

Public Opinion Poll #12

The West Bank and Gaza Strip

September 29-30, 1994

This is the twelfth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The following topics are covered in this poll: economic living conditions, the negotiations, the performance of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the opposition, armed resistance, Palestinian-Jordanian future relations, the participation of women in elections, and political affiliation.

SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. The poll results are published independently and with unit analysis in both Arabic and English. They provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, SRU strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine. Consistent with its commitment to the development of the status of survey research in the West Bank and Gaza, SRU has utilized new methods to select the sample (See Methodology section). SPU will be conducting polls every six weeks.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (see Appendix).

General Background

This poll was conducted over a three day period: Thursday and Friday, September 29 and 30, and Saturday, October 1, 1994. A number of political events preceeded the poll, summarized below:

1. There was an increase in discussion of the topic of elections as the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations regarding elections continued.
2. The economic situation continued to be one of the most important topics of concern to Palestinians. Mr. Ahmed Quree', Economic Minister for the PNA, made a statement that the wheels of the Palestinian economy were beginning to move. Also, Mr. Fraih Abu Madeen, Justice Minister, announced that more and more companies are registering themselves as legal enterprises in the ministry. The results of the poll as will be indicated later show that the majority of Palestinians feel that the economic situation is still bad.
3. There is a continuing debate concerning the imprisonment of the supporters of the opposition especially in Gaza. At the same time, dialogue between the PNA and the opposition continued.

4. Negotiations between Jordan and Israel continued during this period amid an increasing stabilization of their relations.
5. The transformation of authority over education has been completed in this period where now Palestinians have authority over the educational system.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.

Household Sample Selection

SPU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. For the purpose of this poll, public-forum interviews were eliminated and replaced by household interviews. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Sample Localities Selection

The Following table lists the localities that were included in the sample for this month.

District (Sample Type) Size/ %)	Localities (Type)	District (Sample Size/%)	Localities
Nablus (117/9.4%) (C), (RC), Bala' (T), Iktaba	Nablus (C), Balata (RC), Qabalan (V), DirElhatab (V), Talouza (V), Dir Sharaf (V)	Tulkarm/Qalqilya (96/7.7%)	Tulkarm Tulkarm (V), Salfit Azzoun (V), (V)
Jenin (96/7.7%) (C), (RC)	Jenin (C), Jenin (RC), Barta' (V), Ajja (V), Arrabeh (T), Tammoun (V)	Jericho (23/1.8%)	Jericho Jiftlik
Ramallah (119/9.5%) Ithna	Ramallah (C),	Hebron (145/11.6%)	Hebron (C),

Na'im	El-Bireh (C),		(T), Bani
(T), Dir	Jalazoun (RC),		(T), Sa'ir
Al-Aroub	Birzeit (V),		Samit (V),
	Bit-Our Eltihta		(RC)
	(V), Aroura (V),		
	Bittin (V)		
Jerusalem (76/6.1%)	Old City (C), Sheik	Bethlehem (78/6.2%)	Bethelehem
(C), Bit			
Taqu'	Jarah (C), El-Tour		Sahour (T),
Deheishi	(C), Shufat (RC)		(V), Al-
Aizariya			(RC), El-
(V)			(T), Battir
Gaza North	Jabalia (RC), Bit	Gaza City	Al-Rimal,
(137/11.0%)	Hanoun (V)	(141/11.3%)	Al-Shugae'i
Gaza Middle	El-Magazi (RC),	Gaza South	Rafah (C),
Rafah			
(113/9.0%)	Khan Yunis (RC),	(109/8.7%)	(RC)
	Khan Yunis (C)		

Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly. Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be two hundred and is assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 200 by 10, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the second in the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block.

To select the individual within the selected household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice. The first flip was to choose gender of the respondent and the second was to choose whether the respondent is to be older or younger than forty years. When in the household, fieldworkers would conduct the interview with the person who has the characteristics that they selected in this manner.

We received 750 questionnaires from the West Bank and 501 from Gaza, for a total of 1251 interviews.

Table 2 provides the reader with data on sample distribution for the present poll where the sample was selected based on household interviews. The table also compares present data with

those of the month of June 1994 where the sample was obtained primarily through public forum interviews.

It is obvious that household interviews resulted in a higher representation of those Palestinians with fewer years of education. It has also led to a higher percentage of housewives and older individuals. Occupational distribution has also changed where the representation of laborers and employees has declined. The sampling method utilized in this poll resulted in an equal number of men and women.

