

Press Release

Public Opinion Poll No (93)

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

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For the first time since October 7, 2023, simultaneously in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, findings show significant drop in the favorability of the October 7 attack and in the expectations that Hamas will win the current war, and a moderate drop in the level of support for Hamas; moreover, findings show a drop in the Gaza Strip in the preference for a continued Hamas control over that area in the day after the war and a rise in the preference for PA control. Nonetheless, despite all that, support for Hamas remains the highest compared to all Palestinian factions. Furthermore, findings show significant rise in support for the two-state solution accompanied by a drop in the preference for armed struggle and a rise in the preference for negotiations as the best means of ending the Israeli occupation.

3-7 September 2024

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 3-7 September 2024. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip and the failure of all attempts to reach a ceasefire. Talk about the “day after” continued without much progress due to the Israeli government's rejection of the idea. Meanwhile, clashes escalated in the West Bank between the Israeli army and Palestinian armed groups, especially in the northern West Bank. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued. Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas, in Tehran, and Iran announced its intention to avenge his death but had not done so by the time of the completion of the data collection for this survey. Hamas chose Yahya Sinwar as its head, replacing Ismail Haniyeh. The Palestinian factions announced the so-called “Beijing Declaration” to unite the internal ranks. President Mahmoud Abbas announced from Ankara his intention to visit the Gaza Strip.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in specific areas where there was no on-going daily fighting, including Khan Younis area, the central Gaza Strip and all its shelters, but not the northern besieged Gaza Strip and other areas of fighting in the central Gaza Strip and in Rafah. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic conditions and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

The sample size of this survey was 1200 people, of whom 790 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 79 residential locations) and 410 in the Gaza Strip (in 41 locations). The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Methodology of data collection in the Gaza Strip:

This poll, like almost all other PSR polls, was conducted face to face in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers have access to it. There is absolutely no way for anyone to intercept the data or manipulate it. However, in some rare cases during the past 12 years, in certain locations where access to tablets or internet was temporarily denied, we had to rely on the use of paper and pencil. In this case, papers are immediately collected and data entered and sent to our researchers in the same day the data was collected once internet access was restored. In such cases, 20% of the papers are scanned and sent to us to ensure no errors occurred during on-site data entry.

Last month, the Israeli army published a document allegedly written by a Hamas official who claimed that he was able to change the findings in one of our polls in the Gaza Strip and send us falsified findings. We took the story of the Israeli army seriously and investigated it. For the purpose of our investigation we had to assume that the alleged document was real, not fake. While the army interpreted the document as saying that a Hamas official manipulated data collection, the document itself talks about falsifying findings. But it neither describes how the findings were falsified nor explains how it obtained the so-called “real” findings. Moreover, the actual published findings were not based on what the author of the document has supposedly sent us. Instead, it copies and pastes figures from our own press release. In two out of nine questions whose findings the document claimed to have falsified, the figures in that document were actually not for Gaza, but for the total West Bank and Gaza or were simply all wrong as the author simply failed in cutting and pasting numbers.

After a thorough discussion with our team in the Gaza Strip, most of whom worked with us for 20 years or more and some were arrested by Hamas security agents simply for conducting interviews with Gazans, we came to the conclusion that the author of the document, *assuming that it is not a forgery*, misled those who received it and that he did so in order to make money. The document does include a request for money from Hamas. Our own analysis of the data did not flag any inconsistencies that would normally arise when data is arbitrarily altered. A review of all other quality control measures taken during the data collection of the survey in question convinced us that no data manipulation took place and that it was simply impossible for anyone to know the findings before we published them.

While our investigation concluded that it was almost impossible to manipulate the data or falsify the findings, we did recognize that some of the data collection process in the poll under question did indeed take place using paper and pencil. We realize that such use, while still highly secure, given all our other quality control measures, is susceptible to reservations. For this reason, we have now banned any use of paper and pencil in all of our surveys, throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including, as indicated above, in this current survey.

