

# Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

## Public Opinion Poll NO (9)

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### **The Palestinian-Israeli Agreement, the Palestinian National Authority, and Elections**

May 31, 1994

This is the ninth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. This poll focuses on elections, the Palestinian-Israeli agreement concerning Gaza and Jericho signed in Cairo on May 4, and concerns of Palestinians in the interim period, especially concerning the Palestinian police, the rights of women, and the Palestinian authority. SRU conducts a monthly public opinion poll to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. The poll results are published independently and with unit analysis in both Arabic and English. They provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, SRU strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.

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### General Background

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This poll was conducted on Tuesday, May 31, 1994. It was conducted later in the month than usual for two reasons. First, the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, which occurred on May 21st, necessitated postponing the poll until the last week of May. Also, CPRS was hosting expert consultants from the United States who were to help develop the polling unit and needed to monitor the data collection process. The exact date was chosen, therefore, to enable all of the consultants to monitor the fieldwork and make their suggestions for improving the methodology.

The poll was conducted in the month immediately following the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement concerning Gaza and Jericho in Cairo on May 4, 1994, and thus was during the first stage of the implementation for this agreement, which included the following steps:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from population centers in the Gaza Strip and Jericho region, and their redeployment to agreed upon locations, including the borders of the Palestinian autonomous regions, settlements, and main roads in the Gaza Strip and Jericho region.
2. Entrance of the Palestinian police into the areas of Gaza and Jericho, who were received by the Palestinian people, regardless of political affiliation, with euphoric welcome.
3. Release of several hundred Palestinian prisoners

4. Initial preparations to establish the Palestinian administrative infrastructure to replace the Israeli Civil Administration in the autonomous regions and the initial formation of the Palestinian national authority.
5. Announcement of the names of some individuals appointed to the Palestinian national authority, including some individuals from inside the West Bank and Gaza and some from the Diaspora.
6. Numerous questions in the Palestinian community regarding the Palestinian authority and Palestinian society on issues of democracy and human rights, the rights of women and their political participation, and general civil and political rights.

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## Methodology

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The questionnaire was designed through consultations with local and international experts. A new method to validate the survey instrument with this poll was a more systematic pre-test. Fifty draft questionnaires were distributed to fieldworkers to conduct random interviews to assess the validity of the questionnaire instrument. Another twenty questionnaires were distributed to experts to evaluate the questions. The questionnaire was then revised according to the recommendations and problems encountered during the pre-test.

### **Polling Districts**

In order to identify political positions throughout the Occupied Territories and to improve the credibility of the sample, the West Bank was divided into eight polling areas (Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, Jericho, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron) which were in turn divided into eighteen polling districts. During this poll, Gaza was divided into six polling areas instead of three to reflect the new method for sample selection, which was to choose locations by random and then select random samples within those chosen locations. CPRS created a list of all locations in Gaza. A random sample was selected from lists that divided the locations according to population size, type of location (city, camp, village) and degree of development.

The sample that we attained through this system of division enabled us to understand political positions and voting patterns in :

1. The Occupied Territories as a whole (West Bank and Gaza)
2. The West Bank and Gaza separately
3. Polling areas separately
4. Polling districts separately

We received 1974 questionnaires from the West Bank and Gaza, of which 1290 are from the West Bank and 684 are from Gaza. Despite the limitations of the division utilized, it promotes the random nature and representation of the sample.

## Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Area of Residence				Following the News			
West Bank "including Jerusalem" & Gaza Strip	65.3%  34.7%	City Town Village Refugee Camps	39.2% 12.7% 20.6% 27.5	Always Often Sometimes Never	38.7% 29.5% 29.4% 02.4%		
Age		Sex		Education			
18-22 23-26 27-30 31-35 36-42 43-50 51+	21.2% 20.6% 18.8% 13.8% 10.7% 08.7% 06.2%	Males Females	66.2% 33.8%	Up to 9 years (elem./prep) Up to 12 years (Tawjihi) 2 year College University (BA) MA + Phd.	24.0% 38.0% 15.9% 29.4% 1.6%		
Refugee Status		Marital Status		Area		Occupation	
Ref. NonRef.	47.9 52.1	Single Married Divorced & Widowed	35.6% 62.7% 01.7%	Nablus Tulkarem Jenin Jericho Ramallah Hebron Bethlehem Jerusalem Gaza A Gaza B Gaza C Gaza D Gaza E Gaza F	10.3 08.3 08.2 02.0 10.5 12.3 06.6 07.0 09.1 05.3 05.4 04.0 03.6 07.4	Laborers Merchants Craftsmen Students Housewives Farmers Employees* Specialists** Unemployed Retired	13.34% 09.5% 13.7% 11.8% 14.5% 02.0% 20.9% 05.6% 08.7% 00.0%

\* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

\*\* Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

\*\*\*A new question for the demographic section as an initial attempt to measure information access and basis for Palestinian opinions.

\*\*\*\*Gaza A) Jabalyia, al-Nazla; B) Rimal; C) al-Zaytoun, Sabra; D) Deir Balah, Bureij; E) Khan Younis Area; F) Rafah.

## Data Collection

To complete the data collection process, the choice of interview stations was based on our previous experience in the last eight polls. To ensure the representation of Palestinians in all districts, the focus was on areas that attracted villagers and refugee camp residents. Data collectors carried with them an exhaustive list of villages and refugee camps in each district. This allowed them to reach their target sample as efficiently as possible.

In the Gaza Strip, field workers visited randomly selected towns, villages, and refugee camps. Here, around 50% of the interviews were conducted in households to ensure the representation of women. The rest of the interviews were conducted in public places.

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on sampling techniques, survey methods, scientific research,

and field work. Three special training seminars were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers. On Thursday, May 26, a session was held at Bir Zeit University for the Ramallah area fieldworkers, which consisted of a lecture by Dr. Mark Tessler, author of *The Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World*, and a general discussion among the fieldworkers regarding methodology and specific difficulties encountered in the interviewing process. On Friday, May 27, a similar session was held in Gaza for the Gaza Strip fieldworkers. On Monday, May 30, another training session was held in Nablus, which was videotaped for use in further courses and training programs on scientific methods and public opinion polling. In addition, CPRS hosted two international experts from Canada and the United States, Fouad Mugarbi and Elia Zuraik (of Palestinian origin). They assisted in assessing problems facing polling in the West Bank and Gaza, which helped CPRS researchers to further develop the polling process.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. During this poll, the monitors in the Nablus and Tulkarm region were accompanied by expert consultants from the United States: Dr. Mark Tessler, Dr. David Pollock, and Roz Tartaglione. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. All interviews took place on the same day and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 35) to allow for careful interviewing. In general, the public forum of interviews contributed to a 10% non-response rate which was not included in the sample. A large number of non-respondents were women not accustomed to talking to strangers in public places, probably due to cultural constraints. Some non-respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political affiliation out of fear or ambivalence.

Researchers were instructed to refrain from the following:

1. Conducting interviews in public institutions such as trade unions, offices of political parties, women and student organizations, government offices, etc.
2. Interviewing their acquaintances and giving questionnaires to a group of acquaintances.
3. Conducting multiple interviews at the same time.
4. Interfering with the respondents' answers even if they seemed "illogical." If asked to explain a vague item, they must refer to a standard definition provided to them by CPRS. Otherwise, they must leave it up to the respondent to interpret the ambiguity.
5. Interviewing volunteers instead of following the prescribed numerical system.
6. Offering their own opinion on the issues under question to the respondents or anyone else during polling hours.
7. Changing interview stations, except in cases of interviewing drawing a crowd or circumstances in the interviewing area endangering the safety of the fieldworker (in which cases fieldworkers move to a safe location and phone CPRS or their coordinator for instructions).

