

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

Public Opinion Poll NO (11)

Elections and Palestinian-Jordanian Relations, August, 11-13, 1994

This is the eleventh public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. This poll focuses on freedom of the press, Palestinian-Jordanian relations, Jerusalem, and elections. SRU has been conducting monthly public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. The poll results are published independently and with unit analysis in both Arabic and English. They provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, SRU strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine. Consistent with its commitment to the development of the status of survey research in the West Bank and Gaza, SPU has utilized new methods to select the sample (See [Methodology](#) section). SPU will be conducting polls every six weeks.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (see [Appendix A](#)).

General Background

This poll was conducted over a three day period: August 11, 12, and 13, 1994. A number of political events preceded the poll, summarized below:

1. August is the fourth month following the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, a period of preparation for the national authority and its initial implementation. There is still a lack of financing for this administration where the donor countries are withholding promised funds from the authority in Jericho and Gaza. At the same time, elections for the PISGA council that were supposed to take place last month were postponed again until December 1994. Also, at the same time, municipal councils were appointed in Nablus, where elections had last taken place in 1976, and Gaza, which had not had municipal elections since 1945. Also, the national authority banned two newspapers, *Al-Nahar* and *Akhbar al-Balad* from entering the autonomous areas, leading to discussion in Palestinian society where supporters of the ban believe that these papers are loyal to a foreign government and opponents of this ban fear that the authority is interfering in freedom of the press.
2. The Jordanian-Israeli agreement signed in Washington on July 25th led to tension in Jordanian-Palestinian relations. The discussion centered around the topic of sovereignty over Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem since the Jordanian-Israeli agreement gave top priority to the historic role of Jordan in these places.

3. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations continued without much progress in relation to transfer of authority in the rest of the West Bank and a number of other topics including the control of the crossing points and safe passage from Jericho to Gaza. Also, the topic of releasing Palestinian political prisoners from Israeli jails is of great concern to Palestinians.
4. With regard to the economic situation, there is general and specific awareness in the Gaza Strip that it is bad and there is need for a great effort to improve it, especially since the Israeli authorities have prohibited most of the workers from returning to work by not granting permits and making the procedure to get them more difficult. This led to a Palestinian-Israeli confrontation at the Eretz checkpoint on July 17 which resulted in two Palestinian deaths, 100 wounded Palestinians, 21 wounded Israeli soldiers, and the burning of over 100 buses and a gas station.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. The format was changed during this poll in order to expedite the coding and data entry process. Researchers were asked to mark respondents' answers in boxes next to the questions, making it possible to enter the coded data directly from the questionnaire and eliminating the need for code sheets. Besides saving time, this process increased accuracy since it eliminated a step with potential for clerical error. While a separate coding step was no longer necessary, coders did check each questionnaire to ensure that they were completed properly prior to the data entry. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Jenin and Nablus areas prior to the poll.

A number of new variables were added to the original questionnaire. These variables included day and date of interview, time and place of interview (i.e., public forum or household), and length of interview. This is in addition to a question regarding following the news and information on all localities included in the survey.

Sample Selection

SPU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. In fact, for this poll two samples were utilized rather than one.

Public Forum Sampling

The first sample was drawn by using public forum interviews. Here, Nablus, Tulkarm, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jericho, and Hebron were divided into 13 polling districts. Interviews were conducted in the largest town in each district. The choice of interview stations was based on our previous experience in the last ten polls. Respondents were selected by using a numerical system where fieldworkers would choose individuals passing by a specific point in their interview area (a utility poll, crosswalk, etc) and interview the sixth person to cross that point. Then, the fieldworkers would interview the twelfth person, and so on. The size of the sample obtained through public interviews is 792. The bulk of these interviews was conducted Thursday, August 11, between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m.

Household Sampling

The second sample consisted of 770 household interviews. The sample was selected from the districts of Jenin, Ramallah, and the Gaza Strip. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in these three areas according to population size and distribution, type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp) and degree of development. A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists.

Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps detailed the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities, which were further divided into a number of sampling units with each unit comprising an average of three hundred housing units. The sample units to be surveyed were selected randomly. Households were selected based on a systematic sampling. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be three hundred and is assigned twenty interviews, the fieldworker divided the 300 by 20, obtaining 15. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the fifteenth house, and the second in the thirtieth, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc which was noted on their map created in consultation with CPRS researchers.