Methodology of sample selection:

In the current poll, 41 communities were selected from residents of Khan Younis, Al-Mawasi, Deir al-Balah and other areas in southern and central Gaza Strip and from the displaced people who were sheltering in those areas under the instructions of the Israeli army, so that these communities were either "*counting areas*," according to the classification of the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, as was done in Rafah, some areas of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip, or displaced communities in *built-up shelters*, which are schools and other institutions affiliated with the government or UNRWA, or *tent gatherings* located in the areas of Rafah, Khan Younis, Al-Mawasi and the central Gaza Strip. The sample was drawn according to the following methodology:

- 1) In the "**counting areas**" specified by the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, where the number of these areas reached 15.
- 2) In the **built-up shelters**, a regular random sample was withdrawn from the lists of these centers that were obtained, representing all the shelter centers in western Rafah, Deir al-Balah and other areas in central Gaza Strip, Rafah and Khan Younis areas, and the number of these areas reached 8.
- 3) In the **tent gatherings** in the areas of Rafah, Khan Younis, Al-Mawasi and the central Gaza Strip, where satellite maps showing the locations of these communities were relied upon. These areas were divided into blocks and a regular random sample of 18 blocks was drawn.

In each "counting area", built-up shelter, or tent gathering, 10 people were randomly selected for interviews while taking into account gender and age distribution. Refusal to conduct interviews was 9%.

It is worth noting that 72% of the public in the Gaza Strip say they were displaced to their current location, where they were interviewed, because of the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, while the remaining 28% say they were not displaced because of that invasion.

Summary of the Main Findings

As in our previous three polls since October 7, most of the questions in this poll, covering the third quarter of 2024, revolve around the events of that day and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and the Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, the unprecedented human suffering of the Gaza Strip's residents, the debate regarding the future of the Gaza Strip after the war, public satisfaction with the performance of the various parties during the war, and West Bankers' fears of the probability of the war spilling over from Gaza to the West Bank. It should be noted that the samples in all four surveys does not include residents of the northern Gaza Strip who have remained in their homes since the beginning of the war due to the inability of our researchers to reach them and the lack of reliable data on their numbers and whereabouts in that area. The current poll, as in the previous three polls, covers the consequences of the war on the internal balance of power, support for the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian-Israeli relations, and the political process.

While a majority continues to view Hamas' decision to carry out the October 7 attack as "correct," that majority is now smaller than it has been since the first poll, indeed becoming a minority in the Gaza Strip. The fears of the war finally reaching the West Bank, the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip, with declining hopes for a quick ceasefire might have contributed to this and similar findings in this poll, many of which were evident in our previous poll three months ago.

Despite the declining favorability of October 7, the majority of the public continues to believe the attack and the following war have placed the Palestinian issue at the center of global attention. Findings also continue to show that the majority of the public, but one that is smaller than in the past, expects Hamas to win the war on Gaza; for the first time however, the majority of Gazans no longer believe that, a trend we saw in the previous poll. The vast majority does not view President Abbas's statements regarding his intention to visit Gaza as an indication of a policy change regarding the war and the future of the Gaza Strip. Demand for Abbas' resignation remains overwhelming even as it drops slightly. Hamas' popularity drops a little while Fatah's rises slightly. Findings show significant rise in support for the two-state solution in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for armed struggle declines and support for negotiations rise. In both cases however the change is not dramatic.

Humanitarian conditions: We start with the humanitarian and living conditions in the central and southern Gaza Strip. There has been no change in the percentage of those who have lost relatives in this war as about 80% of Gazans say that at least one of their family members has been killed or injured. The survey shows improvements in some indicators that have been monitored, such as access to food and water. In the current poll, the overwhelming majority indicates that they have moved several times from one shelter to another, with 85% moving two to six times.

Support for the attack on October 7: Once again, findings show decline in the overall support for the October 7 Hamas offensive. The decline, by 13 percentage points, is significant in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more so in the latter dropping by 18 points, standing today at 39%. In our previous poll, the drop in the positive view of the attack of October 7 stood at 14 percentage points. It is important to note that support for this attack does not necessarily mean support for Hamas and does not mean support for any killings or atrocities committed against civilians. Indeed, almost 90% of the public believes Hamas men did not commit the atrocities depicted in videos taken on that day. Support for the attack however seems to come from another motive: findings show that more than two thirds of the Palestinians believe that the attack has put the Palestinian issue at the center of attention and eliminated years of neglect at the regional and international levels.

