

Public Opinion Poll #17
Elections, Negotiations, Strike, Refugee Camps, Criticism of the PNA
May 18-20, 1995

Table 1

Sample Localities Selection*

The Following table lists the localities that were included in the sample for this month. The percentages reflect the weighting for the disproportionately large Tulkarm Camp sample.

District (Sample Localities Size/ %)	Localities	District (Sample Size/%)	
Nablus (116/10.3%) city and camp, Zawiya, Zeita, Anabta	Nablus, al-A'yin Camp, Hawara, Borqa, Beita	Tulkarm/Qalqilya (246/8%)*See introduction and page #17 for explanation of Tulkarm sample size	Tulkarm al- Jericho
Jenin (83/7.5%)	Jenin, Jenin Camp, al-Zababda, Zibdeh, Arabeh	Jericho (25/2.2%)	Jericho
Ramallah (104/19.3%) , al-Shiyukh, Om'ar, Dir Samit,	al-Bireh, Ramallah, al-Jib, 'Aroura, Beit Laqia, Qalandia Camp	Hebron (124/11.1%)	Hebron, Beit al-Aroub
Jerusalem (84/7.5%) Bethlehem, Deheisheh, Beit Faj'ar, Jala	Shu'fat Camp, Silwan, Sheikh Jarrar, al-Souwana	Bethlehem (74/6.6%)	Artaas, Beit
Gaza North (69/6.2%) Rimal, ad-Daraj, Shati, al-Sheik al-Tofaah,	Beit Hanoun, Jabalya Camp and Village	Gaza City (153/13.7%)	al- as- Radhwan, al-
Shoja'aya Gaza Middle city and camp (127/11.3%)	Nusseirat Camp, Dir Balah Camp, Bureij Camp, 'Absaan Kabira, Beni Suhaila, Khan Younis	Gaza South (66/5.9%)	Rafah

Camp

*The fieldworkers conducted interviews in 60 cities, villages, and camps where over 145 sampling units were used.

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be two hundred and is assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 200 by 10, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the second in the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block.

To select the individual within the selected household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice. The first flip was to choose gender of the respondent and the second was to choose whether the respondent was to be older or younger than forty years. When in the household, fieldworkers would conduct the interview with the person who has the characteristics that they selected in this manner.

We received 856 questionnaires from the West Bank and 415 from Gaza, for a total of 1271 interviews. In the Tulkarm Camp area, we interviewed 175 Palestinians. Since the Tulkarm Camp sample is disproportionately large, it was weighted (in this case, deflated) when included in the totals. Table 2 provides the reader with data on sample distribution for the present poll. The percentages reflect the weighting for the Tulkarm Camp sample.

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Sample Distribution May 1995		Education		May 1995	
		Up to 9 yrs.	50.2 (53.0)		
		10-12 years	31.3 (27.0)		
West Bank	62.7 (63.0)	Two-Yr. Coll.	10.0		
Gaza Strip	37.3 (37.0)	University	(20***)		
		Degree(s)	08.5		
Muslim	95.7 (95.5)	Male	48.2 (49.0)		
Christian	04.3 (04.5)	Female	51.8 (51.0)		
City	35.1			Single	20.8
Town/Village	37.7	Refugee	46.6 (42.0)	Married	84.9
Refugee Camp	27.3	Non-Refugee	53.4 (58.0)	Divorced or	04.3
				Widowed	
Age	17.0 (20.1)	Occupation			
18-22	14.3 (13.9)	Laborers	09.5		
23-26	11.6 (13.2)	Craftsmen	09.4		
27-30	15.4 (12.1)	Housewives	40.8		
31-35	14.9 (11.5)	Specialists*	01.8		

36-42	11.7 (10.5)	Employees**	10.5
43-50	15.1 (19.0)	Merchants	05.6
Over 50		Students	06.8
		Farmers	03.2
		Retired	02.8
		None	09.6

*Specialists (University teacher, engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, executive).

**Employees(school teacher, government employee, nurse, lower-level company employee).

Population Estimates are based on the "Statistical Abstract of Israel" (1993) and FAFO (1993).

*** for all post-secondary degrees.

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers. Training for data collection was conducted in the field where actual illustrations of the sample selection and interviewing techniques were conducted.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 18 per day) to allow for careful interviewing.

Interviews took place primarily over a three day period (Thursday, Friday, and Saturday) after 1:00 pm in order to obtain a more representative sample and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Household interviews resulted in a lower non-response rate, estimated at 7%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions .

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%.