To select the individual within the chosen household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice. The first flip was to choose gender of the respondent and the second to choose whether the respondent is to be older or younger than forty years. When in the household, fieldworkers would conduct the interview with the person who has the characteristics that they selected in this manner. (CPRS is in the process of evaluating the scientific merits and practical implications of household interviews in polling in the West Bank and Gaza. CPRS will compare the pros and cons of public forum interviews with those of household interviews. For more details, please call CPRS staff.) It is obvious that household interviews resulted in a higher percentage of housewives and older individuals.

We received 1023 questionnaires from the West Bank and 539 from Gaza, for a total of 1562 interviews.

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Area of Residence				Following the News	
West Bank "including Jerusalem" Gaza Strip	65.5% 34.5%	City Town Village Refugee Camps	38.6% 09.9% 30.2% 21.3	Always Often Sometimes Never	31.3% 25.7% 36.6% 06.4%
Age		Sex		Education	
18-22 23-26 27-30 31-35 36-42	16.6% 17.0% 16.5% 13.0% 13.8%	Males Females	59.5% 40.5%	Up to 9 years (elem./prep) Up to 12 years (Tawjihi) 2 year College University	35.6% 32.8% 15.6% 15.1% 0.9%

43-50	11.5%			(BA)			
51+	11.6%			MA + Phd.			
Refugee Status		Marital Status		Area		Occupation	
Ref.	42.1	Single	27.7%	Nablus	11.8	Laborers	11.1%
NonRef.	57.9	Married	68.6%	Tulkarem	08.8	Merchants	08.8%
		Divorced &	03.7%	Jenin	06.7	Craftsmen	11.1%
		Widowed		Jericho	02.4	Students	08.9%
				Ramallah	07.6	Housewives	26.0%
				Hebron	13.7	Farmers	1.8%
				Bethlehem	07.2	Employees*	17.7%
				Jerusalem	07.3	Specialists**	2.2%
				Gaza A	05.4	Unemployed	8.4%
				Gaza B	06.4	Retired	0.8%
				Gaza C	06.3		
				Gaza D	05.1		
				Gaza E	06.4		
				Gaza F	04.9		

* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

** Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

***A new question for the demographic section as an initial attempt to measure information access and basis for Palestinian opinions.

****Gaza A) Jabalyia, al-Nazla; B) Rimal; C) al-Zaytoun, Sabra; D) Deir Balah, Bureij; E) Khan Younis Area; F) Rafah.

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Interviews took place over a three day period, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 35 for public forum and 15 for households) to allow for careful interviewing. In general, the public forum of interviews contributed to a 10% non-response rate which was not included in the sample. Household interviews resulted in a lower non-response rate, estimated at 5%. However, respondents were more careful in declaring their opinions in regard to political affiliation, especially in the Ramallah area, which could be a sign of political sophistication rather than fear. A large number of non-respondents were women not accustomed to talking to strangers in public places, probably due to cultural constraints. Some non-respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political affiliation out of fear, particularly in the household interviews.

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%, and the confidence level is higher than 95%.

Jordanian-Palestinian Relations and Jerusalem

The poll shows that most Palestinians (67.5%) believe that sovereignty over Islamic religious sites in Jerusalem should be Palestinian, and 21.8% believe that it should be joint Arab-Islamic. This support for joint Arab-Islamic sovereignty is related to a large extent to support for Islamic groups, where 43.5% of the supporters of Islamic Jihad support joint Arab-Islamic sovereignty over the city's holy sites, along with 38.4% of Hamas supporters and 35.4% of Islamic independent supporters. A total of 21.1% of Hebron respondents chose Arab-Islamic joint sovereignty. With regard to Palestinian-Jordanian shared sovereignty, 7.6% of Palestinians support this idea. Significantly, 29.8% of Jerusalem residents supported the idea of joint Palestinian-Jordanian sovereignty. Most of the support for this idea comes from nationalist independents (21.3%). (See Table 1) Support for the idea of Jordanian sovereignty alone was 4.2% in Hebron and 3.2% in Nablus.