Ceasefire and who comes out the winner: Half of the Palestinians expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in the next few days. As we did in the previous two polls, we asked in the current one about the side that would emerge victorious in this war. Half of the public expect Hamas to win compared to two thirds three months ago. It is worth noting that decline is greater in Gaza, dropping by 20 points, from 48% to 28%. This decrease comes after the earlier 8-point decrease in the previous poll in the Gaza Strip. The drop in the West Bank, by 14 points, is also significant, standing today at 65%.

Who will control Gaza after the war:

A majority of 57% says that when the war ends, Gaza will remain under Hamas' control. This percentage drops to 37% in the Gaza Strip of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a much higher percentage (70%) in the West Bank. Three months ago, 46% of Gazans said Hamas will control the Gaza Strip after the war. When asked about what the public prefer, 58% (73% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) said they prefer the return of Hamas, 20% chose the Palestinian Authority, 4% chose the Israeli army, and 12% chose to bring the Gaza Strip under the control of international forces. When we specifically asked about support for the return of the PA to control the Rafah Crossing and the Gaza Strip after a ceasefire, 70% expressed opposition and 27% supported it. Support in the Gaza Strip rises to 42% compared to only 17% in the West Bank. The idea of an Arab security deployment in Gaza to assist the PA security forces is opposed by two-thirds of the public, compared to three quarters three months ago.

Satisfaction with the performance of various parties during the war: As we did in our previous polls, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors. On the *Palestinian side*, satisfaction with Hamas' performance drops to 61% (75% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Yahiya Sinwar (54%; 70% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip). As for satisfaction with *Arab/regional actors*, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 69% (78% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Hezbollah (44%), Qatar (43%), Iran (33%), Jordan (23%), Egypt (20%), UAE (19%), and Saudi Arabia (15%). The findings show a 16-point drop in satisfaction with Iran's performance, which seems to be due to the belief of the overwhelming majority that it will not retaliate for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil. A majority of more than three quarters (76%) believes that Iran will not retaliate against Israel for that assassination. For the *international actors*, China received the highest satisfaction (26%), perhaps for its role in organizing the Beijing reconciliation meeting, followed by Russia (19%), the United Nations (13%), and the United States (5%).

President Abbas visit to the Gaza Strip: An overwhelming majority of the public (77%) believes that President Abbas' announcement of his intention to visit the Gaza Strip does not mean a positive change in how the PA henceforth deals with the current war on the Gaza Strip while 20% believe it does. When asked about the measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip, "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," came first, followed by "achieving immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," and finally, to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the residents of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community."

Fear in the West Bank of the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank: 77% of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank while 23% do not fear such a war. 63% of West Bankers believe that if the war spreads to the West Bank, Israel will succeed in destroying most of its cities, as it did in the Gaza Strip. Despite this, 67% believe that Israel will not win a war in the West Bank if it moves there from the Gaza Strip. When asked who would bring the war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, 90% of West Bankers think it could be the government of Netanyahu and settlers, 3% think it could be Hamas, and 5% think it could be armed groups in the West Bank. When asked, what would be the aims of Israel if the war were to move to the West Bank, the largest percentage (33%) said "to commit genocide against the population," 31% said "to eradicate the armed resistance," 25% said "to expel the population to Jordan," and 10% said "to eliminate the Palestinian Authority."

Support for Palestinian factions: When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (21%), 6% selected third parties, and 29% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Three months ago, 40% said they support Hamas and 20% said they support Fatah. Support for Hamas today stands at 37% in the West Bank (compared to 41% three months ago) and for Fatah at 18% (compared to 17% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 35% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 26% (compared to 24% three months ago).

