/opposition, agree/disagree in the following 4 variables:

1. Perception of the manner in which the education one and family receive at school portrays the other side: positively, negatively, or indifference
2. Perception of the manner in which the education on the other side portrays Palestinians: positively, negatively, or indifference
3. Perception of the role of Israeli school curriculum in fostering or diminishing trust among the two peoples
4. Perception of the role of Palestinian school curriculum in fostering or
4. Perception of the manner in which the education one and family receive at school portrays the other side: positively, negatively, or indifference

5. Perception of the manner in which the Israeli Jewish educational system portrays Palestinians: positively, negatively, or indifference

6. Perception of the role of Israeli school curriculum in fostering or diminishing trust among the two peoples

7. Perception of the role of Palestinian school curriculum in fostering or diminishing trust among the two peoples

The indicators’ building exercise produced the following findings. As figure (10) below indicates, the hardships indicator was found relatively high in the August poll and relatively low in the October poll. Exposure to violence was mostly low in August and high in October, but the negative perception of education on the other side was predominantly high in both polls.

Figure (10): Three indicators of sources of distrust in the two joint polls

The three indicators are not influenced by age. Indeed, the older group indicated slightly higher level of hardships and higher levels of exposure to violence than the youth in our August poll and the same level of hardships and greater exposure to violence in our October poll. In both
polls, negative perception of the Israeli educational system is almost identical for the youth and the older age group.

Correlating trust with the levels of hardships, exposure to violence, and perception of education: Using the three indicators described above, the following figure, from the August 2020 poll, shows a somewhat weak correlation between trust and hardships and exposure to violence and strong correlation between trust and perception of education. A high level of hardship produced a low level of trust standing at 78% while a low level of hardship produced a low level of trust standing at 74%. In other words, the higher the level of hardships, the higher the level of distrust and the lower the level of hardships, the lower the level of distrust.

Similarly, a high level of exposure to violence produced a low level of trust standing at 81% while a low level of exposure to violence produced a low level of trust standing at 75%. In other words, the higher the level of exposure to violence, the higher the level of distrust and the lower the level of exposure, the lower the level of distrust.

Finally, as shown in figure (11) below, a negative indicator of perception of education produced a low level of trust standing at 80% while a positive indicator of perception of education produced a low level of trust standing at 60%. In other words, the more positive the perception of education on the other side, the more likely the level of distrust would be lower and the more negative the perception of education, the more likely the level of distrust would be higher. These findings are consistent with the research hypothesis in which these three elements contribute to greater levels of distrust in the other side.

Figure (11): Trust level correlated with three sources of distrust-August 2020
These findings are confirmed in our joint October poll, as shown in figure (12) below. Here too, a high level of hardships increases low trust to 89% while a low level of hardships reduces low trust to 80%. Similarly, a high exposure to violence increases low trust to 87% while a low a low level of exposure to violence reduces low trust to 79%. Finally, a negative perception of the Israeli educational system increases low trust to 86% while a positive perception of that educational system reduces low trust to 73%.

Figure (12): Trust level correlated with three sources of distrust, October 2020

Other sources of distrust: Our October poll identified other potential sources of distrust including various socio-psychological variables. These included (1) religiosity and ideology, (2) the legacy of the Nakba of 1948, (3) perception of the western countries, and (4) perception of the other.

(1) Religiosity and ideology: Level of religiosity is a reasonably good predictor of distrust. An overwhelming majority (86%) of the religious respondents received low trust score, the somewhat religious did slightly better (82%), and the not religious received the best score (67%). Political-religious ideology produced similar results with Islamists receiving the highest score of distrust (87%), followed by mainstream nationalists (83%), traditionalists (69%) and the left (64%).

(2) The legacy of the 1948 Nakba, or catastrophe: Findings show that those who believe or strongly believe that the Palestinian Nakba cannot be forgotten and should serve as a reminder for the Palestinians tend to be less willing to trust Israeli Jews, scoring the highest distrust marks (82% and 89% respectively). On the other hand, those who disagree with this belief tend to show more willingness to trust the other side: 61% for those who disagree and 75% for those who strongly disagree.
(3) **Perception of the western countries**: Palestinians who view western countries as harboring anti-Palestinian sentiments tend to believe that continued Israeli occupation is sustained by these sentiments. These Palestinians tend to be less willing to trust Israeli Jews. The distrust score for those who strongly share this view stands at 94% while those who do not share this view of the western countries tend be more willing to trust Israeli Jews, with a score of 68% and those who strongly disagree with this view receive a score of 72%.

(4) **Perception of Israeli Jews**: As indicated earlier, the joint surveys show highly negative Palestinian perception of Israeli Jews believing that they do not want peace and would not implement a peace agreement if one is signed. The findings show correlation between perception of the other and willingness to trust or distrust it. For example, those who agree or strongly agree with the statement that Israeli Jews are peaceful, receive a lower distrust score of 52% while those who reject or strongly reject that statement tend to have a much higher distrust score of 82% and 94% respectively. Similarly, those who think Israeli Jews are just as much victims of the conflict as the Palestinians obtain a distrust score of only 69% while those who think or strongly think the opposite tend to receive a score of 85% and 91% respectively. Also, those who agree or strongly agree with the statement that there are Israeli Jews who want to end the conflict receive a distrust score of 80% and 84% respectively while those on the opposite side receive a distrust score of 87% and 93% respectively. For those who agree or strongly agree with the statement that Israeli Jews will never accept the existence of a Palestinian state, the distrust score rises to 86% and 95% respectively while those who disagree receive a score of 66%.

(4) **Conclusions and Policy Implications**:

The study shows that although exposure to violence related to the conflict, experience of violence and hardships, and negative perceptions of the educational system of the other side do have some effect on trust on Palestinians who live under the harsh reality of military occupation, other determinants are the socio-psychological variables, such as beliefs, attitudes and emotions, related to religiosity, ideology and perception of the other.

Some of these beliefs and attitudes are acquired at a very early age. They are learned by children at an early age and remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. They may constitute a part of children’s general worldviews which remains relatively constant across time. Eventually, these will pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

Living under military occupation, Palestinian’s experience hardships and exposure to violence on daily basis. These are some of the reasons for such strong distrust of Israeli Jews. Changing the reality on the ground and restoring hope for peace and the two-state solution is essential for
restoring some level of trust. Conflict supporting narratives need to be addressed before any trust can be restored.

7. **Change the new reality on the ground:** For Palestinians, the reality on the ground worsens by the day as land is confiscated, homes demolished, movement and access restricted, and settlers’ violence continues. Although Palestinian and Israeli authorities coordinate with each other on essential civil and security matters, no dialogue takes place on how to ease daily living conditions, stop the building of settlements, or eradicate settlers’ violence. To be effective in reducing distrust and hate, coordination between the two sides need to cover all these additional areas of daily friction and difficulties and search for ways to deliver security to both sides. It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation.

8. **Stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing:** Various formal and informal sources in Israel, present the Palestinian school textbooks, teachers, mass media and the leaders as inciting against Israel, Zionism (Jewish Nationalism) and as being anti-Semitic. This practice can be found also on the Palestinian side. It is exaggerated and augmented serving the struggle between the two contradicting and rival narratives.

9. **Contact between People:** Contact between members of the two societies is one of the most researched methods to change beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in order to improve the relations between them.

10. **Use of mass media:** Mass media is one of the most powerful agents that provides information and shapes public opinion. Mass media should stop presenting the other side in negative way and develop peace journalism. It can supply major information about the other group; it can provide information about the culture of the other- with films, theatrical plays, or entertainment programs.

11. **Education:** Education constitutes one of the most important methods for eradicating distrust. This method involves using the school system since this system is often the only institution of which the society can make wide scope use to change the psychological repertoire of society members. Education for building trust must begin at an early age and continue through the years of schooling. Also, it is possible to establish joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to examine existing textbooks and curricula to eliminate any derogative expressions.

12. **Joint Projects:** Joint projects of various kinds can serve as a method for building trust. They can be in different areas such as culture, health, agriculture, or science. Joint projects in different areas between Israelis and Palestinians can foster links between members of the two groups at different levels of society, such as elites, professionals, as well as grass roots. This method provides opportunities for personal encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations.
The Research Framework – Palestinian-Israeli Research (Macro - PSR): Comprehensive Survey

Short Introduction

Two studies were performed within the framework of the project of studying trust between Israelis and Palestinians. The first study was exploratory carried in August 2020 and the second a major study carried in November 2020. The report includes both studies based on the same hypotheses.

Research hypotheses –

Four major hypotheses were examined in the two studies:

1. Daily harsh life experience will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards the rival group.

2. Exposure to violence and conflict will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards the rival group.

3. Negative presentation of the rival group in the education system will have a major effect of diminishing trust toward the rival group.

4. The more trust one feels towards the rival group, the probability he will support the peace process increases.
STUDY 1

Methods

Population

The total sample of this survey is 1201 adults, 1020 Israeli Jews and 181 Israeli Arabs. Among the Jews were 272 were youth between the age of 18 and 29 and among the Arabs 50 were youth. In total, the participants in the survey were 554 (46.1%) males and 647 (53.9%) females.

Political and religious orientation

With regard to the political orientation among Jews, about 65.2% saw themselves as holders of right political views, about 20.7% saw themselves as centrist and only 10.5% classified themselves as leftists.

With regard to the religious orientation among Jews, 36.5% defined themselves as secular, 26.1% as traditional, 23.7% defined themselves as religious, and 12.9% as ultraorthodox.

Questionnaire

In the study we used only 14 questions divided to different themes. Several questions assessed the extent of trust towards Palestinian people and its leadership, another group of questions measured experiences of violence and separately exposure to violence and conflict related incidences. As follows, we built different groups of questions, which when combined, helped us assess: perception of the effects of the education to the other side, influence of different

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1 Study 1 was performed by cooperation between the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and The Evans Mediation and Conflict Management, School of Social and Policy Studies of Tel Aviv University. Macro-The Center for Political Economics was not involved in the planning of the study 1, construction of the questionnaire and carrying the field work. Macro used the relevant collected data for examining the hypotheses of the trust project.

2Political orientation in Israel on the left-right dimension in this study refers only to the position one has towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The left wing orientation expresses readiness to solve the conflict peacefully with the two-state solution, objects to occupation and Jewish settlement on the occupied territories and sees the Palestinian as partners to negotiate with. On the other hand, right wing opinions here represent: not seeing Palestinians as partners for negotiations, believing that they aim to destroy Israel, support Jewish settlement in the occupied territories and object to any withdrawal from the occupied territories.
sources on the view of the Palestinians and more. All the questions that were used in study 1 appear in Appendix A

On the basis of the used questionnaire, we constructed set of variables that appear in Appendix B

Procedure

The study was carried in August 2020.

Results

Means

Israeli Jews reveal very low level of trust towards the Palestinian. It is possible to say that trust does not exit. Many of them (34%) explain the lack of trust with the attribution that the Palestinian educational system incites against Israel and Jews; 25% say that they cannot trust Palestinian leadership: 15% attribute their lack of trust to the Palestinian religion and culture and 10% do not trust Palestinians because of their political goals.

The support for two state solutions is on the mid-level –not much of support and not much of opposing. Israeli Jews do not have a positive expectation regarding Palestinian preferences: 36.2% of them believe that the Palestinians prefer violent struggle against the occupation, 8.8% prefer nonviolent struggle, 25.3% prefer to reach peace agreement and 13.3% prefer the status quo. Also, Israeli Jews almost did not experience direct violence –either never or once. But they reported an exposure to the violence of the Palestinians (Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums or Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums). Israeli Jews (56.2%) stated that they believe that the Israeli schools present Palestinians indifferent but in contrast believe (82.1%) that Palestinians school present Israelis with negative stereotypes. Finally, Israeli Jews worry about being harmed by Palestinians as well as that Israel may lose its Jewish nature. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables. A deeper examination of the data indicates that the younger Israeli Jews supported less peace process with the Palestinians. They also less believe that Palestinians will accept the existence of the Israeli state. Younger Israeli Jews had also more exposure to the Palestinian violence related to conflict than older Israeli Jews. They also believe that the Israeli educational system presents Palestinians
in a more positive way than the older Israeli Jews. Finally, younger Israeli Jews worry more than older Israeli Jews about being harmed by Palestinians and about losing Jewish character of the state.