Table 1

Holy Site Administration by Political Affiliation

	Palestinian %	Jordanian %	Palestinian-Jordanian Shared %	Arab-Islamic Shared %	No Opinion %
Hamas	51.7	---	05.7	38.4	04.3
Is. Jihad	54.3	---	---	43.5	02.2
Is. Inds.	44.6	---	12.3	35.4	07.7
PFLP	83.2	02.1	---	14.6	---
DFLP	74.2	---	12.9	12.9	---
Fateh	75.6	00.2	07.4	16.2	00.7
Feda	94.3	---	05.7	---	---
H. el-Sha'b	88.5	---	03.8	07.7	---
Nat'l Ind	67.7	00.8	21.3	08.7	01.6
Other	63.8	02.9	04.3	26.1	02.9
No one	57.2	02.3	07.7	27.9	05.0

There is also a relationship between the extent of following the news and perspective on sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem, where the support for Palestinian sovereignty is higher among those following the news (71%) than among those not following the news (59.6%).

The poll confirms that 40.6% of Palestinians believe that the Jordanian-Israeli agreement that was signed in Washington last month will have a negative effect on Jordanian-Palestinian relations. This is compared with 25.4% who felt that the agreement will not have any effect on these relations, and 18.6% who felt that the agreement would have a positive effect. This is related to a large extent to following the news, where 48.9% of those who follow the news "always" believe that the agreement will leave a negative effect on Jordanian-Palestinian relations, compared with 31.6% of those who do not follow the news. (See Table 2).

Table 2

Attitude Towards Jordanian-Israeli Agreement's Effects on Jordanian-Palestinian Relations by Following the News

	No effect %	Positive effect %	Negative effect %	No opinion %
Always	25.3	16.7	48.9	09.1
Often	26.8	19.8	41.0	12.4
Sometimes	25.0	28.3	35.2	18.5
Never	21.1	12.6	31.6	34.7

The belief that the Jordanian-Israeli agreement will have a negative effect on Palestinian-Jordanian relations may be attributed to the fact that 52% of Palestinians believe that the agreement will hinder the return to Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem in the final status negotiations. This can be compared to 15.9% who believe that this agreement will facilitate the return of Jerusalem sovereignty to Palestinians, and 18.2% who believe that there will be no effect. At the same time we find that a large percentage of the residents of the Gaza Strip (58.8%) believe that the agreement will hinder the return of Palestinian sovereignty, compared with 49.1% of the West Bank. This is due to a large percentage in the West Bank (10.1%) who would like to see joint Palestinian-Jordanian sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem and consequently an understanding that any step in this process is positive and from their perspective the Jordanian agreement with Israel is not negative in this respect. In comparison we find that only 2.8% from the Gaza Strip prefer joint Palestinian-Jordanian sovereignty.

The Press

The poll questioned Palestinians concerning the topics of freedom of the press and censorship, with regard to the banning of the two newspapers, *Al-Nahar* and *Akhbar al-Balad*, from entering the autonomous areas specifically, and in general. With regard to the aforementioned ban, 15.7% of those surveyed supported the ban, whereas 65.9% opposed it. The opposition was higher in the Gaza Strip (70%) than in the West Bank (63.7%).

Opposition to the ban does not come from one political party only, but comes from the supporters of all political parties. For example, that 88% of Hizb el-Sha'b supporters oppose this ban, in addition to 81.3% of PFLP supporters and 79.4% of nationalist independents. This can be compared with the opposition rate among Fateh supporters, which is 60%. These results indicate that there is a consensus among the supporters of these various political parties regarding the principle of freedom of the press. It seems that regardless of political affiliation and opinion regarding the specific newspapers, most Palestinians believe that the papers should be distributed in all Palestinian areas. (See Table 3).

Table 3

Attitudes Towards Ban of Newspapers by Political Affiliation

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
Hamas	11.8	72.5	15.6
Is. Jihad	11.1	66.7	22.2
Is. Inds	15.9	68.3	15.9
PFLP	12.5	81.3	06.3
DFLP	09.7	77.4	12.9
Fateh	22.2	59.9	17.9
Feda	25.7	62.9	11.4
H. el-Sha'b	04.0	88.0	08.0
Nat'l Inds.	10.3	79.4	10.3
Other	10.1	68.1	21.7
No Opinion	10.0	55.7	34.2

In addition, we find a relationship between educational attainment and position on the ban of distribution of the two newspapers, where opposition to the ban increases among the more educated. (See Table 4).