Support for Palestinian leaders: If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, Barghouti would receive 32% of all respondents followed by Sinwar at 31% and Abbas at 6%; the remaining respondents say they will not participate in the elections. If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would drop significantly and in this case, Sinwar stands at 41% and Abbas at 13% and the rest do

not wish to participate in the elections. If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would rise to 67%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the entire public would be 35% and for Sinwar 32%. When asked to select a successor to Abbas, the largest percentage (37%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 30% said they prefer Yahiya Sinwar, 10% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 5% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 15% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas: Satisfaction with Abbas' performance stands at 18%, compared to 12% three months ago, and dissatisfaction with 81%. A majority of 84% want the president to resign. Today, 90% of West Bankers and 75% of Gazans demand the resignation of the president.

The new government of Mohammad Mustafa: An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carry out. In all of the reform items we asked about, we found that Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but a majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of the reforms agenda items.

The Beijing Declaration: An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that Beijing's Declaration issued by Palestinian factions will not be implemented soon while 24% believe it will be implemented soon. When those who believe that the Beijing's declaration will not be implemented were asked who they think will obstruct implementation, 39% say it is Fatah headed by President Abbas and 36% believe it is Hamas. 40% say China's role in domestic Palestinian issue is "medium," 38% say it is small, and only 17% say it is big. 57% says they welcome a greater role for China in such issues as reconciliation.

Support for the two-state solution: Support for the concept of the two-state solution continues to rise, standing today at 39%. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%. Rise in support for this solution in the current poll came from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to 39% and 38% respectively. Support for a Palestinian state rises to 59% when it is not linked to the "two-state solution" and when the borders of the state are identified as those of 1967. We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 51% (49% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 19% (14% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 10% (11% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 21% said they did not know or did not want to answer.


Support for Armed struggle: We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 48% (50% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 30% (24% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 15% (11% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. These results indicate a decrease of 6 percentage points in support for armed struggle, a 5 percentage point increase in support for negotiations. The drop in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where this percentage drops by 20 points, essentially reverting to its level of support six months ago.

Main Findings

(1) October the 7th and the War in Gaza:

1. Support for Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive drops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

- For the fourth time since October 7, we asked respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip what they thought of Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack, whether it was correct or incorrect: 54%, compared to 67% three months ago, in June 2024, and 71% six months ago, in March 2024, said it was the right decision. The decrease in this percentage came from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where it stands today at 64% in the West Bank, a decrease of nine percentage points, and 39% in the Gaza Strip, compared to 57% three months ago, a decrease of 18 percentage points. Six months ago, 71% of Gazans said that Hamas’ decision was “correct.”
- As we found in the previous poll, the decrease in this percentage this time also came mostly from the Gaza Strip where it stands today at 39% compared to 57% three months ago and 71% six months ago.




- Despite a 13 percentage point drop in favorable views of the decision to attack on October 7, the belief that the war on Gaza since October 7 has "revived international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that it may lead to increased recognition of the Palestinian state" remained higher than the favorability rate, at 68%, and only 30% said they did not believe so.
- Moreover, an overwhelming majority (70%) believes that international recognition of Palestine and decisions of international organizations and courts help establish Palestinians' right to an independent state while 28% believe they do not. Nonetheless, an overwhelming

majority (79%) believes that the current US administration under Biden will not recognize the state of Palestine this year while 18% believe it will.

2. Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip:

- 69% of Gazans say they have enough food for a day or two; 31% say they don't have enough food for a day or two. These results show an improvement over the results we obtained three months ago when 64% said they had enough food for a day or two. It is important to recall that the data collection did not include the northern besieged area of the Gaza Strip, which is reportedly experiencing increasing famine.
- 57% of Gazans say that one or more members of their family were killed during the current war, and in a separate question, 69% say that one or more members of their family were injured during this war. When combining the answers to the two questions and omitting the overlap, the results show that 78% report that one or more of their family members have been killed or injured, and only 22% report that none of their family members have been killed or injured.



- We asked residents of the Gaza Strip how often they had to move from one shelter to another since the war began on October 7, 2023: 40% said it ranged from two to three times, 45% said it ranged from four to six times, 11% said it was more than ten times, and 3% said it was once.


