

# Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

## Public Opinion Poll NO (6)

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### Palestinian Elections and the Cairo Agreement,

February 19, 1994

This is the sixth public opinion poll conducted by the Surveys Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS). SRU conducts a monthly public opinion poll regarding the peace process, the Declaration of Principles, political attitudes, and elections. The poll results are published independently and with unit analysis in both Arabic and English. They provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. They also serve as a historical record of Palestinian attitudes at the various political stages.

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#### Introduction

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At the present time, CPRS is conducting its March poll so as to assess political attitudes after the Hebron massacre. CPRS plans to publish the results of the March poll before the end of this month. The enclosed poll was conducted 5 days before the massacre and 10 days after the signing of the "Cairo Agreement", which dealt with boarder-crossings, roads, and security. The text of the agreement was published in local newspapers and a number of commentaries were written about it. Still, the agreement went very much unnoticed by many Palestinians because of the low-key signing ceremony and the complexity of the issues involved. This, however, didn't prevent public opinion from forming in regards to the agreement.

In addition, political changes seem to have contributed to a state of frustration in the Occupied Territories (especially in Gaza). This can be seen in the absence of the rule of law, arms proliferation, internal violence, and further Israeli oppression. The killings of a number of Palestinians by the Israeli military led to a three-day strike in Gaza between the 15th and the 18th of February. The 17th was a strike day in the West Bank.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.

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## Methodology

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One of the objectives set for this poll is to attempt to project Palestinian voting patterns in the case of democratic elections. Therefore, 1993 Palestinians were interviewed. A total of 1304 questionnaires were received from the West Bank and 689 questionnaires were received from the Gaza Strip.

### **Polling "electoral" districts in the West Bank**

For the purposes of this poll, the West Bank was divided into 8 "areas" which were further divided into 18 "districts". The population size for these districts ranges from 75,000 to 105,000 (except in Jericho and Nablus (West)), depending on the population distribution pattern. CPRS researchers planned to conduct 70 to 90 interviews in each district according to population size. The data collection process allowed for successful results in almost all districts (more details in the data collection section). For each area, the total sample size is much higher.

#### **West Bank**

District	Population size **	Sample size	Sample distribution *
Nablus city	85,375	69	100 Towns
Nablus East	81,995	72	89% Villages, 11% R.Camps
Nablus West	63,628	56	92% Villages, 8% R.Camps
Nablus Total	230,998	197	

  

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample distribution
Tulkarm (North)	105,694	85	25% Towns, 64% Villages, 11% R. Camps
Tulkarm (South)	96,738	89	33% Towns, 67% Villages
Tulkarm Total	202,432	174	

  

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jenin (East)	96,721	61	54% Towns, 34% Villages, 12% R. Camps
Jenin (West)	100,490	104	100% Villages
Jenin Total	197,211	165	

  

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jericho	25,957	42	55% Towns, 24% Villages, 21% R. Camps

  

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Ramallah (North)	76,983	33	84% Villages, 16% R. Camps
Ramallah (South)	77,533	93	37% Towns, 50% Villages, 13% R.Camps
Ramallah (City)	75,178	77	82% Towns, 10% Villages, 8% R. Camps
Ramallah Total	229,694	203	

  

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Hebron (North)	82,947	83	84% Villages, 16% R. Camps
Hebron (South)	80,073	78	88% Villages, 12% R.Camps
Hebron (City)	96,545	86	100% Towns
Hebron Total	259,565	247	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Bethlehem (City)	68,646	67	33% Towns, 51% Villages, 16% R.Camps
Bethlehem (Vicinity)	70,273	71	10% Towns, 74% Villages, 16% R. Camps
Bethlehem Total	138,919	138	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jerusalem (Vicinity)	81,730	116	49% Towns, 42% Villages, 9% R.Camps
Jerusalem (City)	83,580	22	14% Towns, 86% Villages
Jerusalem Total	165,310	138	

*\* (a complete list of villages and camps included in each district may be obtained from CPRS.)*