Results

Unemployment

The current poll results show that the percentage of unemployment is 36%, which is the average since the month of March. We notice, as shown in Table 3, that the percentage of unemployment reached higher than 50% as a result of the closure (February), and was within the average at

other times. There is still a clear difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where it is 27% in the West Bank and 39% in Gaza. We find that the highest percentage of unemployment is located in the Gaza Strip, in areas outside of Gaza City itself, areas where the refugee camps are mainly located. Unemployment in the middle of the West Bank (Jerusalem and Ramallah) is the least at 10%. The percentage of unemployment in the camps is higher than other areas and the percentage among refugees is 10% higher than among non-refugees. Unemployment is particularly widespread among the 18-30 age group, where it is at 41%, compared with 25% among older respondents. Despite the fact that men are a higher percentage of the labor force, and therefore the unemployed, the percentage among women is higher than that for men. While a large percentage of the educated suffer from unemployment, the least educated are more affected by the problem, perhaps because of the dependence on work in Israel.

Table 3:

Unemployment Demographics

	DEC. 1994 %	FEB. 1995 %	MAR. 1995 %	MAY
1995 %				
Unemployment Rate	30.0	51.0	38.0	36.0
Region				
West Bank Total	22.0	48.0	35.0	27.0
WB North	31.0	56.0	40.8	31.0
WB Middle	16.0	34.0	19.6	10.0
WB South	18.0	52.0	47.6	32.0
Gaza Total	44.0	57.0	43.0	39.0
Gaza City	31.0	51.0	28.8	33.0
Gaza Other	49.0	65.0	50.4	42.0
Place				
City	20.0	43.0	25.0	27.0
Village/Town	36.0	56.0	44.1	30.0
Camp	39.0	58.0	49.7	40.0
Gender				
Male	29.0	49.0	36.1	30.0
Female	37.0	60.0	50.8	42.0
Refugee Status				
Refugee	37.0	56.0	43.4	37.0
Non-refugee	25.0	47.0	35.2	27.0
Education				
Primary	37.0	60.0	45.2	33.0
Secondary	34.0	53.0	42.9	36.0
2-yr college	24.0	43.0	34.6	12.0
University degree(s)	22.0	32.0	23.9	27.0
Marital Status				
Single		45.0	30.8	38.0
Married		53.0	35.6	39.0
Age				
18-30	42.0	54.0	46.7	41.0
31-43	25.0	54.0	35.9	24.0
44-64	20.0	58.0	26.1	25.0

Radio Stations

When Palestinians were asked about the radio stations they listen to, the Voice of Palestine was first and Israel Radio (Voice of Israel) was second. Third were Monte Carlo and Radio Jordan followed by Egyptian radio stations. Despite Voice of Palestine coming in first overall, it was not the first in the Gaza Strip, where the percentage for Israel Radio is slightly higher. As for the West Bank, the percentage of listeners to Voice of Palestine was much larger than other radio stations. The results show that 25% of the respondents do not listen to the Voice of Palestine at all, compared with 17% who do not listen to Israel Radio at all. Because we asked respondents to rank the radio stations by first choice through last choice, obtaining a high percentage of first choice does not mean that the station has the highest listening rate on average. As is clear in Table 4, the Voice of Palestine was the first choice for 37% of the respondents, was the second choice for 17.3%, the third for 11.3%, the fourth for 6.2%, and the fifth for 2.9%. In addition, the percentage of those who never listen was 25%. This means that Voice of Palestine received an average of 3 points on a scale from 0 to 5. If we look at the other radio stations, we find that average listening to Israeli Radio is slightly higher than that for Palestine where Israeli Radio's average is 3.1 out of 5. As for Monte Carlo, it obtains 2 out of 5, and Radio Jordan obtains 2.5 out of 5.

Table 4.A

Ranking of Radio Stations

	Israeli Radio %	Jordanian Radio %	Voice of Palestine%	Monte Carlo %
First choice	26.0%	13.5%	37.0%	14.3%
Second choice	27.3%	21.0%	17.8%	12.2%
Third choice	18.1%	22.2%	11.8%	09.6%
Fourth choice	06.4%	09.7%	06.2%	16.9%
Fifth choice	04.7%	04.9%	02.9%	06.3%
Do not listen	17.6%	28.7%	25.3%	40.9%

*The rows do not add up to 100% because there were other choices in the question.

