

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

Public Opinion Poll NO (20)

Taba Agreement, Elections, Jordanian-Palestinian Relations, Evaluation of PNA October 1995

This is the Survey Research Unit's (SRU) twentieth public opinion poll, and covers the following topics: the Taba Agreement, elections, evaluation of the Palestinian Authority, and Jordanian- Palestinian relations. The part of this survey dealing with Palestinian- Jordanian relations has been conducted in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at Jordan University. Residents of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan were asked the same questions at the same time. Results from the Jordanian sample are reproduced in the text of the analysis. The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community the opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them.

The main findings of this poll are:

- A total of 72.1% of Palestinians support the Taba or Oslo B Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
- Over 509 support the amendment of the charter; 39% oppose it.
- Around 46% believe the Taba Agreement and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
- Some 43% evaluate the Palestinian negotiating performance regarding the release of prisoners as good, but less than 20% consider the performance regarding Hebron as good.
- About 91% consider participation in the upcoming election for the Palestinian Council as a national duty. But 40% believe the elections will provide the Palestinian Authority with justification to oppress the Palestinian opposition.
- Some 68% intend to participate in the elections for the Palestinian Council even if the opposition calls for a boycott. Some 81% intend to register for the elections.
- About 51% support a proportional representation system; 40% support a simple majority system.
- A total of 54% believe the elections will be fair, and 22% think they will not be fair.
- A majority of 70% show willingness to elect a woman candidate, but 25% will not do so
- Popularity of Fateh and Arafat is increasing: over 58% of those polled said that they will elect Arafat and over 52% will elect Fateh candidates.
- More Jordanians agree that the Palestinians and Jordanians have a special relationship not found between the Palestinians and any other Arabs (79% agree in Palestine and 91% in Jordan).
- More Jordanians support the establishment of a form of unity between Jordan and Palestine in the future (there is 74% support among respondents in Palestine and 86% support among those interviewed in Jordan).
- A majority of Palestinians (61%) support a confederation between Palestine and Jordan, while significantly fewer Jordanians (17%) favor such an arrangement.
- On the other hand, more Jordanians (53%) support complete unity than do Palestinians (25%).

Following is an analysis of the results of the twentieth public opinion poll (see [Appendix](#)) conducted by the SRU .

General Background

One of the most important events that took place prior to this poll was the reaching of an interim agreement in Taba between the Israeli government and the PLO to expand Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank. The Taba, or Oslo B, agreement was signed amidst much celebration at the White House on September 28, 1995. Before the agreement was secured, many demonstrations were held in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners still held in Israeli prisons. As a result, dozens of prisoners were released, most of whom had light sentences. However, in an act that breached the agreement, the Israeli president refused to release four female prisoners. The agreement also stipulated that redeployment from the populated areas of the West Bank, except Hebron, would be concluded before the end of the current year and that elections for a Palestinian legislative council would be conducted on the 20th of January 1996.

A security closure was imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Jewish holidays causing a general feeling of frustration and anger among Palestinians. Four young men died in Nablus during confrontations with the Israeli army. Settler harassment and provocation of the Arab inhabitants of Hebron continued.

A reconciliation committee was created in an attempt to renew internal Palestinian dialogue and rebuild an atmosphere of mutual trust between the Palestinian National Authority and Hamas. The National Authority released Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar and other Hamas leaders as a gesture of goodwill. After the redeployment of the Israeli army from Jenin, the town was handed over to the PNA. Preparations for the elections continued, along with the publication of the proposed election law and other draft laws.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.

Household Sample Selection

SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A proportional random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, and fieldworkers and researchers created maps of these localities. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these areas which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of one hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly.

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be one hundred and is assigned

ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 100 by 10, obtaining 10. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 10th house, and the second in the 20th, and so on. Fieldworkers started their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They reported on the direction of their sampling walks, and played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and estimating the number of houses in each block. Interviews for the poll were conducted simultaneously in Palestine and Jordan between the 13th and 15th of October, 1995. The sample distribution included 1144 persons in Palestine (729 in the West Bank and 415 in the Gaza Strip) and 1600 in Jordan (including 400 refugee camp residents).

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Sample Distribution	July 1995 (Population)	Sample Distribution	July 1995 (Population)
West Bank Gaza Strip	63.7(63) 36.3(37)	<u>Education</u> Up to 9 years 10-12 years Two years College University Degree(s)	53.6(53) 27.8(27) 09.6(20*) 09.0 *for all post secondary degrees
City Town/Village Ref. Camp	37.7 38.2 24.0	Single Married Divorced or Widowed	**18.3 **77.5 **04.2
<u>Age</u> 18-22 23-26 27-30 31-35 36-42 43-50 Over 50	15.6(15.4) 12.5(12.2) 14.2(14.2) 14.4(14.6) 14.6(15.5) 12.4(12.5) 16.3(15.6)	<u>Occupation</u> Laborers Craftsmen Housewives Specialists* Employees** Merchants Students Farmers Retired None	10.7 09.8 43.2 01.7 11.8 04.3 04.8 02.0 01.1 10.7
Male Female	47.6(49) 52.4(51)	Muslim Christian	94.7(95.5) 05.3(04.5)
		Refugee Non-Refugee	42.8(42) 57.2(58)