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## Coding and Data Analysis

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The coding system was adjusted during this poll to prevent a loss of information that could form the basis for analysis. Ages were listed as raw data so that SPU analysts could assess the validity of their previous age category divisions and possibly reconstruct these divisions to reflect more accurately the actual difference in attitudes among age groups. Also, places of residence were entered by name rather than just by type, as was the previous practice, in order to record more information for possible later analysis. **The present poll shows that respondents came from 264 villages, towns, cities, and refugee camps.**

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%, and the confidence level is higher than 95%.

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### Remarks

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#### Evaluation of the Cairo Agreement

Palestinians were asked about their evaluation of the Palestinian-Israeli Agreement signed in Cairo on May 4, 1994. A total of 39.6% said that the agreement was "excellent" or "good." Another 17.7% evaluated the agreement as "fair." In contrast, 39.2% of the Palestinians surveyed in the West Bank and Gaza felt that the agreement was "inadequate" or "bad."

In this regard, we notice a difference between the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, 34.4% of respondents said that the agreement is "excellent" or "good." Another 17.1% said that it is "fair" and a total of 45.4% indicated that the agreement is "inadequate" or "bad." In the Gaza Strip, however, 27.3% placed the agreement on the negative side of the scale by describing it as "inadequate" or "bad." The results for Gaza are similar to those in Jericho where 27.5% said that the agreement is "inadequate" or "bad." This can be compared with Hebron and Nablus where 46.9% and 44.9% of the respondents respectively viewed the agreement in a negative manner.

Views of the agreement are correlated with political affiliation where the majority of the opposition sympathizers gave the agreement failing grades ("inadequate" or "bad") and the majority of Fateh and Feda sympathizers gave the agreement passing grades ("excellent" or "good"). Only 20% of Hizb al-Sha'b supporters evaluated the agreement as "excellent" or "good." A total of 30.4% of the supporters of nationalist independents felt that the agreement is "excellent" or "good," with an additional 25.9% evaluating it as "fair." (See Table 1)

#### Table 1.

#### Evaluation of the Gaza-Jericho First Cairo Agreement by Political Affiliation

	Excellent %	Good %	Fair %	Inadequate %	Bad %	Not Sure %
PFLP	---	5.7	12.2	32.5	45.5	4.1
DFLP	---	9.4	3.1	34.4	46.9	6.2
Hamas	4.8	7.4	14.4	26.2	46.3	0.9
I. Jihad	3.4	17.2	13.8	24.1	37.9	3.6

Fateh	25.2	40.4	18.1	11.5	2.4	2.4
Feda	8.0	64.0	24.0	4.0	---	---
Hizb al-Sha'b	4.0	16.0	40.0	36.0	4.0	---
I. ind.	1.1	17.2	13.8	31.0	28.7	8.2
Nat'l ind.	9.5	20.9	25.9	30.3	10.0	3.4
Other	9.8	13.7	23.5	27.5	17.6	7.9
No one	5.9	17.2	17.7	29.6	22.7	6.9

The poll shows an inverse relationship between educational attainment and evaluation of the agreement. A total of 44.4% of those with 9 years of education or less said that the agreement is "excellent" or "good" compared with 30.8% of those with university degrees.

### **Palestinian National Authority (PNA)**

The results of the poll indicate that Palestinians tend to view the list of individuals appointed to the PNA in a negative manner. A total of 49.6% of Palestinians said that they are not satisfied with the appointees or that they are only satisfied with a few of them. The poll shows that dissatisfaction with the list of appointees is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza. A total of 27.1% in the West Bank said that they are dissatisfied with the list, compared with 17.3% in Gaza.

Views of the list of appointees to the PNA are correlated with education. Dissatisfaction with the list is highest among university graduates where it reaches 60.5% (See Table 2). One group that is most supportive of the list is "housewives", which is a relatively less educated group. A total of 46.1% of them said that they are either satisfied with the complete list or with the majority of appointees.

