



المركز الفلسطيني  
للبحوث  
السياسية والمسحية  
Palestinian Center for  
POLICY and  
SURVEY RESEARCH

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### Public Opinion Poll # 1

#### Camp David Summit, Chances for Reconciliation and Lasting Peace, Violence and Confrontations, Hierarchies of Priorities, and Domestic Politics

27-29 July 2000

These are the results of opinion poll # 1, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research , between 27-29 July 2000. The poll deals with The poll deals with Camp David summit, chances for reconciliation and lasting peace, violence and confrontations, hierarchies of priorities, and Palestinian domestic politics. The total sample size of this poll is 1259 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 786 in the West Bank and 473 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is  $\pm 3\%$  and the non-response rate is 3%.

#### MAIN RESULTS:

- **Views on Positions Expressed and Concessions Made at Camp David:**
  1. On Arafat's *overall position* at Camp David: 68%: just right; 6%: not enough of a compromise; and, 15%: too much of a compromise
  2. On Palestinian position on *Jerusalem*: 27%: just right; 9%: not enough of a compromise; and, 57%: too much of a compromise
  3. On Palestinian position on *refugees*: 68%: just right; 8%: not enough of a compromise; and, 20%: too much of a compromise
  4. On Palestinian position on *statehood and borders*: 32%: just right; 11%: not enough of a compromise; and, 51%: too much of a compromise
  5. On Palestinian position on *settlements*: 25%: just right; 12%: not enough of a compromise; and, 55%: too much of a compromise
  6. On Palestinian position on *security arrangements*: 14%: just right; 11%: not enough of a compromise; and, 68%: too much of a compromise

The results show that the Palestinian public is not willing to give Arafat much room for maneuver in his negotiations with Barak. In fact, while the majority (68%) believes that *Arafat's overall position* at the summit was "just right," most Palestinians tend to view Arafat's issue-specific positions that he has reportedly been willing to accept at the summit, as "too much of a compromise."

For example, the suggestion that Arafat may have been willing to accept a *Jerusalem* deal that would have allowed Israel to annex the settlements of Ma'aleh Adumim, Giv'at Zeev, and Gush Etzion as well as the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter in return for full Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods and holy places in East Jerusalem, was seen as "too much of a compromise" by a majority of 57%. Only 36% believed it to be "just right" or "not enough of a compromise."

A majority of 55% found "too much of a compromise" in the reported acceptance by the Palestinian side of a territorial exchange in which Israel would annex *settlement blocs* and the Palestinians would receive territory from Israel and a corridor linking the West Bank with Gaza. Only 37% viewed this position as "just right" or "not enough of a compromise."

Similarly, a majority of 68% found "too much of a compromise" in the reported acceptance of *security arrangements* that would leave the Palestinian state with no air force or heavy weapon systems and would give Israel an early warning station and a military presence in the Jordan Valley during war. Only 25% found this position to be "just right" or "not enough of a compromise."

A *state*, recognized by Israel, in 96% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and a territorial exchange involving the remaining 4%, where most settlers live, with unspecified Israeli territory, was seen as "too much of a compromise" by 51% of the Palestinians. Forty-three percent saw this position as "just right" or "not enough of a compromise."

- **What is Next?**

1. 44% expect negotiations to resume soon without violence; 26% expect dispersed violence to precede return to negotiations, while 21% expect confrontations and end to negotiations
2. 32% believe that an agreement will eventually be reached and it will be a compromise between the Camp David positions of the two sides, while 23% believe that this is the end of the road for the peace process
3. Five to ten years from now, 24% see more Israeli-Palestinian peace and cooperation and 31% see more conflict and violence, while 17% see unchanged situation

Respondents were asked to speculate about the future. The overall results indicate that the majority of Palestinians do not expect the worst, but they remain, nonetheless, uncertain about the future. Only 21% believe that confrontations and

intifada will erupt in the West Bank and Gaza and that the two sides will not return to the negotiations. Similarly, when asked to speculate about the nature of a future possible agreement, only 23% expressed the belief that no agreement is feasible and that this is the end of the road for the peace process. When asked to speculate about relations between Palestinians and Israelis five to ten years from now, only 31% predicted conflict and violence.