## **Electoral Districts in Gaza Strip**

The Gaza Strip was divided into 3 "areas" (North, Middle, South) and 7 electoral districts as shown below:

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Jabalia & North	141,915	116	Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia Village & Project, Jabalia RCamp, Al-Nazli
Gaza city (A)	90,000	85	Al-Shati', Sheikh Radwan, Al-Nasr
Gaza city (B)	110,000	90	Al-Rimal, Al-Sabra, Al-Daraj
Gaza city (C)	1001,000	88	Al-Tofah, Al-Zaytoun, Al-Shuja'iyah
North Total	441,915	379	

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Middle Camps	116,600	115	Al-Bureij, Al-Magazi, Nuseirat, Zawaydeh, Deir El-Balah

District	Population size	Sample size	Sample Distribution
Khan Yunis	140,514	112	Khan Yunis (Camp and City) Qararah, Bani Suhaila, Khaza, Abasan.
Rafah & Camp	102,346	83	Rafah (Camp and City)
South Total	242,860	195	

\* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by "Palestinian Population Handbook" by the "Planning and Research Center 1993".

This division allows for an understanding of voting patterns for (a) the whole Occupied Territories, (b) the West Bank and Gaza separately, (c) each major area, and (d) each district. This, we believe, helps in the formulation of a Palestinian electoral system. It also contributes to a more representative sample.

Naturally, CPRS researchers realize that if elections were to be held, they would not necessarily be based on "electoral districts". We also understand that electoral districts may be divided in various other ways. However, we believe that this poll captures, as accurately as possible, the political map in the Occupied Territories.

In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting patterns in each one these areas according to place of residence (city, village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.

## Sample Distribution

(expressed as a % of the total sample)

Area of Residence					
West Bank "including Jerusalem"	65.4%	City	38.6%		
		Village	42.8%		
Gaza Strip	34.6%	Refugee Camps	18.6%		
Age		Sex		Education	
18-24	26.4%	Males Females	64.7% 35.3%	Up to 9 years (elem./prep)	28.9%
25-31	29.4%			Up to 12 years (Tawjihi)	34.5%
32-38	19.2%			2 year College	16.8%
39-45	12.2%			University (BA)	18.6%
46-52	5.4%			MA + Phd.	1.2%
53+	7.4%				
Marital Status		Refugee Status		Occupation	
Single	31.5%	Refugee Non- Refugee	47.9% 52.1%	Laborers	18.1%
Married	67.2%			Merchants	9.5%
Divorced & Widowed	1.3%			Craftsmen	13.1%
				Students	8.4%
				Housewives	14.2%
				Farmers	1.8%
				Employees*	19.2%
				Specialists**	6.4%
				Unemployed	7.9%
				Retired	1.4%

\* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

\*\* Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

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## Data Collection

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A total of fifty-six well-trained field workers participated in data collection. Thirty of them visited major towns in the West Bank, and conducted interviews in areas (interview stations) that attract a wide range of social groups and strata. The choice of interview stations was based on our previous experience in the last 5 polls. To ensure the representation of Palestinians in all districts, the focus was on areas that attracted villagers and refugee camp residents, such as bus/car stations, city centers, and main markets. Data collectors carried with them an exhaustive list of villages and refugee camps in each districts. This allowed them to reach their target sample as efficiently as possible. While this method was useful in obtaining the required sample in almost all districts, we were unable to collect the appropriate sample for two districts: Jerusalem (city) and Ramallah (north). The results for these two districts, while included in the total sample, will not be published separately.

In Gaza Strip, field workers visited almost all towns, villages, and refugee camps (as indicated in the previous table). Here, around 50% of the interviews were conducted in households to ensure the representation of women. The rest of the interviews were conducted in public places.

In general, the public forum of interviews contributed to a 10% non-response rate which was not included in the sample. A large number of non-respondents were women. Others, we believe, are reluctant to state their political affiliation out of fear or ambivalence.