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Sample	September	June 1994	Sample	September
June Distribution 1994	1994		Distribution 1994	1994
West Bank Gaza Strip	59.9 40.1	66.2 33.8	Education Up to 9 Yrs.	44.9 32.2 30.2
			10-12 Yrs.	10.5 12.4 32.6
			Two-Yr. Coll.	----- 16.5
			Bachelors MA & PHD	19.2
City Town 31.8	41.9 07.4	38.0 08.7	Single Married	23.8 72.3 3.9
Village R. Camp	24.9 25.8	31.2 22.1	Others	64.5
Refugee	50.8 49.2	44.4 55.6	Male Female	50.3 49.7 58.8
Non-Refugee			Occupation	10.9 9.6 15.0
Age 18-22 23-26	20.1 12.8	21.5	Laborers	38.1 2.7 9.6
27-30 31-35	14.8 12.1	18.6 16.4	Craftsmen	5.7 10.1 2.6
10.1			Housewives	1.3 9.4
36-42 43-50	12.0 12.4	12.4 12.1	Specialists*	
20.6			Employees**	
Over 50	16.4	09.2 09.2	Merchants	
04.0			Students	
			Farmers	
18.6			Retired	
08.6			Unemployed	
12.8				
02.1				
00.5				
07.7				

* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

** Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

These changes are believed to have had influence on the results of the poll. The following table illustrates the effect that the changes on the sample distribution had on the survey results. Here, it is obvious that household interviews resulted in a larger representation of Palestinians who are not following the news as much as those represented in a sample obtained through public-forum interviews.

Table 3

Following the News by Sample Type (%)

Following the News		Household Sample	
September 94		94	
Always	25.4		33.1
Often	17.9		27.1
Sometimes	48.7		36.2
I don't follow the news	8.0		3.6

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers. Training for data collection was conducted in the field where actual illustrations of the sample selection and interviewing techniques were conducted.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 15 per day) to allow for careful interviewing.

Interviews took place primarily over a three day period, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. A few interviews took place on Wednesday.

Table 4:

Sample Size (%) by Date and Time of Interviews

Day of Interview	% of Interviews	Time of Interview	% of
Interviews		(for all days)	
Wednesday	1.2	8am-9:59am	13.2
Thursday	37.1		18.4
Friday	44.2	10am-11:59am	20.3
Saturday	17.5	12pm-1:59pm	

2pm-3:59pm 4pm and
After

The mean time for an interview was eleven minutes. The interview period is defined as the time that is spent on the selection of the household and respondent, as well as the actual interviewing.

Household interviews resulted in a lower non-response rate, estimated at 8.6%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions .

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%, and the confidence level is higher than 95%.

Results

Economic Living Conditions

The poll shows that most Palestinians (50%) feel that one year after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) their economic conditions did not change. As much as 40.8% feel that economic conditions have deteriorated since the signing of the DOP and only 9.2% said that conditions have improved. The largest percentage of Gaza Strip respondents (48.5%) said that their economic conditions have deteriorated since the signing of the DOP. This is 13% more than that is in the West Bank. Another 39.7% of Gazans felt that economic conditions have not changed, compared with 56.9% in the West Bank. Only 11.8% of Gazans and 7.5% of West Bankers said that the economic conditions have improved.

Improvement in the economic conditions is felt the most by the residents of Gaza City where 21.3% indicated such a perspective. They are followed by the residents of the Ramallah-Bireh City where 15.1% indicated that their economic conditions have improved. On the other hand, none of the respondents in the Jericho area sample indicated an improvement in the economic situation and 70% of them said that conditions are still the same. The residents of north, middle, and south of the Gaza Strip feel the most worsening in their economic conditions a year after the signing of the DOP. They are followed by the residents of Tulkarm, Jenin, Hebron, and Bethlehem areas. In Jerusalem, 81% of the respondents indicated no-change in economic conditions. (Table 5)

Table 5

Area of Residence by Economic Conditions

	Improve %	Worsen %	No Change %
Nablus	6.8	27.4	65.8
Tulkarm	7.3	44.8	47.9
Jenin	3.1	41.7	55.2
Jericho	---	30.4	69.6
Ramallah	15.1	29.4	55.5
Hebron	11.0	45.5	43.5
Bethlehem	2.6	42.3	55.1
Jerusalem	2.6	15.8	81.6
Gaza North	10.2	50.4	39.4
Gaza City	21.3	27.0	51.7
Gaza Middle	8.8	65.5	25.7
Gaza South	4.6	56.0	39.4

There is also a relationship between refugee status and view of economic conditions where 45.4% of the refugee sample felt that the situation has deteriorated. This is compared with 35.8% among non-refugees. Related to that is respondents' place of residence as the poll shows that residents of refugee camps have a pessimistic view of the effect of the signing of the DOP on economic conditions. A total of 50.5% of refugee camp residents in the sample felt that economic conditions have deteriorated, compared with 40.5% among city residents, 35.4% among village residents, and 28% among town residents where 67.7% of them see no change in the situation. There is also a correlation between education and view of economic condition. The least educated view the economic situation as deteriorating and the most educated see no change.