The percentages of those who were clearly optimistic about the future were higher. For example, 44% expected talks to resume soon with no eruption of violence. About 75% expect to see, in the long run, an agreement that would be a compromise between the Camp David positions of the two sides or one more favorable to the Palestinians or the Israelis. More than 41% expect Palestinian-Israeli relations to remain as is or to be characterized by more peace and cooperation in the next five to ten years.

- **Chances for Reconciliation and Lasting Peace in a Scenario of Successful Negotiations:**
  1. 75% support or strongly support the process of reconciliation between the two peoples
  2. 85% support or strongly support open borders between Palestine and Israel
  3. 71% support or strongly support joint Palestinian-Israeli economic institutions and ventures
  4. 31% support or strongly support joint political institutions leading to an Israeli-Palestinian confederation
  5. 38% support or strongly support taking legal measures against incitement
  6. 10% support or strongly support adopting school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians
  7. 41% would invite an Israeli colleague to visit at home and 41% would visit an Israeli colleague at his home
  8. 36% believe that reconciliation is not possible ever, 23% believe it is possible in ten years
  9. 44% believe that the majority of Israelis believes that reconciliation is not possible ever and that 18% believe it is possible in ten years
  10. 35% believe that a lasting peace is possible or definitely possible between Israelis and Palestinians; 60% believe it to be impossible or definitely impossible
  11. 66% believe that the majority of Israelis does not believe that a lasting peace is possible; 24% believe it does

Respondents were asked to express support or opposition, and to speculate about the chances, for reconciliation between the two peoples in the aftermath of a successful conclusion of negotiations that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel. The results show an overwhelming support for reconciliation but little confidence in its feasibility, at least in the near future. They also show that the Palestinian overwhelming support for reconciliation is based on cold calculations of interests and needs rather than friendship,

forgiveness, or tolerance. Moreover, a majority of Palestinians does not believe that a lasting peace is possible between Israelis and Palestinians; a larger majority thinks that most Israelis think similarly.

In the context of an agreement, a majority of 75% would support or strongly support the process of reconciliation, while only 23% would oppose or strongly oppose it. Yet, only 23% believe that reconciliation is possible in the next 10 years, and 36% believe that it "is not possible." When asked to speculate about the views of the majority of Israelis regarding the prospects for reconciliation, 44% expressed the belief that they think that reconciliation "is not possible ever," and 18% thought that they believe it to be possible within the next 10 year.

An overwhelming majority (85%) of the Palestinians support or strongly support open borders to free movement of people and goods in the context of a peace agreement. Similarly, a majority of 71% supports the creation of joint economic institutions and ventures.

However, even in the context of a peace agreement, a majority of Palestinians opposes, or strongly opposes, other forms of cooperation and reconciliation. For example, 62% oppose or strongly oppose the "creation of joint political institutions, such as a parliament, designed eventually to lead to a confederate system;" 56% oppose, or strongly oppose, "taking legal measures against incitement against Israel;" 87% oppose or strongly oppose adopting "school curriculum in the Palestinian state that would recognize Israel and teach school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians;" 57% would not invite an Israeli colleague to home for a visit; and 57% would not accept an invitation to the home of an Israeli colleague.

A majority of 60% believes that a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians is impossible, or definitely impossible, while only 35% believe it to be possible, or definitely possible. A majority of Palestinians believes that the Israeli public also thinks likewise. A majority of 66% believes that the majority of the Israelis does not, or definitely does not, believe that lasting peace is possible between Israelis and Palestinians. Only 24% of the Palestinians believe that the majority of the Israelis does, or definitely does, believe in the possibility of a lasting peace.