Table 1: Means and Standard Deviation of the Variables (Jews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for Peace</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust for Palestinians</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of Violence</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Violence</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education- Israeli Schools</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education- Palestinian Schools</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Harm by Palestinians</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of losing Jewish Identity</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Trust/ Distrust</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Correlations

In order to substantiate the proposed hypotheses regarding the relationships between the investigated variables we used calculations of correlations (see Table 2).

Table 2 shows that trust and support for peace are highly related. Meaning that the more trust exists among Israeli Jews, the more they support the peace process ($r=.63$). All the other correlations are either of very low magnitude or non-significant. The significant correlations explain at best only about 4% of the effect.
Table 2: Correlation Between Variables (Study 1- Jews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support for peace</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Experience of violence and conflict</th>
<th>Exposure to Palestinian Violence</th>
<th>Education in Israeli Schools</th>
<th>Education in Palestinian Schools</th>
<th>Fear of Harm by Palestinians</th>
<th>Fear of Losing Jewish Identity</th>
<th>Promoting Trust / Distrust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for peace</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.12* (N=491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of Violence and Conflict</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td></td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Palestinian Violence</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td></td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in Israeli Schools</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.1*</td>
<td>0.1*</td>
<td>0.1*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in Palestinian Schools</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td></td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Harm by Palestinians</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5*</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Losing Jewish Identity</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>non-sig</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Trust/Distrust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STUDY 2**

**Methods**

**Population**

The sample of this survey constituted 879 Israelis, 748 Jews and 131 Arabs, all citizens of Israel. In addition, the sample was increased with 317 young respondents who were 18-29 years old: 271 young Jews and 46 Israeli Arabs. In the report we segmented respondents by combining young
respondents (18-29 years old) of the large-scale sample with the respondents from the younger sample. Thus, the survey included 455 young Jews, 79 young Israeli Arabs, 561 older Jews and 102 older Israeli Arabs. In total, the participants in the survey were 46.2 % males and 53.8 % females.

Political orientation

The political orientation differed between Jews and Israeli Arabs (See Diagram 1). Among Jews, about 56% saw themselves as holders of right political views, about 30% saw themselves as centrist and only 13% classified themselves as leftists. Younger Jewish respondent’s political orientation had a higher prevalence of rightist opinions (about 66% saw themselves as rightists) while only 8% supported leftist political views. Among Israeli Arabs, 61% defined themselves with as holders of leftist opinions and only 30% as holders of centrist views. Younger Israeli Arabs had a lower percentage of support to left wing opinions and prevailed commonness of center-oriented opinions, more common compared to the older Israeli Arabs.

Diagram 1: Political Affiliation of the Respondents by the Groups

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Political orientation in Israel on the left-right dimension in this study refers only to the position one has towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The left wing orientation expresses readiness to solve the conflict peacefully with the two-state solution, objects to occupation and Jewish settlement on the occupied territories and sees the Palestinian as partners to negotiate with. On the other hand, right wing opinions here represent: not seeing Palestinians as partners for negotiations, believing that they aim to destroy Israel, support Jewish settlement in the occupied territories and object to any withdrawal from the occupied territories.
Religion

In the Jewish sample, 43.4% categorized themselves as secular, 33.5% as traditional, 13% as religious and 10.2% as ultraorthodox (Haredi). Among Younger Jewish respondents, there is a higher prevalence of ultraorthodox Jews (17.1%) and religious Jews (15.6%), in comparison to the older generation, which is comprised of only 8.9% ultraorthodox Jews and 12.1% religious Jews (See Diagram 2). We found a similarity when we asked about the importance of religion and both age groups yielded similar responses: 64.12% of the older Jewish respondents answered that religion is “very important” or “important” in their eyes, and only 33.75% claimed that it is either “not important” or “not important at all”. Similarly, among the Younger Jewish respondents 63.7% answered that the religion is “very important” or “important” for them and 32.5% claimed that it is either “not important” or “not important at all”.

Diagram 2: Religious Affiliation by a Group (Jews only)

![Diagram 2: Religious Affiliation by a Group (Jews only)](image)

Among the Israeli Arabs, 64% identified themselves as Muslims, 18.3% as Christians, 15.35% as Druze and 1.55% as other. This identification corresponds with the two generations of the Israeli Arabs living here. We found that Israeli Arabs have a larger percentage of people which religion is of great importance for them, as 76.57% of the older Israeli Arabs said that religion is “very important” or “important” in their opinion, and only 20.61% answered that it is either “not important” or “not important at all”. Among the younger Israeli Arabs 68.3% claimed that religion
is “very important” or “important” in their opinion and only 19% answered that it is either “not important” or “not important at all”.

**Questionnaire**

Before describing the questionnaire, it is important to note that the Israeli and Palestinian experiences of life differ considerably because of completely different context they live in. While Israelis live freely in a state that has an army, governmental institutions, work opportunities and much more, Palestinians live under Israeli occupation since 1967. This situation has daily implications for both sides’ lives and affects greatly the differing experiences, views and exposures to violence of each side. Therefore, the questionnaire used in the Palestinian area has different emphases in a comparison to the questionnaire used in Israel. But even using the same questionnaire for Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs (citizens of Israel) is problematic because of different experiences in the state of Israel that is defined as Jewish State and because of the fact that many of the Israeli Arabs consider themselves as Israeli Palestine.

The used questionnaire is comprised of 44 questions divided to different themes. Several questions assessed the extent of trust towards Palestinian people and its leadership, another group of questions measured experiences of violence and separately exposure to violence and conflict related incidences. As follows, we built different groups of questions, which when combined, helped us assess: perception of the effects of the education to the other side, influence of different sources on the view of the Palestinians and more.

In addition, we constructed a series of scales that measured the psychological perception that respondents hold towards the conflict and especially towards Palestinians. To build these scales we measured the following variables: respondents views about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, ethos of conflict, stereotypic perception and delegitimization of the Palestinians,

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4 *Ethos of conflict* is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future in the contexts of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013). It is composed of eight major themes about issues related to the conflict, the in-group, and its adversary

5 Delegitimization is defined as "categorization of a group, or groups, into extremely negative social categories that exclude it, or them, from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserve maltreatment" (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012, p. 30).
readiness to come in contact with a Palestinian, negative and positive emotions towards Palestinians, beliefs about stability of groups’ characteristics and openness to hear information by Palestinians.

Furthermore, there were single questions that referred to various issues of the conflict: Concerns about the Israeli Palestinian conflict, effects of the normalization agreement with the Arab Gulf’s States on the peace agreement with the Palestinians, the assurance of Israel’s existence, worrying about being harmed by Palestinians, worrying about the future of the Jewish character in the state of Israel, the nature of the state of Israel, support of the two-state solution scheme and about the extent of general hope. Then, respondents were asked about their aspirations regarding both Israelis and the Palestinians with regard to the aspired solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, the questionnaire included questions that pertain to the socio demographic variables: Political orientation (5-point scale from left to right) gender, age, religion and the level of religiosity. The full questionnaire is presented in Appendix C.

Procedure

The study was carried in November 2020

Analyses

The analyses of the collected data had six different phases:

The detailed description of the analyses’ phases is presented in Appendix D

Main Findings of the Survey Study 2

The first three hypotheses refer to the antecedents of distrust and the fourth portraits the role of trust between the sides regarding the peace process. The findings of our research mildly support hypotheses 1-3, but provided very strong support of hypothesis 4.

The results of the analyses of the entire Jewish sample, including both older and Younger Jewish respondents, showed unequivocally that socio-psychological variables that represent the psychological repertoire of the participants, determine to a large extent the distrust that they feel.
The most important determinant of distrust is the negative stereotypes that Jews believe regarding Palestinians. Among those, thinking that they are violent and hostile is the leading parameter to build the feeling of distrust towards them. The second most influencing variable is the extent of being opened minded to information from the other side of the conflict. Closed minded individuals who were not ready to open their mind, accept and exchange information from the Palestinian, tend to be more distrustful. The third variable we found to prompt distrust is delegitimization. It is reflected by respondents denying humanity from Palestinians, viewing them as an excluded group from the sphere of human society. Among the older Jewish population, the third determinant of distrust appeared to be political orientation. Meaning that when one's opinion is within the right-wing orientation, his/her distrust increases. Among the entire Jewish population, it seems that only after one's political orientation, comes the influence of the variable of exposure to violence and conflict, indicating that the more an individual was exposed to violence and conflict incidences, the less trust he shall hold towards the other side.

The analyses of Israeli Arabs’ respondents reveal a different tale. Examining the entire sample indicates that the most important predictor of distrust is the influence of the Palestinian media, meaning that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust, the respondents feel of trust in Palestinians increases. In addition, there are the following predictors: views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, stereotyping of the Palestinians, political orientation, openness, negative presentation of Palestinians by Israeli teachers in Israeli schools and importance of religion.

Our most unequivocal finding shows that trust is the most important predictor of support in the peace process among both main groups in the sample, Jews and Israeli Arabs as well. Afterwards, we found additional socio-psychological variables such as ethos and stereotyping, which indicated that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he holds regarding Palestinians, the more he/she supports the peace process.

Another interesting and important finding regarding the Jewish sample was found while comparing the older and younger respondents, revealing that in all the indices of the socio-psychological repertoire, younger Israeli Jews are more commonly to hold right wing political views compared to older Israeli Jews.
Results

In order to execute the analyses, we constructed the different variables of the study, the process of their construction can be seen under Appendix E. We used a 5-point scale with items that were of interval type. In some cases, variables were nominal and did not enable a construction of such scale. Following, we can see the results shown with the different variables:

Phases 1, 2 and 3: Construction of the Variables, Calculation of Means and Standard Deviations and Calculations of the Differences among the Groups

Trust towards Palestinians

The results indicate a relative low level of trust towards Palestinians expressed within the Jewish sample. On a scale of 1-5 the mean Jewish respondent’s answers is 2.25 points. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs rated their trust levels higher, and their mean answer stood on 3.25 points. Diagram 3 shows the means described above graphically.

Diagram 3: Mean Answers of Trust levels for All Groups
Comparison between the groups, shows that in general, Arabs feel higher levels of trust towards Palestinians compared to Jews. In addition, older Jewish respondents feel higher levels of trust towards Palestinians, compared to younger Jewish respondents.

In order to understand respondent’s thoughts behind these answers, the questionnaire included the following nominal question: **If you think Palestinians are not trustworthy, why? Because … [Select the most important factor]**

The results of the Jewish sample are shown below in Diagram 4. Most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the “Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews”. About 24% do not trust Palestinians because of “their leaders who cannot be trusted”. The older Jewish respondents did not differ by much in their answers, compared to the entire sample. The younger respondents attributed a higher importance to the following reason, for their lack of trust: the political aims of the Palestinians in the conflict (20%). (See Diagram 4 and 5). Israeli Arabs attributed their lack of trust mostly to other/ unknown reasons and also to lack of trust in Palestinian leaders (See Diagram 6 and 7).