**Table 2**

### **Relationship Between Education and Satisfaction with Appointees List**

	Satisfied	Satisfied with most	Satisfied with a few	Not Satisfied	Don't Know
Less than 9 years	25.6	17.8	22.0	18.8	15.8
Tawjihi	18.3	21.8	25.7	21.6	13.5
2-Year College	14.1	18.5	29.9	23.8	13.7
University	10.7	20.7	28.8	31.7	8.1
Advanced Degree	10.0	30.0	26.7	13.3	20.0

It is interesting to find that while the majority of Fateh supporters are satisfied with the list of appointees to the PNA, a sizable minority (29.3%) are dissatisfied.

### **Future Outlook**

The initial implementation of the Gaza-Jericho First agreement led to a degree of optimism in the Occupied Territories. A total of 29.5% of Palestinians declared that they are optimistic and another 36.9% said that they are somewhat optimistic. Consistent with our previous polls, we find a difference between the West Bank and Gaza. While 41.9% of Gazans showed an optimistic outlook, only 22.9% of West Bankers felt the same way. The higher rate of optimism in Gaza may be due to a number of factors, including the following:

1. The initial implementation of the agreement and the withdrawal of the Israeli military to the agreed-upon locations. The arrival of the Palestinian police and their reunion with their families led to a general mood of optimism. In addition, the release of hundreds of political prisoners called for celebrations in the streets of Gaza. The same can be said about Jericho, where optimism is even higher than in Gaza.
2. Future outlook is correlated by political affiliation. Fateh supporters are most optimistic. These supporters can be found in Gaza more than in the West Bank.
3. The poll shows a correlation between education and occupation on the one hand and future outlook on the other hand. Optimism decreases with higher education. Housewives, relatively less educated than other groups, are more optimistic. This group is represented in the Gaza sample more than in the West Bank sample.

## **Palestinian Concerns**

Palestinians were asked to evaluate the importance of a number of relevant issues. The poll shows that their primary concern is with unemployment and the present economic living conditions. A total of 86.2% of Palestinians felt that unemployment is a very important issue. Their second choice is related to the possible inability of the PNA to keep law and public order, with 66.7% stating that this is a very important concern. Palestinians are also concerned with the possibility of the PNA oppressing the opposition. A total of 54.8% said that this is a very important concern, and another 20.6% said that it is somewhat important. Concerning the possibility of competition between the "inside" and the returnees, 44.7% of Palestinians surveyed stated that it is a very important concern. This is followed by a concern with Palestinian women losing rights and opportunities under the PNA, with 41.2% declaring that this is a very important concern.

In relation to the issue of women's rights and opportunities, 43% of Palestinians surveyed expected that rights and opportunities for Palestinian women will increase under Palestinian authority. Only 11.3% expected that women's rights will deteriorate and another 27.3% expected that the situation will not change. We find no difference between the expectations of women and those of men in this regard. However, a wide gap exists between Gaza and the West Bank, where only 35.1% of West Bankers feel that the situation will improve, compared with 57.6% in Gaza. This may be a reflection of the recent political changes in Gaza where a Palestinian authority is expected to take charge of the general situation and create laws that will protect women's rights. This is in contrast to the years of the intifada where different political groups in Gaza placed a number of constraints on women's movements, dress, and general participation. The results may also be an indication of the way the PNA is politically perceived. Those in the opposition do not trust the PNA to make improvements in the general situation of women. The majority of those in supporting groups believe that women's rights will improve under a Palestinian authority.

## **The Future of the West Bank**

Palestinians were asked about their expectations of the future of the West Bank in relation to the PNA. Only 13.1% expected that the rest of the West Bank will join Gaza and Jericho under a Palestinian authority within a few months. A total of 20% expected that this would take place in less than three years, another 25.4% of Palestinians surveyed expected that this will only take place in three years or more, and another 22.4% expected that Palestinian authority will not be extended over the rest of the West Bank.