The majority of our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on sampling techniques, survey methods, scientific research, and field work. Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. Fifty percent of our data collectors were female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. All interviews took place on the same day and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 30) to allow for careful interviewing.

Researchers were instructed to refrain from the following:

1. Conducting interviews in public institutions such as trade unions, offices of political parties, women and student organizations, government offices, etc.
2. Interviewing their acquaintances.
3. Giving questionnaires to a group of friends or acquaintances.
4. Conducting multiple interviews at the same time.
5. Interfering with the respondents answers even if they seemed "illogical." If asked to explain a vague item, they must refer to a standard definition provided to them by CPRS. otherwise, they must leave it up to the respondent to interpret the ambiguity.

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies.

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## Remarks

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### **The Cairo Agreement and the DOP**

The Cairo Agreement had minor influence on Palestinian attitudes towards the DOP. A total of 11.8% indicated that their support for the DOP has increased after hearing about the Cairo Agreement. Those who declared that their support has declined were 12.8%.

The majority of Palestinians seem to stick to their original position of the DOP. Almost 56% of them said that their attitude towards the DOP has not changed, with 28.4% being supportive and 27.5% being against. As much as 20% of Palestinians said that they were not sure about the issue due to lack of knowledge about the details of the Cairo Agreement.

In comparison with our December poll, attitudes towards the DOP have not changed. In December, 41.5% of Palestinians declared that they approved of the DOP, compared with 40.2% (28.4% + 11.8%) showing "favorable" attitudes of the DOP this month. Opposition to the DOP was 38.1% in December. This poll shows 40.3% "unfavorable" attitudes, a slight increase from December. Here, "favorable" attitudes are measured by compiling "still approve of the DOP" and "increased support"; "unfavorable" attitudes are determined on the basis of "still against the DOP" and "decreased support".

The poll also shows that PFLP supporters oppose the DOP the most, with 79% of them declaring that they are still against it, and 9.3% of them saying that their support has declined. Opposition for the DOP is still strong among the supporters of Hamas (66.3%), Islamic Jihad (56.7%), and DFLP (55.6%). Some of these groups' supporters declared that their support for the DOP has decreased (see appendixes).

The majority of Fateh supporters (67.3%) show favorable feelings towards the DOP, with 45.6% of them saying that they still support it, and 21.7% showing that their support has increased as a result of the Cairo Agreement. This 67.3% can be compared with more than 90% support for the DOP in September 1993. The present poll shows that 15.1% of Fateh supporters have negative feelings towards the DOP; 5.6% said that they still oppose it and 9.5% said that their support has declined after the Cairo Agreement. Another 17.7% said that they were not sure.

The most support for the DOP can be found among Feda supporters. The majority of them (55.8%) still support the DOP and 20.9% of them indicated that their support has further increased after the signing of the Cairo Agreement.

It is interesting to find that the most change is among the supporters of Hizb El-Sha'b and independents. Almost 21% of Hizb El-Sha'b supporters said that their support for the DOP has declined. Another 9.3% of them indicated that they still oppose the DOP. This may be due to recent differences between the PLO leadership and Hizb El-Sha'b on the issues relating to the

peace negotiations. The leadership of Hizb El-Sha'b declared its disagreement with the Cairo Agreement.

Among independents and "Others", negative feelings towards the DOP are clear. Nationalist independents show the most change in attitude as a result of the Cairo Agreement, with 24.2% of them indicating decline in support of the DOP. Another 16% of them said that they still oppose the DOP. The majority of Islamic Independents showed that they still oppose the DOP (29.4%) or that their support has declined (20.6%) as a result of the Cairo Agreement. Palestinians who said that they will not vote for any of the groups listed in the questionnaire instrument show their opposition to the DOP. A total of 41.3% of them said that they still oppose the DOP and 13.6% said that their support has declined.

In general, the Cairo Agreement has made opposition to the DOP stronger among the opposition groups. It also contributed to doubts among the supporting groups. For Independents, it made the pendulum swing more to the views of the opposition.

The most important conclusion that can be made from this poll is that Palestinians have not yet reached an agreement among themselves on the Palestinian-Israeli agreement.