Table 4.B

Statistical Measures

	Israeli Radio	Jordanian Radio	Voice of Palestine	Monte Carlo
Mean	3.123/5	2.436/5	2.996/5	1.952/5
Mode	Second choice	Don't listen	First choice	Don't listen
Median	4/5	3/5	4/5	2/5
Variance	3.094	3.340	4.037	3.578

These statistics mean that there is sharp competition between Voice of Palestine and Israeli Radio to attract the attention of Palestinian listeners. Although Palestinian Radio was the first

choice for the largest percentage, its average listening rate was less than that of Israeli Radio. This becomes clear if we look at the variance which for Israeli Radio is approximately 3 and for Voice of Palestine is 4. This means that for Voice of Palestine, there is a division mainly between those who say it is their first choice and those who do not listen at all, which may be natural for a new station as many are trying the new station and others do not know of its existence.

We notice that men and women listen at the same rates to Voice of Palestine and also Israel Radio, but more men listen to Monte Carlo and more women listen to Radio Jordan than do men. Israel Radio is listened to at the same rates in villages, cities, and camps, but we notice that Voice of Palestine is listened to more in villages. Also, we find that camp residents are least likely to listen to Radio Jordan, as is the case in the Gaza Strip as a whole. Town residents comprise the most listeners of Radio Jordan. The areas with the most listeners to the Voice of Palestine are Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and Jenin has the least (see Table 5).

Table 5

Choice of Radio Station by Area of Residence

	Israeli Radio %	Jordanian Radio %	Voice of Palestine %	Monte Carlo %	Egypt %	Others
Nablus	34.7	11.5	29.8	16.3	04.8	02.9
Tulkarm	19.4	22.2	33.9	17.1	02.9	04.4
Jenin	36.7	26.6	13.9	13.9	03.8	05.0
Jericho	26.1	17.4	43.5	08.7	---	04.3
Ramallah	19.6	15.5	53.6	07.2	02.1	02.0
Hebron	20.0	16.5	53.0	07.0	01.7	01.8
Bethlehem	21.9	12.3	57.5	05.5	02.7	---
Jerusalem	16.5	11.4	63.3	06.3	02.5	---
Gaza North	35.9	15.6	28.1	09.4	04.7	06.3
Gaza City	24.5	07.0	28.7	16.8	12.6	10.5
Gaza Middle	27.6	04.9	24.4	24.4	13.8	04.9
Gaza South	26.6	07.8	26.6	28.1	10.9	---

With regard to education, we find that more educated respondents are the least likely to listen to Jordanian Radio and more likely to listen to Monte Carlo. Listening to the Voice of Palestine is inversely related to education (see Table 6).

Table 6

Choice of Radio Station by Education

	Israeli Radio %	Jordanian Radio%	Voice of Palestine %	Monte Carlo %	Egypt %	Others %
Up to 9 yrs.	25.4	15.1	41.3	08.5	06.6	03.2
9-12 yrs.	27.8	12.4	36.4	14.0	05.6	03.8
2 yrs.	20.9	13.4	30.0	26.3	06.7	02.9
College BA/BS	22.8	06.1	27.7	28.9	05.0	08.5

Fateh supporters listen to the Voice of Palestine more than others, while supporters of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and PFLP listen to Israel Radio more than Voice of Palestine. Monte Carlo is the first choice among PFLP and DFLP supporters. We notice that there is a relationship between choosing a radio station and support for the negotiations, where Voice of Palestine listeners have the most support for the negotiations and listeners to Monte Carlo and London have the least (see Table 7).

Table 7

Support for Negotiations by Choice of Radio Stations

	Yes %	No %	Not Sure %
Israeli Radio	59.8	29.1	11.1
Jordanian Radio	63.6	16.4	19.9
Voice of Palestine	73.9	16.1	10.0
Monte Carlo	58.3	33.9	07.8
Egypt	67.6	16.3	16.1
Others	35.9	44.2	19.9

Criticism of the PNA without fear

Half of the respondents declared that people are able to criticize the PNA without fear. As for the other half, they were divided among those who answered "to a certain extent" and those who answered "no" and "don't know". We notice a difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip where the percentage of those believing it is possible to criticize the authority is much less (13% less) in the Gaza Strip, where the PNA actually exists (along with Jericho). (See Table 8).

Table 8

Ability to Criticize the PNA without Fear

	Yes %	Somewhat %	No %	Don't
Know %				
Nablus	48.6	15.0	19.5	16.9
Tulkarm	48.7	13.5	26.9	10.9
Jenin	50.6	13.3	25.3	10.8
Jericho	40.0	20.0	36.0	04.0
Ramallah	33.7	24.0	18.3	24.0
Hebron	72.4	11.2	07.8	08.6
Bethlehem	82.4	08.1	02.7	06.8
Jerusalem	59.5	16.7	06.0	17.9
Gaza North	46.4	17.4	26.1	10.1
Gaza City	44.7	20.4	21.7	13.2
Gaza Middle	37.8	24.4	23.6	14.2
Gaza South	40.9	19.7	25.8	13.6

We find also that the educated are less likely to believe that criticism without fear is possible than the uneducated, where 25% of those with a Bachelors degree said that it was not possible compared with 13% of those with less education (see Table 9).