*Specialists (University teacher, engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, executive)

**Employees (school teacher, government employee, nurse, lower-level company employee)

--Population Estimates are based on the "Statistical Abstract of Israel" (1993) and FAFO (1993), and Palestinian Statistical Bureau (1994)

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of seventy fieldworkers. Training for data collection was conducted in the field where actual illustrations of the sample selection and interviewing techniques were demonstrated.

Data collectors worked in teams of two supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors are female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 15 per team) to allow for careful interviewing.

Household interviews resulted in a non-response rate estimated at 2%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions.

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is 3%.

Results

1. The Taba "Oslo B" Agreement

A majority of 72% Palestinians support the Taba Agreement. This percentage can be compared with 65% support for the Oslo Agreement signed in September 1993 (Table 2).

Table 2
Support for Agreements

	Yes %	No %
Oslo Agr. (Sept. 1993)	65.0	35.0
Taba Agr. (Sept. 1995)	72.0	27.9

The results show that opposition to the new agreement tends to increase with more education (Table 3).

Table 3
Support for Agreement by Education

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
Illiterate	73.9	10.9	15.2
Elementary	81.5	12.3	06.2
Preparatory	75.7	16.3	08.0
<i>Tawjihi</i>	68.8	20.5	10.7
College	66.7	18.5	14.8
Bachelor	55.4	29.3	15.2

Table 4 below indicates how opposition decreases with age.

Table 4
Support for Agreement by Age

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
18-22 yrs.	67.4	21.3	11.2
23-26 yrs.	71.3	21.0	07.7
27-30 yrs.	73.3	18.6	08.1
31-35 yrs.	70.7	17.7	11.6
36-42 yrs.	70.7	18.0	11.4
43-50 yrs.	73.8	15.6	10.6
51+ yrs.	77.4	10.8	11.8

Although over 70% of respondents support the Taba Agreement, fewer Palestinians (50%) support the amendment of the Palestinian National Charter as stipulated in the Taba Agreement. The greatest opposition to the amendment is found among the most educated and residents of refugee camps (Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5
Amendment of Charter by Education

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
Illiterate	45.3	31.4	23.4
Elementary	55.9	31.8	12.3
Preparatory	51.1	37.8	11.1
<i>Tawjihi</i>	48.3	43.2	08.5
College	53.2	43.1	03.7
Bachelor	41.3	48.9	09.8

Table 6
Amendment of Charter by Place of Residence

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
City	52.4	34.3	13.2

Town	61.7	31.7	06.7
Village	48.8	40.1	11.1
RefugCamp	45.6	44.9	09.5

As is the case in support for the Taba Agreement, older respondents were more supportive of amending the Charter than were younger persons (Table 7).

Table 7
Amendment of Charter by Age

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
18-22 yrs.	44.4	49.4	06.2
23-26 yrs.	46.9	42.0	11.2
27-30 yrs.	50.0	43.2	06.8
31-35 yrs.	51.2	37.8	11.0
36-42 yrs.	51.2	35.5	13.3
43-50 yrs.	45.4	36.9	17.7
51+ yrs.	60.5	25.4	14.1

Palestinian Elections

I. Views of the Elections

Palestinians were questioned about the factors that might influence their decision concerning participation or boycott of elections. The results can be summarized as follows:

- **Participation:** Palestinians generally have a positive view of participation in elections. A total of 90% of those polled said that participation is a "national duty". More than 70% believe that elections will bring about change for the better, will enhance personal security, will be an implementation of the right to self-determination, and will lead to the establishment of a legislative council.

About 67% think that elections will promote democracy and will guarantee that the "best" wins. Expectations that an improvement in economic conditions would be a result of elections were expressed by 61%. A majority of the supporters of Hamas, PFLP, and Islamic Jihad believe that elections will promote democracy, will bring about change for the better, will improve economic conditions, and will lead to a legislative council. An even higher percentage of the supporters of Fateh and National Independents expressed these views. Incentive to participate in elections is lowest among respondents in refugee camps since, compared with non-refugees, refugees are more skeptical about what will emerge from the elections (Table 8).

Table 8
Views of elections by Place of Residence
(% of those who answered "yes")

	City %	Town %	Village %	Ref. Camp %
Will Promote Democracy	68.8	88.3	72.2	59.6
Will Implement Self-Determination	71.9	86.7	76.5	67.3
Will Lead to Personal Security	73.7	83.3	79.0	66.9
Executive (Admin) Council	72.7	88.3	74.0	66.1
Will Improve Econ. Conditions	60.0	58.3	66.6	57.0

The least favorable evaluation of elections may be found in the middle and south of the Gaza Strip, areas under the authority of Palestinians and predominantly populated by Palestinian refugees. Palestinians between the ages of 23 and 35, compared with other age groups, are less enthusiastic about participating in the elections. Education also plays a role in shaping peoples' views of what influence elections will have on their economic conditions, personal security, and other issues as skepticism increases with more education (Table 9).