**Diagram 4: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Jewish Respondents**

![Diagram 4: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Jewish Respondents](image_url)
Diagram 5: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Younger Jewish respondents

Diagram 6: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Older Arab Respondents
Diagram 7: Reasons for Mistrust Towards Palestinians among Younger Arab Respondents

Experience of violence

This variable included various items that referred to different kinds of direct personal experiences of violence. The results indicate that Jewish respondents reported low levels of experiencing violence, so that the mean answer was between 2.12 (older segment) and 2.15 (younger segment) on a scale of 1-5, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Experience of Violence (Jews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean (Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>2.12 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>2.15 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exposure to violence and to the conflict
This variable is assembled by items that indicated indirect encounter with Palestinian violence, either by seeing or hearing. The variable exposure to violence- through hearing or seeing it on media, shows a relative high level of exposure among Jewish respondents: above 3.5 points out of 5, that is without meaningful differences between older and younger Jewish responses. Among the Arab respondents, the exposure is at lower level, about 2.5 point (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean (Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>3.78 (0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>3.76 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>2.70 (0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Arab respondents (N=79)</td>
<td>2.48 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception of the effects of education on the views held by the other side

As expected, Jews and Israeli Arabs differ regarding their evaluation on how Israeli teachers present Palestinians. Jews believe that Israeli teachers present Palestinians in a more positive manner compared to Israeli Arabs (see Diagram 8). Specifically, Israeli Jews tend to think that Israeli teachers present the Palestinians neither negatively nor positively. And also not surprisingly, Israeli Arab respondents tend to think that Israeli teachers portray Palestinians in a more negative manner.
Diagram 8: In your view, how do Israeli Teachers Portray the Palestinians?  

Table 5 shows that Israeli Jews tend to believe that schools in Israel present Palestinians mostly indifferently, with a slight lean towards a negative presentation. Israeli Arabs, in contrast, believe that the presentation is more likely to be accompanied with negative stereotypes and labels. Interestingly, we found that young Jewish and Arab respondents believe that Palestinians are presented more negatively, compared to responses by the older respondents.

Table 5: Views on Palestinian Representation in Israeli schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean (Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>3.22 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>3.43 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 On a scale of 1-5. 1 being negatively and 5 positively.
7 On a scale of 1-5. 1 being negatively with stereotypical labels, 5 being positively as fellow human beings.
Younger Arab respondents (N=79) 

3.77
(1.8)

Israeli Jews believe that the Palestinian educational system presents Israeli Jews negatively (between very negatively and negatively). Israeli Arabs believe that the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis somewhat less negatively (between little negatively and neither negatively nor positively). Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations.

### Table 6: Views on Israeli Representation in Palestinian Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean (Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>1.52 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>1.57 (0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>2.29 (0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Arab respondents (N=79)</td>
<td>2.53 (0.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Influence of various sources on the views of the Palestinians**

In general, respondents rated the different sources presented to them as having little influence on their views. The media was rated as the most influential source on respondents’ views, and then were political leaders (aggregated views of the entire sample). Younger Jewish respondents seem to evaluate also friends and family as the very influential source on their views, compared to the rest of the sample (See Table 7).
### Table 7: Sources of Influence on Respondents’ Views of Palestinians (means and standard deviation)\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Environment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Political leaders</th>
<th>Religious leaders</th>
<th>Israeli Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jews</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arabs</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Arab respondents</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following eight items helped us assess influences on trust held among the four groups (older and younger Israeli Jews and older and younger Israeli Arabs). Respondents from the entire sample indicated that all of them had a small contribution to diminishing trust towards Palestinians. The means presented below in Table 8 indicate that the influence of these sources range from 2 (somewhat diminishing trust) to a maximum around 3 (neither diminish nor foster). The table and analyses show that while Jewish respondents think that various Palestinian related sources contribute more to diminish trust than Israeli Arabs, Israeli Arabs think that the Israeli sources contribute more to diminish trust compared to Palestinian sources.

\(^8\) On a scale of 1-5, 1 representing low levels of reported influence, 5 representing high levels.
Table 8: Sources of Influence on Trust between Israelis and Palestinians (means and standard deviations)\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Influence</th>
<th>Palestinian Leadership</th>
<th>Israeli Media</th>
<th>Palestinian Media</th>
<th>Israeli Curricula</th>
<th>Palestinian Curricula</th>
<th>Israeli social media</th>
<th>Palestinian social media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jews</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Jews</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arabs</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Arabs</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Psychological variables**

A set of psychological variables which pertains to the world view related to the conflict were also built on the basis of the questionnaire. Each variable consisted of different items, and structured separately, as follows:

There were two items which assessed views about feelings regarding anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. Both items were evaluated highly by Jewish respondents. On the 5-point scale the mean was 4.28 for the older Jewish respondents and 4.26 for the younger respondents. Israeli Arabs, in contrast, evaluated these two items lower, around 3 (neither small nor large extent), specifically the mean of older Israeli Arabs is 3.11 and for the younger respondents was 3. There were no meaningful differences between older and younger generations in both national groups.

Four items assessed ethos of conflict. The results showed that in general, Jews accept the premises of the ethos of conflict, on a 5-point scale the mean is 2.58 (2 indicates “agree” and 3 indicates

---

\(^9\) On a scale of 1-5. 1- greatly diminish trust to 5- greatly foster trust.
“neither disagree nor agree”). Younger Jewish respondents adheres even more to the ethos of conflict compared to older Jewish respondents (the means were 2.47 for younger Jewish respondents and 2.62 older respondents). The mean of Israeli Arab population resulted at 3.46.

Two items measured the **stereotypic perception** of Palestinians. The results revealed that in general, Jews have a negative view of the Palestinians. They rejected the perception that Palestinians are peaceful and non-violent. The general mean of Jewish responses was 2.16 (2 indicates “not true”, regarding the positive perceptions above). The younger and older Jewish respondents differ: **The younger Jewish respondents hold a somewhat more negative stereotypes regarding Palestinians** (Mean answers were 2.10 and 2.22 respectively). **Israeli Arab respondents view Palestinians more positively** (mean 3.4), which means that their perception is between 3 (neither true nor true) and 4 (somewhat true). Older and younger Israeli Arabs groups provided similar mean results, 3.41 and 3.44 respectively.

Measuring of **delegitimization** has shown that Jews tend to delegitimize Palestinians (do not conceive them fully as human). Using a scale between 0 and 100 (0 indicating completely delegitimizing view) the mean score of conceiving them human was 49.81. In contrast, the mean of Israeli Arab’s responses was 74.19. Furthermore, **younger Jewish respondents tend to delegitimize Palestinians even more, compared to older respondents** (their mean scores were 46.13 and 51.06 respectively).

The variable **social distance** was assessed with one item and measured an individual’s readiness to have a Palestinian friend or acquaintance. The mean score of the entire sample was 3.45, meaning that their feelings are between 3 - “neither want nor do not want” and 4 – “do not really want”). **Younger Jewish respondents were found slightly less interested in a contact with a Palestinian, compared to older respondents** (their mean scores were 3.64 and 3.39 respectively). Israeli Arab respondents scores were in the between 2 and 3, which indicates they feel between “somewhat want” and “neither want nor do not want”.

Another relevant item to this variable that was measured is **dichotomous**, by asking respondents: “Have you ever had a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance now or in the past”, with only two responses available, yes or no. Diagram 9 below, shows the differences among Israeli Arabs: we found that there are older Israeli Arabs that reported that they have a Palestinian friend or
personal acquaintance, compared to younger Israeli Arabs. Among Jewish respondents, we did not find a significant difference between older and younger respondents, only about 20% report having a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance.

Diagram 9: Close Relationships of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians

Measuring negative emotions towards Palestinians revealed that Jewish respondents hold neutral feelings with a mean score of 3 on a 5-point scale, indicating that they feel negative emotions to a “neither small nor large extent”. In particular, younger Jewish respondents have expressed somewhat stronger negative emotions compared to older respondents, 3.35 and 2.96 respectively. Unlike the above, Israeli Arabs responses revealed that they barely feel negative emotions toward Palestinians, with a mean answer of 1.8.

When we measured positive emotions towards Palestinians, results show that Jewish respondents feel such emotions only to a small extent, with a mean answer of 2.4 on a 5-point scale. In accordance with the last variable presented, Younger Jewish respondents feel positive emotions to a lower extent compared with older respondents (2.20 and 2.48 respectively). Surprisingly, Israeli Arab respondents revealed a neutral extent of feeling positive emotions towards Palestinians, with a mean answer of 2.91.

Assessing the variable malleability has taught us that to some extent, Jews tend to hold the belief that groups have a fixed nature of characteristics and cannot change. On a scale from
1 to 5 (“certainly disagree” and “certainly agree” respectively with the belief indicating that groups have a fixed nature of characteristics) the mean answer was 3.34, no significant differences were found between older and younger Jewish responses. Israeli Arab respondents differ also in this variable, in comparison to the Jewish sample, with a mean rating of 2.69.

The assessment of the variable openness has shown that Jews can be considered close minded rather than opened minded. They express lack of readiness to get information from a Palestinian. The mean of their responses on a 5-points scale resulted at 2.98. (From 1 indicating “to no extent” and 5, “to a large extent”). similarly, to the distribution found with other variables, Younger Israeli Jewish respondents were found to be less open minded compared to older respondents (with the mean scores of 2.80 and 3.04 respectively). Israeli Arabs responses have shown that in general, they tend to have a more opened mind, with a mean score of 3.30 in this particular case.

The following part of the questionnaire included a few variables that were measured via one item only.

Concerns rising due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were measured by asking “Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?”. Below, we can examine Table 9 which indicates that neither Jewish nor Arab Israelis are very concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The mean scores of the entire sample were 3.18, indicating that their concern is neither small nor large. In other words, both populations do not deny its existence, but it does not preoccupy their thoughts too much. We also found that there are no significant differences in levels of concern between the age groups, for both Jewish and Arab groups of the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Measuring the effect of recent peace agreement with the Arab Gulf States, has revealed that Jews and Israeli Arabs agree that the “Abraham Agreement”, with both Bahrain and the Emirates, did not contribute significantly to the efforts of reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. The mean scores of each section of the sample were all below 3 on the 5-point scale, indicating that all Israelis felt it had little contribution for the peace efforts, with the Jewish group rating its contribution at 2.80 and the Arab group at 2.71 (“neither to a small nor large extent”).

Jewish and Arab Israelis’ answers differed considerably when asked if they agree with the following statement: “only a powerful Israeli military can assure the existence of Israel.” While the Jewish group mainly agreed with the above, the Arab respondents opposed it. On a 5-point scale (1 and 5 indicating “certainly disagree” and “certainly agree”, respectively) the mean rating by Israeli Jews was 4.23 and 2.86 by Israeli Arabs. There is also a small variance between the ratings given by different generations, as the mean rating by older Israeli Jewish respondents was 4.27 compared to 4.11 rated by the younger respondents. As for the Israeli Arab group, older respondents mean rating was 2.85, while the younger respondents felt even less sympathetic to the statement and their mean rating was 2.65.

Reportedly, Israeli Jews feel worried about being harmed by the Palestinians, to some extent. Measured on a scale of 5 points, from 1, indicating “never worried” to 5, indicating “very much worried”, Younger Jewish respondents worry more than the older respondents as mean ratings resulted at 3.70 and 3.17 respectively. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs expressed lower levels of concern as their mean score was 1.95.

Not surprisingly, Israeli Jews worry considerably more compared to Israeli Arabs regarding the future of the Jewish character of Israel. Measured on a scale of 5 points, from 1, indicating “never worried” to 5 indicating “very much worried”, Jewish and Arab respondents mean rating differed by 1.37 points, as the mean rating were 4.23 and 2.86 respectively. Furthermore, older respondents worry more compared to younger respondents, as the Israeli Jewish groups differed at 4.27 and 4.11, respectively, and the Israeli Arab groups differed at 2.85 and 2.64, respectively.
Surprisingly, Jewish and Arab respondents both agree with the statement: “Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or losing its Jewish nature, if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations”. Both groups disagree with it, meaning that Israel will not have to choose between Apartheid state or losing its Jewish nature by ruling out the two states solution. All different segments rated their level of agreement below 3 (neither disagree nor agree), as shown below in Table 10.