Table 9

Attitude Towards Possibility to Criticize PNA by Education

	Yes %	Somewhat %	No %	Don't
Know %				
Up to 9 yrs.	50.7	12.8	17.9	18.6
9-12 yrs.	49.3	20.4	20.6	09.7
2 yrs College	52.8	22.2	16.8	08.3
BA/BS	49.0	25.0	23.5	02.5

The Negotiations

There was no noticeable change in support for the negotiations this month, where support was 66.6% in March, and is now 65%. We notice that opposition to continuing the negotiations is higher than 30% in the area of Hebron, among those with a Bachelors degree, and among employees, specialists, and merchants.

Refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Palestinians were polled concerning their views of the future of the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and gave the most support to keeping the camps with improvements in their living conditions. A quarter of the respondents chose transferring the residents to new housing projects and fewer chose keeping them as they are until a final agreement is reached concerning them. We notice a large increase of support for the choice of improving the living conditions compared with a poll conducted in April 1994 where support for this option was 31% and has now become 47.3%. We notice that camp residents are the most supportive of this option (see Table 10).

Table 10

Attitude Toward Refugee Camp Futures by Place of Residence

Others %	Remain as are %	Transfer Residents %	Remain with Improvements%	
City	20.7	28.9	42.7	07.7
Town	16.1	19.6	55.4	08.9
Village	23.5	26.0	44.2	06.4
Ref. Camp	21.7	18.7	55.5	04.1

Also, we find that support for this option is spread throughout the political parties and especially the opposition. (see Table 11)

Table 11**Attitude Toward Refugee Camp Futures by Political Affiliation**

Others %	Remain as are %	Transfer Residents %	Remain with Improvements%	
DFLP	19.8	20.3	54.6	05.3
PPP	44.8	16.6	38.7	---
Fateh	19.6	27.6	47.2	05.6
PFLP	25.7	18.8	51.8	03.7
Hamas	20.4	16.6	59.2	03.8
Islamic Jihad	26.0	26.0	44.3	03.7
Islamic Inds.	25.5	24.1	46.9	03.4
Nationalist Inds.	40.6	26.7	28.7	04.0
Others	22.6	19.5	45.2	12.7
No one	16.9	26.3	44.0	12.8

Strike on 9th of each month

Most of the respondents support abolishing the strike on the 9th of each month or transforming it to a yearly occasion. Less than a quarter of the respondents declared their wish to keep the strike in its monthly form. Despite the fact that the strike has been abolished in the Gaza Strip since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, approximately 25% of the residents of Gaza support keeping it. We find that the groups most supportive of abolishing the strike are the merchants and the laborers. Concerning political affiliation, we also find that independents are the most supportive of cancelling the strike (see Table 12).

Table 12**Attitude Toward the Strike by Political Affiliation**

%	Cancel %	Remain %	Anniversary %	Other
DFLP	33.3	33.3	33.4	---
PPP	15.8	10.5	73.7	---
Fateh	39.7	20.1	36.0	04.2
PFLP	25.9	32.8	37.9	03.4
Hamas	31.3	34.4	31.9	02.5
Is. Jihad	30.0	33.3	33.3	03.3
Is. Inds.	42.1	21.1	31.6	05.3
Nat. Inds.	43.9	24.6	31.6	---
Others	35.9	16.7	32.1	15.1
No one	41.0	17.5	31.3	10.2

Fairness of elections

A total of 27.6% of the respondents declared that they believe that the elections will be fair compared with 19% who believe that they will not. A further 22.6% said that they will be somewhat fair. It is significant that more than 30% chose "don't know". Supporters of the opposition believe that elections will not be fair more than supporters of other groups. We find also that older respondents are more likely to believe in the possibility of fair elections than younger respondents. Also, we find that the least educated are the most likely to believe the possibility of fair elections (see Table 13).