It seems that regardless of Palestinian attitudes towards the political developments and the peace process, as expressed by their political affiliation, few Palestinians are willing to claim that their general economic status has improved. As Table 6 demonstrates, the People's Party -- PPP -- (referred to as Hizb el-Sha'b in previous polls) and Fateh are less likely to note that their economic situation has worsened than respondents affiliating with other political groups. However, Fateh supporters are not more likely to express improvement in the economic situation, with most expressing that their economic situation has not changed.

Table 6

Political Affiliation by Economic Conditions

	Improve %	Worsen %	No Change %
PFLP	9.6	48.9	41.5
Fateh	11.4	33.0	55.6
Islamic Jihad	10.8	45.9	43.3
PPP (Hizb el-Sha'b)	20.0	20.0	60.0
Hamas	8.1	48.4	43.5
DFLP	---	66.7	33.3
Feda	16.7	50.0	33.3
Islamic Inds	2.3	61.4	36.3
Nationalist Inds	7.0	49.3	43.7
Others	4.6	47.7	43.7
No one	8.6	38.3	53.1

The Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations

One year after the signing of the DOP, the majority of Palestinians show support for the negotiations. A total of 51.8% of respondents said that their support for the negotiations has either increased (23.3%) or didn't change (28.5%). In comparison, 37.3% declared that they oppose the negotiations while 17.2% said that their support for the negotiations has declined and another 20.1% said that their opposition is still the same. The negative evaluation for the negotiations is higher in Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In Gaza, 44.2% (20.5%+23.7%) indicated that their support for the negotiations has declined or that their opposition is still the same. This is compared with 32.7% (17.7%+15%) in the West Bank. It is possible that West Bankers still believe that the negotiations are necessary and are waiting for them to materialize. In the Gaza Strip, the issue of negotiations is not as urgent.

The poll results show a correlation between district and view of the negotiations. Unlike the rest of the Gaza Strip, the residents of Gaza City show the most positive outlook towards the negotiations, where 39% said that their support for the negotiations has increased. In contrast, residents of the middle and south of the Gaza Strip are least supportive of the negotiations. For example, 33.8% of the residents of the south of the Gaza Strip declared that their support has declined.

Table 7

Area of Residence by Attitude Towards Negotiations

Don't Know	Increase %	Decrease %	No Change, Positive %	No Change, Negative %
Nablus	22.2	12.0	10.3	45.3
10.2				
Tulkarm	26.0	22.9	10.4	33.3
7.3				
Jenin	34.4	10.4	15.6	30.2
9.4				
Jericho	8.7	17.4	13.0	43.5
17.4				
Ramallah	21.8	16.0	20.2	29.4
12.6				
Hebron	25.5	12.4	24.1	22.1
15.9				
Bethlehem	20.5	16.7	24.4	21.8
16.6				
Jerusalem	18.9	16.2	20.3	25.7
18.9				
Gaza North	22.1	16.2	26.5	23.5
11.7				
Gaza City	39.0	9.2	14.9	29.1
7.8				
Gaza Middle	17.9	25.9	23.2	26.8
6.2				

Gaza South 4.6	5.6	35.2	31.5	23.1
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This is related to another variable which is refugee status. Refugees are more critical of the negotiations than non-refugees. (Table 8) The residents of the middle and south of Gaza are mostly refugees. In Gaza City, the majority of the residents are non-refugees.

Table 8

Refugee Status by Attitude Towards Negotiations

Don't Know %	Increase %	Decrease %	No Change, Positive %	No Change, Negative %
Refugee 8.2	21.0	20.2	22.8	27.8
Non-Refugee 13.7	25.3	14.1	17.1	29.8

This correlation meant that opposition to the negotiations is higher in refugee camps than in towns, cities, and villages.

The most educated give the negotiations a negative mark, where 48.4% of those with Bachelors degrees said that their support for the negotiations has declined or that their opposition is still the same. In comparison, 46.4% of them view the negotiations positively. In addition, we find that negative evaluation of the negotiations is high among students where 48.4% of them said that their support has declined or that they still oppose the negotiations, compared with 41.3% who view the negotiations positively.

