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The Day After: paper #6



The Repercussions of the PNA's collapse on Infrastructure Services

Dr. Abdel Rahman Tamimi

Comments by **Dr. Shaddad Attili & Yahya Arafat**

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Dr. Abdel Rahman Tamimi

Dr. Tamimi Has a PhD and Bsc in water resources engineering, an MS in Geological Engineering and an MA in International Studies. Dr. Abdel Rahman Tamimi is the Director of the Palestinian Hydrology Group, a lecturer at Al-Quds University, and a member of the academic committee for its post graduate program. Dr. Tamimi's expertise emphasizes water security, water policy, water institutions, social conflicts, integrated water management and water & environmental conflicts in the Middle East. He has coordinated many international research projects. Dr. Tamimi is a specialist in the field of water resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. During the last 20 years his activities have focused around water resources management and planning at the regional and national levels. Dr. Tamimi contributed to the development of the negotiation strategy for the Palestinian delegation in the multi-lateral talks, and has participated in all negotiation rounds.

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P. O. Box 76, Ramallah, Palestine

Tel: +970-2-2964933

Fax: +970-2-2964934

pcpsr@pcpsr.org

www.pcpsr.org

The Repercussions of the PNA's collapse on Infrastructure Services

This paper is one amongst ten such papers prepared within the Palestinian center for policy and survey research's initiative titled, "The day after". The initiative aims to study the circumstances that would face Palestinian politics and society in a situation in which the PA becomes unable to carry out its role. These papers examine the consequences of the dissolution or collapse of the PA on a number of central issues that concern the Palestinians, which include: security, economy, education, health, judiciary, telecommunications, basic services such as water and power, local government, political and civil conditions, as well as the future of the two-state solution.

These papers examine the significance and implications of PA's absence as well as possible options that could be adopted to mitigate the negative effects of such an absence and develop specific recommendations for the sector in question. Two experts have commented on each of these prepared papers. Each paper was presented and discussed in a workshop attended by policy makers, parliamentarians, experts, and academics.

This initiative has been organized in cooperation with the U.S./Middle East Project and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.

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Summary:

The absence of the PNA could be due to any of the following reasons, each with its own effects on the infrastructure sector:

1. **Shortage of finances:** This would lead to the inability of municipalities, village councils and water/power companies to pay their dues as a result of citizens failure to pay their own dues, which would lead to a collapse in services, especially in areas greatly dependent on Israel in securing their water and power. This could lead to an increase in built up social tension due to a shortage in services, resulting in the disbanding of many municipal and village councils leading to a progressively growing chaotic state.
2. **Dissolution of the PNA without an alternative:** This would have catastrophic outcomes; especially taking into consideration that the direct beneficiaries would oppose this possibility. If it is ever to materialize, it would cause a state of chaos that would lead to a collapse in basic services (water, power).
3. **Internal conflict within Palestinian society:** This would lead to diminishing the PNA's legitimacy and bring immense confusion to infrastructure management. Israel would attempt to seize this opportunity and fuel the conflict among the Palestinian factions by using water and power to enhance tribalism/factionalism and grant one party some advantages at the expense of the other.
4. **Decision by occupation authorities:** Israel is not interested in dismantling the PNA, but rather in keeping it weak, which could render the PNA unable to address the growing need for water, approximately 500 million m³, which could instigate severe protests.
5. **Outbreak of a third Intifada:** This is a weak possibility, however, in case it does occur, many communities would refrain from paying their water and electricity bills, which would lead to cutting off of services to these communities. This in turn would lead to a progressive and gradual collapse of the PNA as it would not be able to curb the uprising on one hand, nor would it be able to face Israeli pressure on the other hand.

If the PNA is absent for any reason of the above, there are multiple scenarios concerning the administration of services, and they are:

Takeover by Israeli authorities: This would lead to a collapse of the PNA's institutional structures, and a restructuring of service provision mechanisms, especially in the water sector. This would accompany an expansion in the authorities given to Mekorot and Israel Electricity Co. There would be total Israeli control over the amount of water provided to Palestinian communities, and would grant an effective role to Palestinian staff at the civil administration.

Return of Jordanian authorities (*a la* holy sites): Or through any other framework chosen by Palestinian factions, or international administration through the United Nations or the European Union. All of these mechanisms are dependent on Israeli approval.

Progressive incorporation of services with Israeli settlements: This mechanism is almost in effect already. Technical incorporation of power and water networks with settlements is very easy.

Chaos: This would have catastrophic effects on service management and create countless social problems.

If the PNA is absent, there are many Palestinian parties that could play a role in providing services to citizens, to a varying degree, including: Civil society organizations, local government bodies, international organizations and the private sector.

Recommendations:

- Great dependence on existing structures (water authorities, electricity companies and municipalities) and work on strengthening them further.
- Enhance the role played by CSOs and social powers (and factions if possible) to be the main alternative protecting the infrastructure on one hand and supporting service providers on the other hand.
- Secure international logistical and financial cover, hold Israel accountable for provision of water and electricity and avoid falling under Israeli punishments.
- Form a higher council to guarantee the continuation of services, provided that it would not be politicized and has social legitimacy.
- Haste in the development of power providers to become power producers, and the continuation of the centralization of services through joint service councils.

1. Introduction:

Despite the lack of absolute evidence indicating the likelihood of PNA collapse, there are indicators that must be taken into account. These indicators inform us that this collapse would not necessarily be the result of someone's decision. Large structures do not collapse with a decision, but through visible or invisible cracks. Indicators that may draw attention to and give subtle hints that the PNA is in a state nearing collapse include:

- Social indicators: Feelings of persecution and marginalization and the growth of non-political violence.
- Economic indicators: Increase in poverty and the absence of balanced economic development.
- Political indicators (most crucial): Absence of legitimacy in the eyes of a large sector of the population, deterioration of public services, political deadlock, failure of the national project, domination of security agencies, weak political factions, growth of non-politicized elites, foreign interference in domestic affairs and failure to renew the Legitimacies of different institutions.

Therefore, we can comprehend that many factors –with more than one form- could contribute to the mechanisms of the PNA's collapse. Therefore there are a myriad of considerable possibilities for the repercussions of this collapse, each according to its mechanism, form, influence, duration and other factors.

This study aims at clarifying the possible impacts brought on by the PNA's collapse on infrastructure, especially the water and power sectors, which are key needs. The study will also show the institutional mechanisms that might arise from the attempt to adapt with such a collapse, as well as their pros and cons in filling the resulting vacuum.

2. The repercussions of the PNA's collapse on Palestinian infrastructure

Authority, in the general sense, is a tool which regulates the interactions between the components of the context which it controls; therefore its absence is an event that brings uncontrolled consequences. However, the past experiences of societies during times of crisis reveals that the political system is replaced with a social one resulting from mechanisms of self-adaptation similar to the 'self-management' models known to societies in post collapse stages.

The structure of authority in Palestinian society is intricate. There is the PNA on one hand and the Israeli occupation on the other hand, which paves the way for complex and wide ranging repercussions. These repercussions necessitate a call for a theoretical framework in order to adjust the pace of possibilities arising from a collapse.

We reckon that mixing the political/social adaptation theory with the 'future wheel' method is the most effective way in anticipating the consequences of collapse on any of society's sectors, including infrastructure.