Table 13

Attitudes Towards Fair Elections by Education

	Yes %	Somewhat %	No %	Don't
Know %				
up to 9 years	31.1	17.3	15.0	36.6
9-12 years	22.6	25.1	23.4	28.9
2 yr college	27.4	34.5	21.5	16.6
BA/BS	22.4	31.2	25.4	21.0

Also, there is a relationship between political affiliation and view toward fairness of the elections where supporters of the opposition believe that the elections will not be fair more than others (see Table 14)

Table 14

Attitudes Towards Fair Elections by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	Somewhat %	No %	Don't
Know %				
DFLP	29.5	19.8	35.7	15.0
PPP	16.6	27.6	11.6	44.2
Fateh	38.3	22.6	09.6	29.5
PFLP	15.1	27.6	36.9	20.4
Hamas	15.1	24.2	30.6	30.1
Islamic Jihad	29.3	18.7	26.0	26.0
Islamic Inds.	17.2	38.6	24.5	19.7
Nationalist	17.1	40.2	24.5	18.3
Inds.				
Others	25.7	13.9	25.1	35.3
No One	12.8	14.8	27.0	45.3

Boycott of elections

If the Palestinian opposition calls for a boycott of the elections, 20.5% will boycott, compared with 58.3% who will participate. Compared with the previous poll, we find that if there is no boycott the percentage of participants increases to more than 74%. The condition of a boycott stipulated in the question led to a higher percentage of respondents (20%) who declared they

have no opinion on the subject. A third of the supporters of Hamas will participate along with a quarter of the supporters of PFLP, despite a call for a boycott (see Table 15).

Table 15

Participation in Elections by Political Affiliation

	Will boycott %	Will participate %	No opinion %
DFLP	35.7	54.6	09.7
PPP	22.1	55.8	22.1
Fateh	08.2	76.9	14.9
PFLP	57.4	24.3	18.4
Hamas	48.5	33.4	18.1
Islamic Jihad	29.3	55.7	15.0
Islamic Independent	29.7	55.9	14.5
National Inds.	12.0	65.7	22.3
Other	19.8	61.4	18.8
No one	23.6	23.4	53.1

It seems that there is a clear relationship between age and intent to boycott the elections, where approximately 33% of the 18-22 age group will boycott compared with 10% of those who are over 50 (see Table 16)

Table 16

Participation in Elections by Age

	Boycott %	Participate %	No Opinion %
18-22	32.6	49.2	18.3
23-26	20.4	59.2	19.8
27-30	19.8	62.0	18.2
31-35	20.1	58.5	21.4
36-42	21.5	56.9	21.6
43-50	17.8	58.0	24.2
51+	09.7	66.5	23.8

This could be due to the lower percentage of younger respondents who believe the elections will be fair compared with older respondents. It could also be due to the fact that the percentage for support for opposition factions among the 18-22 age group is approximately 33% compared with 13% among those who are over 50.

Participation of women in elections

A total of 71% of the respondents declared that they are ready to elect a qualified woman if she ran for election, whereas 27% refused to elect a woman. We notice a difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on this subject, where a larger percentage of West Bank residents are ready to elect a woman. There is not a large difference between women and men with regard to the possibility of electing a qualified woman, however, a larger percentage of men refuse on

principle whereas a larger percentage of women believe a man is more qualified. This is linked fundamentally to degree of education, where more educated respondents, whether men or women, are more ready to elect a qualified woman (see Table 17).

Table 17

Readiness to Elect a Woman by Education

	Yes %	No, a man...%	No %	Other
%				
up to 9 years	67.5	21.9	08.2	02.4
9-12 years	71.4	14.8	12.4	01.4
2-yr college	82.4	09.3	08.3	---
BA/BS	80.1	09.4	10.4	---

Also we find that women with university degrees comprise the group most ready to elect a woman (90%) compared with 75% of men with university degrees. As for the least educated, there is no difference between women and men concerning their views towards this topic. (See Table 18)

Table 18

Readiness to Elect a Woman Among Men and Women by Education

Men: 12 yrs or less	69%	Women: 12 yrs or less	68%
Men: 2 yr College	86%	Women: 2 yr College	78%
Men: University	75%	Women: University	90%

This means that with an increase in education the gap between men and women concerning a female candidate increases. In other words, while readiness to elect a women increases with education, it increases more dramatically among women than among men. We notice also a relationship between political affiliation and view on this topic, where supporters of Islamic Jihad and Hamas are the least willing to elect a woman (see Table 19).

Table 19

Readiness to Elect a Woman by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	No, a man...%	No %	Other
Others %				
DFLP	80.2	04.8	10.1	04.8
PPP	82.9	06.1	05.5	05.5
Fateh	77.7	16.1	05.6	00.6
PFLP	86.8	07.7	05.5	---
Hamas	47.5	28.5	21.7	02.2
Islamic Jihad	62.3	30.4	07.3	---
Islamic Inds.	53.4	35.9	10.7	---
Nationalist	83.5	02.0	14.5	---

Incls.				
Others	73.4	08.4	11.2	07.1
No One	60.2	23.6	12.8	03.4

President of the PNA

There is no appreciable change in the support for Arafat in this poll, which is now at 55.4% (see Table 20). There is a difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where support for Arafat is 14% less in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. There are no noticeable changes among the other people mentioned in the poll. Support for Arafat comes less from those with university degrees, where it is 45% compared with 62% among those with only primary education. Also, support for Arafat is roughly equal between men and women. As for Ahmed Yassin, women (16.6%) support him more than men (9.5%). As for Hayder Abdel Shafi and George Habash, the support for them comes mainly from educated men.