There is also a correlation between political affiliation and views on the negotiations. It is interesting to find that among the support groups, the supporters of the People's Party are the most critical. A total of 26.7% of them declared that their support for the negotiations, of which they were a part, has declined. (Table 9)

Table 9

Political Affiliation by Attitude Towards Negotiations

Don't Know %	Increase %	Decrease %	No Change, Positive %	No Change, Negative %	
PFLP 5.3	2.1	14.9	64.9	12.8	
Fateh 7.7	39.9	12.9	3.6	35.9	
Islamic Jihad 13.6	16.2	21.6	40.5	8.1	
PPP -	13.3	26.7	6.7	53.3	--

7.4	7.3	20.3	44.7	20.3	
DFLP	6.7	33.3	53.3	---	
6.7					
Fida	58.3	8.3	---	33.4	--
-					
Islamic Inds.	11.4	20.5	31.8	18.2	
18.1					
Nationalist	15.5	32.4	12.7	31.0	
8.4					
Inds.					
Others	16.4	20.3	14.1	37.5	
11.7					
No one	9.9	15.5	28.0	20.5	
26.1					

Evaluation of Palestinian National Authority (PNA)

The poll results confirm that Palestinians are giving the PNA the benefit of the doubt. A total of 40.8% said that it is early to make any judgement about the performance of the PNA. A total of 30.9% gave the PNA a positive evaluation where they said that they are satisfied with its performance. In contrast, 21.2% said they they are dissatisfied. A similar satisfaction rate exists in both the West Bank (30%) and Gaza Strip (32.1%). However, dissatisfaction in the Gaza Strip is higher, where 26.5% said that they are dissatisfied. This is compared with 17.6% in the West Bank.

The results obtained from the Gaza Strip portray a significant degree of polarization. Residents of Gaza City are most satisfied with the PNA, while the residents of the southern part of the Gaza Strip (ie., Rafah) are most dissatisfied. Only 16.5% of the residents in this area said that they are satisfied with the performance of the PNA, compared with 42% in Gaza City. Positive evaluation for the PNA can be found in the north of the West Bank (i.e., Jenin and Nablus). In Jericho, however, there is a split where 26% said that they are dissatisfied and 22% said that they are satisfied. It is interesting to notice the differences in the various regions in the Gaza Strip and to compare the situation in Gaza City with that of Jericho where people are less satisfied with the PNA. This is possibly due to the fact that most of the PNA activities are seen and felt most in Gaza City and not in Jericho or in the rest of the Gaza Strip .

Table 10

Area of Residence by Evaluation of PNA Performance

Opinion %	Satisfied %	Not Satisfied %	Too Early %	No
Nablus	32.5	13.7	46.2	7.6
Tulkarm	24.0	14.6	52.1	9.3
Jenin	40.6	12.5	36.5	10.4
Jericho	21.7	26.1	52.2	---
Ramallah	23.5	20.2	47.9	8.4
Hebron	37.2	22.1	31.7	9.0

Bethlehem	24.4	19.2	44.9	11.5
Jerusalem	25.0	17.1	42.1	15.8
Gaza North	37.0	32.6	26.8	3.6
Gaza City	41.8	13.5	41.1	3.6
Gaza Middle	29.2	23.9	43.4	3.5
Gaza South	16.5	38.5	42.2	2.8

Satisfaction with the PNA is high among farmers (43.8%), the unemployed (38.1%), and housewives (34%). Dissatisfaction is higher among employees where 29.6% of them said that they are dissatisfied and 20.2% said that they are satisfied.

Evaluation of the PNA is also correlated with place of residence where the results show that villagers are most supportive followed by residents of refugee camps, cities, and towns. It is also noticeable that there is an inverse relationship between education and satisfaction with the PNA. A total of 37.5% of those with less than 9 years of education said that they are satisfied. This is compared with 17.6% among those with a bachelors degree.