- **Violence, Confrontation, and Unilateral Declaration of Statehood in a Scenario of Failed Negotiations:**
  1. Today, 52% support armed attacks against Israelis while 43% oppose them
  2. 63% believe that Hizbullah methods in South Lebanon should be emulated by Palestinians
  3. 60% would support or strongly support violent confrontations if no agreement is reached by 13 September
  4. 57% believe such confrontations would help Palestinians achieve greater gains
  5. 35% believe such confrontations would help Israel achieve greater gains
  6. 56% support unilateral state declaration in September while 37% support waiting for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement

7. 41% believe that Israel will re-occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or annex areas currently under its control, and 26% believe it will impose a blockade on Palestinian areas if a state is declared unilaterally

The results show a majority of Palestinians supporting armed attacks against Israeli targets. A majority also indicated that it would support violent confrontations if no agreement were reached by 13 September. In such a case, most would support a unilateral declaration of statehood even if Israel objected and despite the fact that most expected a harsh Israeli response.

Support for violence among Palestinians stood last March at 44% compared to 52% in this poll. This is the highest level of support for violence recorded among Palestinians since 1994. The perceived Hizbullah victory in South Lebanon and the failed summit at Camp David may have contributed to this outcome. Indeed, 63% of all respondents agreed that the Palestinians should emulate Hizbullah methods.

Respondents were asked whether they would support violent confrontations against Israel if no agreement were reached by 13 September. A majority of 60% said that it supports, or strongly supports, such confrontations. A similar majority (57%) believed that such confrontations would help achieve Palestinian rights in a way that the negotiations could not. When asked if Israel would achieve greater gains from such confrontations, only (35%) responded in the affirmative.

When asked whether they would support a unilateral declaration of statehood on 13 September if no agreement were reached by then, most (56%) said that they would. Only 37% said that they would support waiting until an agreement is reached with Israel. In speculating about possible Israeli response to such a unilateral declaration, one quarter said that it would annex all the areas under its control today. Another quarter said that instead, it would blockade the Palestinian areas and act on the international arena to reverse the unilateral step. Sixteen percent said that it would invade the Palestinian areas and occupy back all the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while 12% said that Israel would impose other punishment measures. Only 20% said that Israel would recognize the new state or try to negotiate with it.

- **Perceptions of Palestinian and Israeli Hierarchies of Priorities**

1. The greatest majority (68%) ranks the "establishment of an independent and secure Palestinian state" as the first or second national interest, followed by the unity of the Palestinian people, economic prosperity, peace, and finally democracy.
2. Most Palestinians (76%) believe that Israelis rank "secure and independent state" as the first or second Israeli national interest, followed by the Jewish character of the state, economic prosperity, democracy, and finally, peace.
3. Positive rating of Israeli democracy reaches 57%
4. In the next ten years, Israel's democracy will be good or very good according to 42%

5. 62% are willing to sacrifice democracy and rule of law for the sake of the national interest

Respondents were given a list of national interests and were asked to rank them according to importance. The results make it clear that for the majority of Palestinians, the most important national interest is the "establishment of an independent and secure Palestinian state," followed by "unity of the Palestinian people." The results indicate that Palestinians are clearly willing to sacrifice democracy for the sake of interests like statehood, security, and unity. When asked to speculate about the way the majority of Israelis organizes its hierarchy of priorities, Palestinian respondents thought that the most important national interest for the majority of Israelis is a "secure and independent state," followed by the "Jewish character of the state." Even though most Palestinians do not think that the majority of the Israelis place a very high value on democracy, they, nonetheless regard highly Israeli democracy.

A majority of 68% placed the goal of an independent and secure state as the first and second priority, followed by unity of the Palestinian people (first and second according to 53%). The third priority for the Palestinians is economic prosperity (placed first and second by 33%), the fourth is peace (by 23%), and the last is democracy (by 13%). The relative disregard for democracy by the respondents is confirmed in another question in which they were asked whether they would be willing to sacrifice democracy and the rule of law in order to assure the attainment of other national interests such as security. A majority of 62% responded in the affirmative, with only 29% refusing to do so.