The results could be an indication that Palestinians are misinformed about the agreement, which states that elections, dissolution of the civil administration, withdrawal of the military government, and the redeployment of the Israeli army outside populated areas in the rest of the west Bank should take place no later than nine months after the DoP enters into force. The DoP entered into force on October 13, 1993. However, one might argue that the responses presented here are expressing the actual expectations of Palestinians, where the negotiation process left many Palestinians doubtful about the seriousness of Israel in implementing the agreements and about the ability of the PLO to press Israel into that.

**Table 3**

**Relationship Between Following News and Expectations of West Bank Future**

	Soon (weeks or months) %	Less than 3 Years %	3 Years or More %	Never %	Don't Know %
Always	15.8	23.3	24.5	20.4	16.0
Often	8.6	19.4	26.0	25.4	20.6
Sometimes	14.7	17.5	27.8	21.0	20.0
Never	10.6	8.5	17.0	25.5	38.4

Table 3 demonstrates that whether Palestinians follow the news or not really has no bearing on their expectations regarding the future of the West Bank. Again, it is not clear from this information alone whether Palestinians are aware of the specific terms of the agreement in this regard or not. There are three factors at work in this question: whether Palestinians receive and understand the news or not, whether the news media actually present accurate information or not, and whether Palestinians formulate their expectations because of or in spite of the information they receive.

**Palestinian Police and Security Forces**

The majority of respondents (50.6%) believe that the Palestinian police will treat all Palestinians equally. Only 16.8% felt that the police will oppress the Palestinian opposition. The difference between the West Bank and Gaza is further affirmed here where 61.4% of Gazans felt that the police will be fair and only 44.8% of West Bankers felt the same way.

In Gaza, the Palestinian police is visible and trying to bring public order to the streets. The need for immediate stability in Gaza resulted in a hope for harmony between the police and all political groups. Gazans witnessed a warm welcome for the police by all groups, including Hamas, where 33.5% of its supporters in the West Bank and Gaza felt that the Palestinian police will treat all Palestinians equally (See Table 4). Among Hamas supporters in Gaza, there was a major shift in attitudes towards the police. In December, 53% of Gaza Hamas supporters said that the police will oppress the opposition. This is compared with 12.3% this month. The arrival of the Palestinian police and the welcome they received even from opposition group supporters might have led Gazans to be optimistic about the role of the police. It is also important to note that most policemen arriving in Gaza have a large number of family members living there. The results may also be expressions of fear and hope about the future of Palestinian society.

**Table 4**

**Relationship Between Political Affiliation and Perception of Palestinian Police and PNA**





Nablu	5.6	---	14.6	3.5	45.5	0.5	0.5	3.5	11.1	
2.0	13.2									
T'lkrm	1.9	2.5	13.2	---	46.5	0.6	0.6	7.5	12.6	
1.9	12.7									
Jenin	7.9	1.3	7.2	2.0	47.4	0.7	0.7	2.0	11.2	
3.3	16.3									
Jericho	5.0	5.0	20.0	2.5	50.0	---	2.5	2.5	12.5	--
-	---									
Ram.'h	8.1	2.0	9.1	2.0	35.0	3.0	1.0	3.0	20.3	
4.1	12.4									
Hebron	9.1	1.7	17.7	1.7	29.9	6.1	1.3	10.4	14.7	
1.3	6.1									
B'hem	9.9	2.7	12.6	3.6	47.7	3.6	3.6	5.4	7.2	
0.9	2.8									
J'salem	4.0	2.4	4.8	0.8	31.7	3.2	5.6	8.7	19.8	
5.6	13.4									
Gaza A	8.6	---	10.4	2.5	46.6	7.4	0.6	3.1	4.3	
3.1	13.4									
Gaza B	3.2	1.1	8.4	1.1	58.9	1.1	1.1	3.2	9.5	
4.2	7.2									
Gaza C	9.1	---	15.2	---	50.5	2.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	
7.1	10.1									
Gaza D	6.7	---	12.0	2.7	53.3	5.3	---	---	2.7	
1.3	16.0									
Gaza E	2.9	---	10.1	---	60.9	2.9	1.4	5.8	4.3	--
-	11.7									
Gaza F	6.3	1.4	17.4	0.7	51.4	4.2	0.7	2.1	3.5	
2.1	10.2									