The poll results show that satisfaction with the PNA is correlated with political affiliation where supporters of Feda and Fateh are most satisfied with the PNA. It is however noticeable that 46.7% of the supporters of People's Party are dissatisfied with the performance of the PNA. (Table 11)

Table 11

Political Affiliation by Evaluation of the PNA

Opinion %	Satisfied %	Not Satisfied %	Too Early %	No
PFLP	10.6	53.2	29.8	6.4
Fateh	48.0	8.5	38.7	4.8
Islamic Jihad	16.2	48.6	35.2	---
PPP	20.0	46.7	33.3	---
Hamas	16.9	33.1	38.7	11.3
DFLP	13.3	40.0	40.0	6.7
Feda	50.0	8.3	33.3	8.4
Islamic Inds	13.6	13.6	63.6	9.2
Nationalist Inds	16.9	26.8	49.3	7.0
Others	23.7	22.9	46.6	6.8
No One	21.6	23.5	42.0	12.9

Evaluation of the opposition

Palestinians are generally dissatisfied with the performance of the opposition. A total of 33.5% said that they are dissatisfied and 33.1% said that it is early to evaluate its performance. Only 19.5% declared that they are satisfied with the performance of the opposition. Satisfaction with the performance of the opposition in the West Bank is slightly higher than in Gaza.

It is interesting to find that dissatisfaction with the performance of the opposition is also high among supporters of the opposition groups. For example, 33% of PFLP supporters and 27% of Islamic Jihad supporters are dissatisfied. (Table 12)

Table 12

Political Affiliation by Evaluation of Opposition

Opinion %	Satisfied %	Not Satisfied %	Too Early %	No
PFLP	40.4	33.0	22.3	4.3
Fateh	16.3	40.4	28.3	15.0
Islamic Jihad	27.0	27.0	29.7	16.2
PPP	13.3	40.0	46.7	---
Hamas	30.1	25.2	31.7	13.0
DFLP	33.3	26.7	40.0	---
Feda	25.0	33.3	41.7	---
Islamic Inds	11.4	22.7	45.5	20.5
Nationalist Inds	14.1	43.7	33.8	8.5
Others	17.7	27.7	44.6	10.0
No One	14.2	23.5	38.9	23.5

Students and merchants are most satisfied with the performance of the opposition and farmers and specialists are most dissatisfied. Evaluation of the opposition is correlated with place of residence where dissatisfaction is higher among town residents followed by city, village, and refugee camp residents.

Armed Operations

Palestinians were asked about their position regarding armed operations by some Palestinian factions against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. A total of 32.7% of the respondents said that they support the continuation of such operations while 55.8% said that they don't support such continuation. Only 11.5% said that they have no opinion on the subject. Support for the continuation of armed operations against Israeli targets is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. A total of 38.8% of Gazans said that they support the operations, compared with 28.6% in the West Bank. West Bankers may not be as supportive because they fear that these operations could bring a halt to the negotiations before the West Bank joins Gaza and Jericho under Palestinian authority. There are also more refugee camp residents in Gaza than in the West Bank, and there is more support for the operations in refugee camps than elsewhere, as discussed below. There is a correlation between area of residence and view of armed operations against Israeli targets. Support for the continuation of these operations is higher in the north and south of Gaza. (Table 13) The least support, however, is in Gaza City itself. There is less support for such operations in the north of the West Bank than in the south.

Table 13

Area of Residence by Support for Armed Operations in Gaza and Jericho

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion
%			
Nablus	22.4	69.0	8.6
Tulkarm	20.8	62.5	16.7
Jenin	20.2	71.3	5.5
Jericho	21.7	52.2	26.1
Ramallah	29.4	56.3	14.3
Hebron	37.2	49.7	13.1
Bethlehem	38.5	48.7	21.8
Jerusalem	31.6	61.8	6.6
Gaza North	53.3	40.1	6.6
Gaza City	19.3	64.3	16.4
Gaza Middle	38.9	54.9	6.2
Gaza South	45.9	41.3	12.8

The poll results show an inverse relation between age and support for armed operations where 41.2% of the age group 18-22 declared their support for the continuation of these operations. In contrast, 22.4% of those over 50 declared their support for such operations. It is also correlated with education where support for the continuation is higher among the educated, for example 39.2% of those with 2-year college supported the continuation of armed operations compared with 29.4% among those with 9 years of education or less. The most support for armed operations is in refugee camps. However, this support is roughly equal to opposition, where 44.9% of refugee camp residents support the continuation and 44.5% oppose it. The least support for the continuation is among town residents followed by city and village residents.

Women and Elections

Palestinians were asked about their position regarding the preferred extent of the participation of women in elections. The choices for this question were: participation through voting, candidacy, and a number of seats reserved for women; voting and candidacy only; voting only; and no participation at all. A total of 54% of respondents chose the first option, 17.8% the second, and 16.1% the third. Only 12.1% said that women should not participate at all in elections. Support for the participation of women is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza. Of the West Bank respondents, 57.2% chose the first option, compared with 49.3% in Gaza. The only significant difference between genders was in the first option, with more women (58.4%) choosing this option than men (49.7%).