Most Palestinians seem to think that the majority of Israelis think likewise. To most Palestinians, the first Israeli priority is the security and independence of the state (placed first and second by 76%), followed by the Jewish character of the state (placed first and second by 56%). Economic prosperity, peace, and democracy came third, fourth and fifth (placed first and second by 17%, 16%, and 14% respectively). Despite the fact that democracy came last in the Palestinian speculation about the Israeli ordering of priorities, most Palestinians (57%) view democracy in Israel as good or very good. However, when asked to speculate about the prospects for Israeli democracy in the next ten years, only 42% said that it would be good or very good. Last February, a majority of 68% viewed Israeli democracy as good or very good. It is possible that concern about an eminent threat to the peace process posed by the Israeli right wing and religious parties may have led many Palestinians to refrain from the Israeli system of government.

- **Palestinian Domestic Politics:**

1. *Arafat's* support level increases from 39% last March to 46% in this poll
2. *Fateh's* support level increases from 35% last March to 36% in this poll
3. Haidar Abdul Shafi is the most popular vice president (16%), followed by Saeb Erakat with 9%
4. 76% believe that *corruption* exists in PA institutions and 62% of them believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future

5. Positive rating of Palestinian *democracy* today reaches 21% In ten years Palestinian democracy will be good or very good according to 37%
6. 63% say that people cannot criticize the PA without *fear*

The results show a rise in the popularity of Yasir Arafat from 39% last March to 46% in this poll. Fateh maintained its standing at 36%. Haidar Abdul Shafi came first as vice president with 16% of the vote, followed by Sa'eb Eriqat with 9%.

The results show also that belief in the existence of corruption continues to rise reaching 76% in this poll, compared to 71% last March. Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy remains unchanged at 21%. Similarly, belief that people can not criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear remains unchanged at 63%.

**Results of Public Opinion Poll # (1)  
27-29 July 2000**

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
<b>1. The Palestinian and Israeli sides failed to reach a peace agreement at Camp David. In general, do you support or oppose the broad position taken by president Yasir Arafat at Camp David as you have heard it in the news?</b>			
1. This position is just right	67.5	61.5	76.8
2. Not enough of a compromise	5.7	5.8	5.5
3. Too much of a compromise	14.9	17.8	10.5
4. Don't know	11.9	15.0	7.2
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>
<b>2. Looking at the issue of Jerusalem, the Palestinian side demanded full sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods and holy places in East Jerusalem. Some media reports say also that the Palestinian side agreed to allow Israel to annex the settlements of Ma'aleh Adumim, Givat Zeev, and Gush Etzion, to become part of West Jerusalem and to put the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall under Israeli sovereignty. What is your opinion of this position?</b>			
1. This position is just right	27.1	27.6	26.3
2. Not enough of a compromise	8.9	6.9	11.9
3. Too much of a compromise	57.1	57.2	57.0
4. Don't know	7.0	8.4	4.8
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>
<b>3. Looking at the issue of refugees, the Palestinian side demanded an Israeli admission of responsibility for creating the refugee problem and demanded that Israel recognizes UN resolution #194 and it showed willingness to absorb hundreds of thousands of refugees who wish to return to the Palestinian state. What is your opinion of this position?</b>			
1. This position is just right	67.9	64.8	72.7
2. Not enough of a compromise	7.7	5.4	11.4
3. Too much of a compromise	19.7	24.1	12.7
4. Don't know	4.7	5.7	3.2
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>
<b>4. Looking at the issue of the Palestinian state and borders, some media reports say that the Palestinian side has agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian state, recognized by</b>			



**Israel, in 96% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in exchange for territory from inside Israel, and Israel would annex settlements blocs in the remaining 4%. What do you think of this position?**