Table 9
Views of Elections by Education
(% of those who answered "yes")

	Illiterate %	Elementary %	Preparatory %	Secondary %	Middle Diploma %	Bachelor %
Will Improve Economic Conditions	67.2	68.7	62.7	59.5	52.3	51.1
Will Lead to Personal Security	75.7	81.0	76.0	75.1	61.5	65.2
Best Person Will Win	71.3	71.1	70.3	68.4	58.7	53.3

- **Boycott:** It would seem the most important factor that could lead to a boycott of elections is the belief on the part of 41% of respondents that elections will result in the establishment of a limited executive council. Palestinians are also anxious that elections might lead to the legitimizing of oppressive measures against the Palestinian opposition. Less than one-third of the Palestinians feel that elections will give legitimacy to an unsatisfactory agreement and that the results of these elections are predetermine. A quarter of the respondents believe elections will consolidate Israeli control. The percentage of those who think that elections violate religious instructions does not exceed 17%. Doubts about elections are higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip owing to the fact that many West Bank residents feel that elections will consolidate Israel's control, provide legitimacy to an unsatisfactory agreement, and will lead to the formation of an executive (admin.) council only. Palestinians in Jerusalem are also skeptical about elections, as they, more than any other group, feel that election results are pre-determined, and that elections will reinforce Israel's control and give legitimacy to a bad agreement. Refugees and camp

residents are more critical than non-refugees, and educated Palestinians are more critical than those with less education (Table 10).

Table 10
Views of Elections by Education
 (% of those who answered "yes")

	Illiterate %	Elementary %	Preparatory %	Secondary %	Middle Diploma %	Bachelor <ýBR> %
Results Pre-Determined	24.3	28.0	36.1	33.4	38.5	41.3
Will Reinforce Israeli Control	16.9	21.8	25.2	24.6	37.6	31.5
Will Oppress Opposition	26.5	37.4	39.2	46.1	43.1	41.3
Executive (Ad) Council	35.6	43.1	39.8	39.1	42.2	45.7

II. Participation in Elections

Survey results reveal that the motives for participation are stronger than are motives for boycotting elections. A majority of respondents (70.9%) declared their intent to participate; however, one-fifth of those polled said they will not participate. Although intent to participate does not change with the added assumption that the opposition will call for a boycott, around 10% of those polled were not sure if they will participate. The lowest participation rates are expected in Jerusalem where only 52% expressed an intent to participate. The highest participation rates can be found among town and city residents where more than 73% want to participate compared with 66% in refugee camps. Young Palestinians, from age 18-22, and students are the least enthusiastic about participating. This is probably due to the strong support of the Palestinian opposition among these groups. Intent to participate in elections can also be correlated to gender as a higher percentage of men (78%) intend to participate compared with women (65%). The majority of the supporters of all political groups said that they intend to participate. Participation is correlated with views on the fairness of elections as shown in Table 11.

Table 11
Fairness of Elections by Participation

	Yes %	No %	Don't Know %
Fair	80.4	12.5	07.1
Not Fair	55.4	37.1	07.6
Don't Know	63.9	21.4	14.7

Residents of Jerusalem, south and north of the Gaza Strip, and Bethlehem are the most doubtful about the fairness of elections. Doubts about fairness are higher among supporters of PýFLP, DFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Independents than supporters of Fateh, Feda, and PPP.

III. Willingness to Vote for a Woman

A majority of Palestinians say that they are ready to elect a Palestinian woman candidate if she nominated herself for elections. Readiness to elect a woman is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, as almost one-third of respondents from Gaza and one-fifth of those from the West Bank said that they were not ready to do so. Respondents living in Gaza North, Middle, and South are the least supportive of a woman candidate, while those living in Ramallah, Tulkarm, and Bethlehem are the most supportive (Table 12).

Table 12
Willingness to Vote for a Women by Place of Interview

	Yes %	No %	Don't Know %
Nablus	68.3	25.0	06.7
Tulkarm	80.8	17.3	01.9
Jenin	71.3	26.4	02.3
Jericho	80.0	20.0	---
Ramallah	80.6	12.6	06.8
Hebron	74.2	21.2	04.5
Bethlehem	78.1	20.5	01.4
Jerusalem	74.7	25.3	---
Gaza North	60.7	34.4	04.9
Gaza City	68.6	23.4	08.0
Gaza Middle	60.7	32.8	06.6
Gaza South	53.8	38.7	07.5

No significant difference can be found in this poll between the opinions of men and women concerning their willingness to vote for a woman; however, a previous poll showed that women were more willing to vote for a female candidate. The results confirm that young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years old are the least willing to vote for a woman and that willingness to vote for a woman candidate is highest among BA holders. With regard to occupation, professionals (a small group in the sample) are the most willing to vote for a woman (95%), compared with housewives (71%).