Table 14

Gender by Attitude Towards Extent of Participation of Women in Elections

Participation %	Voting, Candidacy, and Quota %	Voting and Candidacy %	Voting Only %	No
Male	49.7	19.1	17.6	13.6
Female	58.4	16.5	14.6	10.5

There is a direct correlation between education and support for the participation of women in elections. With regards to occupation, the retired are more supportive of the first option, followed by students and employees. In contrast, 21.9% of farmers in the sample said that women should not participate in any form. The north of the West Bank is less supportive of women's participation than the middle and south. In Gaza, however, support for women's participation is higher in the north than in the center and south. In regard to political affiliation, support for women's participation is higher among the supporters of the People's Party, PFLP, Feda, and DFLP. They are followed by Fateh, nationalist independents, Islamic independents, and "others." The least support is found in Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and "no one."

Table 15

Political Affiliation by Attitude Towards Extent of Participation of Women in Elections

Participation %	Voting, Candidacy, and Quota %	Voting and Candidacy %	Voting Only %	No
PFLP	78.7	10.6	2.1	8.6
Fateh	57.6	21.2	11.6	9.6
Islamic Jihad	37.8	24.3	21.6	16.3
PPP	73.3	26.7	---	---
Hamas	37.9	9.7	32.3	20.1
DFLP	66.7	6.7	20.0	6.6
Fida	100.0	---	---	---
Islamic Inds	52.3	15.9	22.7	9.1
Nationalist Inds	59.2	21.1	12.7	7.0
Other	46.9	22.3	21.5	9.3
No One	42.8	12.6	22.6	22.0

Palestinian-Jordanian Future Relations

The poll results indicate that the majority (60.5%) of Palestinians support an independent Palestinian state as opposed to a complete union with Jordan (20.9%) or a confederation (16.3%). Support for independence is much higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. In Gaza 72.7% supported such an option, compared with 52.3% in the West Bank. There are 46.4% of West Bank respondents supportive of complete union (26.4%) or confederation (19.0%). Support for a union with Jordan is highest in Nablus, Tulkarm, and Hebron. Traditionally these cities have shown strong pro-Jordanian tendencies due to close family and commercial ties. Support for a confederation is strongest in Jerusalem.

Table 16

Area of Residence by Attitude Towards Palestinian-Jordanian Future Relations

%	Two States %	Complete Unity %	Confederation %	Other
Nablus	39.7	31.9	22.4	6.0

Tulkarm	49.0	31.3	19.7	---
Jenin	56.3	25.0	16.7	2.0
Jericho	52.2	21.7	26.1	---
Ramallah	63.0	16.8	17.6	2.6
Hebron	55.9	33.8	9.0	1.3
Bethlehem	60.3	16.7	21.8	1.2
Jerusalem	39.2	25.7	32.4	2.7
Gaza North	72.3	12.4	8.8	6.5
Gaza City	75.2	12.8	11.3	0.7
Gaza Middle	67.3	14.2	17.7	0.8
Gaza South	75.2	11.0	11.0	1.8

There is a direct correlation between age and support for a form of unity with Jordan, as indicated by Table 17.

Table 17

Age by Attitude Towards Future Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

%	Two States %	Complete Unity %	Confederation %	Other
18-22	68.7	15.7	13.6	2.0
23-26	71.3	15.6	11.9	1.2
27-30	66.1	13.6	14.7	5.6
31-35	61.6	14.6	19.8	4.0
36-42	54.0	24.7	19.3	2.0
43-50	58.7	25.8	15.5	---
51+	41.5	36.5	20.0	2.0

Support for union with Jordan is higher among the least educated, the retired, specialists, farmers, and among town residents. The results of the poll show that PFLP supporters are most supportive of independence, while Islamic independents and supporters of Feda are most supportive of a form of unity with Jordan.

Table 18

Political Affiliation by Attitude Towards Future Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

%	Two States %	Complete Unity %	Confederation %	Other
PFLP	80.9	8.5	7.4	3.2
Fateh	61.8	17.7	19.0	1.5
Islamic Jihad	59.5	21.6	10.8	8.1
PPP	73.3	13.3	13.3	---
Hamas	64.5	21.0	12.1	2.4
DFLP	53.3	33.3	13.3	---
Fida	50.0	33.3	16.7	---
Islamic Inds	47.7	34.1	15.9	2.3
Nationalist Inds	62.0	18.3	19.7	---
Other	55.0	25.2	16.8	3.4
No One	49.7	29.8	15.5	5.0

Elections

The poll results indicate that consistent with previous findings, 79% of respondents prefer elections as the means to select their representatives. Only 12.4% preferred appointment by the PLO. With regards to participation in the elections, 74.1% indicated their intention to participate. This is a higher percentage than what was obtained in the previous poll in August, where 65.1% indicated their intention to participate. It is interesting to find that supporters of the opposition are intending to participate as well, as indicated by Table 19.