3. Methodology

The adaptation theory revolves around the connection between the collapse mechanism or the absence of authorities on one hand, and the self-management and adaptation mechanism on the other hand, and through the following dimensions:

1.3 Determination of the authorities' absence mechanism, which culminate in the following possibilities:

- a. Shortage of finances.
- b. Dissolution of the PNA without an alternative.
- c. Internal conflict within Palestinian society.
- d. Decision by occupation authorities.
- e. Third Intifada (new uprising).
- f. A combination of factors (or what future studies call: synergy).

The consequences arising from each possibility are observed on the infrastructure.

2.3 Brainstorming for possible potential adaptation mechanisms: Such as the management of public bodies, which could be handled by:

- a. The occupation authorities.
- b. Jordan (*a la* holy sites).
- c. International administration through the UN, the Arab League, an Islamic country (i.e.: Turkey) or the European Union.
- d. Palestinian factions (electing a substitute for public bodies' management, or multiple local managements in each province).
- e. Progressive incorporation of services with Israeli settlements.
- f. International organizations following the declaration of the West Bank as a disaster area (different from item c above).
- g. Chaos.

3.3 Collapse mechanism, which could be through:

- a. Gradual absence of the PNA (such as disbanding management of political nature, not administrative systems in charge of bodies).
- b. Sudden collapse of all systems.

3.4 Application of the 'future wheel' through:

- a. Placing each of the seven possibilities in the second tier of the wheel, then arranging 3-4 results for each possibility, which in turn generate their own consequences according to the length of time predicted.
- b. Putting together a matrix to determine the interactions between the final consequences recorded in the wheel.

First possibility: shortage of finances

The likelihood of this option depends on many fundamental factors such as diminished legitimacy and, consequently, the severe shortage and deterioration of economic/social conditions. This would result in negative impacts on the PNA's institutional structure, which in turn would lead to:

1. Inability of municipalities, village councils and water/power companies to pay their dues as a result of citizens failure to pay their own dues, which has happened many times before, only this time the problem will be much deeper, causing the collapse of services and the insufficient provision of basic needs (water, power, fuel).
2. Water and power cutoffs in many provinces and areas. Areas that greatly depend on Israel will be affected the most (Hebron, Ramallah, Jerusalem countryside, Bethlehem) followed by other areas when it comes to electricity.
3. Built up social tension due to a shortage in services, resulting in the disbanding of many municipal and village councils. This would lead to a progressively growing chaotic state.

Second possibility: Dissolution of the PNA without an alternative

If such a possibility were to occur, which seems the least possible based on discussions with many politicians, it would have catastrophic outcomes; especially taking into consideration that the direct beneficiaries would oppose this possibility. Moreover, the nature of the PNA structure would prevent that from happening (fears for self-interest and of the unknown). If this (low probability/high risk) possibility is ever to materialize, it would cause a state of chaos that would undermine basic services (water, power) as the providers would stop operating.

Third possibility: Internal conflict within Palestinian society

A failure to reach a consensus on renewing the future role played by the PNA with a domestic agreement and the ensuing intra Palestinian conflict would diminish the PNA's legitimacy and bring immense confusion to infrastructure management. Israel would attempt to seize this opportunity and fuel the conflict among the Palestinian factions by using water and power to enhance tribalism/factionalism and grant one party some advantages at the expense of the other.

Fourth possibility: Decision by occupation authorities

A revision of Israel's history with the PNA reveals that Israel is not in favor of PNA collapse, but it is keen to keep the PNA weak (through methods such as the tax affair). Keeping it vulnerable without the need to dismantle it. This would weaken services and infrastructure development, and will render the PNA unable to address the growing need for water (It is expected that Palestinians need for water would be approximately 500 million m³), which would instigate severe protests that might force the PNA to dismantle itself. This amount of water would be impossible to provide in light of Israeli domination, which would aim to turn Palestinians into clients for Israel's Mekorot Water Company and the Israeli Electricity Company.

Fifth possibility: Third Intifada (new uprising)

All political and social data indicate that there is a weak possibility for such an option due to the following reasons:

1. Negative results and disposition still lingering in the Palestinian collective memory from the second Intifada (uprising).
2. PNA's reluctance towards this option.
3. Israel's ability to adapt with this option.

However, in case it does happen, many communities would refrain from paying their water and electricity bills. This would lead to:

- Water/power cutoffs.
- Progressive and gradual collapse of the PNA as it would not be able to curb the uprising on one hand (for political and domestic reasons) nor would it be able to face Israeli pressure on the other hand.

Sixth possibility: Combined factors (or what future studies call: Synergy)

A Combination of any of the following reasons could be the key element that propels the PNA's collapse:

- Political deadlock and failure of the national project.
- Diminished political and social legitimacy.
- Insufficient finances and inability to fulfill commitments.
- Internal conflict.
- Severe crisis amongst Palestinian factions.
- Emerging new powers in society demanding PNA dissolution.
- Israel's desire to annex the Jordan Valley and large territories of 'C' areas.

These reasons combined, or some of them, will necessarily mean the collapse of the PNA and causing great confusion to infrastructure services. Consequences of which depend on adaptation mechanisms which will be discussed later.

4. Sectors affected

It is clear that all aspects of life will be affected as a result of the PNA's collapse, whereas water and power sectors will be the most affected as they are directly tied to daily life.

1.4 Water:

Many successive authorities have been in charge of the water sector since the Ottoman era. This sector fell under the jurisdiction of the British, the Jordanians (1948-1967) and finally the Israelis. The latter occupied the entire Palestinian territories over the course of two wars; the 1948 war when Israel seized the upper Jordan River basin, and the 1967 war when all surface and groundwater sources were occupied. An array of military orders was given stipulating that water sources and facilities are state property and cannot be used without permission from the military administration.

The structure of water sector management revolved around the water officer at the civil administration, who controls all water-related issues, as well as placing the West Bank water department (established as part of the responsibilities of the Natural Resources Authority as stated by the Jordanian law 12/1966) under the mandate of the military governor. Responsibilities of which include following up on water provisions to municipalities and water establishments in the West Bank and granting authority to operate water wells to the Mekorot Company. The amount of drinking water reached approximately 27 m³ annually in total, for which distribution is under supervision.

Provision of water to Palestinians was kept in the hands of the municipalities and village councils, such as the Jerusalem Water Authority (established according to law 9/1966) and Bethlehem Water and Sanitation Authority (established in 1972 by military order). Thus, relations with Palestinians were through these establishments.

1993-now:

Israel has not ended its control over water sources, even with the political changes following the signing of the declaration of principles in September 1993 and the transitional agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1995. Article 40 / index III (economic cooperation protocol) of the transitional agreement (Oslo 2) postponed the water rights issue to the final status negotiations.

According to which, the joint water committee was founded to administer water and sanitation projects in the West Bank, whether for Palestinians or for settlements, by giving permissions to such projects. Consent of this committee is associated with the consent of the civil administration, which impeded

project implementation and rendered the committee –according to the Palestinian Water Authority- as an obstacle.

According to the transitional agreement, it was agreed that Israelis would transfer all civil affairs to the Palestinians, including the placement of the West Bank Department under the PNA mandate. However, this did not happen, and the Department remained under the supervision of the water officer at the civil administration.

With the advent of the PNA, the presidential decree 90/1995 on the establishment of the water authority, the water law 2/1996 and the amending law 3/2002 were issued to develop water sources management, increase capacity, improve quality and protect against pollution. The water authority was given jurisdiction to manage water sources.