IV. Electoral System

A total of 51.4% of Palestinian respondents said that a proportional representation system should be adopted for the upcoming election. This can be compared with 39.7% who prefer a simple majority system. Preference for one or another electoral system is correlated with education; the most educated favor a proportional system while the least educated prefer a majority system (Table 13).

Table 13
Electoral System by Education

	Simple Majority %	Proportional Representation	Don't Know %
Illiterate	42.5	37.3	20.1

Elementary	44.5	41.7	13.7
Preparatory	40.4	53.1	06.5
Secondary	37.0	57.6	05.4
Middle Diploma	34.9	61.5	03.7
Bachelor	37.0	56.5	06.5

V. Registration to Vote

A majority of 80% of the respondents said they will participate in the registration for elections. In contrast, 15% said they will not. There are no significant differences between the various demographic groups concerning registration. Refusal to participate in registration was highest among supporters of the opposition; 26% of Hamas and PFLP supporters said that they will not register to vote. In terms of geographic areas, residents of Jerusalem are the most reluctant as only 67.6% said that they will register to vote (Table 14).

Table 14
Registration by Place of Residence

	Yes %	No %	Not Sure %
Nablus	85.0	12.5	02.5
Tulkarm	82.7	12.5	04.8
Jenin	85.1	11.5	03.4
Jericho	86.7	06.7	06.7
Ramallah	82.5	12.6	04.9
Hebron	82.9	13.2	03.9
Bethlehem	74.0	20.5	05.5
Jerusalem	67.6	29.7	02.7
Gaza N.	85.2	13.1	01.6
Gaza City	84.1	13.0	02.9
Gaza M.	73.0	19.7	07.4
Gaza S.	76.3	14.0	09.7

VI. PNA Presidents

The current poll shows a 6.3% increase in the popularity of Arafat from the last poll in August, 1995 (Table 15).

Table 15
Comparison of Support for Possible Presidential Candidates

	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Habash %	Others %
Nov 1994	44.2	19.7	08.9	06.8	20.4
Dec 1994	48.5	18.4	08.6	05.8	18.7
Feb 1995	53.4	14.6	10.0	03.6	18.4
Mar 1995	56.5	13.5	07.6	03.2	19.2

May 1995	55.4	11.9	08.4	04.0	20.2
July 1995	49.3	13.4	07.6	03.9	25.7
Aug 1995	53.7	17.2	07.2	04.3	17.3
Oct 1995	60.0	13.4	08.0	03.2	15.4

Table 16 also confirms that support for Arafat is higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, and comes primarily from Fateh supporters. Yassin enjoys the support of Islamists, while Abdel Shafi competes with Arafat for the votes of Nationalist Independents and supporters of PPP and Fedat. Habash received 75% of the votes of PFLP supporters.

VII. Political Affiliation

Fateh enjoyed a majority of votes in this poll. Independents comprise around 28%, Islamists 18%, and Leftists (PPP, PFLP, Fedat, and DFLP) less than 6%. Support for Fateh is high in the north of the West Bank and in Gaza. However, it has less than 40% support in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Hamas's strongest support comes from Hebron, Jericho, Jerusalem, and Nablus (Table 16).

Table 16
Political Affiliation by Place of Residence*

	Hamas	PFLP	Fateh	Islamic Jihad	Islamic Ind.	Nat. Ind.	Other	No One
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Nablus	14.2	01.7	60.0	---	03.3	04.2	04.2	12.5
Tulkarm	09.9	03.0	51.5	05.0	03.0	05.0	05.9	14.9
Jenin	12.5	03.4	61.4	01.1	05.7	04.5	01.1	10.2
Jericho	17.9	---	57.1	03.6	03.6	07.1	---	10.7
Ramallah	08.7	05.8	43.7	01.9	---	04.9	12.6	15.5
Hebron	21.8	01.5	49.6	03.0	03.8	04.5	02.3	12.0
Bethlehem	11.0	04.1	38.4	02.7	11.0	08.2	05.5	15.1
Jerusalem	17.6	06.8	39.2	02.7	02.7	02.7	05.4	21.6
Gaza N.	11.5	04.9	60.7	01.6	01.6	---	---	13.1
Gaza City	12.3	01.4	57.2	02.2	01.4	02.9	08.7	10.9
Gaza M.	08.1	04.9	52.0	---	02.4	04.1	02.4	24.4
Gaza S.	11.8	03.2	58.1	01.1	04.3	01.1	02.2	17.2

*DFLP, Fedat, and PPP are not included in this table because of small sample size resulting in tow totals less than 100% in some cases. Results for Jericho were not included for the same reason.