## Appendix A

### 1. How would you evaluate the Palestinian-Israeli agreement concerning Gaza and Jericho signed in Cairo at the beginning of this month (May 4, 1994)?

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
a. Excellent	13.6%	10.7%	19.3%
b. Good	26.0%	23.7%	30.7%
c. Fair	17.7%	17.1%	19.0%
d. Inadequate	22.6%	24.1%	17.3%
e. Bad	17.6%	21.3%	10.0%
f. Not Sure	03.5%	03.1%	03.7%

### 2. Are you satisfied with the list of appointed members in the Palestinian National Interim Authority?

a. Yes, I'm satisfied	17.7%	15.4%	22.2%
b. I'm satisfied with most of them	19.9%	20.3%	19.4%
c. I'm satisfied with a few of them	26.1%	26.8%	25.1%
d. No, I'm not satisfied	23.5%	27.1%	17.3%
e. I don't know	12.8%	10.4%	16.0%

### 3. After the initial implementation of Gaza-Jericho First, I view the future with:

a. Optimism	29.5%	22.9%	41.9%
b. Optimism to a certain extent	36.9%	39.7%	31.8%
c. Pessimism	21.4%	25.8%	13.0%
d. Not sure	12.2%	11.6%	13.3%

### 4. At this stage, my most important concern in relation to internal Palestinian affairs is:

#### a. Lack of employment opportunities and a decrease in standard of living

1. very important	86.2%	84.3%	89.8%
2. important to a certain extent	09.5%	10.3%	07.9%
3. not important	02.8%	03.7%	01.0%
4. no opinion	01.5%	01.7%	01.3%

#### b. Possible repression of the opposition groups by Palestinian government and police

1. very important	54.8%	58.5%	47.7%
2. important to a certain extent	20.6%	20.4%	20.8%
3. not important	14.6%	13.1%	17.6%
4. no opinion	10.0%	08.0%	14.0%

**c. Chaos and the inability of the Palestinian authority to maintain control**

1. very important	66.7%	68.4%	63.6%
2. important to a certain extent	16.1%	15.4%	17.2%
3. not important	11.2%	10.6%	13.1%
4. no opinion	06.0%	06.0%	06.1%

**d. Competition between Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and those returning from the diaspora**

1. very important	44.7%	44.5%	45.2%
2. important to a certain extent	26.0%	26.6%	24.7%
3. not important	21.3%	21.9%	20.3%
4. no opinion	08.0%	07.0%	09.7%

**e. Loss of a large part of women's rights and opportunities under Palestinian control**

1. very important	41.2%	42.2%	39.4%
2. important to a certain extent	22.4%	23.0%	21.1%
3. not important	27.1%	26.0%	29.2%
4. no opinion	09.3%	08.8%	10.3%
5. Other (Specify)	05.1%	04.6%	06.1%

**5. When do you expect that the rest of the West Bank will join Gaza and Jericho under Palestinian authority?**

a. Very soon (in a few weeks or months)	13.1%	13.0%	13.2%
b. In less than three years	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%
c. After a number of years (three years or more).	25.4%	22.7%	30.6%
d. I don't think that Palestinian authority will be extended to the rest of the West Bank.	22.4%	26.2%	10.3%
e. I don't know	19.1%	18.1%	20.9%