3. War crimes and atrocities:

- When asked if Hamas had committed the atrocities seen in the videos shown by international media displaying acts or atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians, such as killing women and children in their homes. The overwhelming majority (89%) said it did not commit such atrocities, and only 8% said it did.

4. Expectations regarding the ceasefire and who will win the war

- 50% expect Hamas and Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement in a few days while 48% do not expect that.

- As we did in our previous three polls since the war, we asked in the current poll about the party that will emerge victorious in this war. Half of the public expects Hamas to win, compared to 67% three months ago and 64% six months ago. It is worth noting, as the figure below shows, that fewer Gazans, at just 28% today, expect Hamas to win compared to the results three and six months ago, when those percentages stood at 48% and 56%, respectively. Hamas's expectation of victory has also dropped significantly in the West Bank, where today it stands at only 65% compared to 79% three months ago. It is also worth noting that while 4% in the West Bank expect Israel to win the current war, a quarter of Gazans expect Israel to win.



5. “The Day After:” Who will rule Gaza after the war?

- We asked respondents to speculate about the future of the Gaza Strip the day after the end of the current war. A majority of 57% says it will come under Hamas’ control. As we found in the previous poll, there are significant differences between West Bankers and Gazans, with only 37% of Gazans saying Hamas will actually control that area, compared to a much higher percentage (70%) in the West Bank. Three months ago, 46% of Gazans said Hamas will control the Gaza Strip after the war. Only 9% believe that the Israeli army will be in control of the Gaza Strip; 17% believe that the PA will return to control the Gaza Strip; and 13% believe it will come under international control.
- When asked about the likelihood that the public would prefer to happen after the war, 58% (73% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) said they prefer the return of Hamas, 20% chose the Palestinian Authority, 4% chose the Israeli army, and 12% chose to bring the Gaza Strip under the control of international forces. Three months ago, 71% of the West Bankers and 46% of Gazans said they prefer to see Hamas remaining in control.
- When asked about support and opposition to the return of President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip and its control of the Rafah crossing after a ceasefire, 70% opposed it and 27% supported it. Support in the Gaza Strip rises to 42% compared to only 17% in the West Bank.

- We asked about the public's attitude towards the deployment of an Arab security force from Egypt and Jordan in the Gaza Strip to assist the Palestinian security forces. Opposition to such a security force drops to 66%, compared to 75% three months ago, and support stands today at 32% today. Three months ago, support stood at 23%.


6. President Abbas visit to the Gaza Strip and what the public wants from its leadership:

- An overwhelming majority of the public (77%) believes that President Abbas' announcement of his intention to visit the Gaza Strip does not mean a positive change in how the PA henceforth deals with the current war on the Gaza Strip while 20% believe it does.
- We asked the public for the second time what political measures the PA leadership should take today to help address the effects of the current war in the Gaza Strip. We presented the public with three options: reconciliation, the formation of a national unity government, and the provision of humanitarian services. First came "the formation of a national unity government to negotiate with Israel and the international community to end the war and rebuild the Gaza Strip in the future," with 42% opting for it, compared to 33% three months ago. Second was "achieving immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" with 38% selecting it. The third option, chosen by only 16%, was for the PA to "lead a campaign to provide humanitarian services to the residents of Gaza in cooperation with Egypt and the international community." It is worth noting that support for the formation of a national unity government stands at 52% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank.

7. Satisfaction with selected Palestinian, regional, and international actors:

- As we did in our previous poll, we asked in the current one about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:
 1. On the *Palestinian side*, satisfaction with Hamas' performance drops to 61% (75% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Yahya Sinwar (54%; 70% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip), Fateh (26%; 25% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (22%; 30% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank), president Abbas (18%; 13% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), and the new prime minister Muhammad Mustafa (15%; 23% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank). Three months ago, satisfaction with Sinwar in the Gaza Strip stood at 50% and with Hamas at 64%.