* Margin of error is more than 3% because of small sample size.

This poll confirms that support for Hamas is higher among women than men and is also high among younger Palestinians.

Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

I. Political Relationships

Most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip believe that the political relations between the PNA and both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments are strong, while most rate its relations with the Syrian government as bad. In Jordan, more than 89% of the respondents feel that PNA-Jordan relations are strong. In addition, 59% feel that PNA-Egypt relations are strong. This compares with 33.9% who say that PNA-Syria relations are strong (Table 17).

Table 17
PNA Political Relationships

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza
	%	%	%	%	%
Very Strong	36.6	39.5	19.4	12.2	16.7
Strong	52.9	49.8	52.0	53.6	52.6
Not Strong	04.9	05.8	17.7	17.6	17.7
Bad	01.4	01.5	05.5	04.7	05.2
Don't Know	04.2	03.5	05.4	11.9	07.8
Very Strong	03.4	03.0	02.8	01.4	02.3
Strong	30.5	28.5	22.2	18.1	20.7
Not Strong	31.3	28.3	32.2	26.3	30.0
Bad	13.6	17.3	26.3	33.3	28.9
Don't Know	21.2	23.0	16.5	20.9	18.1
Very Strong	10.4	11.5	28.2	46.5	35.1
Strong	48.6	45.0	43.3	33.8	39.7
Not Strong	18.4	17.3	13.3	08.2	11.4
Bad	05.6	08.5	05.6	05.9	05.7
Don't Know	17.0	17.8	09.6	05.6	08.1

II. Peace Negotiation Performance

With regard to peace negotiations with Israel, most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip evaluate the performance of Jordanian negotiators as successful and that of Palestinian negotiators as fairly successful. As for Syrian performance, Palestinian opinion is split. No significant difference can be found between Palestinian and Jordanian respondents regarding the evaluation of the management of negotiations with Israel (Table 18).

Table 18
Management of Negotiations with Israel

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza

	%	%	%	%	%
Successful	31.9	34.8	31.7	39.9	34.8
Fairly Successful	38.9	35.5	40.6	41.3	40.9
A Little Successful	10.4	08.2	15.3	08.2	12.7
Unsuccessful	13.8	16.8	10.0	06.8	08.8
Don't Know	05.5	04.8	02.4	03.8	02.8
Successful	12.6	15.0	26.7	29.8	27.9
Fairly Successful	18.3	17.3	15.0	11.3	13.6
A Little Successful	15.3	14.5	12.2	13.6	12.7
Unsuccessful	34.0	29.5	28.5	23.2	26.5
Don't Know	19.8	23.8	17.6	22.1	19.3
Successful	80.9	73.8	67.4	62.9	65.7
Fairly Successful	16.0	11.5	13.9	16.2	14.8
A Little Successful	03.3	04.2	04.4	04.2	04.3
Unsuccessful	05.3	07.8	08.4	04.9	07.1
Don't Know	04.4	02.8	05.9	11.7	08.1

In spite of the high assessment of the Jordan's ability to negotiate with Israel, most of the Palestinian respondents (55%) believe that Jordan did not obtain all its land rights. Moreover, 56% of the Palestinians believe that Jordan did not obtain all its water rights as a result of the peace agreement with Israel. Jordan, however, is seen as more successful in the area of security negotiations as 53% think that Jordan did achieve all its rights in security. The results of the poll conducted in Jordan show dramatic variances between residents of Jordan and those of Palestine concerning views on these issues. Jordan respondents view Jordan's performance in the negotiations more positively than do respondents from the West Bank and Gaza (Table 19).

Table 19
Evaluation of Jordan's Success in Peace Treaty

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza
	%	%	%	%	%
Achieved	63.4	53.3	33.4	26.6	30.9
Did Not Achieve	28.8	37.0	54.5	55.8	55.0
Don't Know	07.8	09.8	12.1	17.6	14.1
Achieved	49.2	46.8	23.5	13.2	19.6

Did Not Achieve	37.9	38.0	57.3	54.5	56.3
Don't Know	12.9	15.3	19.2	32.3	24.1
Achieved	73.9	67.8	53.2	51.8	52.7
Did Not Achieve	17.8	24.0	33.3	27.0	30.9
Don't Know	08.3	08.2	13.5	21.2	16.4

III. Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

79% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip believe that Jordanians and Palestinians have a special relationship not found between Palestinians and any other Arabs. This compares with more than 91% among the respondents in Jordan who express this view (Table 20).

Table 20
The Palestinian-Jordanian Relationship is Special?

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza
	%	%	%	%	%
Correct	91.1	94.5	82.6	73.2	79.1
Incorrect	07.2	04.5	15.7	17.9	16.5
Don't Know	01.8	01.0	01.7	08.9	04.4

IV. Unity Between Palestine and Jordan

74% of respondents from Palestine support the establishment of a form of unity with Jordan in the future, compared with over 83% of Jordanian residents who are in favor of the union (Table 21).