Table 4

Attitude Towards Ban of Newspapers by Education

	I support the ban %	I oppose the ban %	No opinion %
Up to 9 years	16.7	58.4	24.9
Tawjihi	15.0	68.3	16.7
2 year college	14.3	74.0	11.7
B.A./B.S.	15.9	74.4	09.7
M.A./M.S./PhD	14.3	71.4	14.3

Yet again we find that there is a relationship between position on the ban and following the news, where 67.7% of those claiming to follow the news "always" oppose the ban, as opposed to fewer, 47.9%, among those who do not follow the news, yet oppose the ban.

The answers to the question regarding the general relationship between the press and government confirmed Palestinian support for freedom of the press. Poll results show that most Palestinians (55.2%) support without restrictions the freedom of Palestinian and non-Palestinian press, whether supporting or opposing government. Another 25.4% supported freedom of Palestinian press, whether supporting the official line of the authority or opposing it. Only 12.7% limited their support to freedom for Palestinian press supporting the official line of the authority only.

We find that support for freedom of the press extends across party lines. For example, 73% of PFLP and DFLP supporters support freedom of the press without restrictions, along with 69% of Hizb el-Sha'b and 66% of Hamas. We find fewer supporters of freedom of the press without restriction from Fateh (47.5%) and Feda (37%), with an additional 37% of Feda supporters supporting freedom of Palestinian press regardless of support or opposition to the authority. Here also we find that the more educated Palestinians are the most supportive of freedom of the press without restriction.

Municipal Appointments and Elections

These poll results confirm what the Palestinians have said in all previous polls, that most believe that elections are the preferred way to select their representatives. In this poll, 78.8% of Palestinians believe that general political elections are the preferred way to choose the interim self-governing authority. This represents an increase over the average of previous months, which is 73%. The increase comes basically from the Gaza Strip, where 83.4% chose elections, only 8.8% of them preferred that the PLO appoint members of the council. This may be due to the political changes in the area that led many to believe that such elections are possible and led others to be concerned about the whole idea of appointments. Many feel that it is necessary to have elected legislative and executive institutions that would be able to face up to the challenge of solving serious problems.

The poll shows a clear correlation between political affiliation and attitudes towards municipal appointments. As can be expected, opposition groups are more critical of appointments than

supporting groups. For example, 69.8% of PFLP supporters are against these appointments. (Table 5)

Table 5

Support for Municipal Appointments by Political Affiliation

	Support %	Support if Temp %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
Hamas	07.5	29.2	52.8	10.4
Is. Jihad	15.2	26.1	45.7	13.0
Is. Inds	06.2	43.1	30.8	20.0
PFLP	07.3	20.8	69.7	02.1
DFLP	12.9	25.8	58.1	03.2
Fateh	32.7	53.9	06.1	07.4
Feda	40.0	60.0	---	---
H. el-Sha'b	26.9	26.9	42.3	03.8
Nat'l Inds	13.5	65.9	18.3	02.4
Other	21.7	39.1	20.3	18.8
No One	17.0	39.9	19.3	23.8

In contrast, only 6.1% of Fateh supporters share this view, compared with 32.7% of them who are supportive of appointments. Among Feda supporters, 40% are supportive of appointments. A number of indicators, as shown in Table 6, illustrate that a high degree of loyalty to the PNA exists among the supporters of Fateh and Feda and their positions on these issues show that they are less liberal than the supporters of those groups which are not part of the PNA, such as Hamas and PFLP.

Table 6

	Opposed to the Ban	Supportive of Freedom of Press w/o Restriction	Opposed to Municipal Appointments
Fateh	59.9	47.5	6.1
Feda	62.9	37	---
Hamas	72.5	66	52.8
PFLP	81.3	73	69.8

We also find that the most opposition to municipal appointments is in the areas of Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Hebron. Support for municipal appointments decreases with educational attainment as demonstrated in Table 7.