Table 10: Respondents’ Thoughts on Israel’s Character (Apartheid or Jewish) Regarding the “Two-State Solution”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Arab respondents (N=79)</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 shows that Israeli Jews tend to hold a neutral view, with regard to the notion of supporting the two-state solution, while Israeli Arabs have presented higher levels of supporting this solution, 2.6 and 3.77 respectively (there was a 5-point scale ranging from 1 “strongly oppose” to 5 “strongly support”). Additionally, younger Israeli Jewish respondents expressed stronger opposition compared to older respondents, as their mean rating were 2.26 and 2.85, respectively. As for the Israeli Arab groups, the different generations have shown a smaller difference, as their mean ratings resulted at 3.87 by older respondents and 3.58 by the younger ones.
Table 11: Respondents’ Position on the “Two-State Solution”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jewish respondents (N=455)</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Arab respondents (N=79)</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variable Hope was measured with the question: “When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future?” On a 5-point scale ranging from 1 indicating “never”, through 3 indicating “sometimes” and 5 indicating “always”, the mean rating of the entire sample was 2.87. As shown in Table 10, it seems Israeli Arabs are less hopeful regarding their future here, in comparison to Jewish respondents, as their mean ratings were 3.34 and 2.91, respectively. We also see that there is no significant difference between the generations.

Table 12: Frequency of “Loss of Hope” for a Better Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>(Standard Deviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Jewish respondents (N=563)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Jews (N=455)</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trust in *Israeli media* reporting about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was assessed with one item, asking: “To what extent do you trust information presented by the Israeli media regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?” The responses were given on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 to 5 indicating “none” and “to a large extent”, respectively. The mean ratings by all different segments of the sample were surprisingly similar, near 2.84 (neither small nor large extent), indicating that Israelis, both Jews and Arabs, do not see the Israeli media as very trustworthy with covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Diagram 10 shows the distribution of responses from all four groups, about perceived aspirations of the Palestinians. Older Israeli Jewish respondents attributed to the Palestinian Authorities moderate aspirations compared to younger Israeli Jewish respondents: about 28% % of the former believe that the Palestinians aspire either to “regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war”, or “regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war”, but only 16% think so among the younger Jewish respondents. About one third in both groups attribute either “conquest of the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine” or “conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel”. Israeli Arabs differ in their attributions. Many of them did not respond to this question, especially among the younger Israeli Arabs. Among the older Israeli Arabs 34.3% thought that the Palestinian authority aspires “to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Mean Rating</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Older Arab respondents (N=102)</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger Arab respondents (N=79)</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second question was: “Out of the following four possibilities which one do you think is preferred mostly by the majority of Palestinians?”

Diagram 11 shows similar views of the older and younger Israeli Jewish respondents. Over 40% of them think that the majority of Palestinians prefer “waging an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation”. Only 21.1% of the older Jewish respondents and 12.5% of the Younger Jewish respondents believe that they prefer “to reach a peace agreement with Israel”. In contrast, among Israeli Arabs, 52.94% believe that they prefer “to reach a peace agreement with Israel” and among the younger generation only 30.4% believe so. Less than 12% of the entire Arab sample believe that Palestinians prefer “waging an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation”.

Diagram 10: Respondents’ Attributions on the PA’s goals
Two additional questions examine the aspirations of Israelis. The first one was: “And what do you think is the long run aspiration of Israel?”

Diagram 12 indicates that older Israeli Jewish respondents attribute a clear aspiration, namely 28.4% attribute at least “withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security”. With that said, about 40% of the younger Jewish respondents choose a very militant aspiration- either “annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens” or “extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens”. Most of the Israeli Arabs claimed that they do not know what the aspiration of Israelis is. While a smaller group, 27.8% of the younger generation and 23.5% of the older generation, believe that Israelis aspire to “extend the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens”.

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The second question was directly personal: “Which of the following four possibilities is the most preferred to you, about what should be done now, regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations:

Diagram 13 exhibits the four choices and reveals a clear difference between older and younger Israeli Jewish respondents. While 42.63% of the older respondents prefer to “reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians”, the younger respondents hold a different opinion: 23.3% prefer to maintain the status quo; 20.88% to “wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capabilities”, 18.68% to “reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians” and 14.07% prefer to “annex the territories or parts of the territories”. In contrast to the above, about 50% of the entire Israeli Arab sample preferred to “reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians”
Phase 4: Relationships between the Variables

As the next step of the analyses, we found it necessary to reveal relationships between the different variables selected for this study, and so four sets of correlations were calculated. The first set of correlations examined relationship within the six groups between the variable “trust towards Palestinians” and various variables presented in Table 13- (See Appendix F). Looking at the specific results of the carried correlations we found the following. Examining the variables “trust” and “experience of violence” yielded significant correlation, only in the younger Jewish and older Arab group, (0.14) and (0.32) respectively, indicating that the more they experience violence, they feel less trust towards Palestinians. Examining “trust” and “exposure to violence” revealed that only among the young Israeli Jews (0.27) and older Jewish respondents (0.24) a significant correlation was found, indicating that the more they experienced exposure to violence, the less trust they felt toward Palestinians.

When examining education, we found a correlation between “trust” and “the view of how the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis”, among younger and older Israeli Jews and Arabs in general. It indicated that the more respondents believed that the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis negatively, the less trust they felt.
Furthermore, a correlation was found between “trust” and “Israeli leadership” among all 6 groups (Israeli Jews, older Israeli Jews, younger Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, older Israeli Arabs and younger Israeli Arabs). This meant that the more the Israeli diminish the trust, the less the respondents feel trust. Trust and “Palestinian leadership and Palestinian social networks” correlations were found only among Jewish respondents. They indicated that the more this source diminished trust, the less trust the respondents felt. Surprisingly, “trust” was found to be related to the variables “Anti-Semitism” and “Holocaust” with the entire sample, indicating that the less trust one feels towards Palestinians, the more he/she will agree with the statements “Antisemitism prevails strongly among the nations of today” and “The holocaust cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews”.

Table 14- (see Appendix F) displays the following relations: “the less trust felt towards the Palestinians, the more respondents believe in the stability of group characteristics”, “the less readiness one has to hear information from a Palestinian, the more rightist political orientation one has and the more religious a respondent is (religion regards Jewish respondents only). Surprisingly, we found no correlation between “trust” and “importance of religion” among Israeli Arab respondents (may be because the majority of them declared that they are religious).

Table 15— (see Appendix F) shows relationships between “trust” and a series of socio-psychological variables. These correlations were carried only with Israeli Jews because we assumed that they do not make much sense for the Israeli Arabs who many consider themselves as Palestinians. The calculated correlations show very strong relationship to all the socio-psychological variables. Specifically, they indicate that the less trust the Israeli Jews feel towards Palestinians, the more they: Adhere to the ethos of conflict, perceive Palestinians with negative stereotypes, delegitimize Palestinians, abstain from meeting a Palestinian, feel negative emotions and also feel fewer positive ones towards Palestinians.

Table 16 – (See Appendix F) shows that among Jews, ethos of conflict, which represents the most important ideology related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (regarding conflict supporting narratives), is strongly related to all factors of influence examined and all socio-psychological
variables. Ethos of conflict goes well beyond the self-categorization: it provides elaboration what does it mean ideologically to support rightist orientation.

**Phase 5: Testing the Hypotheses of the Study**

The main hypotheses of this study suggest that trust is best predicted by: (1) experiences of violence, (2) exposure to violence and (3) perception of educational practices in Israel. In order to test these hypotheses, we carried hierarchical regressions (a reliable statistical method of analysis for identifying which variables have an impact on the explained variable, trust in our case).

The first regression we ran examined only the Israeli Jewish sample (See Table 17-Appendix G). We found successfully a good picture due to analysis powerful ability to explain different levels of influence by various variables.

The results of the regression revealed indisputably that the best predictor of trust is the “stereotype of Palestinians that Jews hold”. Meaning that the variable “negative stereotype of the Palestinians” has the strongest ability to predict lack of trust felt by an individual. The second-best predictor was found to be “level of openness to receive information from a Palestinian”.

Not far from the above and sorted from strongest to weakest, we found the following variables exhibiting slightly less, but still strong predicting abilities: “Delegitimization” (the more one delegitimizes, the less trust he/she feels), “Political orientation” (the more an individual’s orientation tends to the right, the less trust he/she feels).

After these, the next variables revealed an even weaker ability of explanation: “exposure to violence and conflict” (indicating that the more a person was exposed to violence the less trust he/she feels), “perception of how the Palestinian educational system portrays Israelis” (indicating that the more the system is perceived as presenting Israelis negatively, the less trust Jews feel).

Finally, the variables we found to have the weakest ability to predict trust levels were: “ethos of conflict”, “age” and “negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system”.
Table 18 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the same **hierarchical regression analysis**, only this time we ran it on the older Jewish sample and found similar results to the analysis done on the entire Jewish population. Following is the list of predicting variables, sorted by strength of predicting ability, strongest to weakest: Stereotyping of the Palestinians (negative stereotyping), openness to information from a Palestinian (closure), political orientation (rightist orientation), perception of the Palestinian educational system (negative perception), age, exposure to violence and conflict, delegitimization of the Palestinians, influence of the Israeli leadership.

Table 19 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the **hierarchical regression analysis** performed on the younger Jewish sample. Again, stereotyping of the Palestinians (negative stereotyping) and openness to information from a Palestinian (closure), were found as best predictors of lack of trust towards Palestinians. Followed by: Delegitimization of the Palestinians, negative perception of the Palestinian educational system, importance of religion, negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system, political orientation, experience of violence, exposure to violence, exposure to conflict and finally the influence of the negative view of the Palestinian educational system.

Table 20 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the **hierarchical regression analysis**, done with the Israeli Arab population. Not surprisingly, the results differ from the those presented above. We found that the variable with the strongest predicting power regarding lack of trust is “the influence of the Palestinian media” (indicating that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust the more a person has trust in Palestinians).

Other predictors presented from strongest to weakest are: views about **Holocaust and Anti-Semitism**, **negative stereotyping of the Palestinians**, political orientation, openness, negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system and importance of religion.

An intriguing finding was that trust felt by Israeli Arabs toward Palestinians revealed an effect of their view of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. Indicating that the more they believe in the spread of Anti-Semitism and the possibility of another Holocaust, the less trust they feel towards Palestinians.
Table 21 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis preformed on the older Israeli Arab population. The results below show that the predictors with the best explanatory power of trust levels towards Palestinians are from the strongest to weakest effect: The influence of the Palestinian media, views about the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, political orientation and negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli educational system.

Table 22 (see Appendix G) presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis calculated on younger Israeli Arabs data. Surprisingly, it revealed only four consistent predictors which are presented in the following order (strongest to weakest): Stereotyping of the Palestinians, the influence of the Palestinian media, views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism and negative emotions towards the Palestinians.

In sum, not surprisingly, findings show that the socio-psychological variables that serve as the prism for information and processing experiences, play a crucial role in the development of distrust. Individuals who have negative stereotypes of the Palestinians and especially hold delegitimizing view have distrust towards the Palestinians. But of surprise is the finding that the Israeli Arabs are affected by their view of Jews in the light of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. The more they see Jews as victims of the Anti-Semitism and of the Holocaust, the less they have trust towards the Palestinians. The results did not show that this variable affected the Jews.

Phase 6: Examining the Variables that Predict Support for Peace-making

The last phase of this study focused on detecting variables that help predict an individual’s level of support in the peace process. But first of all, we constructed he index for peace support and found that it is a reliable one (0.79). Subsequently, like the analysis in phase 5, we used the same methodology, based on a hierarchical regression analysis. Only this time, we changed the predicted variable which was “level of support in the peace process” (see Appendix E). Thus, in the hierarchical regression analyses trust and all the other variables were the predictors of peace support.

But before reporting the regression analysis we would like to report that peace support did not receive a very high support among the respondents of our survey. In general, the mean for Israeli
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Jews is 2.39, indicating that it is even below the middle level (between to a small extent -2 and neither small nor high extent-3). The mean of Israeli Arabs is higher –3.49-above the middle. Of special interest is the finding showing that the younger Israeli Jews support less the peace process than older Israeli Jews 2.26 and 2.45 respectively. No significant difference was found between younger and older Israeli Arabs –3.45 and 3.59 respectively.