Table 21
Unity between Palestine and Jordan

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza
	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	83.9	93.0	73.5	77.3	73.6
No	12.8	05.3	21.9	21.4	21.8
Don't Know	03.3	01.7	03.7	04.7	04.0

Among those supporters of a future political unity between Jordan and Palestine, 61% advocate a confederation, while about 33% support complete unity or a federation. While support for confederation is higher in the Gaza Strip, support for complete unity or federation is higher in the West Bank. Although support for complete unity was the first choice of a majority of Jordan respondents, where 58% of them declared support for such a form of unity and support for

complete unity reaches 69% among residents of refugee camps in Jordan, support for confederation is lower in Jordan than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Table 22).

Table 22
Form of Unity Between Palestine and Jordan

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza
	%	%	%	%	%
Complete Union	58.1	69.9	29.1	18.8	25.3
Federation	10.6	08.3	08.0	05.9	07.3
Confed.	21.2	16.4	57.1	66.8	60.6
Others	00.3	00.5	03.0	03.6	03.2
Don't Know	03.2	03.8	02.7	04.9	03.6

Support for complete unity is found particularly in Nablus, Jenin, and Hebron, while support for confederation is strongest in Jerusalem, Jericho, Ramallah, and Gaza (Table 23).

Table 23
Support for Unity by Place of Residence

	Yes %	No %	Don't Know %
Nablus	70.8	23.3	05.8
Tulkarm	85.6	10.6	03.8
Jenin	76.7	18.6	04.7
Jericho	80.0	20.0	---
Ramallah	64.1	28.2	07.8
Hebron	71.2	26.5	02.3
Bethlehem	76.7	23.3	---
Jerusalem	74.7	24.0	01.3
Gaza North	62.3	32.8	04.9
Gaza City	85.5	12.3	02.2
Gaza Middle	66.4	27.0	06.6
Gaza South	74.2	20.4	05.4

V. Will agreements lead to a Palestinian state?

Around 46% of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza believe that the Palestinian/Israeli negotiations will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This belief is shared by around 31% of Jordanians. In Jordan, 39% of the population feels that these negotiations will only lead to limited autonomy under Israeli control. This compares with 28.9% in the West Bank and 15.9% in Gaza who anticipate a limited autonomy (Table 24).

Table 24
Negotiation will lead to...

	Jordan		Palestine		
	National Sample	Refugee Camps	West Bank	Gaza Strip	West Bank & Gaza
	%	%	%	%	%
Limited Autonomy	39.0	33.3	28.9	16.4	24.2
Palestinian Entity Less Than a State	18.1	20.0	18.4	20.1	19.1
Independent Palestinian State	30.8	34.5	44.2	50.1	46.4
Don't Know	12.2	12.3	08.5	13.3	10.3

Despite the widespread support for the Taba Agreement, less than a majority believe it will lead to an independent Palestinian state. Again we see that there is a relationship between the level of the respondents' education and their opinions about the outcome of the negotiations; illiterate persons voiced twice as much optimism that an independent state will result than did those with the most education. In contrast, optimism for a limited autonomy was highest among Bachelor degree holders and lowest among the illiterate (Table 25).

Table 25
Negotiations will produce... by Education

	Limited Autonomy	A Palestinian Entity	A Palestinian State	Don't Know
	%	%	%	%
Illiterate	15.9	06.5	55.1	22.5
Elementary	19.4	10.0	58.3	12.3
Preparatory	22.4	15.2	54.4	08.0
<i>Tawjihi</i>	25.6	24.9	41.3	08.2
College	33.9	30.3	32.1	03.7
Bachelor	33.7	33.7	22.8	09.8

Appendix

1. What is your attitude towards the Oslo B Agreement which was recently signed between Israel and the Palestinian authority?

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
a) I support	72.1%	69.7%	76.1%
b) I oppose	17.5%	20.5%	12.4%
c) No opinion	10.4%	09.8%	11.5%

2. Do you support the amendment of the Palestinian National Charter (as agreed upon in Oslo B which stipulates the cancellation of the articles calling for the destruction of a state of Israel)?

a) I support	50.1%	49.5%	51.1%
b) I oppose	38.6%	40.6%	35.4%
c) No opinion	11.3%	09.9%	13.5%

3. The agreements which have been signed and the current negotiations will lead to the establishment of:

a) Limited Autonomy	24.2%	28.9%	16.4%
b) A Palestinian entity less than a state.	19.1%	18.4%	20.1%
c) An Independent Palestinian state.	46.4%	44.2%	50.1%
d) Don't know	10.3%	08.5%	13.3%

4. What is your evaluation of the Palestinian Authority's performance regarding:

A. The release of prisoners

a) Good	42.7%	40.4%	46.6%
b) Fair	28.4%	28.5%	28.3%
c) Weak	25.1%	28.6%	19.2%
d) Don't know	03.8%	02.5%	05.9%

B. Hebron

a) Good	19.7%	19.8%	19.5%
b) Fair	24.1%	22.7%	26.5%
c) Weak	39.8%	43.2%	34.0%
d) Don't know	16.4%	14.3%	20.0%

5. The following statements refer to the upcoming election of the Palestinian Council. Do you agree with these statements?