1.This position is just right	31.5	30.1	33.7
2. Not enough of a compromise	11.4	9.0	15.0
3. Too much of a compromise	50.6	52.7	47.4
4. Don't know	6.3	8.2	3.9
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**5. Looking at the issue of settlements, some media reports say that the Palestinian side has agreed to allow Israel to annex the settlements of Gush Etzion, Ma'aleh Adumim, Givat Zeev, and Ariel and to allow other settlements to remain under Palestinian sovereignty in exchange for territory form inside Israel and for receiving a corridor that would link the West Bank with Gaza. What do you think of this position?**

1.This position is just right	25.4	26.2	24.2
2. Not enough of a compromise	11.8	8.9	16.4
3. Too much of a compromise	55.3	56.4	53.6
4. Don't know	7.5	8.5	5.8
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**6. Looking at the issue of security arrangements, some media reports say that the Palestinian side has agreed not to acquire an air force or heavy weapon systems and to allow an early warning station at one of the mountain tops and to allow an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley during war. What do you think of this position?**

1.This position is just right	13.6	12.3	15.5
2. Not enough of a compromise	11.2	11.2	11.2
3. Too much of a compromise	67.9	69.3	65.9
4. Don't know	7.2	7.2	7.4
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**7. In your opinion what will happen now, after the failure of the "Camp David" talks?**

1) Talks will resume soon enough and no violence will erupt	43.6	39.2	50.5
2) Dispersed acts of violence will take place before the resumption of the talks	25.6	25.2	26.1
3) Confrontations and intifada will erupt in	21.3	24.1	17.0

the West Bank and Gaza, and the parties will not return to the negotiations

4) Don't know	9.4	11.5	6.3
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**8) And in the long run how do you see the prospects for a Palestinian Israeli agreement**

1) in the long run, an agreement similar to the Palestinian position presented at Camp David will be reached	9.3	8.5	10.5
2. A compromise between the Palestinian and Israeli positions will be reached	31.9	29.1	36.3
3. An agreement more favorable to the Palestinians will be reached	14.0	13.6	14.8
4. An agreement more favorable to the Israelis will be reached	19.5	21.5	16.3
5. This is the end to the peace process and No agreement will be reached in the years to come	23.4	24.6	21.7
6. No Opinion/ Don't know	1.8	2.8	0.3
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**9) Five to ten years from now, how do you see relations between Palestinians and Israelis?**

1) As they are now	17.0	17.5	16.1
2) More peace and cooperation	23.7	22.2	26.1
3) Less peace and cooperation	14.5	12.2	18.2
4) Conflict and violence	31.4	34.5	26.6
5) Others (Specify ----- )	13.4	13.6	13.0
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**10) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you support or oppose the process of reconciliation between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel?**

1. Strongly support	9.5	7.5	12.7
2. Support	65.1	64.9	65.4
3. Oppose	14.8	15.9	13.0

4. Strongly oppose	7.7	7.8	7.6
5. No opinion/do not know	2.9	3.9	1.4
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**11) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, how soon do you think will reconciliation between the two peoples be achieved?**

1. reconciliation is not possible ever	35.8	35.3	36.7
2. only in many generations to come	16.5	17.8	14.6
3. only in the next generation	8.4	6.7	11.1
4. only in the next decade	6.7	7.4	5.6
5. on the next few years	16.6	15.2	19.0
6. No Opinion /Don't know	15.8	17.6	13.1
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**12) And what about the majority of Israelis? How soon do then in your opinion believe that a full reconciliation between the two peoples can be achieved?**

1) reconciliation is not possible ever	44.1	42.5	46.5
2) only in many generations to come	12.2	13.8	9.6
3) only in the next generation	5.6	5.4	5.9
4) only in the next decade	5.7	5.1	6.6
5) on the next few years	12.7	10.6	16.0
6. No Opinion /Don't know	19.7	22.5	15.4
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**13) After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, the following are steps may be taken in order to enhance relations between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State. For each of the suggested steps please tell me whether you support or oppose it:**