An intriguing finding across all different groups was that trust was found to be the variable which predicts best an individual’s level of support in peace. Table 23 (see Appendix-G) shows below that the regression on Jews indicates that after trust, the best predictors were: ethos of conflict, stereotyping of the Palestinians, political, orientation exposure to violence and conflict, influence of the Israeli leadership and view of the Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.

We also found that Israeli Jews show high levels of supporting peace, when they have: high trust in Palestinians, low level of ethos of conflict, more positive stereotypes, leftist orientation, less exposure to violence, less influenced by Israeli leaders and less influenced by the view of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.

The analysis of this regression on the younger Jewish segment shows very similar results as seen in Table 24 (see Appendix G), with the slight difference that this group’s level of support is also affected by “openness to information from a Palestinian”.

The analysis of the older Jewish respondents (See Table 25—see Appendix G) is almost identical to the analysis of Jews in general, while it only differs by not including “exposure to violence and conflict” as meaningful predictors.

Table 26 (see Appendix G) shows that the analysis of Israeli Arabs indicates that below trust, the following strongest predictors, also explain levels of support, in the following order (strongest to weakest): the view about how Israeli teachers present Palestinians, ethos of conflict, influence of the Israeli curriculum and the level of an individual’s education.

The regression which measured answers by older Israeli Arabs, presented a very similar picture of predicting variables (from the strongest to the weakest): trust, the ethos of conflict, view about how the Israeli teachers present Palestinians, the level of the respondents’ education and finally, the negative emotions felt towards Palestinians (see Table 27- see appendix G).
The regression conducted with young Israeli Arab’s answers gave slightly different results, as for them the best predictor was found to be the Palestinian media, followed by: experience of violence, Palestinian curriculum, trust, education that the respondent’s children received in school and finally exposure to violence and conflict (see Table 28 - see Appendix G).

We performed two more regressions which turned out to be important to clarify different tendencies within the Israeli Jewish population, based on differences in political orientation. The first was carried on those holding a right winged political orientation, and the second was conducted on left and center winged oriented respondents, both out of the Jewish sample. The former shows that for right winged Jews, the best predictors for low levels of support in peace are: adherence to ethos of conflict, negative stereotyping of the Palestinians, low trust, exposure to violence and conflict and view of the Israeli leadership and lastly the respondents age (the younger the respondents are, the less he/she supports the peace process – (see Table 29 – See Appendix G).

The second regression, done with answers given by left and center politically oriented Jews combined, shows that support for peace is best predicted by: trust, low adherence to ethos of conflict, less negative emotions, low agreement with the view about Anti-Semitism (meaning it remains strong among the nations) and the Holocaust (meaning it cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews— (see Table 30 - see Appendix G)

**Discussion**

The present study concerns one of the key elements in intergroup relations –namely trust and distrust. It determines to a large extent, the nature of the intergroup relationship: whether it is amicable, cooperative, competitive, conflictive, or hostile and so on. This socio-psychological construction can be considered as one dimension that extends from maximal trust to minimal distrust. Trust and distrust are related intimately to expectations about future behaviors of the other group. Expectations determine the level of risk that the group is ready to take. When there is maximal trust and minimal distrust in a group’s expectations, it implies that the group can take risks and initiate actions with the other group in a way that deepens codependency between them, as for example peaceful relation. In contrast, when there is maximal distrust and minimal trust
towards another group, expectations imply that the one might not take risks and interact peacefully with another, nor rely on the other group. Expectations, thus, lead to specific courses of action and determine the level of vulnerability that one is ready to take in relations with the other.

The present study focuses on distrust between Israelis and Palestinians, who live for many decades in intractable conflict. This distrust stands as a major barrier in moving towards a peace building process. Thus, that goal of this study is to determine the antecedents of the developed distrust and its impact on support levels of the peace process.

The advanced hypotheses suggested the following:

- Daily harsh life experience will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards a rival group.
- Exposure to violence and conflict will have a major effect of diminishing trust towards a rival group.
- Negative presentation of the rival group in the educational system will have a major effect of diminishing trust toward a rival group.
- If an individual holds more trust towards a rival group, he will also be more supportive of a peace process with that group.

The first three hypotheses refer to the origin of distrust and the last one is concerned in the role of trust in the support of peace making. The findings of the survey provided limited support of the first three hypotheses, but strongly confirms the last one.

**Distrust towards Palestinians**

**Israeli Jews**

The analyses were used to find the impact different variables had on trust, held by Jews and Israeli Arabs towards Palestinians. The results for the entire Israeli Jewish sample as well as for older and younger Israeli Jews separately showed unequivocally that socio-psychological variables that represent the socio-psychological repertoire of the participants determine the levels of trust to a large extent. Specifically, the most important determinant of distrust is the negative stereotyping that Israeli Jews hold towards Palestinians. Thinking that Palestinians are violent and hostile leads
to high levels of distrust. The second most influencing variable on trust, is **open mindedness**. That is, closed minded individuals who are not ready to expose themselves and to exchange information with Palestinians also tend to distrust them. The next contributor to distrust is related to extreme negative stereotyping—i.e., **delegitimization** of Palestinians. Meaning that many respondents mentally deny Palestinians of their humanity, viewing them as an excluded group. The delegitimization variable appeared as the third most dominant factor in determining distrust among the Israeli Jewish population and the younger Israeli Jewish population. Among the older Jewish population, the third strongest determinant of distrust is **political orientation**, meaning the more right-wing a person is, the less trust he/she has towards Palestinians. Among Israeli Jews in general, only after **political orientation** comes the variable of **exposure to violence and conflict**, indicating that the more a person was exposed to conflict violence the less trust he has towards Palestinians. Then comes the variable of perception of the **Palestinian educational system**, indicating that the more this system is perceived as presenting Israelis negatively, the less trust Jews have towards Palestinians. Finally, comes **ethos of conflict, age, and negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers in the Israeli schools**—All significantly predict lack of trust.

**Israeli Arabs**

The analyses of the Israeli Arabs’ responses show a different picture. Looking at the general Israeli Arab population, the most important predictor of trust is **the influence of the Palestinian media**, indicating that the more the Palestinian media fosters trust, the more a person (Israeli Arabs) has trust towards Palestinians. Other predictors are: views about **Holocaust and Anti-Semitism**, **stereotyping** of the Palestinians, **political orientation**, **openness**, **negative presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers in the Israeli schools** and **importance of religion**. We learn that the Israeli Arabs are affected surprisingly by their beliefs about **antisemitism and Holocaust**: The more they believe in the spread of the Anti-Semitism and the possibility of another Holocaust, the less they trust the Palestinians. **Younger Israeli Arabs** build their mistrust through stereotyping of Palestinians, the influence of the Palestinian media, views about Holocaust and Anti-Semitism and negative emotions towards the Palestinians.
Support of the Peace Process.

The analyses present one unequivocal finding. **Trust** has been found as the most important predictor of support for the peace process among all groups of Jews and among the general sample of Israeli Arabs and the older sample of Israeli Arabs. Unsurprisingly, additional socio-psychological variables such as **ethos of conflict and stereotyping** indicating that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative are the held stereotypes of the Palestinians, the more he or she supports the peace process. Also, **political orientation** predicts support for peace, where as expected, the more leftist is the person, the more he or she supports the peace process.

**Israeli Jews**-

Among Israeli Jews in general and younger Jews, in addition to the above presented variables, **exposure to violence** has a negative effect on Jewish support for peace. In addition, Jews’ openness for peace is affected by the Israeli leadership and the perception of antisemitism and the Holocaust. Among younger Jews, it was also found that openness and experience of violence are significant predictors for support of the peace process.

**Israeli Arabs**-

The analysis for Israeli Arabs indicates that after trust, the most important factors for support of the peace process include variables concerning education. Among those are how **Israeli teachers present Palestinians**, then **Ethos of conflict**, influence of the **Israeli curricula** and the level of **Education** of the respondents. All these mean that the more trust a person has towards the Palestinians, the more positive is the presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers, the less he or she adheres to ethos of conflict and the more positive is the presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli curricula, the more the person tends to support the peace process. The regression with the older Israeli Arabs presents very similar picture: The strongest predictor is **trust**, then **ethos of conflict**, views on how **Israeli teachers present Palestinians**, then the level of **Education** of the respondents, and finally, the **negative emotions felt towards the Palestinians**. The regression conducted for the younger Israeli Arabs differs. The result shows that the best predictor is the **Palestinian press**, then **experience of violence**, **Palestinian curricula**, **Education** of the respondents, and finally, the **negative emotions felt towards the Palestinians**.
then **Trust**, following by **Education** that the respondent’s children received in school, and finally **Exposure to violence** and conflict.

**Implications**

The present study unveils the roots of distrust in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. **The study shows that although the exposure to violence and experience of violence have some effect on trust, the primary determinants are the socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs are carrying.** This repertoire includes beliefs, attitudes and emotions. These beliefs and attitudes take the form of stereotypes, ethos of conflict, concerns about antisemitism and holocaust and political orientation. They lead also to cognitive closure, reflected in refusal to acquire information from a Palestinian. This socio-psychological repertoire influences what information receives attention and the way in which it is mentally coded and organized. Next, it functions as an interpretive framework, influencing evaluations, judgments, predictions and conclusions drawn by Israelis. This repertoire is the key determinant of trust. For example, Israeli Jews, who stereotype negatively Palestinians and even delegitimize them, while adhering to ethos of conflict as their ideology, do not trust Palestinians.

What should be of great concern is the well-established findings showing that this repertoire is acquired at the very early age. This is unavoidable, as children learn this repertoire from all agents of socialization, including parents, leaders, television, literature, teachers, social media and schoolbooks. Already in a kindergarten, children acquire negative stereotyping of Arabs/Palestinians and the foundations of the ethos of conflict. The beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict learned by children at an early age remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. They may constitute a part of children’s general worldviews which remains relatively constant across time. Eventually, these will pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

The present study provides indirect confirmation to the forementioned process of socialization and its effects. Comparison of the two groups of the Israeli Jewish sample: younger Jews (18-29 years old) and older (30 years old and above) reveals that in all the indices of the socio-psychological repertoire, younger Israeli Jews are more rightist than older Israeli Jews. Specifically, younger Israeli Jews have less trust towards Palestinians, adhere more to beliefs of ethos of conflict, hold
a stronger negative stereotype of Palestinians, tend more to delegitimize them, are less interested in initiating contact with a Palestinian, express somewhat stronger negative emotions and less positive emotions towards Palestinians, and express stronger opposition regarding the two-state solution than older Jews.

Another interesting finding in the Jewish sample was that younger Israeli Jews, compared to the older sample, are less opened to receive information from a Palestinian about the conflict, worry more about the future of the Jewish character of the state, attribute to the Palestinians and the Palestinians Authority extreme violent aspirations and not surprisingly, they hold extreme rightist preferences for the future relations with the Palestinians.

Finally, we see that while among younger Israeli Jewish respondents, 66% categorize their political orientation as right wing and only 8% as left wing. Examining the older sample shows a more moderate distribution, as 52% of them define themselves as right wing and only 15% as left-wing. When we examined the distribution of different religious groups among Israeli Jews. Not surprisingly, we found that younger Israeli Jewish respondents are “more religious” compared to older respondents. As the younger divide to 17.1% ultraorthodox and 15.6% religious, in comparison to the older generation which divide to 8.9% ultraorthodox and 12.1% religious.

The responses of Israeli Arab respondents were not too different from those of the Israeli Jewish population. Although one might expect in a study examining beliefs and attitudes towards Palestinians as a national category, which includes a majority of the Israeli Arab population, that there should be a distinguished difference in Jewish and Arab views. We found that Israeli Arabs did not differ much with regard to: trust in Palestinians, stereotyping, positive emotions and even with openness to listen to information about the conflict from a Palestinian.