Table 7

Support for Municipal Appointments by Education

	I Support %	Support if Temp %	I Oppose %	No Opinion %
Up to 9 years	27.3	36.7	19.7	16.3
Tawjihi	18.7	50.9	21.9	08.5
2 year college	14.0	51.9	28.5	05.6
BA/BS	17.0	46.7	33.2	03.1
MA/MS/PhD	07.1	50.0	42.9	---

The poll results show that opposition to municipal appointments comes from professionals, where 41.2% of them declare that they are against appointments. This may be due to their high level of education and their awareness of the general political situation as they are always following the

news. The group least opposed to appointments is merchants, where only 20% of them said that they are against appointments. This may be a result of their dependence on a functioning city council and their belief that appointments create such councils as soon as possible. We also find that opposition to municipal appointments is higher among those who constantly follow the news (27%) than those who never follow the news (21%). In both cases, however, the largest percentage approve of the appointments on the condition that they are temporary and to prepare for elections, which is the official position of the authority.

In regard to participation in general elections to select the members of PISGA, 65.1% of those surveyed expressed their intention to participate. Only 19.6% said that they will not participate and another 15.3% said that they were not sure. Here we find that more Gazans (69.3%) want to participate in elections than West Bankers (62.9%).

The poll shows a clear correlation between following the news and the intention to participate in elections where we find that 69.3% of those who constantly follow the news express their intention to participate while 47.4% of those who do not follow the news express the same intention. This is an expected correlation since following the news may be a demonstration of interest in political events and subsequent involvement in political life.

Palestinian Leadership

Two months after the establishment of the Palestinian authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the poll shows that 25.2% of Palestinians declare that their support for Palestinian leadership has increased. Another 17.2% said that their support has decreased. At the same time 27.9% said that their evaluation was initially positive and has not changed, while 19.2% said that their evaluation was initially negative and has not changed. This means that 53.1% view Palestinian leadership positively and 36.4% view it negatively. Another 10.5% said that they had no opinion on this issue.

The results indicate that the positive view of Palestinian leadership is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. A total of 57.2% in Gaza said that they viewed Palestinian leadership positively, compared with 51% in the West Bank. It was also noticeable that the most decrease in support for the Palestinian leadership is in Jericho, with 35.1% of residents surveyed said that their support has decreased two months after the establishment of Palestinian authority there. In Gaza, the decrease in support was not as sharp, at 16.6%. There are more people who view the Palestinian leadership negatively than positively in the following areas: Bethlehem, Hebron, and Jerusalem. In Nablus, however, the positive evaluation of the leadership reached 58.1%, compared with 36.4% negative.

Table 8

Evaluation of Leadership by Area of Residence

	Increase %	Decrease %	No change, Positive %	No Change, Negative %	No Opinion %
Nablus	26.6	20.7	31.5	14.7	06.5
Tulkarm	24.1	12.0	37.6	15.0	11.3
Jenin	36.9	12.6	32.0	09.7	08.8
Jericho	21.6	35.1	27.0	05.4	10.9
Ramallah	19.0	12.1	27.6	18.1	23.2
Hebron	23.4	12.6	17.3	31.8	14.9

Bethlehem	30.1	23.9	14.2	27.4	04.4
Jerusalem	17.5	25.4	24.6	23.7	08.8

In addition, we find an inverse correlation between education and evaluation of Palestinian leadership. A total of 47.4% of bachelor's degree holders surveyed evaluated the leadership negatively and 41.2% of them evaluated the leadership positively. A related correlation is found among professionals whose positive evaluation of the leadership is at 32.4% while their negative evaluation is at 52.9%.

Political Affiliation

The results of the poll show a slight decrease in the popularity of Fateh. A total of 39% declared their support for Fateh this month, compared with 41.7% last month. The decrease in support is more obvious in the Gaza Strip, where Fateh was at 45.2% last month and is now at 40.4%. Although support for Fateh exists among the members of all social categories, we find that it is higher among those with less education. For example, 44% of those with 12 years of education or less support Fateh and only 28.5% of those with a bachelor's degree support it.

The results of the poll show that support for Hamas is constant at 13.7%. In the Gaza Strip, however, we notice a slight increase (1.1%) in its popularity from last month. A total of 31.8% of Palestinians surveyed said that they are independent, undecided, or will not elect any of the groups listed in the questionnaire. In the Gaza Strip, 17.7% said that they will not vote for any of the groups listed. This could be an indication of rational decision reflecting their inability to decide for whom they will vote or an indication of their desire to see Palestinian groups form coalitions or that they are tired of factionalism or that they are afraid to express their real political affiliation. Probably all of these reasons contribute to a higher percentage of those who are undecided.