13-1 Open borders to free movement of people and goods

1) Strongly Support	22.5	16.5	31.7
2) Support	62.5	67.6	54.7
3) Oppose	8.8	9.8	7.2
4) Strongly Oppose	4.0	3.6	4.8

5) Don't Know	2.2	2.5	1.5
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

13-2 Create joint economic institutions and ventures

1) Strongly Support	13.6	9.1	20.5
2) Support	56.9	59.1	53.3
3) Oppose	20.7	22.3	18.2
4) Strongly Oppose	5.6	5.5	5.9
5) Don't Know	3.2	4.0	2.0
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

13-3 Create joint political institutions (such as a parliament) designed eventually to lead to a confederate system

1) Strongly Support	3.8	2.9	5.3
2) Support	26.7	28.0	24.8
3) Oppose	41.6	42.6	40.0
4) Strongly Oppose	20.7	18.5	24.0
5) Don't Know	7.2	8.0	6.0
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

13-4 Take legal measures against incitement against Israel

1) Strongly Support	2.5	1.6	4.1
2) Support	35.6	37.4	32.8
3) Oppose	38.6	39.3	37.6
4) Strongly Oppose	17.0	13.9	21.7
5) Don't Know	6.3	7.8	3.8
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

13-5 Adopt school curriculum in the Palestinian state that recognizes Israel and teach school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians

1) Strongly Support	1.1	0.2	2.4
2) Support	8.6	8.7	8.5
3) Oppose	43.2	45.2	40.1

4) Strongly Oppose	43.3	41.0	46.7
5) Don't Know	3.9	4.9	2.2
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**14. After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you, under these conditions of peace, invite an Israeli colleague to visit you in your home?**

1) Definitely yes	6.8	5.2	9.3
2) Yes	34.3	35.8	32.0
3) No	33.9	36.1	30.4
4) Definitely no	23.1	20.6	27.0
5) Don't Know	1.9	2.2	1.3
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**15. After reaching a peace agreement between the Palestinian side and Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel, would you, under these conditions of peace, visit an Israeli colleague in his home?**

1) Definitely yes	6.8	5.1	9.4
2) Yes	34.3	35.9	31.8
3) No	34.0	37.1	29.4
4) Definitely no	23.2	20.2	27.7
5) Don't Know	1.8	1.7	1.7
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**16. In your opinion, is lasting peace possible between Israelis and Palestinians?**

1) Definitely Possible	1.8	1.7	2.0
2) Possible	32.8	31.7	34.4
3) Impossible	33.9	34.4	33.3
4) Definitely impossible	25.9	25.5	26.6
5) No opinion/ do not know	5.5	6.8	3.7
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**17. And what about the majority of the Israelis, do they, in your opinion, believe that lasting peace is possible between Israelis and Palestinians?**

1) Definitely they do	1.9	2.0	1.8
2) They do	22.5	23.0	21.7
3) They do not	39.8	40.0	39.9
4) Definitely they don not	26.2	24.2	29.4
5) No opinion/do not know	9.6	11.1	7.1
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**18. Concerning armed attacks against Israeli targets, I...**

1) Support	51.6	53.5	48.8
2) Oppose	42.7	39.3	48.0
3) No Opinion /Don't Know	5.7	7.3	3.3
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**19. And what about Hizbullah methods and the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, do you think the Palestinians should emulate these Lebanese methods?**

1) Definitely yes	30.6	29.1	32.9
2) Yes	32.8	33.1	32.4
3) No	22.4	22.9	21.8
4) Definitely no	6.5	7.6	4.9
5) No opinion/Don't know	7.6	7.4	8.0
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**20. And if no agreement is reached by September 13 when the interim period ends and violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations erupt in the West Bank and Gaza, would you support or oppose such confrontations?**