Figure (4): Now I will ask you about several Palestinian actors and whether you are satisfied or dissatisfied with their performance in the current war.:



A large majority in the West Bank (75%) is satisfied with Hamas' decision to replace its head, Ismail Haniyyeh, with Yahiya Sinwar. Two thirds (65%) of Gazans say they are dissatisfied; only 32% are satisfied with Sinwar's selection. Moreover, a majority of 53% of all the public believes that Hamas' policy under Sinwar will not change while 29% believe it will become closer to Iran, and 10% believe it will become closer to Egypt and Qatar.

- As for satisfaction with Arab/regional actors, the highest satisfaction rate went to Yemen, as we found in our previous polls, today at 69% (78% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Hezbollah (44%), Qatar (43%), Iran (33%), Jordan (23%), Egypt (20%), UAE (19%), and Saudi Arabia (15%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction in the current and previous polls in the West Bank and Gaza. Significant in this poll is the decline in satisfaction with Yemen, Hezbollah, Qatar and Iran. It is also useful to note that satisfaction with Yemen and Hezbollah rises in the West Bank while decreasing in the Gaza Strip; in contrast, satisfaction with Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia rises in the Gaza Strip and decreases in the West Bank, while satisfaction with Iran is equal in both regions.


Figure (5): Now I will ask you about several Arab and regional actors and whether you are satisfied or dissatisfied with their performance in the current war:



The significant drop in satisfaction with Iran's performance, a 16-point drop, seems to be due to the belief of the overwhelming majority that it will not avenge the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil. A majority of more than three quarters (76%) believes that Iran will not retaliate against Israel for assassinating Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran while 20% believe it will take revenge. Belief that Iran will retaliate against Israel increases in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank at 27% and 15% respectively.

If Iran attacks Israel in response to its assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil, 44% of the Palestinians believe that the war will extend into a broad regional war, but a slim majority of 51% (54% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that Iran's response will be limited as it did five months ago.

3. For the *international actors*, China received the highest satisfaction (26%), perhaps for its role in organizing the Beijing reconciliation meeting, followed by Russia (19%), the United Nations (13%), and the United States (5%).




8. Fear in the West Bank of the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank:

- 77% of West Bankers say they fear the spread of war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank while 23% do not fear such a war. 63% of West Bankers believe that if the war spreads to the West Bank, Israel will succeed in destroying most of its cities, as it did in the Gaza Strip.
- Despite this, 67% believe that Israel will not win a war in the West Bank if it moves there from the Gaza Strip, but 25% believe it will win it. When West Bankers are asked what they would do if the war moved to the West Bank, would they move with their families to Jordan or stay in the West Bank, 90% of West Bankers say they will remain in the West Bank while 8% say they will go to Jordan.
- When asked who would bring the war from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, 90% of West Bankers think it could be the government of Netanyahu and settlers, 3% think it could be Hamas, and 5% think it could be armed groups in the West Bank.
- When asked, what would be the aims of Israel if the war were to move to the West Bank, the largest percentage (33%) said “to commit genocide against the population.” The second motivation attributed to Israel, selected by 31% of the public, was “to eradicate the armed resistance;” the third, selected by 25% was “to expel the population to Jordan,” and 10% said “to eliminate the Palestinian Authority.”

(2) Parliamentary and presidential elections and the domestic balance of power:


- If presidential elections were held between three candidates, Marwan Barghouti of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and Yahiya Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would be 69%. Vote for Marwan Barghouti among all public, voters and non-voters, stands at 32%, followed by Sinwar (31%) and Abbas (6%). Among voters only, i.e. among those who actually intend to vote in the presidential elections, Barghouti receives 46%, Sinwar 44%, and Abbas 9%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti among voters stood at 56%, Hamas candidate 36%, and Abbas 6%.

Figure (7): And what if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti, Ismail Haniyeh, and Mahmoud Abbas, to whom would you vote?




- If only two candidates were in the competition for the presidency, Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and Yahya Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would drop to 55%. In this case, Sinwar stands at 41% and Abbas at 13%. Among voters actually participating in the elections, Sinwar receives 74% and Abbas 24%. Three months ago, only 20% among the actual voters chose Abbas and 76% chose Hamas’s candidate.

Figure (8): If new presidential elections are to take place today, and Mahmud Abbas was nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, whom would you vote for?