The above, which might seem as confusing results, require further explanation, which we believe can be debunked by the following reasons. The first explanation is based on the notion that Israeli Arabs are going through a process, described in common literature as “Israelization”. Studies find that Israeli Arabs became more and more integrated into Israeli society, especially the middle class and those with professions which require education. They come in contact with the Jewish population, and presumably they are exposed and influenced by their beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict, and as a result accept some of them.
The second explanation is based on a sociological theory, which suggests that minorities tend to accept the views of the majority, to increase their acceptance by the last. Currently, we cannot conclude decisively which explanation is more prominent, and it is also possible that both explain simultaneously the findings presented.

**Summarizing Notes**

In conclusion, the wide and deep scope of our analysis presented in this study, shows an unequivocal picture. The socio-psychological repertoire about Palestinians in the Israeli Jewish society is negative. It includes distrust, negative stereotypes, delegitimization, negative attitudes, negative emotions and negative behavioral intentions. In other words, Palestinian’s repertoire is very negative, as Jews perceive that they strive to wage an armed struggle against the occupation.

We suggest that some of the reasons for such strong distrust, lies in the cultural-societal-political climate of local society, as reflected in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies. These formulate the shared beliefs which affect distrust, they can be found immediately in information conveyed through different channels and institutions regarding the conflict. Nevertheless, most members of society have been exposed to the collective memory through formal institutions of education, society and culture, which mostly embed within various ideologies and political views, where distrust constitutes a central concept. Although, sometimes it is being ascribed with various interpretations and meanings.

**Recommendations**

Change of the negative psychological intergroup repertoire is of crucial significance. After years of homogenous negative stereotyping, including delegitimization, prejudice, fear and hatred, we propose that on the cognitive-affective level, the change requires legitimization, equalization, differentiation and personalization of the rival group members. It requires major changes in perception on a macro level.
The success of such aspirations depends heavily on effective dissemination of new beliefs that could replace common social perception from their roots. It is an essential process, convincing the Israelis and Palestinians to change their socio-psychological intergroup repertoire, from delegitimating the opponent to legitimization, equalization, differentiation and personalization which support the emergence of peaceful relations and reconciliation. In addition, it is important to help new norms to evolve, so new socio-psychological intergroup repertoire could be supported and survive the initial negative political atmosphere. These new norms require legislation which supports their existence, such legislation might even sanction racism and/or illegalize discrimination of the rival group.

Practically, successful changing of the socio-psychological repertoire requires well defined and planned policies on a national level, in which leaders, institutions and the media take an active part. It has to rely on both formal and none formal institutions, means of dissemination, which all should present positive interactions with members of the other group. These policies cannot rely only on statements and speeches, they must be reflected in formal acts, which symbolically communicate changes in the groups relationship with it rival group. The formal acts should take place in various spheres, beginning with formal meetings between representatives of both groups, leaders, establishing formal relations, followed by political, economic and cultural common acts. These acts must be institutionalized and widened so that they can include as many society members, institutions and organizations, as possible. Change in masses psychological perception can also be enhanced by middle-level leaders, such as prominent figures in ethnic, religious, economic academic, intellectual and humanitarian circles. In this process elites play a crucial role; they include those individuals who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements. These individuals should take an important part in initiating and implementing such policies of change. As for the individuals’ close circle, local leaders, businessmen, community developers, local health officials, and educators can play an important role in initiating and implementing the new policies of reconciliation.

Thus, the processes presented have to be implanted to different levels of society, from top to bottom by all types of social leaders. The leaders play an essential role in this process. They set
the climate of relations with the rival group, decisions, policies, and courses of actions, which are seen as instructional directions and models for the masses, especially when they are perceived as epistemic authorities.

It is important to note that the societal campaign for changing the socio-psychological intergroup repertoire, has difficulty in defining unitary objectives and policies and then implement them. This is because in democratic states there is no centralized control over groups, organizations, institutions, and channels of communication. They are free to formulate their own ideas and express them. In democratic societies, the societal campaign depends on the voluntary and free will of the societal institutions and channels of communication, which may decide that change of the socio-psychological repertoire should reflect important values for the society and, therefore, should be socially disseminated. Thus, in democratic societies the process of persuasion is of determinative importance.

A variety of methods to facilitate change of the socio-psychological repertoire have been proposed in social science literature. Some are part of formal policies and some are carried out voluntarily and informally. All however, serve as mechanisms to change society members’ beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in the direction of peace making. They either directly or indirectly transmit information about the rival group and construct new and peaceful relations.

Education is one of the most important methods for changing the psychological repertoire, and for improving the other side’s opinion. This mostly involves using the school system, since its institutions are often the only way for a society to make formal, intentional, and extensive methods to change the psychological repertoire of its members. In order to achieve this objective, schools must provide pupils with knowledge that is in line with principles of eliminating prejudice (for example: about the other group, about the course of the conflict, about future peaceful relations, about conflict resolution, etc.). This is a large-scale endeavor that requires setting educational objectives, preparing curricula, specifying textbook contents, developing instructional material, training teachers and constructing an educational climate that is conducive to the implementation of peace-loving thinking.
Appendixes

Appendix A

Survey Questions of the August 2020 study Used in the Trust project

1. Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution? —V4
   1-Certainly support, 2-support, 3-oppose, 4-certainly oppose, 5-Don’t know/refuse to respond. (DK/NA)

2. Of the following four possibilities about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one you think is preferred most by the majority of the Palestinians? V15
   a) Maintain the status quo
   b) Wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation
   c) Wage an unarmed struggle against the Israeli occupation
   d) Reach a peace agreement with Israel
   e) Other
   f) DK/NA

3. Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:
   It is possible to trust Palestinians? V30
   1-Certainly disagree, 2-Disagree, 3-Agree, 4- Certainly agree, 5-DK/NA

4. How often did the following happen to you?
   1) Never    2) Once     4) Several times     5) Many times

   4-1 How often have you taken part during your army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? V32
4-2 How often have any of your close family members taken part during their army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? V34

4-3 How often have you been hurt in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? V36

4-4 How often have any of your close family members hurt in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? V37
4-5 How often have you witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict? V38

5 When thinking about the education you or your children receive(d) at school, you would say it calls more for (one response only): V41
a. Seeing other side positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.
b. Seeing other side indifferently
c. Seeing other side through negative stereotypes
d. DK/NA

6. Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, you would say it calls more for (one response only): V42
a. Seeing other side positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.
b. Seeing other side indifferently
c. Seeing other side through negative stereotypes
d. DK/NA

7. The following questions try to assess your feelings and concerns or fear regarding relations with Palestinians.
1) Never worried  2) Little worried  3) Much worried  4) Very much worried
7-1 I am worried being harmed by Palestinian terror attacks, rocket fire or war-V43-1

7-2 I worry about losing the Jewish majority in Israel and losing the Jewish character of the state V43-2

8. During the last year, how many times have you faced the following situation
Combined Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls

1) Never  2) once   3) A few times  4) Many times

8-1 I heard about Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums such as the ICC, UN, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad? V44-2

8-2 I heard about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians, either in the media or from personal contacts and experience? V44-3

9. Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following sentences:
   1-Certainly agree  2-Agree  3-Disagree  4-Certainly disagree  5- DK/NA
   9-1 I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians. V 45-1)
   9-2 It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side. V45-2
   9-3 Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of the Palestinian people and will strive to annihilate it if they can. V45-3

10. If you think Palestinians/ are not trustworthy, why? V46 Because
   1. I have had bad personal experiences with them
   2. I do not trust their political aims in the conflict
   3. Their religion and culture
   4. Their leaders cannot be trusted
   5. Their education incites against Israel and Jews
   6. Other: ____________

11. If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian/ people would honor their commitment in that agreement? —V47
   1-yes, 2- no’ 3. DK/NA

12. And do you think Palestinian government would honor its commitment in that agreement? V48
   1-yes, 2- no, 3. DK/NA
13. To what extent would you say each one of the following fosters or diminish trust among the two peoples: V49

1) Foster trust 2) Diminish trust 3) Neither diminish nor foster trust 4) DK/NA

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<tr>
<th>13.1) Israeli current government leadership</th>
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<td>13.2) Palestinian current political leadership in the West Bank</td>
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<td>13.3) Israeli media</td>
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<td>13.4) Palestinian media</td>
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<td>13.5) Israeli school curriculum</td>
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<td>13.6) Palestinian school curriculum</td>
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<td>13.7) Israeli social media</td>
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<td>13.8) Palestinian social media</td>
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14 - And now after we went over the main proposed terms of the two-state solution of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement (demilitarization of the Palestinian state, Palestine and Israel will both be democratic states, equal territorial exchange, the family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel, the end of the conflict, guarantees of implementation by the US & Arab states, and comprehensive regional peace with Arab states, please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general as one combined package V10-13

Appendix B
Constructing Variables for the Study 1

Trust of the Palestinians V 30-(4 levels), V45-1,2,3, (4 levels) V47 (2 Levels)
Support for peace ---V4- (4 levels), V10-13- 4 levels
Support for various options for the future by the Israeli Jews V15
Experiences of violence and conflict V32, V34, V36, V37, V38
Exposure to Palestinian violence V44-2,3 – (4 levels)
Education –View of the Israeli schools of the Palestinians V41 (3 levels)
Education –View of the Palestinian schools of the Israeli Jews V42 (3 levels)
Worrying about being harmed by Palestinians V 43 -1- (4 levels)
Worrying about losing Jewish nature V43-2 (4 levels)
Why cannot rely on the Palestinians –V 46
Sources promoting trust or distrust V 49 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, - (3 levels)
### Questionnaire used in the survey study

**Joint Palestinian-Israeli Poll of Distrust**

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<tr>
<th>Question</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?</td>
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<td>2) Do you think the peace or normalization agreement with the Emirates and with Bahrain contributes to reach an agreement with the Palestinians</td>
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<td>3) Tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:</td>
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<td>1) Certainly disagree  2) Disagree  3) Neither disagree nor agree  4) Agree  5) Certainly agree</td>
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| 3.1) The antisemitism remains strong among the nations of today.          | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3.2) Holocaust cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews. |   |   |   |   |   |
| 3.3) Only powerful military Israel can assure the existence of Israel among surrounding hostile nations. |   |   |   |   |   |
| 3.4) The ongoing Palestinian violence shows clearly that the Palestinians desire to exterminate Israel and not to stop the occupation. |   |   |   |   |   |
4) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

1) Certainly disagree   2) Disagree   3) Neither disagree nor agree   4) Agree   5) Certainly agree

5) The following questions try to assess your view regarding Palestinians / Israelis education:

1) Very negatively   2) Little Negatively   3) Neither negatively nor positively   4) little positively   5) very positively

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<td>5.1) When thinking about the education at school how in your view the Israeli teachers present the Palestinians.</td>
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<td>5.2) Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian curriculum and schoolbooks present the Israelis.</td>
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<td>5.3) Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian teachers present the Israelis.</td>
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6) When thinking about the education you or your children receive(d) at school, you would say it calls more for (one response only):

1. Definitely seeing Palestinians positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.
2. Somewhat seeing Palestinians positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.
4. Seeing Palestinians through negative stereotypes and labels.
5. Definitely seeing Palestinians through negative stereotypes and labels.
6. DK/NA

7) Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, you would say it calls more for (one response only):

1. Definitely seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.
2. Seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights.
4. Seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels.
5. Definitely seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels.
6. DK/NA

8) To what extent did any of the following influence your views about Palestinians:
1) None  2) To a small extent  3) Neither small nor large extent  4) To some extent  5) To a Large extent

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<th>8.1) Members of your family</th>
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<td>8.2) Teachers at school or university</td>
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<td>8.3) Textbooks you read at school or university</td>
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<td>8.4) Friends</td>
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<td>8.6) Social media and Internet</td>
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<td>8.7) Political Leaders</td>
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<td>8.8) Religious leaders</td>
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9) How true is this of Palestinians?
1) Not true at all  2) Not true  3) Neither true nor untrue  4) Somewhat true  5) Very true

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<th>9.1) …are peaceful.</th>
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<td>9.2) …are violent.</td>
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10) Psychological studies show that individuals tend to attribute different levels of humaneness to people of different groups. The following scale represents the level of humaneness of the Palestinians. 0 represents lack of humaneness and 100 represents very high level of humaneness. Please choose one number that in your opinion represents the level of humaneness of Palestinians: Please use all the numbers from 0 to 100

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11) To what extent each of the following emotions expresses your feeling towards Palestinians:
1) None  2) To a small extent  3) Neither small nor large extent  4) To some extent  5) To a Large extent

---0

Much not at all
11) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

11.1) Anger
11.2) Hatred
11.3) Fear
11.4) Empathy
11.5) Compassion

12) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

12.1) Groups that are characterized by violent tendencies will never change their ways.
12.2) Every group or nation has basic moral values and beliefs that can't be changed.