Table 19

Political Affiliation by Intention to Participate in Elections

	Yes %	No %	Not Sure %
PFLP	63.8	28.7	7.5
Fateh	86.5	7.6	5.9
Islamic Jihad	54.1	21.6	24.3
PPP	100.0	---	---
Hamas	60.5	25.0	14.5
DFLP	46.7	26.7	26.7
Fida	91.7	8.3	---
Islamic Inds	79.5	13.6	6.9
Nationalist Inds	77.5	8.5	14.0
Other	75.4	10.0	14.6
No One	51.2	31.5	17.3

Political Affiliation

The results of the poll indicate an increase (3.8%) in the popularity of Fateh among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, we notice a decline (3.8%) in the popularity of Hamas and an increase (1.3%) in the popularity of PFLP. Independents and others seem to comprise 1/3 of the Palestinian community where 33.1% of the respondents indicated that they support Islamic independents, nationalist independents, others, or no one.

It was noticeable that the percentage of support for Hamas in this poll stands at 10.7%, less than the average support it enjoyed in previous CPRS polls, where for example, support for Hamas in August was 13.9%. This difference of 3.8% is close to the margin of error (3%) and it might not have any statistical significance, which is to say that the popularity of Hamas as indicated in this poll is an expression of this specific sample that we obtained through household interviews and if we repeat the process of sampling we will probably be able to obtain the percentage for average support for Hamas (other variables held constant). Therefore, from a scientific perspective, there is no basis for exaggerating this decline. For example, the popularity of Fateh has ranged from 46% to 34% (a difference of 12%) where in some areas at certain times its popularity has reached 20%, but on average, its popularity has been 40%.

The decline in the popularity of Hamas is in part due to fear as the current political changes have created an atmosphere of uncertainty. In addition, the sample distribution that resulted from household interviews (not public forum) is the main factor that led to the decline in the representation of Hamas (the increase in the popularity of Fateh, independents, and others) among the respondents. It was clear that there was an increase in the representation of some social groups at the expense of other social groups. For example, the groups that gained higher representation are housewives (18%), older individuals (defined as 43 and over, 10%), and those with the least education (defined as 12 years or less of education, 16%). The results of previous polls and the current poll indicate that these groups tend to affiliate with the mainstream in Palestinian society, i.e. Fateh and tend to be less politicized where they would tend to select options such as "others" and "no one." As for the groups whose representation declined in the current sample, they are the young (defined as 18-22 years, 7%), students (2.7), college and university graduates (13.6%), and village residents (6%). These groups more than others tend to support Hamas and the opposition in general than the members of the other groups. For example, support for the opposition among students is roughly equal to support for Fateh among students.

The changes in the current sample representation rates described above actually allowed for a more representative sample of the Palestinian community as a whole, as compared with the existing data on Palestinian society. (*Palestine Population Handbook*, Ziad Abdeen and Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Jerusalem, 1993; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1992; *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions*, FAFO, 1993)

Age

Table 20 shows the sample distribution obtained through household interviews (September 1994) and compares it with the June 1994 poll obtained primarily through public forum interviews and with the existing statistics.

Table 20

Age Sample Distribution

Age	West Bank %			Gaza Strip		
	Sept 1994	June 1994	1992	Sept 1994	June 1994	1992
18-22	19.7	23.3	21.8	20.6	18.1	22.4
23-26	11.4	18.1	16.4	15.0	19.6	17.1
27-30	12.9	16.9	14.5	16.2	15.4	13.6
31-35	12.2	12.3	13.0	12.0	12.3	11.3
36-42	10.3	11.2	08.0	14.6	13.9	11.2
43-50	13.0	08.8	06.7	11.6	09.9	6.4
51+	20.4	09.2	19.6	10.2	10.8	18.0

The table shows a closer representation to the actual demographic figures in this sample than in the previous one. If we weight the sample to correct for discrepancies, the popularity of Hamas will increase slightly, reaching 11%.

Gender

Table 21 shows an almost equal representation of men and women in the current sample, which almost perfectly matches the demographic figures.