The water authority prepared infrastructure blueprints for water and sanitation, and dug water wells with huge budgets financed by donor countries. Additionally, 12 wells were dug and handed to the West Bank Water Department, where the latter recruited more staff and added them to those recruited during the civil administration era as part of the development plan. However, refusal of the civil administration to transfer authorities of the West Bank Water Department to the PNA pushed the council of ministers into a unilateral decision in 2010 to move staff appointed by the civil administration to the Water Authority and consider them civil servants. The follow up of that decision was weak, which resulted in two water departments; one with Israeli civil administration and the other with the PNA.

Regarding service provision, respective authorities were given to municipalities, village councils, Jerusalem Water Authority and Bethlehem Water and Sanitation Authority. All of which get water from the West Bank Water Department (estimated at 49 m³ in 2011), in addition to some wells supervised by municipalities such as Nablus and Tulkarm.

The amounts of water provided to Palestinians remain relatively low. Share per capita in 2011 was 75 liters despite funds the donor countries investments to improve water infrastructure, and this is mainly because of inadequate water supply against demand, and due to restrictions stipulated by the transitional agreement itself.

Israeli domination over the Palestinian water rights, infrastructure and development renders the role played by the PNA in this regard to very limited options.

District	Population-000	Amount of increase outside Israel's control/million m ³	Amounts purchased from Mekorot/million m ³ & percentage (%)
Jenin	275	8,3	19,4 2
Tubas	56	10	28,5 4
Tulkarm	166	14	3,5 5,2
Nablus	340	14	22 4
Qalqilya	98	11	0.5 5,7
Salfit	65	5,2	33 2,7
Ramallah	310	3,08	84 16,6
Jericho	46	25	7 2
Jerusalem	148	8	83 4
Bethlehem	192	4,5	62 7,6
Hebron	625	7,8	81 12,6
	2,145	98,6	29,4 56,7

Table (1): water amount consumed in provinces by source (Water Authority, 2012)

The table above shows that the total drinking water consumption in the West Bank is at 155.3 million m³ (98.6 millions from local sources and 56.7 millions provided by Mekorot). Dependence on the latter reached %36.5, given that the need exceeds 50 million m³ annually.

The table explains that the province which depends on Mekorot the least is Qalqilya (0.5), the highest dependence rates were recorded in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Hebron (more than %80). The rate of Palestinian provinces' dependence on Israel is %29.4. This rate is continuously growing.

Factors affecting any Palestinian provision mechanism:

1. Israel's control over %80 of water sources and %98 of power sources.
2. Steady growth of needs brought by an increase in population, where the West Bank needs an annual increase of %1 in power and %3 in water.
3. Expensive water and power prices if purchased from Israel.
4. The international and regional arenas that might play a substantial role in the success or failure of any Palestinian administration.
5. Local surroundings (factional agreement, level of chaos, nature of local administration).

2.4 Power:

Imported electricity in the Palestinian territories is estimated at around 4.2 million megawatt/hour. 172 million liters of gasoline, 476 million liters of diesel and 122 million tons of liquefied petrol were also imported in 2010 (PCBS, 2010).

The Palestinian territories average consumption of electricity is approximately 266 kilowatt/hr., 46 liters of gasoline, 21 kg of liquefied gas and 10 liters of Kerosene. The table below shows the amounts of energy imported by month and kind.

Table 2 clarifies the distribution of energy consumption rates in the West Bank in particular by province (January 2011).

The Palestinian power sector is managed by municipalities, the Jerusalem District Electricity Company, the North Electricity Company and the South Electricity Company, but all of them import power from the Israeli Electricity Company, and only %2 is imported from Jordan for the Jericho Municipality (table 3).

As for fuel consumed in the West Bank, all of it is imported from Israel, which controls its commercial distribution.

Province	Family consumption rate					
	Electricity (kilowatt/hr.)	Firewood (kg)	Liquefied petrol (kg)	Kerosene (liter)	Gasoline (liter)	Diesel (liter)
Palestinian territories	266	228	21	10	46	102
The West Bank	256	313	24	20	77	113
North WB	220	219	22	15	79	95
Central WB	314	364	23	23	89	170
South WB	244	419	26	22	56	74

Table 2: Family consumption rate of power in the Palestinian territories by province, January 2011. (Power Authority, 2012)

Electricity is imported through 154 linking points between the Israeli companies on one side and Palestinian distribution companies or local government bodies on the other side. It is worth noting that

Israeli settlements also receive electricity from these linking points, which contributes to making them part of the control mechanisms for this sector.

Year	Gaza Consumption				West Bank consumption				Total Consumption - IEC
	Gaza Power Plant	Egypt	IEC	Total Gaza	Other West Bank Areas - IEC	JDECO Area		Total WB	
						IEC	Jordan		
Jan	35,174,720	11,329,500	102,233,590	148,737,810	96,589,112	148,577,298	5,859,500	251,025,910	347,400,000
Feb	26,737,010	11,519,550	97,094,500	135,351,060	73,422,046	130,283,454	5,112,500	208,818,000	300,800,000
Mar	21,424,010	12,820,500	88,241,919	122,486,429	108,363,037	143,095,044	6,421,500	257,879,581	339,700,000
Apr	18,098,770	11,903,850	94,181,453	124,184,073	87,360,857	89,457,690	6,975,000	183,793,547	271,000,000
May	19,627,560	12,110,700	87,398,437	119,136,697	97,239,341	113,262,222	6,362,500	216,864,063	297,900,000
Jun	16,570,490	12,133,800	95,121,771	123,826,061	92,943,315	130,234,914	1,968,000	225,146,229	318,300,000
Jul	19,702,850	14,523,600	82,799,899	117,026,349	130,637,151	133,762,950	4,256,500	268,656,601	347,200,000
Aug	21,870,500	12,297,600	86,632,950	120,801,050	190,969,436	149,197,614	4,425,000	344,592,050	426,800,000
Sep	33,733,630	12,647,250	92,125,353	138,506,233	115,511,477	130,663,170	3,654,500	249,829,147	338,300,000
Oct	35,728,340	10,961,528	80,817,118	127,506,986	117,200,082	130,882,800	3,112,000	251,194,882	328,900,000
Nov	23,298,260	10,795,943	100,898,760	134,992,963	82,858,660	118,442,580	232,500	201,533,740	302,200,000
Dec	33,018,130	11,817,383	86,651,832	131,487,345	106,414,500	154,033,668	0	260,448,168	347,100,000
Total	304,984,270	144,861,204	1,094,197,581	1,544,043,055	1,299,509,015	1,571,893,404	48,379,500	2,919,781,919	3,965,600,000

Table 3: Monthly electricity consumption, 2011 (Power Authority, 2012)

5. Adaptation mechanisms

The long experience and ability gained by the Palestinian people indicate resilience and the ability to adapt with all possibilities. Therefore, potential mechanisms in the wake of the PNA's collapse include:

- **Takeover by Israeli authorities:** This mechanism is not new to the Palestinian people, but it would not necessarily mean that conditions would be the same as before the advent of the PNA. The Israeli administration is still visible and undertakes actions in area 'C'. It will be able to reactivate operations quickly, which will impact infrastructure:

1. Collapse of PNA institutions.
2. Restructuring of service provision mechanisms, especially in the water sector.
3. Expand the authorities given to Mekorot and Israel Electricity Co.
4. Control the amount of water provided to Palestinian communities.
5. Grant an effective role to Palestinian staff at the civil administration.