Table 20

Comparison of PNA President Election Results

	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Habash %	
Other %					
Nov 1994	44.2	19.7	08.9	06.8	20.4
Dec 1994	48.5	18.4	08.6	05.8	18.7
Feb 1995	53.4	14.6	10.0	03.6	18.4
Mar 1995	56.5	13.5	07.6	03.2	19.2
May 1995	55.4	11.9	08.4	04.0	20.2

Political Affiliation

There was no noticeable change in the percentage of support for various political groups where the popularity of Fateh is still higher than other groups. The opposition groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and DFLP) still command 21.6% of the votes. As for independents and those not specifying a particular affiliation, they comprise 23.3% of the respondents. As for Fedai, the latest poll indicates that its support is almost nonexistent (see Table 21).

Table 21

Political Affiliation by Place of Residence

	PPP %	Hamas %	Fateh %	Is.	DFLP %	PFLP %	Is	Nat
Other	No one %			Jihad %			Ind %	Ind %
Nablus	01.8	14.1	53.1	01.8	01.8	03.5	01.9	04.4
00.9	16.8							
T'lkrm	00.1	14.4	47.5	01.5	04.2	02.7	04.4	02.0
06.5	15.6							
Jenin	---	08.5	50.0	06.1	04.9	06.1	01.2	06.1
04.9	11.0							

Jericho	---	16.0	36.0	---	04.0	08.0	08.0	---	-
--	28.0								
Ram.'h	01.0	07.7	47.1	01.0	01.0	02.9	01.0	05.8	
19.2	13.5								
Hebron	01.6	19.5	37.4	03.3	01.6	03.3	02.4	04.1	
08.1	18.7								
B'hem	06.8	04.1	44.6	01.4	01.4	09.5	02.7	13.5	
04.1	10.8								
J'salem	01.2	11.0	36.6	03.7	02.4	06.1	06.1	08.5	
03.7	20.7								
Gaza N	01.5	13.2	60.3	01.5	---	07.4	01.5	01.5	
05.9	07.4								
Gaza C	01.3	11.8	59.2	02.6	01.3	04.6	02.0	03.3	
05.3	08.6								
Gaza M	02.4	15.7	55.1	02.4	01.6	03.9	01.6	00.8	
07.1	09.4								
Gaza S	01.5	07.7	49.2	03.1	---	07.7	04.6	04.6	
06.2	13.8								

N: North; C: City; M: Middle; S: South

*The margin of error is higher for smaller samples.



Focus on Tulkarm Refugee Camp

A. Results

More than 10,000 Palestinians live in the Tulkarm Refugee Camp, and it seems clear from previous election experiences that all political parties in Palestinian society are represented. Our study has revealed that the Tulkarm Refugee Camp reflects the variance that exists in Palestinian society.

The results of the poll reveal the following (See Table 22):

1. Support for Fateh and Yassir Arafat is similar to that in the population as a whole, while support for Hamas is slightly higher than in the general population. As for Ahmed Yassin, his support is much higher than average reaching 22% compared with 17% in the rest of the camps. As for Hayder Abdel Shafi and George Habash, support for them in the camp is similar to society in general. We also find that support for DFLP in the camp is higher than average, as 4% of the respondents showed support for this group. Support for PFLP (2.3%) and PPP (0.6%) in the camp is less than average.
2. Views of electing female candidates in the camp are similar to those in the larger society. Another similarity between the refugee camp and the rest of society concerns views of the strike, where a majority want to cancel the strike altogether or transform it to a yearly occasion. Also, views towards the potential for fair elections are similar.
3. Listening to the Voice of Palestine in the camp is much less than average, where the percentage of those who chose Voice of Palestine as their first choice was 25% compared with 37% in the population as a whole and 32% in the rest of the camps.

4. The residents of the camp felt that it is possible to criticize the PNA without fear more than the rest of the sample, where 66% of the camp residents declared such a view compared with 50% of the population and 54% of the other camps.
5. Support for continuing the negotiations in the Tulkarm Camp (61%) is similar to the population (65%) and the rest of the camps (64%). Opposition to the negotiations is slightly higher, in general, than in the rest of the areas.
6. Tulkarm Camp is similar to other camps in view of the future of the camps, where the idea of keeping the camps with improvements in their conditions was supported by 60% of the residents of Tulkarm Camp and 57% of the residents of other camps. Support for this idea in cities and villages was approximately 43%.
7. If the opposition calls for a boycott of the elections, 66% of Tulkarm Camp intends to participate in the elections compared with 58% of the population and 63% of other camps.