13) The following questions try to assess your feelings and concerns or fear regarding relations with Palestinians.

13.1) I am worried of being harmed by Palestinians.
13.2) I am worried about the future of the Jewish character of the state.

14) Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is possible to trust Palestinians:

14.1) Certainly disagree 2) Disagree 3) Neither disagree nor agree 4) Agree 5) Certainly agree

15) If you think Palestinians are not trustworthy, why? Because … [Select the most important factor]

7. I have had bad personal experiences with them
8. I do not trust their political aims in the conflict
9. Their religion and culture
10. Their leaders cannot be trusted
11. Their education incites against Israel and Jews
12. Their personality
13. Other: ______________

63) Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements:

1) Certainly disagree  2) Disagree  3) Neither disagree nor agree  4) Agree  5) Certainly agree

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<td>16.1) It is possible to trust Palestinian leaders</td>
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<td>16.2) I think that Palestinian and Israeli Jews can build trustful relationship in principle</td>
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17) To what extent would you say each one of the following fosters or diminish trust among the two peoples:

1) Greatly diminish trust 2) Somewhat diminish trust 3) Neither diminish nor foster trust 4) Somewhat foster trust 5) Greatly foster trust

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<td>17.2) Palestinian current political leadership in the West Bank</td>
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<td>17.4) Palestinian press</td>
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<td>17.7) Israeli social media</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.8) Palestinian social media</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18) If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian leadership would honor their commitment in that agreement?

1) Definitely no  2) No  3) Neither no nor yes  4) Yes  5) Definitely yes
19) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following sentences:

1) Certainly disagree  2) Disagree  3) Neither disagree nor agree  4) Agree  5) Certainly agree

| 19.1) I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians. |
| 19.2) It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side. |
| 19.3) Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of Israel and will strive to annihilate it if they can. |

20) How strongly do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution?

1) Strongly oppose it  2) Somewhat oppose it  3) Neither support nor oppose it  4) Somewhat support  5) Strongly support it

21) What in your opinion are the long run aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO?

1) Regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war
2) Regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war
3) Conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine
4) Conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel
5) DK/NA

22) And What do you think is the long run aspiration of Israel?

1) Withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security
2) Withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security
3) Annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens
4) Extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens
5) DK/NA

23) Tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or to lose its Jewish nature if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations.
1) Certainly disagree  
2) Disagree  
3) Neither disagree nor agree  
4) Agree  
5) Certainly agree

24) When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future?

1) Never  
2) Rarely  
3) Sometimes  
4) Often  
5) Always

25) The following four possibilities refer to your views about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one is the most preferred to you:

1) Maintain the status quo  
2) Annex the territories or parts of the territories  
3) Wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capability  
4) Reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians  
5) Other  
6) DK/NA

26) Of the following four possibilities about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one you think is preferred most by the majority of the Palestinians?

1) Maintain the status quo  
2) Wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation  
3) Wage an unarmed struggle against the Israeli occupation  
4) Reach a peace agreement with Israel  
5) Other  
6) DK/NA

27) During the last few years, how many times have you faced the following situation?

1) Never  
2) Very few times  
3) A few times  
4) Many times  
5) Frequently

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27.1) I heard about anti-Israeli taking action against Israel in international forums such as the ICC, UN, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.2) I heard about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians, either in the media or from personal contacts and experience.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.3) My family home came under rocket attack, or incendiary balloons landed in our land, or you were asked to stay in a bomb shelter.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28) How many people in your family, friends, or acquaintances have been killed in violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

1) No one  
2) One  
3) Two  
4) 3-5 people  
5) More than 5 people
29) How often did the following happen to you?
1) Never    2) Once    3) Twice    4) 3-5 times    5) More than 5 times

29.1) How often have you taken part during your army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

29.2) How often have any of your close family members taken part during their army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

29.3) How often have you seen in the TV or in the mass media reports of a harm carried by the Palestinians?

29.4) How often have you witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict?

29.5) How often have you witnessed personally a harm carried by the Palestinians?

30) To what extent are you willing to exchange views and information with Palestinian sources regarding the conflict?
1) None extent    2) To a small extent    3) Neither small nor large extent    4) To some extent    5) To a Large extent

31) To what extent are you ready to hear Palestinian sources and receive new information about the conflict?
1) None extent    2) To a small extent    3) Neither small nor large extent    4) To some extent    5) To a Large extent

32) Have you ever had a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance (חבר, מכר, ידיד) now or in the past?
1) Yes    2) No

33) Would you like to have a Palestinian friend or personal acquaintance that you could meet in person or by phone/zoom to explain your positions and hear their ideas?
1) Very much want to    2) Somewhat want to    3) Neither want nor do not want to    4) Do not really want to    5) Strongly do not want to

34) I will read you some statements related to your household income. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
1) Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save.
2) Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties.
3) Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs.
4) Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs.
5) DK/NA
35) In terms of political opinions, which of the following describes you best
   1) Left
   2) Moderate left
   3) Center
   4) Moderate right
   5) Right

36) How interested are you in politics?
   1) Very interested
   2) Interested
   3) Quite interested
   4) Not quite interested
   5) Not interested

37) To what extent do you trust information stemming from the Israeli media regarding the
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
   1) None  2) To a small extent  3) Neither small nor large extent  4) To some extent  5) To a Large extent

38) How important is religion in your life?
   1) Very important
   2) Important
   3) Not important
   4) Not important at all
   5) DK/NA

39) Generally, do you see yourself as:
   1) Religious
   2) Somewhat religious
   3) Not religious
   4) DK/NA

40) (Israeli Arabs only): Are You?
   1) Moslem
   2) Druze
   3) Christian
4) Other

*(Israeli Jews Only): Are You?*

1) Haredi (ultra-orthodox)
2) Religious
3) Traditional
4) Secular
5) DK/NA

41) What is your Gender?
   1) Male
   2) Female

42) What is your age? _____

43) What is your place of Residence?
   1) Major cities
   2) Neighborhoods / cities of development
   3) Kibbutzim/ Moshavim/ Moshavot
   4) Jewish settlements in Yehuda and Shomron

43) What is your education?
   1) 1-6 years of schooling
   2) 7-9 years of schooling
   3) 10-12 years of schooling
   4) 13-14 years of schooling
   5) 15-18 years of schooling
   6) 19-21
   7) 22-28
Appendix D

Phases of the analyses of the collected data

Phases 1: Construction of the variables

The first phase required constructing variables on the basis of the items used in the questionnaire in order to build scales that enable aggregation of the items that measure the same constructs. This construction required also an assessment of the reliability of the constructed variables, that is to measure whether the items constitute consistently the same variable. This assessment was done with the test called Cronbach alpha. The test indicated that while a variable was constructed with several questionnaire’s items constituting a scale, in other cases two items constituted the same variable. in some cases, a single item was considered a variable.

Phase 2: Calculation of means and standard deviations.

On the basis of the constructed variables, we were able to calculate means and standard deviation for each variable for the following populations:

Phase 3: Calculations of the differences among the groups

In the third phase we examined differences among the different populations of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs (general population, older and younger) in the sample of the participants in the study. This phase compared the different groups with statistics of ANOVA test and then to find differences between the groups, a TUKEY test was performed. In case that a difference was examined between two groups T tests were carried.

Phase 4: Calculations of relationships between the variables

The fourth phase moved to simple statistics of calculating relationships (correlations) between different variables in different populations. When the data was not numerical, we performed cross tabs in order to find relationship between the variables of interest.

Phase 5: Examination the variables that affect the trust.

The fifth phase was done to examine the major goal of the study: To determine what kind of variables affect the trust of the Israelis towards Palestinians? These analyses required more
advanced statistical test, namely, hierarchical regression that indicates clearly which variables determine the trust, and even to what extent.

Hierarchical regression is a way to show if variables used in the survey explain a statistically significant amount of variance in the variables after accounting for all other variables. This is a framework for model comparison rather than a statistical method. In other words, the hierarchical regression analysis is a reliable method of identifying which variables have impact on trust. The process of performing a regression allows confidently determine which variables matter most, what is the strength of their influence and which variables can be ignored. We report only the significant results of the regressions. If the variable does not appear in the report, it means that its effect is not significant.

Phase 6: Examination of variables that affect the support of peace process.

The last phase was designed to examine the variables, including trust, that determine the support for the peace process. In this phase we also used hierarchical regression that selects the influencing variables.
Appendix E  
Construction of the Variables of the Study

In order to carry the analyses, we had to construct the variables of the study. The following variables were constructed and we report only the ones that the test of reliability was high (above .70), indicating high consistency among the items, meaning that they belong to the same group. We also used 5-point scale with each of the variable.

**Trust towards Palestinians.** The main variable of the study, trust, was eventually constructed by combing items that measured trust towards Palestinian people and trust towards Palestinian leaders because Israeli Jews did not differentiate between these two entities. Thus, the variable included the following items

The ongoing Palestinian violence shows clearly that the Palestinians desire to exterminate Israel and not to stop the occupation.

I think that Palestinian and Israeli Jews can build trustful relationship in principle

I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians.

It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side.

Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of Israel and will strive to annihilate it if they can.

It is possible to trust Palestinian leaders

If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian leadership would honor their commitment in that agreement?

In addition, the questionnaire included a nominal question: **If you think Palestinians are not trustworthy, why? Because .... [Select the most important factor]**

14. I have had bad personal experiences with them
15. I do not trust their political aims in the conflict
16. Their religion and culture
17. Their leaders cannot be trusted  
18. Their education incites against Israel and Jews  
19. Their personality  
20. Other: ______________

**Experience of violence.** This variable included various items that referred to different kind of direct personal experiences –

- My family home came under rocket attack, or incendiary balloons landed in our land, or you were asked to stay in a bomb shelter.

- How many people in your family, friends, or acquaintances have been killed in violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

- How often have you taken part during your army service (compulsory, career military personnel, reserve) in violent incident(s) related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

- How often have any of your close family members taken part during their army service

- How often have you witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict?

- How often have you witnessed personally a harm carried by the Palestinians?

**Exposure to violence and to the conflict** assembled items that indicated indirect either seeing or hearing about Palestinian violence.

- I heard about anti-Israeli taking action against Israel in international forums such as the ICC, UN, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad.

- I heard about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians, either in the media or from personal contacts and experience.

- How often have you seen in the TV or in the mass media reports of a harm carried by the Palestinians?
Perception of the effects of the education on the views of the other side

Items that measured the effect of education were of three kinds. a. An item that measured the perception of the presentation of the Palestinians by the Israeli teachers (When thinking about the education at school how in your view the Israeli teachers present the Palestinians). b. an item that assessed presentation of Palestinians by the Israeli educational system as having legitimate needs and rights and c. three items that measured the view of the Israelis about the presentation of the Israelis in the Palestinian educational system (Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian curriculum and schoolbooks present the Israelis; Based on your best knowledge of Palestinian education system, how in your view the Palestinian teachers present the Israelis; and assessed presentation of Israelis by the Palestinian educational system as having legitimate needs and rights).

The next item is problematic from the point of view of the Israeli Jews. It refers to the presentation of Palestinians by the Israeli educational system as having legitimate needs and rights. Legitimate rights and needs indicate justness of the Palestinian goals. Israeli Jews refrained from this recognition.

Then comes the variable that assesses the view of how the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis. Israeli Jews believe that the Palestinian educational system presents Israelis negatively (between very negatively and little negatively).