- **Return of Jordanian authorities (*a la* holy sites):** Jordan can practically arrange to manage public bodies and services, such as the case for holy sites in Jerusalem. However, this mechanism depends on Israel's consent as the party controlling %80 of water sources, %36.5 of water supplies and %98 of power supplies. So, any arrangements done without incorporating Israel are worthless.

- **Electing a substitute body to manage facilities or local departments in each province:** This mechanism also depends on Israel's consent, otherwise, they would be paralyzed and unable to operate (such was the case following the municipal elections of 1976). If the different factions and Israel showed acceptance for this mechanism, the social legitimacy of these departments would be at the lowest level, which would impede their ability to provide services.

- **Progressive incorporation of services with Israeli settlements:** This mechanism is almost in effect already, as there are many Palestinian villages (especially north and south of the West Bank) that share the same water network the settlements use, which fall under Israel's control, and the story is the same for the power grid. Technical incorporation of these networks with settlements is very easy.

- **International administration through the UN, the Arab League, an Islamic country (i.e.: Turkey) or the European Union:** This mechanism is possible but conditioned to Israel's cooperation. The latter might accept this mechanism provided that it does not have any political or sovereignty connotations and only limited to finance.

- **International organizations following the declaration of the West Bank as a disaster area (different from previous item):** With this mechanism, water and electricity would be purchased and paid for only to the civil administration or directly to the Israeli providers, as what happened with Gaza Strip. According to the Israeli vision, international organizations role will only be for finance and relief.

- **Chaos:** This case is not hypothetical as it previously happened in many locations (Somalia and Iraq for instance). Chaos might last for a long time, then an Israeli or international intervention would take place, or one of the mechanisms mentioned above. This would have catastrophic results to service management and create countless social problems.

6. Mechanisms of collapse:

The PNA might collapse by one of the following mechanisms:

- Progressive disappearance of the PNA, which is likely through dissolving departments of political nature and keeping a Palestinian semi-civil administration. An alternative arrangement could be to maintain municipalities and water/power companies as they are.
- Sudden collapse of all departments, which will cause a state of chaos that would:
 1. Terminate services and cause chaos in dealing with local resources, especially water.
 2. Advent of social powers to take control of departments and services.
 3. Israeli intervention to reoccupy and annex the Palestinian territories and start new foundations (such as appointing municipal committees).

7. Determining the consequences of each adaptation mechanism

The consequences have to be systematically determined in order to comprehend the the most feasible and realistic adaptation mechanism, as well as the pros and cons of such. The 'future wheel' and expert opinion polls have been used to that end.

Scenario I: takeover by Israeli authorities.

1. Institutional consequences:

- The civil administration will be in control of the water and power sectors.
- A large of number of staff at water and power authorities might be laid off and even recruited to the civil administration.
- Reactivation of military orders regarding water and power.

2. Consequences to services:

It is clear that services will be provided to Palestinians according to the arising conditions. Since Israel would be in charge of the territories where Palestinians live, it would completely control the services provided. This would not bring substantial change to the status quo of the power sector, and the collapse of PNA water-related bodies (joint service councils and water authorities) would return Palestinians to the situation prior to the advent of the PNA. This would mean that municipalities would remain as the key water providers through Mekorot Co., and services in all provinces where new providers are established will be supervised by the West Bank Water Authority, which still exists within the Israeli military administration. This Department, in coordination with Mekorot Co., would remain the key operator of the services sector (maintenance and daily operations).

As mentioned before, no changes would occur to the power sector. The Israeli electricity company would keep providing services, and Israelis would continue to be the main source of fuel as they are now.

3. Long term consequences:

More Palestinian communities could be linked with settlements, which would make settlers' control of services extremely dangerous.

Scenario II: Electing a substitute body by Palestinian factions to manage facilities, or society's self-organization.

Based on past experience (1976 elections), where national municipal councils were elected, but were then dissolved and replaced by municipal committees by the Israel authorities, this option is fraught with risks of failure that would be reflected in social and economic conditions, especially in services.

This mechanism depends on Israel's attitude on one hand and the domestic agreement not to politicize municipal committees on the other hand. This option might have the following consequences:

1. Failure to reach an agreement between factions and social powers, and the resulting disturbance in service provision.
2. Continuous water and power cutoffs due to vandalism of infrastructure (thefts or illegal subscription), which would lead Israeli companies to terminate services.
3. If this scenario were to take place, it would create mismanagement due to inefficient committees elected or for any other reasons.

Consequences of this option will be much worse for Ramallah, Jerusalem, Hebron and Bethlehem provinces, where Mekorot Co. controls %84, %83 and %82 of the water share respectively. 98% of the power sector in the whole West Bank will be controlled by Israel, except for Jericho (%2).

Scenario III: incorporation of services with Israeli settlements.

This one might be from a practical standpoint the most complicated and difficult, where settlements will be in control of service management. The Israeli government may hand settlers this role in order to grant them legitimacy on one hand, and create a forced normalization between Palestinian municipalities and settlements on the other hand. This will cause a split in Palestinian public opinion on how to deal with these services, and would probably develop into an internal conflict, especially in light of the frustration and skepticism that would arise. Current circumstances already show that there is a great number of Palestinian communities that share the same infrastructure networks with settlements, especially electricity in the north and water in south West Bank.

This option would not only affect the quality of service provision, but it would also bring structural changes to the infrastructure, so that settlers would –with time- have complete control over the main networks and grids. It is not farfetched that settlers would establish their own companies for service distribution and management, as what has already happened in the settlement of 'Ariel', where settlers started a company to move wastewater into Israel proper. Similar methods are intended for use for the Nabi Musa purification plant. It should be mentioned that the purification plant supervised by el-Bireh Municipality also serves the settlement of 'Pisagot', which is built on el-Bireh territory.

Israeli journalist Amira Haas said in an article published in 'Ha'aretz' Newspaper that the PNA, in one way or another, helped in the enhancement of Israel's control over lands in the West Bank. She also said that most of the major infrastructure expansion projects in settlements undertaken from 1995-2008 were granted consent by the PNA. Research conducted by the British researcher Jan Selby, based on 142 meeting minutes of the joint Palestinian-Israeli committee, found that Israeli authorities were always keen to link infrastructure networks of settlements with Palestinian ones. What interests us here, is that the idea of controlling and dominating the Palestinian infrastructure seems to be present in the minds of Israeli decision makers. This has moved to practical steps; settlers seized 30 drinking water springs in the West Bank, and further 26 are about to be seized by declaring their areas prohibited to Palestinians. This will be exacerbated with the growing weakness of the PNA and the increase in settlers, where this might expand the tourist infrastructure of settlements in view of the desire to dominate sources of infrastructure in the West Bank, especially springs.

Scenario IV: Hand responsibilities to international or Arab administration, whether through finance or direct administration.

This mechanism is theoretically possible, but very hard on the practical side. The role played by international organizations may be limited to finance and guaranteeing continuous services by paying the Israelis. Similar to what is taking place with the Gaza Electricity Company, on behalf of which the EU pays for fuel used to generate power.