Table 22

Comparative View of Refugee Camps, Tulkarm Camp, Experimental Group, and Control Group

UCL**	Camps %	Tulkarm Camp %	Experimental Group %	Control Group %	LCL *
Possible to criticize -0.021	48	66	59	75	-0.299
PNA without fear					
Support for 0.086	65	61	59	65	-0.205
continuing negotiations					
Intend to participate -0.095	61	66	56	79	-0.365
in elections, even if boycott called					
Do not believe 0.026	18	18	14	23	-0.206
elections will be fair					
Believe elections 0.108	23	30	28	31	-0.168
will be fair					
Willing to elect a 0.168	65	70	72	69	-0.108
woman					
Listening to Israeli 0.012	26	26	20	32	-0.252
radio					
Listening to Voice of 0.257	35	25	31	18	0.003
Palestine					
Support improving 0.317	56	59	67	50	0.023
living conditions in camps					

Support for 0.146 Abolishing Strike on 9th of each month	36	38	38	38	-0.146
Affiliated with 0.214 Islamic faction (Hamas, Jihad, Islamic independents)	23	23	27	18	-0.034
Support for Hamas 0.158	16	16	18	13	-0.058
Support for Fateh 0.191	48	51	53	49	-0.111
Support for Ahmed 0.232 Yassin	15	22	27	16	-0.012
Support for Yassir 0.100 Arafat	56	54	52	57	-0.200

*LCL: lower confidence limit

**UCL: upper confidence limit



B. Effect of Researcher Appearance on the Respondent

In order to carry out fieldwork in the Tulkarm camp, we divided the camp into 24 sampling units, of which we chose twenty in which to conduct polling. In an effort to lower the percentage of error in results, SRU conducted an experiment to assess the extent of the influence of the researchers' appearance on the respondents' answers. We sent to the Tulkarm Camp two groups of fieldworkers: an experimental group with exclusively "Islamic" appearance and a control group of our typical group of fieldworkers. Each group was assigned ten of the twenty sampling units. The experimental group was instructed to greet the respondents with "Assalam aleykum" and begin each interview by saying "bism allah". The control group was instructed not to alter their previous routine.

Our fieldworkers reported that respondents' reactions to both groups were no different from those in previous polls. They felt that the majority of the respondents behaved in a "normal" way and paid no attention to the appearance of the fieldworkers. In term of the results of the Tulkarm Camp Poll, as indicated in the table above, they show that Ahmed Yassin received 27% of the vote from those respondents interviewed by the experimental group. However, he received 17% of the vote from the respondents interviewed by the control group. Hamas received 17% of the vote from the experimental group and 13% in interviews with the control group. In contrast, Fateh received more votes (53%) from the respondents interviewed by the experimental group than those interviewed by the control group (49%). As for Arafat, he received 52% of the vote from the respondents interviewed by the experimental group and 57% from the respondents interviewed by the control group. These statistics can be compared with 50% support for Arafat in the West Bank and 56% in refugee camps. However, these results do not confirm or refute the effect of researcher appearance on the respondent since there is a need for additional statistical tests. The last two columns in Table 22 represent a 95% confidence interval for the experimental group (P1) and the control group (P2) or P1-P2. The first column represents the lower confidence

limit (LCL) and the second column represents the upper confidence limit (UCL). It is possible through this test to know if the difference between the two groups is statistically significant or not. If $LCL < 0$ and $UCL > 0$, then $P1 - P2$ could be zero and this case will be a result of sampling error. On the other hand, if $LCL > 0$ and $UCL > 0$ or $LCL < 0$ and $UCL < 0$, then it is possible to say that there is a strong indication that the variance in the results is due to the affect of the researcher on the respondent. Looking at the results of this test, it is possible for us to conclude that we have strong evidence that the differences in percentages are due to the effect of researcher appearance on the respondent in four cases:

1. The question regarding ability to criticize the PNA without fear, since the LCL and UCL are both less than zero. This coincides with expectations, that the sample interviewed by the experimental group would say that people cannot criticize the authority without fear more than the sample obtained by the control group.
2. The question regarding participation in the elections where the LCL and UCL are less than zero. This also corresponds with the above-mentioned expectations.
3. Support for improving the conditions in the refugee camps where LCL and UCL are higher than zero.
4. The question on Listening to Voice of Palestine since LCL and UCL are higher than zero. This does not coincide with the expectation that the sample interviewed by the experimental group would be less likely to choose Voice of Palestine.