- If the two presidential candidates were Marwan Barghouti of Fatah and Sinwar of Hamas, turnout would rise to 67%. In this case, the vote for Barghouti among the entire public would be 35% and for Sinwar 32%. Among voters actually participating in the elections, Barghouti receives 52% and Sinwar 47%. These results indicate a 7-point decrease in the percentage of votes for Barghouti and an 8-point increase in the vote for the Hamas candidate.




- In a closed question, we asked the public to choose the person it deems appropriate as President Abbas's successor from a predetermined list of options. The largest percentage (37%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti, 30% said they prefer Yahya Sinwar, 10% chose Mohammed Dahlan, 5% chose Mustafa Barghouti, and 15% said they do not know or chose someone other than those listed.
- Satisfaction with President Abbas' performance stands at 18% and dissatisfaction at 81%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 11% in the West Bank (compared to 8% three months ago) and in the Gaza Strip at 27% (compared to 19% three months ago).
- 84% want President Abbas to resign while 15% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 89% said they want the president to resign, and nine months ago 84% said they want him to resign. Today, 90% of the demand for the president's resignation comes from the West Bank and 75% comes from the Gaza Strip.

Figure (10): If it is up to you, would you want to have Abbas resign or not resign?




- When asked which political party or movement they support, the largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Hamas, followed by Fatah (21%), 6% selected third parties, and 29% said they do not support any of them or do not know. Three months ago, 40% said they support Hamas and 20% said they support Fatah. Twelve months ago, support for Hamas stood at 22% and Fatah at 26%. These results mean that support for Hamas over the past three months has decreased by 4 percentage points, while support for Fatah has risen by one point over the same period. Support for Hamas today stands at 37% in the West Bank (compared to 41% three months ago) and for Fatah at 18% (compared to 17% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 35% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 26% (compared to 24% three months ago).

Figure (11): Which of the following political parties do you support?



- But if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they will participate in them, and among the public at large, 29% say they will vote for Hamas, 18% for Fatah, 4% for third parties, and 15% have not yet decided. Among voters actually participating in the elections, support stands at Hamas at 45%, Fatah at 27%, third parties at 5%, and 22% are undecided on whom they will vote. Compared to the results we obtained three months ago, the current results among voters actually participating in the elections indicate a decrease of 3 percentage points for Hamas and a rise of one percentage point for Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, vote for Hamas among voters participating in the elections stands at 42% (compared to 44% three months ago), and vote for Fatah among voters participating in the elections stands at 33% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 48% (compared to 48% three months ago) and Fatah among voters participating in elections stands at 23% (compared to 21% three months ago).

Figure (12): If new elections agreed to by all factions are held today and the same lists that took part in the last PLC elections were nominated, for whom would you vote?




- 43% (compared to 51% three months ago) believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 19% (compared to 16% three months ago) believe that Fatah led by president Abbas is the most deserving. About a third, (32%) compared to 27% three months ago, believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. A year ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving of it, 24% said Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said that both movements do not deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people.

(3) Domestic conditions:

- An overwhelming majority (69%) believes that the new Palestinian government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas and formed in March will not succeed in carrying out reforms that the previous government headed by Mohammad Shtayyeh was unable to carry out. By contrast, 22% believe it will succeed in doing so. Three months ago, 72% said the new government would not succeed in carrying out reforms.
- We also asked the public about its expectations for the new government, such as carrying out specific reforms announced by this government or meeting the priorities of the public:
 1. 75% believe that the government will not succeed in pushing for reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
 2. 72% believe it will not succeed in improving economic conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
 3. 73% believe it will not succeed in holding legislative and presidential elections
 4. 71% say it will not succeed in providing relief for the Gaza Strip and reconstruction in the future

It is important to note, as the following figure shows, that in all of these measures, Gazans are more optimistic than West Bankers about the new government's ability to succeed, but the majority there also does not believe that the government will succeed in any of these reforms.