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## Future Outlook

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Palestinians are divided in their outlook to the future, with 39% of them saying that they are optimistic and 36.7% saying that they were pessimistic. Another 24.3% said that they were not sure.

Here, we notice a difference between the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, the pessimists comprise more than 40% of the respondents. However, in Gaza they comprise 30% (a 10 points difference). This may be due to the fact that many Gazans foresee future changes in relation to the Israeli occupation. It is, however, unclear to West Bankers if they will actually benefit from the peace agreement. This may also be due to the fact that "independents" and "others" demonstrate a pessimistic outlook. These "groups" are more prevalent in the West Bank than in Gaza, and most responsive to changes on the ground. The Gaza sample is comprised of more housewives (9% more) than that of the West Bank. This group of Palestinians show the least pessimism.

The poll indicates that future outlook is correlated with political affiliation. The majority of DOP supporters are optimistic, while the majority of opposition supporters are pessimistic. The future outlook of "Independents" and "Others" is predominantly pessimistic.

The poll also shows a correlation between future outlook and educational attainment. Those with the least and the most education are most optimistic. This may be due to relative expectations, where the least educated may have lower expectations and therefore be more optimistic. The most educated have high expectations, at the same time, they may feel that they are able to achieve such expectations because they are educated.

## **Elections**

A significant majority of Palestinians (71.3%) insist that general political election is the best means to select the members of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PISGA). Among Fateh supporters, we notice that 63.7% support an elections, and 30.2% support appointment by PLO. Hamas, PFLP and DFLP supporters indicated their support for an elections, where 72.5% of Hamas supporters, 80% of PFLP supporters and 56.6% of DFLP supporters believe that elections are the best means to select the members of PISGA.

Support for appointments by PLO or political factions increased slightly from our previous polls (2 points). This may be due to doubts about the possibility of an election taking place on the 13th of July, 1994.

Furthermore, Palestinians are doubtful about the fairness of an election, with 61.5% of them saying that elections for PISGA will not be fair or "not sure". Palestinians need to perceive the electoral process as free and fair so as to translate their desire to participate in election to actual participation.

In this regard, Palestinians say that they want to participate, (a 67% majority). Again, this view goes across party lines . A clear majority among DOP support groups want to participate in elections. The largest percentage of those who support Hamas, DFLP and Islamic Jihad want to participate in an elections for PISGA. PFLP supporters are divided on the issue.

## **Political affiliation**

In regard to political affiliation, the present figures are mostly consistent with those of our previous polls. Fateh has regained some popularity in Palestinian society with an increase of more than six points from our January poll. Fateh has returned to the monthly average that it has been showing in all other CPRS polls. This may be due partly to the Cairo Agreement, where some Palestinians felt that it is a sign of progress in the peace process.

The reader must be reminded that the results for electoral districts are based on small sample size where the margin of error is significant. Still, we believe that the results of the poll reflect a reliable indicator of Palestinian political affiliation, especially when compared with the total sample, the West Bank and Gaza samples, and area samples.

The results in this regard can be summarized as follows:

- The general sample shows 41.6% support for Fateh. Hamas is next with 13.8% followed by nationalist independents (11.4%). Support for Fateh, Hamas and PFLP is stronger in Gaza. In the West Bank, more Palestinians support "independents" (32.3%) than in Gaza (23.9%) confirming the polarization existing in the Gaza Strip.
- The area sample shows a Fateh lead in all areas. However, it faces competition from a coalition among the opposition groups (Hamas, PFLP, DFLP, and Islamic Jihad) in Hebron, Bethlehem and Gaza.
- Fateh's strongest districts are : Nablus (East), Nablus (City), Tulkarm (North), Jenin (East), Jenin (West) Jericho, Ramallah (South), Ramallah (City), Bethlehem (Vicinity), Jerusalem (Vicinity), and all districts in Gaza.