Looking at students, which is the largest group in Palestinian society to have recent experience with elections, we find that a coalition among opposition groups (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP) will gain 37.7% of the vote compared with 43.5% for a coalition among supporting groups (Fateh, Feda, Hizb el-Sha'b). Independents would gain 5.0% of the vote, with the remaining 13.7% going to "others" or "no one."

Furthermore, we notice that support for Fateh is higher in the north of the West Bank than the middle or south. Also, support for Hamas is higher in the area of Hebron.

Table 9

Political Affiliation by Place of Residence

Place of Residence	Hamas %	H. el-Shab %	DFLP %	Feda %	Isl. Jihad %	Fateh %	PFLP %	Isl Inds %	Nat Ind %
Nablus	10.9	0.5	2.2	1.6	1.1	51.6	8.7	2.2	4.9
Tulkarm	12.2	2.3	0.8	5.3	3.8	44.3	0.8	6.1	10.8
Jenin	9.8	---	2.0	2.0	1.0	50.0	1.0	2.9	5.9
Jericho	13.5	---	---	---	8.1	32.4	5.4	---	10.8

Ram.'h	11.4	2.6	2.6	---	1.8	28.9	2.6	4.4	6.1	
10.5	29.1									
Hebron	22.0	2.8	1.9	3.3	7.0	30.4	5.6	6.1	9.8	
3.3	7.8									
B'hem	13.3	7.1	7.1	7.1	1.8	28.3	12.4	5.3	12.4	--
-	5.2									
J'salem	4.6	1.8	3.7	2.8	0.9	34.9	4.6	11.0	22.0	
0.9	12.8									
Gaza A	14.1	1.3	---	---	3.8	35.9	11.5	2.6	5.1	
7.7	18.0									
Gaza B	14.3	---	---	---	2.2	38.5	6.6	2.2	6.6	
2.2	27.4									
Gaza C	14.1	---	1.0	---	4.0	29.3	7.1	6.1	7.1	
13.1	18.2									
Gaza D	25.3	1.3	2.5	1.3	2.5	49.4	5.1	---	3.8	--
-	8.8									
Gaza E	13.3	1.0	2.0	3.1	3.1	53.1	7.1	1.0	3.1	
2.0	11.2									
Gaza F	13.3	---	---	1.3	1.3	36.0	12.0	4.0	6.7	
1.3	24.1									

Appendix A

1. Last month, a municipal council was appointed in Gaza and a municipal committee in Nablus. With regard to municipal appointments, I...

	Total West Bank Gaza		
a. Support them	21.1%	22.8%	17.9%
b. Support them if they are temporary and in preparation for elections.	44.6%	42.7%	48.0%
c. Oppose them	23.9%	25.5%	20.9%
d. Have no Opinion	10.4%	09.0%	13.2%

2. Recently, *al-Nahar* and *Akhbar al-Balad* were banned from some Palestinian territories

a. I support the ban	15.7%	18.5%	10.5%
b. I oppose the ban	65.9%	63.7%	69.9%
c. No opinion	18.4%	17.8%	19.6%

3. With regard to freedom of the press, I

a. Support freedom for Palestinian press that supports the official national line only (the line of the Palestinian National Authority).	12.7%	13.9%	10.5%
b. Support freedom for Palestinian press that supports the official national line and that of the opposition.	25.4%	24.1%	27.9%
c. Support freedom for Palestinian (whether supportive or opposing) and non-Palestinian press without conditions.	55.2%	54.2%	57.1%
d. Have no opinion	06.7%	07.8%	04.5%