Figure (13): Do you think the new government headed by Mohammad Mustafa will or will not succeed in the following reforms that the Shtayyeh government could not carry out? **Not succeed**



- Al Jazeera is the most watched TV station in Palestine as 60% selecting it as the one they watched the most during the past two months. Due to the current war conditions, residents of the West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to watch Aljazeera, 80% and 30% respectively. The second most popular stations are Al-Aqsa and Palestine Today (3% each), followed by Palestine, Al-Arabiya, Ma'an and Al-Mayadeen TV (2% each).
- A majority of 66% (compared to 69% three months ago) believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. A year ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.
- We asked the public in the *West Bank* about its personal and family safety and security. The findings show that only 9% feel safe and secure while 90% feel unsafe and insecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 13% and 12 months ago at 48%.


(4) The Beijing Declaration and the role of regional and international parties in influencing the decision-making of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority:

- An overwhelming majority (72%) believes that the Beijing's Declaration issued by Palestinian factions in July will not be implemented soon while 24% believe it will be implemented soon. When those who believe that the Beijing's declaration will not be implemented were asked who they think will obstruct implementation, 39% say it is Fatah headed by President Abbas and 36% believe it is Hamas.
- We asked the public about its assessment of China's role in domestic Palestinian affairs, is it big or small? 40% say it is "medium," 38% say it is small, and only 17% say it is big. When asked whether or not respondents welcome a broader Chinese role in Palestinian domestic affairs, such as reconciliation, a majority of 57% says it welcomes it while 40% say it does not.

- We asked the public which regional or international party has the greatest influence on the decisions of the Hamas leadership today. The largest percentage (38%) says it is Iran, 20% say it is Qatar, 3% say it is Egypt, and 2% say it is Russia. Four countries received a single percentage point: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United States. 30% select "none of the above."
- When asked about the most influential regional or international party on the decisions of the PA leadership today, the largest percentage (28%) say it is Israel, 25% say it is the US, 11% say it is Egypt, 7% say it is Qatar, followed by Saudi Arabia (4%), Jordan (3%), and 14% select "none of the above."

(5) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:


- 39% support and 58% oppose the concept of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%. Rise in support for this solution in the current poll came from both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to 39% and 38% respectively.



- But when asked about support or opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967, i.e. defining the borders of the state and without linking it to the two-state solution, support rises to 59% (60% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip), while 37% do not support the establishment of such a state.
- Support for a two-state solution is usually linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for a Palestinian state. Today, 57% (compared to 65% three months ago) believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion, but 39% (compared to 34% three months ago) believe it remains practical. Moreover, 69% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 30% believe the chances are medium or high.

- When asked about the public's support or opposition to specific political measures to break the deadlock, 57% supported joining more international organizations, 45% supported resorting to unarmed popular resistance, 51% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 49% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, and 22% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 63% supported a return to confrontations and an armed intifada, 49% supported unarmed popular resistance, 62% supported the dissolution of the PA, and 22% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
- We asked about the public support for three possible solutions to the conflict: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the solution of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel, and a one-state solution in which the Jews and Palestinians live with equality, 51% (49% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, while 19% (14% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) prefer a confederation between two states. 10% (11% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) prefer the establishment of a single state with equality between the two sides. 21% said they did not know or did not want to answer.
- We presented the public with three ways to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state and asked them to choose the most effective one: 48% (50% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) chose "armed struggle"; 30% (24% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) chose negotiations; and 15% (11% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) chose popular peaceful resistance. As shown in the figure below, these results indicate a decrease of 6 percentage points in support for armed struggle, a 5 percentage point increase in support for negotiations, and a decrease of one percentage point in support for peaceful resistance. The drop in support for armed struggle comes from the Gaza Strip, where this percentage drops by 20 points, essentially reverting to its level of support six months ago.

Figure (15): In your view, what is the best means of achieving Palestinian goals in ending the occupation and building an independent state?



(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the most pressing problems confronting Palestinians today:

- 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages; 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; and 11% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%; 38% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; 30% said it is the Israeli occupation; 11% said it is corruption; 10% said it is unemployment; and 9% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, 50% (45% in the West Bank and 57% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; and 28% said it is the Israeli occupation.