A coalition among the opposition groups is strong (20% or more of the vote) in the following districts: Nablus (East), Nablus (West), Jenin (East), Jenin (West), Jericho (31%), Hebron (North) (30.1%), Hebron (South) (29.5%), Hebron (City), Bethlehem (City) (32.9%), Bethlehem (Vicinity) (34.7%), and all districts in Gaza especially the North and the Middle.

Looking at this poll and previous CPRS polls, we are able to come to the following conclusions:

1. Fateh will face its strongest competition in Hebron.
2. The Gaza Strip, while polarized, the situation is both volatile and complex. The situation on the ground will be the decisive factor in determining the outcome of an elections.
3. In the West Bank, "Independents" and "Others" will play a major role in any elections.
4. Fateh might be able to draw on the support of Nationalist Independents. Hamas, however, has the potential to attract the votes of Islamic Independents, Palestinians who say that they will not vote for any of the political groups, and those who refused to participate in the poll. This lead us to say that support for Hamas might be higher than 13.9%.

### Palestinian Elections and the Cairo-Agreement

1. On 9/2/1994, a Palestinian-Israeli agreement was signed concerning borders, security, and roads (the Cairo Agreement). After hearing about this agreement, has your position concerning the DOP changed.

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
a) My support of the DOP has increased	11.8%	11.2%	12.9%
b) My support for the DOP has decreased	12.8%	13.1%	12.3%
c) My position has not changed, I still support the DOP	28.4%	29.5%	26.2%
d) My position has not changed, I am still against the DOP.	27.5%	28.4%	25.8%
e) I am not sure (because I don't have enough information on the Cairo Agreement).	19.5%	17.8%	22.8%

2. Taking into consideration the political and economic conditions

facing the country (the occupied territories) and the current Palestinian

- Israeli negotiations, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

a) Optimistic	39.0%	37.2%	42.4%
b) Pessimistic	36.7%	40.3%	29.9%
c) Not sure	24.3%	22.5%	27.7%

3. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose members of the

"Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing

Authority?

a) Appointment by PLO leadership	15.3%	14.3%	17.2%
b) Appointment by political groups	07.7%	08.5%	06.2%
c) Political elections	71.3%	72.2%	69.7%
d) Others	05.7%	05.0%	06.9%

4. Will you participate in the elections for the "Palestinian

Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a) Yes	66.7%	67.8%	64.7%
b) No	17.5%	17.2%	18.2%
c) Not sure	15.8%	15.0%	17.1%

5. Do you think that the public election for selecting the Council

for the Palestinian Interim Self-governing Authority will be fair?

a) Yes	38.5%	41.0%	33.7%
b) No	21.2%	22.0%	19.6%
c) Not sure	40.3%	37.0%	46.7%

6. If elections were held today, you would vote for candidates affiliated

with:

a) PFLP	06.1%	05.5%	07.2%
b) Feda	02.2%	02.6%	01.3%
c) Hamas	13.9%	12.2%	17.1%
d) DFLP	01.4%	01.6%	01.0%
e) Fateh	41.6%	40.3%	44.0%
f) Islamic Jihad	03.2%	03.2%	03.1%
g) Hisb Al-Sha'b	02.3%	02.3%	02.4%
h) Islamic Independents	06.4%	07.3%	04.7%
i) Nationalist Independents	11.4%	12.6%	09.0%
j) Other organizations (Specify)	02.1%	02.3%	01.9%
k) No one	09.4%	10.1%	08.3%

#### RESULTS BY PARTY AFFILIATION

1. On 9/2/1994, a Palestinian-Israeli agreement was signed concerning borders, security, and roads (the Cairo Agreement). After hearing about this agreement, has your position concerning the DOP changed?