A. It will promote the democratic process in the Palestinian community.

a) Yes	68.8%	70.4%	66.0%
b) No	18.4%	18.7%	17.8%
c) Don't know	12.8%	10.9%	16.2%

B. It is an implementation of Palestinian right to self determination.

a) Yes	73.1%	75.0%	69.7%
b) No	18.1%	18.4%	17.6%
c) Don't know	08.8%	06.6%	12.7%

C. It will bring changes for the better.

a) Yes	74.5%	75.3%	75.4%
b) No	14.0%	14.4%	13.4%
c) Don't know	11.5%	10.3%	13.4%

D. It will lead to an improvement in economic conditions.

a) Yes	61.4%	60.6%	62.6%
b) No	23.4%	26.5%	18.0%
c) Don't know	15.2%	12.9%	19.4%

E. It will lead to personal security.

a) Yes	74.3%	73.7%	75.4%
b) No	15.3%	17.2%	12.2%
c) Don't know	10.4%	09.1%	12.4%

F. It will guarantee the victory of the best party or political trend.

a) Yes	67.3%	68.4%	65.4%
b) No	19.9%	20.9%	18.1%
c) Don't know	12.8%	10.7%	16.5%

G. Participation in elections is a national duty.

a) Yes	91.2%	91.3%	90.8%
b) No	06.4%	06.6%	06.1%
c) Don't know	02.4%	02.1%	03.1%

H. It will lead to the establishment of a legislative council.

a) Yes	72.4%	73.6%	70.4%
b) No	12.0%	11.9%	12.2%
c) Don't know	15.6%	14.5%	17.4%

I. It will be a false election; the results are predetermined.

a) Yes	33.2%	33.5%	32.6%
b) No	49.0%	51.1%	45.5%
c) Don't know	17.8%	15.4%	21.9%

J. It will consolidate Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza.

a) Yes	25.2%	29.2%	18.6%
b) No	61.6%	60.1%	64.2%
c) Don't know	13.2%	10.7%	17.2%

K. It will provide legitimacy for an unsatisfactory agreement.

a) Yes	37.2%	41.1%	30.5%
b) No	45.0%	42.2%	49.8%
c) Don't know	17.8%	16.7%	19.7%

L. It will provide the Authority with justification to oppress the Opposition.

a) Yes	40.0%	41.3%	37.8%
b) No	45.4%	44.7%	46.5%
c) Don't know	14.6%	14.0%	15.7%

M. It will lead to the formation of an executive (administrative) council only.

a) Yes	40.6%	43.0%	36.5%
b) No	40.6%	37.8%	45.2%
c) Don't know	18.8%	19.2%	18.3%

N. It will be a change for the worse.

a) Yes	17.7%	19.3%	15.0%
b) No	67.8%	68.1%	67.4%
c) Don't know	14.5%	12.6%	17.6%

O. It will violate religious instructions.

a) Yes	16.9%	18.3%	14.6%
b) No	73.3%	71.6%	76.0%
c) Don't know	09.8%	10.1%	09.4%

P. It will not change the status quo.

a) Yes	27.8%	28.8%	26.2%
b) No	60.9%	60.8%	61.1%
c) Don't know	11.3%	10.4%	12.7%

6. Will you participate in the general political elections to choose the members of the Palestinian Council?

a) Yes	70.9%	69.5%	73.2%
b) No	20.0%	21.7%	17.1%
c) Not sure	09.1%	08.8%	09.7%

7. If the following nominate themselves for the head of the Palestinian Authority, I will choose...

a) Ahmad Yassin	14.1%	15.9%	10.9%
b) Yassir Arafat	58.4%	53.7%	66.3%
c) H. Abdel Shafi	08.0%	08.8%	08.0%
d) George Habash	03.2%	03.6%	02.7%
e) Others	16.3%	18.8%	12.1%

8. If general political elections were held and I decided to participate, I would vote for...

a) Hamas	13.0%	14.3%	10.6%
b) PPP	01.2%	01.5%	00.7%
c) PFLP	03.3%	03.3%	03.3%
d) Fateh	52.5%	50.5%	55.9%
e) Fedai	00.8%	00.4%	01.4%
f) Islamic Jihad	01.9%	02.4%	01.2%
g) DFLP	00.3%	00.1%	00.5%
h) Islamic Ind.	03.3%	03.9%	02.4%

i) National Ind.	04.0%	04.6%	02.8%
j) Others	04.7%	04.6%	04.7%
k) None of the above	15.0%	14.1%	16.5%