With regard to the rest of the questions, there is no strong evidence of the effect of the researcher's appearance on the respondent since $(P1 - P2)$ could be zero (i.e., between LCL and UCL) and therefore the variance in the results is due to sampling error.

The experiment as conducted did not confirm the issue at hand: the influence of the fieldworkers' appearance on the respondents. The present experiment has shown the need for further testing that is more rigorous. There is a need for replication, a larger sample size, comparable samples, and a more effective introduction of the independent variable (i.e., appearance). At this point, we are unable to settle the debate over the issue of the influence of appearance on respondents' answers, but the data that we obtained will be used in future testing.



Appendix

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
*Unemployment rate	36.0%	27.0%	39.0%
1. The radio station that I listen to more than others is (rank from 5 being the most listened to and 1 the least listened to)... (figures here are percentage of population answering 5 to each choice - see analysis for complete rankings)			
a. Voice of Israel	25.6%	24.3%	27.7%
b. Radio Jordan	13.2%	16.4%	07.9%
c. Voice of Palestine	37.4%	43.8%	26.9%
d. Radio Monte Carlo	13.9%	10.4%	19.8%
e. Egypt	06.1%	02.8%	11.4%
f. others	03.9%	02.4%	06.3%

2. A person (such as yourself) can criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear. (Do you agree with this statement?)			
a. Yes	50.3%	55.2%	42.2%
b. Somewhat	17.2%	15.0%	21.0%
c. No	18.9%	16.1%	23.6%
d. Don't know	13.4%	13.6%	13.0%
3. Do you support the continuation of the current peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel?			
a. Yes	65.0%	63.2%	68.0%
b. No	22.7%	23.1%	21.9%
c. Not sure	12.3%	13.5%	10.1%
4. With regard to the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, I support...			
a. keeping them as they are until a final agreement is reached concerning them.	21.6%	21.9%	21.3%
b. transferring the residents to new housing projects	24.7%	26.3%	22.0%
c. keeping them with improvements in their living conditions.	47.3%	43.1%	54.3%
d. other (specify)	06.3%	08.7%	02.4%
5. With regard to the strike on the ninth of each month, I support...			
a. abolishing it	37.5%	38.7%	35.4%
b. keeping it	22.6%	21.6%	24.3%
c. transforming it to a yearly occasion.	34.6%	34.2%	35.2%
d. Other (specify)	05.3%	05.5%	05.1%
6. Do you believe that the general political elections for the Palestinian Self-Governing Council will be fair?			
a. Yes	27.6%	25.3%	31.6%
b. Somewhat	22.6%	23.7%	20.7%
c. No	19.1%	20.9%	15.9%
d. Don't know	30.8%	30.1%	31.8%
7. If the Palestinian opposition calls for a boycott of the elections for the National Authority Council, I ...			
a. will boycott the elections	20.5%	21.0%	19.6%
b. will participate in the elections	58.3%	57.7%	59.2%
c. have no opinion	21.2%	21.1%	21.3%
8. If a Palestinian woman ran for elections, are you ready to vote for her?			
a. Yes, if she is qualified	71.2%	74.1%	66.3%
b. No, a man is probably more qualified.	17.5%	15.1%	21.4%
c. No, I do not support women's candidacy.	09.6%	08.8%	10.8%
d. Other (specify)	01.7%	01.9%	01.4%
9. If an independent election to choose the president of the Palestinian Authority takes place and the following nominate themselves, you will choose:			
a. Ahmed Yassin	11.1%	11.9%	11.8%
b. Yassir Arafat	55.4%	50.1%	64.3%
c. Hayder Abdel Shafi	08.4%	08.6%	08.2%
d. George Habash	04.0%	04.1%	03.9%
e. Other (Specify)	20.2%	25.3%	11.8%
10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:			
a. DFLP	01.9%	02.4%	01.0%

b. PPP	01.6%	01.6%	01.7%
c. Fateh	49.2%	44.8%	56.6%
d. PFLP	04.9%	04.7%	05.3%
e. Hamas	12.3%	12.1%	12.6%
f. Fedayeen	00.3%	00.3%	00.2%
g. Islamic Jihad	02.5%	02.5%	02.4%
h. Islamic independents	02.6%	02.9%	02.2%
i. Nationalist independents	04.5%	05.8%	02.4%
j. Other (specify)	06.5%	06.8%	06.1%
k. None of the above	13.6%	16.0%	09.5%