Party	Increased support	Decreased support	No change, supporting	No change, opposing	Not sure
PFLP	3.4	9.2	5.0	79.0	3.4
Feda	20.9	9.2	55.7	2.3	11.7
Hamas	3.3	10.4	8.5	66.3	11.5
DFLP	--	18.5	18.5	55.6	7.4
Fateh	21.7	9.5	45.6	5.6	17.6
Islamic Jihad	6.7	8.3	3.3	56.7	25.0
Hizb el-Sha'b	9.2	20.9	44.2	9.2	17.2

Islamic Inds.	4.0	20.6	12.7	29.4	33.3
Nationalist Inds.	4.6	24.2	21.5	16.0	33.7
Others	9.8	19.5	24.4	31.7	14.6
No one	2.7	12.6	14.7	41.3	27.7

**2. Taking into consideration the political and economic conditions**

**facing the country (the occupied territories) and the current Palestinian**

**- Israeli negotiations, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?**

Party	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Not sure
PFLP	10.0	69.2	20.8
Feda	55.8	18.6	25.6
Hamas	14.0	64.3	21.7
DFLP	7.1	67.9	25.0
Fateh	65.6	14.5	19.9
Islamic Jihad	11.3	69.4	19.3
Hizb el-Sha'b	52.2	24.4	22.3
Islamic Independents	19.8	46.0	34.2
Nationalist Inds.	24.3	38.7	37.0
Others	29.3	41.5	29.2
No one	17.9	53.3	28.8

**3. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose members of the**

**"Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian interim Self-Governing**

**Authority?**

Party	Appointment by PLO Leadership	Appointment by Political Groups	Political Election	Other
PFLP	3.3	14.2	80.0	2.5
Feda	26.8	12.2	61.0	---
Hamas	4.1	13.0	72.5	10.4
DFLP	11.1	29.6	55.6	3.7
Fateh	30.2	4.5	23.7	1.6
Islamic Jihad	1.6	26.2	62.3	9.9
Hizb el-Sha'b	16.3	11.6	69.8	2.3
Islamic Inds.	2.4	6.5	86.3	4.8
Nationalist Inds.	3.2	3.2	90.4	3.2
Others	2.4	2.4	82.9	12.3
No one	3.9	6.1	70.0	20.0

**4. Will you participate in the elections for the "Palestinian**

**Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?**

Party	Yes	No	Not Sure
PFLP	28.2	40.8	20.9
Feda	92.0	---	7.0
Hamas	47.1	31.6	21.3

DFLP	50.0	25.0	25.0
Fateh	85.7	5.9	8.4
Islamic Jihad	53.2	30.6	16.2
Hizb el-Sha'b	82.6	4.3	13.1
Islamic Inds.	56.5	13.7	29.8
Nationalist Inds.	70.7	7.2	22.1
Others	61.0	19.5	19.5
No one	30.3	48.6	21.1

**5. Do you think that the public election for selecting the Council for the Palestinian Interim Self- governing Authority will be fair?**

Party	Yes	No	Not Sure
PFLP	13.3	47.5	39.2
Feda	60.5	9.3	30.2
Hamas	16.9	39.7	43.4
DFLP	25.0	35.7	39.3
Fateh	62.0	7.6	30.2
Islamic Jihad	18.0	37.7	44.3
Hizb el-Sha'b	37.8	8.9	53.3
Islamic Inds.	26.2	17.5	56.3
Nationalist Inds.	27.5	11.7	60.8
Others	25.0	32.5	42.5
No one	12.4	44.3	43.3

**VIEW OF THE FUTURE**

**With regard to Education:**

**2. Taking into consideration the political and economic conditions facing the country (the occupied territories) and the current Palestinian - Israeli negotiations, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?**

	Elementary	Tawjihi	2 - year College	B.A./B.S.	M.A./M.S PhD
Optimistic	45.6	41.1	33.5	32.4	47.8
Pessimistic	32.3	26.0	38.8	41.1	34.8
Not Sure	22.1	22.9	27.7	26.5	17.4

**With regard to Employment:**

	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Not Sure
Students	41.8	25.2	22.0
Laborers	29.2	29.8	20.9
Housewives	41.2	29.4	29.4
Employees	33.7	40.6	35.7
Merchants	40.0	26.2	23.8
Farmers	55.6	8.2	26.1
Craftsmen	29.1	40.7	20.2