9. The electoral system which should be adopted for the upcoming election of the Palestinian Council is...

a) A simple Majority system *	39.7%	38.8%	41.2%
b) Proportional Representation system **	51.4%	51.8%	50.8%
c) Don't know	08.9%	09.4%	08.0%

*candidates with the largest number of votes win

**the distribution of seats is based on the percentage of votes each party wins

10. If the Palestinian opposition called for a boycott of the election for the National Authority Council, I will...

a) Boycott	19.4%	19.4%	19.3%
b) Participate	67.8%	68.4%	66.7%
c) Have no opinion	12.8%	12.2%	14.0%

11. Do you think that the general political elections for the Palestinian Council will be fair or unfair?

a) Fair	54.4%	56.4%	51.1%
b) Unfair	22.1%	23.5%	19.8%
c) Don't know	23.5%	20.1%	29.2%

12. If a Palestinian woman candidate nominated herself for elections, are you ready to elect her?

a) Yes	70.4%	75.1%	62.6%
b) No	24.7%	21.2%	30.6%
c) Not sure	04.9%	03.7%	06.8%

13. The electoral law stipulates that the first step in the election process is the registration of the names of voters through house visits by fieldworkers working for the Central Election Commission. When that happens will you participate in registration?

a) Yes	80.4%	80.8%	79.8%
b) No	15.0%	15.1%	14.8%
c) Not sure	04.6%	04.1%	05.4%

14. The political relationships between the Palestinian National Authority and the Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian governments are...

A. PNA-Jordan

a) Very Strong	16.7%	19.4%	12.2%
b) Strong	52.6%	52.0%	53.6%
c) Not Strong	17.7%	17.7%	17.6%
d) Bad	05.2%	05.5%	04.7%
e) Don't know	07.8%	05.4%	11.9%

B. PNA-Syria

a) Very Strong	02.3%	02.8%	01.4%
b) Strong	20.7%	22.2%	18.1%
c) Not Strong	30.0%	32.2%	26.3%
d) Bad	28.9%	26.3%	33.3%
e) Don't know	18.1%	16.5%	20.9%

C. PNA-Egypt

a) Very Strong	35.1%	28.2%	46.5%
b) Strong	39.7%	43.3%	33.8%
c) Not Strong	11.4%	13.3%	08.2%
d) Bad	05.7%	05.6%	05.9%
e) Don't Know	08.1%	09.6%	05.6%

15. The Palestinian Authority, Syrian government, and Jordanian governments' management of the peace negotiations with Israel has been...

Palestinian Authority

a) Successful	34.8%	31.7%	39.9%
b) Fairly successful	40.9%	40.6%	41.3%
c) A little success	12.7%	15.3%	08.2%
d) Unsuccessful	08.8%	10.0%	06.8%
e) Don't know	02.8%	02.4%	03.8%

Syrian government

a) Successful	27.9%	26.7%	29.8%
b) Fairly successful	13.6%	15.0%	11.3%
c) A little success	12.7%	12.2%	13.6%

d) Unsuccessful	26.5%	28.5%	23.2%
e) Don't know	19.3%	17.6%	22.1%

Jordanian government

a) Successful	65.7%	67.4%	62.9%
b) Fairly successful	14.8%	13.9%	16.2%
c) A little success	04.3%	04.4%	04.2%
d) Unsuccessful	07.1%	08.4%	04.9%
e) Don't know	08.1%	05.9%	11.7%

16. Did Jordan obtain all it's rights to land, water, and security as a result of the peace treaty with Israel?

A. Land

a) Yes	30.9%	33.4%	26.6%
b) No	55.0%	54.5%	55.8%
c) Don't Know	14.1%	12.1%	17.6%

B. Water

a) Yes	19.6%	23.5%	13.2%
b) No	56.3%	57.3%	54.5%
c) Don't Know	24.1%	19.2%	32.3%

C. Security

a) Yes	52.7%	53.2%	51.8%
b) No	30.9%	33.3%	27.0%
c) Don't Know	16.4%	13.5%	21.2%

17. Do you think the following statement is correct or not?

"The Palestinian and Jordanian people have a special relationship not found between them and any other Arabs."

a) Correct	79.1%	82.6%	73.2%
b) Not Correct	16.5%	15.7%	17.9%
c) Don't Know	04.4%	01.7%	08.9%

18. Do you support the establishment of any form of unity between Jordan and Palestine in the future?

a) Yes (go to Q.19)	74.1%	74.1%	73.9%
b) No	21.9%	22.1%	27.5%
c) Don't Know	04.0%	03.8%	04.6%

19. (To those who said "Yes" in Q.18): What form of unity would you support

a) Complete unity	25.3%	29.1%	18.8%
b) Federation	07.3%	08.0%	05.9%
c) Confederation	60.6%	57.1%	66.8%
d) Others (specify)	03.2%	03.0%	03.6%
e) Don't know	03.6%	02.7%	04.9%