1) Strongly Support	21.3	19.4	24.2
2) Support	38.3	35.6	42.5
3) Oppose	26.9	31.5	19.9
4) Strongly Oppose	6.1	6.4	5.6
5) Not Sure	4.8	5.0	4.5
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	2.6	2.2	3.3
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**21. Do you believe that such confrontations, if they do take place, would achieve Palestinian rights in a way that the negotiations could not**

1) Definitely yes	17.4	16.0	19.6
2) Yes	39.6	38.2	41.7
3) No	29.1	31.3	25.8
4) Definitely no	8.5	8.3	9.0
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	5.3	6.2	3.9
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**22. Do you believe that such confrontations, if they do take place, would allow Israel to achieve greater gains in a way that could not be achieved at Camp David?**

1) Definitely yes	7.0	5.9	8.7
2) Yes	28.0	27.4	29.0
3) No	45.4	47.6	42.1
4) Definitely no	11.5	11.0	12.3
5) No Opinion/ Don't know	8.0	8.2	7.8
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**23. The deadline for reaching a permanent Israeli- Palestinian settlement ends on September 13<sup>th</sup> 2000. If no agreement is reached by then, some people see the necessity of transforming the PA into a Palestinian State at that date even if Israel objects. Others argue that the establishment of the state should wait until an agreement with Israel is reached. What do you think?**

1) Support waiting till reaching an agreement with Israel	36.8	34.9	39.6
2) Support Establishing a Palestinian state right after the deadline on 13 September 2000 even if no agreement was reached with Israel at that time	55.8	56.7	54.3
3) Others (specify_____)	2.9	3.2	2.5
4) No opinion /Don't know	4.6	5.2	3.6
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**24. In your opinion how will Israel respond if a Palestinian State is declared unilaterally on 13 September 2000 before reaching an agreement with Israel?**

1) Israel will invade the PA, occupy back	15.5	16.7	13.5
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all the West Bank and Gaza and annex them to Israel

2) Israel will annex all the territories that are still under its control and will blockade the PA.	25.8	23.1	30.0
3) Israel will blockade the PA and act on the international arena to reverse the unilateral step	25.5	24.1	27.6
4) Israel will try to negotiate an agreement with the Palestinian State and recognize it only after such an agreement is reached	13.3	14.3	11.7
5) Israel will first recognize the new Palestinian State and then negotiate a final peace agreement with it.	6.5	6.3	6.8
6) Israel will impose other punishment measures	12.0	13.5	9.7
7) No opinion/Don't know	15.0	2.0	0.7
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**25) What in your opinion is the most important Palestinian national interest? Rank the following objective**

1) Establishment of an independent and secure Palestinian state	34.0	36.0	31.0
2) Economic prosperity	16.5	15.5	17.5
3) Democracy	6.5	6.5	7.0
4) Peace	11.5	10.0	13.4
5) Unity of the Palestinian people	26.5	24.8	29.7
6) No opinion/Don't know	5.0	7.2	1.4
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**26) Are you willing sacrifice democracy and the rule of law in order to insure the attainment of national interest, such as security for the Palestinians?**

1) Definitely yes	20.7	22.8	17.3
2) Yes	41.7	42.6	40.4
3) No	18.4	16.2	21.7
4) Definitely no	10.8	10.6	11.0



5) No opinion/do not know	8.5	7.7	9.6
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**27) And how in your opinion do most Israelis define their most important national interest? Rank the following objectives**

1) Secure and independent state	38.0	37.4	39.4
2) Economic prosperity	8.5	8.5	8.4
3) Democracy	7.0	6.3	8.4
4) Peace with Arab neighbors	8.0	7.1	8.5
5) Jewish character of the state of Israel	28.0	27.5	28.8
6) No opinion/Don't know	10.5	13.2	6.5
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**28) How do you evaluate the status of democracy in Israel?**