However, many legal complications might arise from this option, where the international/Arab role was absent following Israel's disengagement from Gaza and Hamas takeover of power. This situation

continued without discussing an international administration as a transitional stage to end the domestic conflict over legitimate government.

This indicates the difficulty of international intervention in case of the PNA collapsing, which would cause living conditions to deteriorate, and would drive the international community to view the whole situation from a humanitarian point of view. In case the PLO decided that the PNA should be dismantled, it would notify the international community which –in turn- might not do anything due to them finding the decision unacceptable, and the intervention would take the form of relief, as mentioned above.

Scenario V: Chaos.

This scenario is perhaps the worst, but incorporates a low probability with a high risk. The central question that is mainly associated with the collapse mechanism is whether it is by a Palestinian decision (less chaos), or an Israeli decision, or by a breakdown of PNA ability. This scenario would bring the following consequences:

- Chaotic service provision and emergence of many social conflicts.
- Growing attacks against infrastructure.
- An increase in the rate of people not paying for services and the termination of said services as a result.
- Dismantling of the PNA might cause the cessation of international assistance and bring about the collapse of many services due to their inability to pay operational and maintenance costs.

8. Role played by the stakeholders following service collapse

Having many service providers in a post collapse scenario would complicate matters greatly, as it is linked with ability and effectiveness, which will be impacted (negatively or positively) with the PNA's collapse. Stakeholders could be divided into six categories:

1. Palestinian civil society organizations (CSO)s: despite their long experience, logistic capabilities and resilient decision making, their experience in water/power provision is very limited, especially when it comes to major communities. The role played by CSOs might be limited to a complementary role to any local government body, it could assist in securing financing for operational and maintenance costs and encourage the international community's direct intervention to guarantee proper services through necessary support, advocacy and fundraising.

2. Local government bodies: They are supposed to play a primary role, and form the main guarantee for sustainability, but this depends on:

- Legitimacy of local government bodies.
- Cooperation of society, especially with the absence of political/social agreement.
- Financial/administrative capacity.
- Israel's desire to keep water and power provision.

Despite all that, local government bodies may be reluctantly favored in the Palestinian context, similar to what happened in the 1970s, when Israel appointed local committees and people dealt with them despite their illegitimacy.

3. International organizations: They might play an essential role in guaranteeing financing and the admission of materials necessary for maintenance and operation, with the consent of Israel and Palestinian society. However, their capabilities would remain limited to basic matters such as the collection of bills, operation/maintenance operations and dealing with attacks against public property and infrastructure.

4. Israel and settlements: Needless to say that the military governor and the settlers are the most important players in the infrastructure sector. Their behavior is what determines to what extent any local administration or international organization could function. They control the water/power sources, where it is possible that settlers will utilize these conditions to expand their area of influence and tighten control over wells and distribution stations.

5. The private sector: The PNA's collapse would prompt great losses in all economic aspects, where the private sector would suffer numerous problems. In the case of infrastructure, it would be unable to:

- Provide spare parts necessary for operation and maintenance.

- Poverty and unemployment arising from the PNA collapse would mean that many households would lose their source of income. This would form a heavy social burden for the private sector to assist in creating infrastructure projects. The private sector would not be able to manage the services sector at all due to lack of experience, fears of failure or absence of the finance necessary to manage these services.

6. Service companies and authorities: These authorities play an important role in the provision of water and power, such as the Jerusalem Water Authority. Their empowerment is extremely important. They operate based on Israel's provision (more than %60 of the population is served this way). This also depends on payment of bills and public protection against attacks targeting infrastructure, which occasionally happened during first and second uprisings.

9. Results

After reviewing these scenarios, and under all of these circumstances, we will find that Israel is the crucial part of service and infrastructure management in the West Bank. This means that application of each and every scenario is theoretically possible, but practically impossible without Israel's consent or cooperation. A scale of 1-5 was set up to test each scenario according to its repercussions, the results were as follows:

It was found through the examination of occurrence likelihood of each scenario that there is a %45.4 chance that Israel would assume responsibility (the highest percentage). The second scenario (linking infrastructure with settlements) received a %27.2 chance. The remaining scenarios (self-administration, international intervention and turmoil) received %3.7, %11 and %12.7 respectively. If we add the likelihood of the first and second scenarios, where Israel controls everything 100%, we find that together these options received a likelihood chance of 72.6%.

These rates were calculated according to the proportion of control over infrastructure and sources.

However, we must address these rates as a part of the political and economic consequences, as well as the regional and international conditions arising in the West Bank and Israeli political balances.

These results are based on two fundamental things; PNA collapse might take many different forms, therefore adaptation mechanisms –and local, regional and international conditions- will also depend on the mechanisms and nature of the collapse. Repercussions may be long-term and short-term, and the development of conditions on the ground will greatly determine the adaptation mechanisms and effects of adaption options.

Accordingly,

1. There would not be a considerable change to services and infrastructure if the Palestinian territories were to be reoccupied. The existing conditions will be very similar to the new situation that will arise from the PNA's collapse.

2. Other options (settlers' takeover of infrastructure, chaos) will be more disastrous to services.

3. In case the first option does not materialize, the essential role of providing services and preventing chaos would be played by local government bodies and CSOs. Social powers may play a bigger role than political factions, which would also suffer from the consequences of collapse.

4. Economic and social conditions that follow the collapse would be central to the ability to deal with service management, in terms of the ability/willingness to pay, legitimacy of municipalities and ability of civil society.

10. Recommendations

After the analysis and revision of different scenarios, taking into account impediments and problems that may originate from and the economic/social deterioration, the following infrastructure management-related recommendations could be deduced:

1. Great dependence on existing structures (water authorities, electricity companies and municipalities) and their empowerment in case of PNA collapse due to a self-made decision or progressively.
2. Enhance the role played by CSOs and social powers (and factions if possible) to be the main alternative protecting the infrastructure on one hand and supporting service providers on the other hand.
3. Secure an international cover (logistics and financing) in case of PNA collapse or dissolution to guarantee sustainability.
4. Hold Israel accountable for provision of water and electricity under all circumstances, while giving special attention to local structures and administrations to avoid Israeli punishments under several pretexts (failure to pay and others).
5. Form a higher council in light of the possible mechanisms to guarantee sustainability, provided that it would not be politicized and has social legitimacy.
6. Give an effective role to CSOs to help in the provision of services through complementing local government bodies.
7. Accelerate development of electricity providers to become power generating companies.
8. Continue the centralization of services through joint service councils.
9. Involve the international community in service issues under humanitarian and human rights pretexts, as this will protect any Palestinian adaptation mechanism.

Comments and Workshop Discussion

Dr. Abd Al_Rahman Attamimi:

There are social and economic indications that point to the possibility of the PNA's collapse . Israel may also give up its support to the PNA or the PLO may release a decree dissolving the PNA. These are just suppositions or incomprehensible cases.

Among the suggested mechanics concerning the authority's absence: Lack of funding. By this, the PNA will not be able to provide services by an intended act to let the PNA bankrupt. This absence may also become through a Palestinian interior conflict as a result of poverty or marginalization. Or it could happen by an interior (Palestinian) or Israeli decision. Finally, the authority's absence can be caused by a third uprising (Intifada) or as a result of all factors mentioned. The possible scenarios (after the PNA's collapse):

1. Israeli occupation will take over all responsibilities as did before the PNA's existence.
2. Jordan may take over some responsibilities as what happened with the religious places in an agreement with the Palestinians.
3. The United Nations may establish an international administration since what is going is service and humanitarian issue.
4. The Palestinian factions will direct the services by a especial administration just as national committees did.
5. Israeli will direct these services through settlements.
6. Considering the West Bank a disastrous area.
7. Chaos.