Influence of various sources on the views of the Palestinians

Then the questionnaire had a number of items that asked about the influence of various sources on views of the Palestinians but they did not provide the direction of the influence. Five sources were noted: social environment (Family members and friends), educational system (teachers and textbooks): media (mass media and social media); political leaders and religious leaders.

The next eight items asked similar questions with the direction. To what extent would you say each one of the following fosters or diminishes trust among the two peoples: Each of the items referred to a different source of influence: Israeli leadership, Palestinian leadership, Israeli media, Palestinian media, Israeli curricula, Palestinian curricula, Israeli social networks and Palestinian social networks.
Psychological variables

The next part included a series of scales that assessed psychological variables. These variables are of special importance because they provide the glasses through which individuals evaluate their experience and information. Every perception from the outside world is processed by mind that gives meaning and interpretation to what was seen. In addition, it is the mind that creates impressions and judgments on the basis of the stored knowledge, attitudes and values. The following variables were measured:

Two items about the views about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust (The antisemitism remains strong among the nations of today and Holocaust cannot be forgotten and should serve as a lesson for Jews).

Four items of ethos of conflict\textsuperscript{10} (Despite Israelis will for peace, Palestinians forced on them again and again violence; The Palestinians are just as much victims of the conflict as Jews are; The need for a state for the Jews, which results from the fact that they were living in their homeland two thousand years ago, does not contradict the right of the Palestinian for their own state in part of this country; and It is possible to find among the Palestinians a moderate segment that wants to end the conflict). Support for ethos of conflict indicates an adherence to conflict supporting narratives that justify continuation of the conflict as kind of ideology.

Two items measuring the stereotypic perception of the Palestinians: they are peaceful and they are violent. Changing the direction of the second time, the results showed that in general Jews have a negative view of the Palestinians. They rejected the perception that Palestinians are peaceful and non-violent

Measure of delegitimization\textsuperscript{11}: Psychological studies show that individuals tend to attribute different levels of humaneness to people of different groups. The following scale represents the

\textsuperscript{10} Ethos of conflict is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future in the contexts of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013).

\textsuperscript{11} Delegitimization is defined as "categorization of a group, or groups, into extremely negative social categories that exclude it, or them, from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or
level of humaneness of the Palestinians. 0 represents lack of humanness and 100 represents very high level of humanness.

**Social distance** with one item assessed the readiness to have a Palestinian friend or acquaintance and share views about the conflict Jews are somewhat indifferent to the possibility of having a contact with a Palestinian.

**Negative emotions** towards the Palestinians were measured with three items: Anger, hatred and fear- on a scale of 5-points.

**Positive emotions** towards the Palestinians were measured with two items: Empathy and compassion.

The variable of **malleability**\(^\text{12}\) assessed with two items the extent to which respondents believe that the group’s characteristics are fixed (Groups that are characterized by violent tendencies will never change their ways; Every group or nation has basic moral values and beliefs that can't be changed).

The variable **openness** assessed the extent to which the respondent is opened to be exposed to Palestinian views (readiness to exchange views and information with Palestinian sources regarding the conflict and readiness to hear Palestinian sources and receive new information about the conflict? This is an important variable that indicates the level of opens of the groups to hear information from Palestinian sources about the conflict.

Then the questionnaire included a number of variables that consisted of one item.

**Concern with the Israeli Palestinian conflict** (Are you concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?)

Measure of the **effect of normalization agreement with the Gulf’s Arab States** with the item:
Do you think the peace or normalization agreement with the Emirates and with Bahrain contributes to reach an agreement with the Palestinians?

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values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserve maltreatment” (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012, p. 30).
Measure of the assurance of Israel’s existence with the item -Only powerful military Israel can assure the existence of Israel among surrounding hostile nations.

Measure of worrying about being harm by the Palestinians was assessed with the item I am worried of being harmed by Palestinians.

Measure of worrying about the future of the Jewish character of the state was assessed with the item I am worried about the future of the Jewish character of the state. This measure is of special importance because it indicates the level of uncertainty a respondent feels about the future of the state as defined by Jews—Jewish state. Measured on a scale of 5 points from 1 indicating “never worried” and 5 indicating “very much worried”.

Measure about the choice of the nature of the state of Israel was assessed with the item Israel will have to choose between Apartheid state or to lose its Jewish nature if it will not choose the solution of two states to two nations. The response was given on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 indicating “certainly disagree” to 5 indicating “certainly agree.

Measure of support for the two-state solution was assessed with the item How strongly do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution? The responses on a 5-point scale to this item are very revealing with the reference to the previous item. (1 indicates strong opposition, 3 indicates neither opposition nor support and 5 indicates strong support.

Hope was measured with the item: When you think about your life as an Israeli, how many times do you feel that you lose hope for the better future. Jews do not tend to lose hope. In different comparative surveys Jews in Israel were found to be very happy with their life. For example, findings show that Israelis were in eleventh place in the World Happiness Survey of 2018.13

Two nominal items asked about the perceived aspirations of the Palestinians: the first one was: What in your opinion are the long run aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO (choose one)?

1) Regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war

2) Regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war

3) Conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine

4) Conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.

13 https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5481839,00.html
The second one was: Of the following four possibilities about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one you think is preferred most by the majority of the Palestinians?

7) Maintain the status quo
8) Wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation
9) Wage an unarmed struggle against the Israeli occupation
10) Reach a peace agreement with Israel
11) Other
12) DK/NA

Two nominal items asked about the aspirations of the Israelis. The first one was: And What do you think is the long run aspiration of Israel?

1) Withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security
2) Withdrawal from part of the territories it occupied after guaranteeing its security
3) Annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinian citizens
4) Extending the borders of the state of Israel to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expelling its Arab citizens
5) DK/NA

The second one was: The following four possibilities refer to your views about what to do now about Israeli-Palestinian relations, which one is the most preferred to you:

7) Maintain the status quo
8) Annex the territories or parts of the territories
9) Wage a definitive war against the Palestinians in which Israel destroys their military capability
10) Reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians
11) Other
12) DK/NA

Support for Peace-making
To construct this index, the following 4 items were selected:
1. I believe in the peaceful intentions of Palestinians.
2. It is impossible to reach a peace agreement with Palestinians because there is no partner on the other side. (The direction of this item was changed).
3. Palestinians will never accept the existence of the state of Israel and will strive to annihilate it if they can. (The direction of this item was changed).
4. How strongly do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution?

**New trust measure**

Since three first items were taken from the trust index, a new index for trust was constructed that relied on 5 following items:

- The ongoing Palestinian violence shows clearly that the Palestinians desire to exterminate Israel and not to stop the occupation.
- Please tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is possible to trust Palestinians:
- It is possible to trust Palestinian leaders
- I think that Palestinian and Israeli Jews can build trustful relationship in principle
- If Israel and the PA reached a peace agreement, do you think the Palestinian leadership would honor their commitment in that agreement?
### Appendix G

#### Tables of the Regressions

**Table 17: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Jews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>1.260 (0.299)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.220</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stereotypes</strong></td>
<td>0.454 (0.037)</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>12.141</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Openness</strong></td>
<td>0.108 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>5.352</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delegitimization</strong></td>
<td>0.004 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>4.111</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Orientation</strong></td>
<td>-0.098 (0.029)</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>-3.344</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exposure to Violence and Conflict</strong></td>
<td>-0.101 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>-3.232</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Educ. System</td>
<td>0.078 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>2.563</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos of Conflict</td>
<td>0.102 (0.042)</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>2.415</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.004 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>2.503</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Education</td>
<td>-0.065 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-2.285</td>
<td>0.023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importance of Religion</td>
<td>0.042 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>1.895</td>
<td>0.059</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holocaust &amp; Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>-0.062 (0.037)</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-1.682</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 18: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Older Jewish respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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### Table 19: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Younger Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.022 (0.361)</td>
<td>5.598</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>.0323 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>8.077</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>0.099 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>4.787</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegitimization</td>
<td>0.004 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>3.707</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Unstandardized Coefficients</td>
<td>Standardized Coefficients</td>
<td>T-Stat</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Education System</td>
<td>0.103 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>3.702</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Religion</td>
<td>0.073 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>3.490</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Education</td>
<td>-0.102 (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>-3.653</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.087 (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-2.910</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of Violence</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-2.955</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Violence</td>
<td>-0.070 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>-2.370</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Curricula</td>
<td>0.050 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>2.098</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Arabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.796 (0.302)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.641</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Media</td>
<td>0.187 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>6.030</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>0.167 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>4.087</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>0.204 (0.060)</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>3.399</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.108 (0.038)</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>-2.797</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>0.079 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>2.391</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Education</td>
<td>0.097 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>2.760</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Religion</td>
<td>0.071 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Older Arab respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.429 (0.344)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.152</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Media</td>
<td>0.216 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>6.466</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>0.200 (0.043)</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>4.608</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.170 (0.042)</td>
<td>-0.311</td>
<td>-4.024</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Education 1</td>
<td>0.077 (0.038)</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>2.019</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: The Effect of Variables on Trust Among Young Arabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.737 (0.577)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>0.410 (0.093)</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>4.417</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Media</td>
<td>0.196 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>3.779</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>0.127 (0.053)</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>2.379</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Emotions</td>
<td>-0.141 (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>-2.079</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 23: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.353 (0.326)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.152</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.344 (0.051)</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>6.781</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos of Conflict</td>
<td>0.271 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>6.944</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>-0.211 (0.042)</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>5.083</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.100 (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-3.368</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Violence</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.028)</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>-3.483</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Leadership</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-3.259</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>-0.074 (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-2.165</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>2.224</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Younger Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.447 (0.416)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.474</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.413 (0.065)</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>6.306</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos of Conflict</td>
<td>0.191 (0.053)</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>3.616</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>0.140 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>2.705</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 25: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Older Jewish Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.235 (0.336)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.673</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.360 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>6.297</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos of Conflict</td>
<td>0.277 (0.043)</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>6.424</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>0.196 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>4.242</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>-0.103 (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-3.108</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Leadership</td>
<td>-0.088 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-3.338</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>-0.118 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-3.109</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>3.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 26: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Arabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.940 (0.409)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.195</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.396 (0.064)</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>6.185</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education 1 (Israeli Education)</td>
<td>-0.187 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.273</td>
<td>-3.715</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td>0.215 (0.064)</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>3.352</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Curricula Education</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.043)</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>-3.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.110 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>-2.852</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Older Israeli Arab Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.349 (0.480)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.889</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.383 (0.073)</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>5.277</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos of Conflict</td>
<td>0.287 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>3.885</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Education</td>
<td>-0.191 (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
<td>-4.049</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>-2.090</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Emotions</td>
<td>-0.122 (0.061)</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-1.994</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 28: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Younger Israeli Arabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.341 (0.783)</td>
<td>2.991</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Media</td>
<td>0.272 (0.104)</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>2.621</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of Violence</td>
<td>-0.355 (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.438</td>
<td>-3.615</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Curricula</td>
<td>-0.251 (0.100)</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
<td>-2.497</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.304 (0.095)</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>3.210</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Education (Q6)</td>
<td>0.119 (0.043)</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>2.726</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Violence</td>
<td>0.178 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>2.081</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 29: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Right-Oriented Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (s.d)</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.858 (0.287)</td>
<td>2.986</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos of Conflict</td>
<td>0.257 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>4.916</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>0.251 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>4.625</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.228 (0.069)</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>3.287</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 30: The Effect of Variables on Support for Peace Among Left & Center-Oriented Jews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(s.d)</td>
<td>(s.d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.670 (0.361)</td>
<td>1.858</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.508 (0.066)</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>7.690</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td>0.321 (0.060)</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>5.368</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Emotions</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-2.803</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust and Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>-0.108 (0.048)</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-2.260</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>0.065 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>2.060</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report is part of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Project on “Mapping Sources of Mutual Distrust in Palestinian-Israeli Relations” funded by the European Union (EU). The joint surveys were funded by the European Union (EU), with additional funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP. The content does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the other donors.