**6. Under Palestinian authority, I think that Palestinian women's rights and opportunities within Palestinian society**

a. Will increase	43.0%	35.1%	57.6%
b. Will stay the same	27.3%	32.2%	18.2%
c. Will decrease	11.3%	14.0%	06.0%
d. I don't know	18.4%	18.7%	18.2%

**7. In relation to Palestinian police and security forces located in Gaza and Jericho,**

a. I think that they will treat all Palestinians equally.	50.6%	44.8%	61.4%
b. I think that they will oppress Palestinian opposition.	16.8%	20.7%	09.6%
c. Not sure	26.7%	28.9%	22.7%
d. Other (specify)	05.9%	05.6%	06.3%

**8. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?**

a. Appointment by PLO leadership	13.0%	11.8%	15.3%
b. Appointment by political groups on a quota basis.	04.5%	04.2%	05.1%
c. Political Elections	79.9%	81.2%	77.2%
d. Other	02.6%	02.8%	02.4%

**9. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?**

a. Yes	71.6%	70.2%	74.1%
b. No	15.7%	16.7%	13.9%
c. Not sure	12.7%	13.1%	12.0%

**10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:**

a. PFLP	06.6%	06.7%	06.5%
b. Feda	01.3%	01.8%	00.5%
c. Hamas	12.3%	12.2%	12.6%
d. DFLP	01.7%	02.0%	01.2%
e. Fateh	44.4%	40.1%	52.4%
f. Islamic Jihad	03.1%	02.6%	04.2%
g. Hizb al-Sha'b	01.3%	01.6%	00.8%
h. Islamic independents	04.7%	05.8%	02.6%
i. Nationalist independents	10.8%	14.1%	04.7%
j. Other (specify)	02.7%	02.6%	03.1%
k. None of the above	11.1%	10.5%	11.4%

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## Appendix B

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### **Polling Districts**

#### **The West Bank**

The West Bank was divided into 8 areas and 18 polling districts as follows:

District	Population size **	Sample size
Nablus city	85,375	86
Nablus East	81,995	40
Nablus West	63,638	78
Nablus Total	230,998	204

District	Population size	Sample size
Tulkarm (North)	105,699	88
Tulkarm (South)	96,738	75
Tulkarm Total	202,432	163

District	Population size	Sample size
Jenin (East)	96,721	82
Jenin (West)	100,490	80
Jenin Total	197,211	162

District	Population size	Sample size
Jericho	25,957	40

District	Population size	Sample size
Ramallah (North)	76,983	66
Ramallah (South)	77,533	58
Ramallah (City)	75,178	84
Ramallah Total	229,694	208

District	Population size	Sample size
Hebron (North)	82,947	84
Hebron (South)	80,073	75
Hebron (City)	96,545	84
Hebron Total	259,565	243

District	Population size	Sample size
Bethlehem (City)	68,646	65
Bethlehem (Vicinity)	70,273	66

Bethlehem Total	138,919	131
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District	Population size	Sample size
Jerusalem (Vicinity)	83,580	75
Jerusalem (City)	81,370	74
Jerusalem Total	165,310	139

\* (a complete list of villages and camps included in each district may be obtained from CPRS.)

**The Gaza Strip**

The Gaza Strip was divided into 6 polling districts as shown below:

District	Population size	Sample size**	Sample Distribution
Gaza A	141,915	179	Jabalyia Camp, Jabalyia Village, al-Nazla
Gaza B	150,000	105	Rimal
Gaza C	151,000	106	Zaytoun, Sabra
Gaza D	116,600	78	Deir al-Balah Camp, Deir al-Balah, Bureij
Gaza E	140,514	68	Khan Younis City, Abbasan al-Kabir
Gaza F	102,346	148	Rafah Camp

\* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by *Palestinian Population Handbook* (Jerusalem: Planning and Research Center, 1993).

\*\* The sample distribution in Gaza was based on the population distribution among refugee camps, cities, and villages and not on the basis of population size in the various regions.

\*\*\* In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting patterns in each one of these areas according to place of residence (city, village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.