What will happen with these probabilities:

- Municipalities, local councils, water and electricity companies will not be able pay their debts because people don't pay debts. This leads to the gradual collapse of services. Consequently, the Israeli Occupation companies will cut off these services. As a result, the social crisis will increase.
 - The resignation of the PNA, chaos, the collapse of the basic services, although this option is weak , it will be disastrous.
 - An interior conflict within the Palestinian society that leads to the decrease of services especially if there is more than one political organization (faction) controls west bank.
 - Israel will dissolve the PNA although it doesn't prefer this option , but weakening the PNA .Chaos will not be repeated because Israel is ready for adaptation.
 - A third Intifada (uprising) will start. This probability is very weak. If it happens, many populated areas will stop paying the prices of services which cause cutting off these services or even a graduate collapse of the PNA.
 - All the previous factors mentioned above will cause a great confusion of services of the infra structure. Even worse, a disastrous services situation.

In general, if the Israeli occupation takes responsibility over the Palestinian territories, no change will happen. If Jordan takes the responsibility over them, with the

Palestinian-Jordanian understanding, there will be no essential changes. But if the Palestinian factions take over the responsibility, it will be connected with both the Israeli approval and Palestinian consensus. If the United Nations does, it will need an Israeli approval, and finally, if the Palestinian territories (West Bank particular) are connected Israeli settlements, then it will be an Israeli decision.

To conclude, the active role in all these options is Israel.

Our best option for us (the Palestinians) for adaptation is that Israel occupies and annexes the Palestinian territories, however, the most painful choice is chaos and fear that reoccupation the Palestinian territories is Palestinian request.

Recommendations:

1. Relying on the present structures and reinforcing them concerning municipalities, electricity and water.
2. Activating role of the institutions of civil society towards protecting the infra structure.
3. Guaranteeing an international cover to guarantee continuing services.
4. Asking Israel to hold the responsibility of the supply of services to avoid being under Israeli sanctions if their prices are not paid.
5. Forming a higher council to assure that the continuation of services has a legitimacy and away from politics.

Dr. Shadad Al-Atteeli:

My comment will focus on the issue of the Authority collapse and collapse of services during the political emptiness and the actual absence of the PNA on the ground regardless the reasons; e.g the decision of the Palestine liberation organization to dissolve the PNA, Israeli occupation decision to end the actual existence of the PNA on the ground. My comment will also focus on the scenarios of administrating institutions if the PLO transfers this mission to any one or dissolving the Palestinian authority.

At first, I don't agree with the researcher concerning reasons of the collapse, it would be better if we talk about the collapse of service sector and completely different from talking about the collapse of the authority (vanishing it) and its effect on services. Therefore, the collapse or the deteriorating of services may happen without the PNA collapse and the situation may continue, but services deteriorate and goes from bad to worse. We call this deteriorating, decrease or lack of efficiency and so talking about water and electricity issues completely different from talking about a collapse connected with institutional, legal and political emptiness.

Since the Palestinian Authority has been established, it has experienced all the scenarios that researcher considered it may cause collapse (except the resignation of the Palestinian Authority), but it hasn't collapsed. For example, funding dispersed after forming a consensus government. It didn't also collapse during the second intifada (in 2000) when Israel re-occupied the territories it had withdrawn from (according to Oslo agreement).

Furthermore, it didn't collapse as a result of the interior conflict, but complicated its mission and the Palestinian people has had an authority with two governments on land that is considered by the

PLO as occupied territories whether it is Jerusalem in West Bank or Gaza regardless of Oslo agreement's division to land (A,B ,and C).

I suppose that there are options that must be put into consideration (I can't explain them upon the organizer's request to introduce a brief comment on the research paper) if the PLO decides to dissolve the PNA or Israel ends its real and legal existence on the ground. These options include:

1. The Palestinian liberation organization calls for the administration of local municipalities and service suppliers to continue their mission of providing services to citizen without imposing its control on land. This will cause problems with references of the services Suppliers work in the absence of the Ministries organizing its work with the difficulty of the continuing laws that governed its work in addition to decreasing of the financial sources that services suppliers obtained to support the essential infra structure or provide services because of the disappearance of Paris economic protocol and the international fund. This is also because services suppliers will face the issue of paying the fees of sewage treatment or pay the prices of water, electricity and fuel that are purchased from the Israeli companies to reach an agreement with the so called “ the civil administration” which will impose its military orders by force.
2. The PLO dissolves all institutions including municipalities and creates a new complicated political situation to the Israeli occupation by handing it over the responsibility of education, health, environment, water and energy which mean expanding the range of the civil administration to include all the Palestinian territories and re-annexing the department of West Bank water with reduced employees. This will negatively affect relationship between the major supplier and minor suppliers of service and the Palestinian citizens under occupation. Moreover, it will end subsidizing water, thus, water will be sold by its real running cost, and it will impose on the bodies that receive water supplies to get prices of water back from citizens.
3. Israel resorts to create committees, municipalities or the so called (Rawabit Al-qura) “ spies” which means turning back the Palestinian people to the situation before Oslo agreement which mean huge mess.
4. Suppose that an emptiness caused by non- existence of the legal Authority. It impossible to talk about service sector without considering other sectors that support each other to prevent chaos. For instance, security ,Judiciary sectors and the local government guarantee the minimum services since what guarantees paying cost back for suppliers is legislations, laws, and punishments, however, we will suppose for discussion the non- existence of the PNA to discuss the situations in West Bank and Gaza Strip:
 - The so called “the civil administration” will widely take over responsibility in West Bank, whereas municipalities continue as they were when the authority ended. And managing the daily life of the Palestinian citizens is connected with the PLO decision concerning the call for pursuing managing the daily life or the call for dissolving municipalities and leaving everything to the Israeli occupation force.

- The PNA in Gaza Strip will continue and not collapse, so this collapse will negatively affect Gaza Strip (stopping all forms of funding to different sectors in Gaza). And since “ Hamas movement ” is not a member in the PLO, it will go on in consolidating its authority.
- Forming obstinate powers or policies that lead to create sorts of undesirable obligational co-existence from both sides (the Palestinians and the Israelis) which reinforce all factors of a bi-national state.

Conclusion:

Under the partition of the PNA into two governments that have institutions and infrastructure, we discuss the service sector which suffers bitterly from the continuation of the Israeli occupation that controls everything including water, electricity, fuel and energy. Israeli occupation keeps on exploiting Palestinian natural resources ; Palestinian water rights remains stuck , the joint water committee strictly controls water sector from A to Z even in projects. In addition, all kinds of improvements, implementation and supplies are conditioned by Israeli approval. Therefore, the discussion must focus on putting an end to occupation, Israeli obstacles, administration and funding to keep on and develop services to a sovereign state, not to focus on the alternatives if the PNA collapses or dissolved, especially these alternatives that free Israeli occupation from its main commitments and bear the responsibility for the full cost of its occupation, since the main issues which wasn't solved in the transitional agreement (refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, borders and water) have been complicated by Israel through asking the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state which means, crossing out the 194 resolution, annexing and ” unifying ” Jerusalem, then declaring it as the capital of Israel for ever . It also means Israel controls borders of the West Bank and Gaza strip. Even worse, Israel has said that the Palestinian state mustn't dream of borders with Egypt and Jordan. Furthermore, borders of the Palestinian state must be under the control of Israel. It also pursues building settlements, the separation wall, confiscating land and declared that the Palestinians will not get even a drop of water. Moreover, if they want to drink water, they must buy it from an Israeli water desalination plants. These issues have made the possible a two –state solution illusion.