Table 21

Gender Sample Distribution

Male			Female		
Sept 1994 %	June 1994 %	Society 1992/3%	Sept 1994 %	June 1994 %	Society 1992/3 %
50.3	58.8	50.2	49.7	41.2	49.8

Education

Table 22 shows that the representation of the least educated in our current sample has increased to become closer to that of society. However, the representation of the educated in the sample is still higher than that found in society. The educated tend to vote for Hamas more than the uneducated as shown in previous polls. If we weight for this variable, there will be a slight decline (0.1%) in Hamas support.

Table 22

Education Sample Distribution

Years of Education	September 1994 %	June 1994 %	Society 1992/3 %
0-9	30.2	44.9	62.8
10-12	32.6	32.2	27.2
13+	37.2	22.9	10.0

It is clear that part of the decline in Hamas support can be attributed to sample selection procedures, underlying the importance of sample selection and other issues of methodology in assessing credibility of survey results.

Appendix

1. One year after the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement) my general economic situation has

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
a. Improved	09.2%	07.5%	11.8%

b. Worsened	40.8%	35.6%	48.5%
c. Not changed	50.0%	56.9%	39.7%
2. With regard to the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, one year after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement),			
a. My support for the Israeli-PLO negotiations has increased.	23.3%	24.0%	22.3%
b. My support for the Israeli-PLO negotiations has decreased.	17.2%	15.0%	20.5%
c. My position has not changed and I am still opposed to the negotiations.	20.1%	17.7%	23.7%
d. My position has not changed and I am still supportive of the negotiations.	28.5%	30.3%	25.7%
e. I don't Know	10.9%	13.0%	07.8%
3. With regard to the performance of the Palestinian National Authority, four months after its establishment,			
a. I am satisfied with it	30.9%	30.0%	32.1%
b. I am not satisfied with it	21.2%	17.6%	26.5%
c. It is too early to judge it	40.8%	42.7%	38.0%
d. I have no opinion	07.1%	09.7%	03.4%
4. With regard to the performance of the opposition four months after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in Gaza and Jericho,			
a. I am satisfied with it	19.5%	17.5%	22.6%
b. I am not satisfied with it	33.5%	35.3%	30.9%
c. It is too early to judge it	33.1%	31.7%	35.1%
d. I have no opinion	13.9%	15.5%	11.4%
5. Do you support the continuing resort of some Palestinian factions to armed operations against Israeli targets in Gaza and Jericho?			
a. Yes	32.7%	28.6%	38.8%
b. No	55.7%	59.2%	50.6%
c. No opinion	11.6%	12.2%	10.6%
6. With regard to the role of Palestinian women in the coming political elections...			
a. I support their participation through voting, candidacy, and a guaranteed number of seats.	54.0%	57.2%	49.3%
b. I support their participation through voting and candidacy.	17.8%	18.4%	16.9%
c. I support their participation through voting only.	16.1%	12.9%	20.9%
d. I do not support their participation in any form.	12.1%	11.5%	12.9%
7. With regard to future Palestinian-Jordanian relations, I support the establishment of...			
a. Two independent states: Palestine and Jordan.	60.5%	52.3%	72.7%
b. Complete unity between Jordan and Palestine.	20.9%	26.4%	12.6%
c. Confederation between Jordan and Palestine.	16.3%	19.0%	12.2%
d. Other (specify)	02.3%	02.3%	02.5%
8. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the			

"Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a. Appointment by PLO leadership	12.4%	13.8%	10.2%
b. Appointment by political groups on a quota basis.	05.6%	05.6%	05.6%
c. Political Elections	79.0%	77.3%	81.6%
d. Other	03.0%	03.3%	02.6%

9. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a. Yes	74.1%	75.0%	72.8%
b. No	15.3%	16.5%	13.6%
c. Not sure	10.6%	08.5%	13.6%

10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:

a. PFLP	07.6%	07.1%	08.5%
b. Fateh	42.8%	44.6%	40.0%
c. Islamic Jihad	03.0%	02.6%	03.6%
d. People's Party (Hizb el-Sha'b)	01.2%	00.8%	01.8%
e. Hamas	10.1%	08.7%	12.1%
f. DFLP	01.2%	01.6%	00.6%
g. Feda	01.0%	01.2%	00.6%
h. Islamic independents	03.6%	03.0%	04.4%
i. Nationalist independents	05.8%	05.3%	06.5%
j. Other (specify)	10.6%	10.4%	11.0%
k. None of the above	13.1%	14.7%	10.9%