4. Two months after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in Gaza and Jericho, I...

a. Have increased my support for the Palestinian leadership.	25.2%	25.0%	25.8%
b. Have decreased my support for the Palestinian leadership.	17.2%	17.5%	16.6%
c. Have not changed my support for the leadership, which was positive.	27.9%	26.0%	31.4%
d. Have not changed my support for the leadership, which was negative.	19.2%	20.3%	17.0%

e. Have no opinion	10.5%	11.2%	09.2%
5. In my opinion, religious sovereignty in Jerusalem (including supervision of the Awqaf and Islamic religious places in the city) should be			
a. Palestinian	67.5%	65.3%	71.6%
b. Jordanian	00.8%	00.9%	00.6%
c. joint Palestinian-Jordanian	07.6%	10.1%	02.8%
d. joint Arab-Islamic	21.8%	20.7%	23.7%
e. Other (Specify)	02.3%	03.0%	01.3%
6. With regard to the Jordanian-Israeli agreement that was signed in Washington last month by King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin, I believe that it..			
a. Will not influence Palestinian-Jordanian relations.	25.4%	24.7%	26.9%
b. Will influence Palestinian-Jordanian relations positively.	18.6%	18.8%	18.3%
c. Will influence Palestinian-Jordanian relations negatively.	40.6%	40.6%	40.5%
d. No opinion	15.4%	15.9%	14.3%
7. Included in the aforementioned Jordanian-Israeli agreement is the following part with regard to Jerusalem: (Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.)			
That part concerning the Jordanian role in Jerusalem:			
a. will facilitate the return to Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem in the final negotiations.	15.9%	15.3%	16.9%
b. will hinder the return to Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem in the final negotiations.	52.4%	49.1%	58.8%
c. will have no impact on the chances of the return to Palestinian control over Jerusalem in the final negotiations.	18.2%	21.3%	12.5%
d. No opinion	13.5%	14.3%	11.8%
8. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?			
a. Appointment by PLO leadership	11.2%	12.5%	08.8%
b. Appointment by political groups on a quota basis.	07.0%	07.2%	06.5%
c. Political Elections	78.8%	76.4%	83.4%
d. Other	03.0%	03.9%	01.3%
9. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?			
a. Yes	65.1%	62.9%	69.3%
b. No	19.6%	21.8%	15.5%
c. Not sure	15.3%	15.3%	15.2%
10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:			
a. Hamas	13.9%	13.0%	15.6%
b. Hizb al-Sha'b	01.7%	02.3%	00.6%
c. DFLP	02.0%	02.6%	01.0%
d. Feda	02.3%	03.0%	01.0%
e. Islamic Jihad	03.0%	03.1%	02.9%
f. Fateh	39.0%	38.2%	40.4%
g. PFLP	06.3%	05.4%	08.1%
h. Islamic independents	04.3%	05.1%	02.7%
i. Nationalist independents	08.3%	09.9%	05.4%
j. Other (specify)	04.5%	04.5%	04.6%
k. None of the above	14.7%	12.9%	17.7%

Polling Districts**The West Bank**

The West Bank was divided into 8 areas and 18 polling districts as follows:

District	Population size **	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Nablus city	85,375	63	Tulkarm (North)	105,699	69
Nablus East	81,995	60	Tulkarm (South)	96,738	68
Nablus West	63,638	61	Tulkarm (Total)	202,432	137
Nablus Total	230,998	184			
District	Population size	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Jenin (East)	96,721	72	Jericho	25,957	38
Jenin (West)	100,490	32			
Jenin Total	197,211	104			
District	Population size	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Ramallah (North)	76,983	30	Hebron (North)	82,947	73
Ramallah (South)	77,533	53	Hebron (South)	80,073	70
Ramallah (City)	75,178	36	Hebron (city)	96,545	71
Ramallah Total	229,694	119	Hebron Total	259,565	214
District	Population size	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Bethlehem (City)	68,646	57	Jerusalem (Vicinity)	83,580	57
Bethlehem (Vicinity)	70,273	56	Jerusalem (City)	81,370	57
Bethlehem Total	138,919	113	Jerusalem Total	165,310	114

* (a complete list of villages and camps included in each district may be obtained from CPRS.)

The Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip was divided into 6 polling districts as shown below:

District	Population size	Sample size**	Sample Distribution
Gaza A	141,915	85	Jabalyia Camp, Jabalyia Village, al-Nazla
Gaza B	150,000	100	Rimal
Gaza C	151,000	99	Zaytoun, Sabra
Gaza D	116,600	80	Deir al-Balah Camp, Deir al-Balah City, Bureij Camp
Gaza E	140,524	100	Khan Younis City, Abbasan al-Kabira
Gaza F	102,346	90	Rafah Camp

* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by *Palestinian Population Handbook* (Jerusalem: Planning and Research Center, 1993).

** In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting patterns in each district each one of these areas according to place of residence (city, village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.