This is what Mr. Robert Seri assured by saying that what see now is one state on the ground. However, both the Israeli and Palestinian sides refuse it although a front calling for a democratic state for the two peoples has been established recently.

The Palestinian National Organization has taken a decision to dissolve the PNA because Israel has been creating facts on the ground that aim to prevent establishing an independent state, so the PLO postponed a decision to dissolve the PNA. Its chairman said that Oslo (agreement) should lead to a state getting up with the international consensus as expressed in the acceptance resolution of the United Nations as a non-member state. As a result, it is difficult to talk about the PNA collapse without the PLO desire, the responsible organization. ‘ Hamas ’ also has benefitted from the PNA's components and institutions despite its opposition to OSLO agreement by keeping the administrations of the PNA as executive devices in Gaza Strip that have been continuing for the fifth year. Thus, the issue of water and energy is the deficit of supply, not administration. If there is an intention for this, it will aim to make Israel hold responsibility as an occupation force that prevents the establishment of an independent state. This is the first step to implement the only alternative of a two-state solution, that is, one state solution. Therefore, it is difficult that the PLO agrees on the administrative solution which reduces the cost of Israeli occupation legally, all the parties agree that legality of transitional period ended but the political will of different parties have kept the PNA into existence. It has been like a person in the intensive care. On one hand, the

medical equipment keep him alive (by the road map) recovers from dying (Anapolis) and about to get out of the intensive care (A plan of building the state and ending occupation). On the other hand, to turn back to it that obliges doctors to say that a miracle could happen to keep him alive.

Yet, there is still another possible scenario the writer tackled that Egypt and Jordan take services over after water and electricity supply in Gaza has complicated. This may include annexing what is left of the Palestinian people which the separation wall excluded in addition to territories that Israel doesn't want to confiscate, but to annex them to Jordan by force. This may complicate the regional situation.

Therefore, talking about service sector is nonsense but talking about a political change in the whole region this arouses the question of the alternative homeland. However, both the Palestinian and Jordanian sides don't accept it.

Concerning annexing the service sector to United Nations, this may be excluded as its services are deteriorating and its frequent financial problems. So, I conclude that the issue of service will take a transitional form in a way that the occupation force is responsible for the cost of services which we must study well to minimize the Palestinian loss and maximize the cost and responsibility of Israeli Occupation force that pushes the situation into an apartheid state against its wish.

In fact, Israel has made from the PNA a distorted entity it wanted it to be a policeman (keeping its security) and entity providing services on behalf of it as well. So, Israel conquered land, sea and air leaving little to the Palestinians. This is the scenario that Israel wants to continue. However, we- as Palestinians –shouldn't prepare for a third Intifada, but to a model of libration or independence even if it comes through a one bi- national state whatever the price is. Anyhow, it is a high price Israel must pay, since its policy on the ground have pushed the situation into this option. However, this option starts with reforming the PLO and returning the compass to its right direction.

Salam al Zagher, an engineer

By 1967, there hadn't been any electricity networks. The Israeli electricity company started working in 1980s, but there was a resistance to connect electricity from the Israeli company; people did so were described as betrayals. In fact, Nablus municipality struggled after the 1976's elections and got a especial company to Nablus.

When the PNA came, the authority of energy was established. It was able to build institutions to provide the appropriate services. However, municipalities couldn't provide services in a better way, then , electricity law was issued in 2009.

During the two Intifadas (1987 and 2000), no electricity cutting off took place although electricity networks were destroyed in the second Intifada (2000).

To tell the truth, the subject of electricity wasn't included in both Oslo and Paris economic agreement. Thus, Israel and the Israeli companies will be the main player of this field, Israelis are responsible for providing electricity to the territories that are under their control, but they hand it over to distributing companies which they treat as customers and this is dangerous.

Another Israeli policy with respect to electricity is that separating the networks. Therefore, they agreed on establishing four power stations in Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah. The only supplier is Israel. In fact, Israel hasn't dealt with North Electricity Company since it doesn't have an Israeli licence.

Recommendations:

1. Reinforcing institutions of services.
2. Organizing the laws concerning services.

3. Establishing a union of employees of the service sector to put policies and strategies.

Other Comments

Electricity is the only sector that wasn't transferred, the Israelis will not transfer it. It is an Israeli benefit to deal with one customer.

The danger isn't represented in the collapse of the PNA, but in the collapse of the institutions that provide services.

Our electricity debts to Israel reaches 590 millions. If the collapse takes place, electricity is connected with three issues: social behavior, security, and economical situation. However, dealing with electricity has two sides, professional and political.

In fact, after the PNA had been established, many values concerning duties, national commitments and the spirit of resistance collapsed. To tell truth, the most dangerous of them all is the social behaviour, and how they deal with services. Anyhow, I think the best thing is to continue supplying services whatever the circumstances are.

Anyway, in Gaza, levying taxes has improved and thefts declined, why don't we do this in the West Bank?

Therefore, we must set a strategy to consolidate our people and there must also be an efficient leadership, popular awareness, new political regime and a reform of the PLO.

In addition, renewable energy projects must be located in C areas because they have a vast open land and this provide wind power.

If the collapse happens, Israel isn't interested in stopping services whether politically commercially or in terms of security. So, planning should be centralized, but when carrying out plans, it should be decentralized, so that there must be services' distributing companies. To conclude, everything is connected with Israeli Occupation. This includes water, electricity and fuel. What we bet that we are existing here and able to build our popular institutions more than the current authority as it is a restricted, limited official one. We bet that our people will win.

Day After - Workshops' Participants

#	Name	Organization
1	Mr. Abd Alnaser Masoud	National Sec. Forces - NSF
2	Dr. Abd Alrahman Altamimi	Head of Palestinian Hydrology Group
3	Dr. Abdelnaser Makky	JICA/Birzeit University
4	Ms. Abeer Albatma	PENGON
5	Mr. Abulmajeed Melhem	PALTEL
6	Mr. Ahmad Hindi	PWA
7	Mr. Ahmad Qurei "Abu Alaa"	Adisory Board/Fatah
8	Mr. Ahmad Surghally	PALTEL
9	Mr. Alaa Lahlouh	PSR
10	Mr. Alaa Yaghi	PLC
11	Mr. Ali Hamoudeh	JDECO
12	Dr. Ali Jarbawi	Minister of Higher Education
13	Mr. Ali Nazzal	President office
14	Mr. Ali Omar	National Sec. Forces - NSF
15	Mr. Amin Maqboul	Sec. General, Fateh Revol. Council
16	Mr. Ammar Dwaik	Birzeit University
17	Mr. Anwar Abu Ammash	Welfare Association
18	Dr. Ayman Daraghme	PLC
19	Mr. Aziz Kayed	PSR
20	Dr. Azmi Shuaibi	AMAN
21	Mr. Basem Tamimi	Popular Committes
22	Mr. Basri Saleh	Ministry of Education
23	Mr. Bassam Alaqtash	National Sec. Forces - NSF
24	Ms. Buthaina Hamdan	Ministry of TLC
25	Ms. Covadonga Bertrand	UNDP
26	Mr. Daoud Darawi	Adala law
27	Mr. Eyad Zeitawi	PMA
28	Mr. Fadel Hamdan	PLC Member
29	Mr. Fadi Qura'an	Alhaq
30	Ms. Fadwa Barghouthi	Revolutaionary Council/Fatah
31	Dr. Faisal Awartani	Researcher
32	Mr. Fajr Harb	Carter Center
33	Mr. Faris Sabaneh	Supreme Judicial Council
34	Dr. Fathi Abumoghli	former minister of Health
35	Ms. Florence Mandelik	NOREF
36	Mr. Florid Zurba	Ministry of TLC
37	Dr. Ghassan Khatib	Birzeit University
38	Dr. Hanan Ashrawi	PLO
39	Dr. Hanna Abdalnour	Alquds University
40	Mr. Hasan Abushalbak	Ramallah Municipality
41	Mr. Hazem Gheith	Egyptian Embassy