1) Very good	27.4	22.8	34.5
2) Good	29.9	32.0	26.6
3) Neither good nor bad	15.2	14.9	15.6
4) Bad	14.1	14.8	13.1
5) Very bad	3.1	3.0	3.3
6) No opinion/Don't know	10.2	12.4	6.9
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**29. How do you see the status of democracy in Israel in the next ten years?**

1) Very good	19.7	18.3	21.8
2) Good	22.3	21.7	23.3
3) Neither good nor bad	13.7	14.0	13.2
4) Bad	13.4	16.1	9.4
5) Very bad	5.8	4.7	7.4
6) No opinion/Don't know	25.1	25.2	24.9
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**30) If separate elections for the president of the Palestinian Authority were held today, whom would you choose?**

1) Haidar Abdul Shafi	8.0	7.6	8.6
2) Yasser Arafat	45.5	41.2	52.2
3) Ahmad Yasin	8.4	9.5	6.8
4) No one	22.9	25.6	18.6
5) Others	1.2	1.9	0.2
6) I will not participate	11.1	11.0	11.2
7) No Opinion / Don't Know	2.9	3.3	2.4
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**31) Which of the following political parties do you support?**

1) PPP	1.1	1.5	0.5
2) PFLP	3.2	4.5	1.4
3) Fateh	36.5	32.9	42.0
4) Hamas	10.3	9.9	10.9
5) DFLP	0.4	0.5	0.3
6) Islamic Jihad	3.7	4.3	2.7
7) Fida	0.1	0.2	0.0
8) Independent Islamists	3.2	3.2	3.1
9) Independent Nationalists	5.2	6.3	3.5
10) None of the above	34.8	35.1	34.2
11) Others	1.6	1.7	1.5
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**32) If separate elections for a Vice President of the Palestinian Authority were held today, and the following names were nominated as candidates, whom would you choose?**

1) Haidar Abdul Shafi	15.7	12.3	20.8
2) Sa'eb Erikat	9.1	10.7	6.7
3) Hanan Ashrawi	6.2	5.1	8.0
4) Farouq Kaddomi	5.7	6.8	4.1
5) Ahmad Qurai' (Abu Ala')	5.6	5.2	6.2

6) Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin)	5.4	4.5	6.7
7) Faisal Husseini	5.4	7.1	2.8
8) Nabil Sha'ath	1.5	1.1	2.1
9) Other (Specify_____)	0.5	0.6	0.4
10) Will not participate in the elections	12.1	12.4	11.7
11) Non of the above and will decide later	28.5	29.5	26.9
12) No Opinion /Don't Know	4.4	4.8	3.6
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**33) Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions?**

1) Yes	76.1	73.8	79.6
2) No	11.7	12.9	9.9
3) Not Sure	12.2	13.4	10.6
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**34) Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future?**

1) Increase	53.8	55.4	51.6
2) Remain as it is	8.6	6.1	12.0
3) Decrease	26.7	29.1	23.5
4) Don't Know/ No Opinion	10.9	9.4	12.9
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**35) If you want to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights under the Palestinian Authority, you would say it is:**

1) Very Good	3.5	2.9	4.3
2) Good	17.1	17.1	17.1
3) Fair	30.8	32.5	28.2
4) Bad	27.4	28.5	25.6
5) Very Bad	17.3	14.0	22.4
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	3.9	5.0	2.4
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**36) And how would the Palestinian democracy status in the next 10 years ?**

1) Very Good	8.9	8.4	9.6
2) Good	27.9	27.7	28.2
3) Fair	21.5	23.0	19.2
4) Bad	15.0	15.1	15.0
5) Very Bad	11.6	9.7	14.6
6) Don't Know/ No Opinion	15.0	16.2	13.5
	<b>Total %</b>	<b>West Bank %</b>	<b>Gaza Strip %</b>

**37) In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear?**

1) Yes	32.2	31.2	33.7
2) No	62.8	63.6	61.6
3) Do not know	5.0	5.2	4.7