42	Mr. Henry Siegman	US/ MIDDLE EAST PROJECT
43	Mr. Ibrahim Barghouthi	head of MUSAWA
44	Mr. Ihab Shihadeh	Ministry of Justice
45	Mr. Jacob Hoigilt	NOREF
46	Mr. Jamal Zakout	FIDA
47	Mr. Jamil Rabah	Negotiations Support Unit - NSU
48	Dr. Jehad Albadawi	MOH
49	Mr. Jehad Alwazer	PMA Governor
50	Mr. Jehad Harb	PSR
51	Dr. Jehad Mashal	Expert
52	Mr. Jihad Shomali	UNDP
53	Mr. Khaled Alosaily	Business man
54	Mr. Khaled Shtayeh	UNDP
55	Mr. Khalil Rifai	Deputy Ministry of Justice
56	Dr. Khalil Shikaki	PSR
57	Mr. Mahmoud Haroun	Military Intelligence
58	Mr. Mariano Aguirre	NOREF
59	Dr. Mashhour Abu Daka	Former Minister of Communication
60	Mr. Mazen Sinokrot	Private Sector
61	Mr. Mohammad Alfaqih	PNC
62	Mr. Mohammad Aref	PMA
63	Mr. Mohammad Attoun	Wassel co.
64	Mr. Mohammad Daraghmeh	Journalist
65	Mr. Mohammad Hadieh	Ministry of Justice
66	Dr. Mohammad Odeh	MOH
67	Dr. Muatasem Alhmod	MOH
68	Mr. Munib Masri	Private Sector
69	Mr. Munir Barghouthi	Ministry of Education
70	Dr. Munther Alsharif	NAS
71	Mr. Musa Haj Hasan	QIF
72	Mr. Mutaz Abadi	PWA
73	Mr. Nabil Amr	Fatah
74	Mr. Nabil Masri	Private Sector
75	Dr. Naim Sabra	MOH
76	Dr. Naim Abuhommos	Birzeit University
77	Dr. Naser Abdelkarim	UNDP/Birzeit University
78	Mr. Naser Yosef	Adisory Board/Fatah
79	Mr. Natasha Carmi	Negotiation Aff. Dep.
80	Mr. Nayef Swetat	Revolutaionary Council/Fatah
81	Mr. Omar Assaf	Return right committee
82	Mr. Peter Krause	Boston University
83	Mr. Qaddora Fares	Prisoner's Affairs
84	Mr. Qais Abdelkarim	PLC

85	Mr. Radi Jarai	Alquds University
86	Mr. Reda Awadallah	PPP
87	Mr. Roland Friedrich	DCAF
88	Dr. Sabri Saidam	President consultant
89	Mr. Sadam Omar	National Security Forces
90	Dr. Safa Nseraldin	Minister of TLC
91	Mr. Said Alhmouz	PMC
92	Mr. Said Zaid	PLC
93	Mr. Salam Zagha	NEDCO
94	Mr. Saleh Ra'afat	Former Head of FIDA
95	Mr. Samer Farah	Welfare Association
96	Mr. Sami Alsaedi	AI Bank
97	Mr. Samir Abdallah	MAS
98	Mr. Sergio Garcia	NOREF
99	Dr. Shaddad Attili	PWA president
100	Mr. Shaker Sarsour	PMA
101	Ms. Shereen Zedan	PWTI-PHG
102	Mr. Shihadeh Hussein	PMA
103	Ms. Stephanie Heitmann	KAS
104	Dr. Sufian Abuzayedeh	Birzeit University
105	Mr. Tareq Tayel	Egypt Embassy
106	Dr. Tarif Ashour	MOH
107	Mr. Tayseer Zabre	HURRAT Center
108	Dr. Ummaya Khammash	UNRWA
109	Dr. Wael Qa'adan	PRCS
110	Mr. Waleedd Ladadweh	PSR
111	Dr. Walid Aburas	HWC
112	Mr. Walid Hodali	JWU
113	Mr. Wisam Atwan	National Security Forces
114	Mr. Yousef Adwan	UNDP
115	Mr. Zafer Milhem	PERC

The Day After: How Palestinians Can Cope if the PA Ceases to Function

January-October 2013

PSR, in cooperation with the USMEP and NOREF, has initiated in January 2013 a policy research project that aims at exploring Palestinian conditions and options in the day after the PA ceases to function. The initiative seeks to produce a series of expert papers focusing on 10 main challenging areas of “the day after” in Palestinian political, social, financial, economic, and security life.

The initiative’s point of departure is that the PA may collapse or may decide to dissolve itself in the near future under the heavy weight of various financial and political pressures. Three scenarios are conceivable: (1) Israel and the US may impose on the PA severe or crippling financial and political sanctions; (2) the PLO leadership may conclude that the two-state solution is no longer practical and may begin to search for other means to gain Palestinian rights leading it to dissolve the PA; and (3) a series of economic, financial and political crises may lead to popular demands for change expressed in mass demonstrations against the PA and a widespread demand for regime change leading to chaos and eventual collapse.

The initiative goals are three: (1) explore the implications of such a development on various critical dimensions of Palestinian life and government, elaborating on the magnitude of the problems and challenges that might arise as a result of PA demise; (2) debate various policy options to respond to such a development, to contain the damage, and to capitalize on potential benefits, if any; and, (3) recommend a course of action for Palestinians to pursue in response to the expected complications.

PSR has gathered a team of 30 experts in the areas of finance and economics, internal security and law enforcement, health, education, communication, justice system, local government, water and electricity, civil and domestic political affairs, and the future of the two-state solution. Experts have been asked to write 10 papers in their various areas of expertise examining the implications, policy options, and recommendations. Each paper has been reviewed and critiqued by two experts. Drafts of the expert papers have been discussed in small specialized workshops attended by policy makers, parliamentarians, experts, and academics.

A final report will be prepared based on the expert papers, workshops/focus groups, interviews, and background research. The report will summarize the main findings, examine the overall policy implications for the PA and the international community, and provide policy recommendations for the various relevant parties.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)

P. O. Box 76, Ramallah, Palestine

Tel: +970-2-2964933

Fax: +970-2-2964934

pcpsr@pcpsr.org

www.pcpsr.org