The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. The center engages in several activities. It conducts academic and policy analysis studies. It organizes socio-political surveys and public opinion polls on current Palestinian political and social attitudes. It sponsors study groups and task forces on issues of critical importance to the Palestinians. Finally, it organizes conferences, public lectures, and briefings on current public policy issues. PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas.

This poll is part of PSR series of regular polls.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah and Jerusalem

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PRESS RELEASE

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2014

Following the war in Gaza, mutual threat perceptions are very high while Palestinian and Israeli support for the two-state solution and willingness to compromise go down

7-12 December 2014

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

- Following the war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 50% of Israelis and 38% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. These results are lower than the figures in December 2013 when 54% of the Israelis and 46% of the Palestinians supported the package.

- Given the Gaza war and the increasing tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank, 47% of Israelis and 36% of Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations: 39% of the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place; 8% of the Israelis and 10% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks. By contrast, in June 2014, 28% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place and 7% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.

- At the same time - consistent with previous results - each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 37% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.
The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 3 and 6, 2014. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 616 adult Israelis interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 7 and 12, 2014. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Department of Communication, and Director of the Swiss Center for Conflict Research, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki, at email pepsr@pepsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) Conflict management and threat perceptions

- Following the war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 and the increasing tensions in Jerusalem and the West Bank, we asked both sides about their expectations for the future: 7% of the Israelis and 24% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations. 32% of the Israelis and 37% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will take place. 39% of the Israelis and 26% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place. Finally, 8% of the Israelis and 10% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks. In June 2014, 28% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place and 7% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians thought that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.

- Among Israelis, 62% are worried and 36% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians, 82% are worried and 19% are not worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.

- The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 16% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part (6%) or all (10%) of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 33% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain all (17%) or some (16%) of the territories conquered in 1967.

- At the same time: 11% of the Israelis say the aspirations of Israel are to withdraw to the 1967 borders after guaranteeing Israel’s security. 32% say the aspirations of Israel in the long run are to withdraw from parts of the territories after guaranteeing Israel’s security. 18% say they are to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there. 13% say the aspirations of Israel in the long run are to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there.

- Among the Palestinians 38% say that the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are to regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war. 31% say the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority in the long run are to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war. 14% say they are to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine. 12% say the aspirations of
the Palestinian Authority in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.

(B) Attitudes, perceptions and expectations regarding a permanent settlement

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues regularly since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues, amidst a turbulent Middle East and the recent war in Gaza.

- 50% of Israelis and 38% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. The results are lower than the figures in December 2013 (54% support among Israelis and 46% support among Palestinians).
- Since 2003, we observed only once majority support for such a settlement on both sides: in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat. The level of support then was 64% among Israelis and 54% among Palestinians.

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton / Geneva permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 45% support or strongly support and 54% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2013, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 52% and opposition at 48%.

Among Israelis 41% support and 47% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2013, 44% of the Israelis supported this component while 48% opposed it.

(2) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2013 28% support and opposition reached 71%.
This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians, as in previous polls. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

**Among Israelis** 59% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 60% support and 33% opposition obtained in December 2013.

### (3) Jerusalem

**Among Palestinians** 29% support and 71% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2013, an identical compromise obtained 32% support and 68% opposition.

**Among Israelis**, 32% support and 59% oppose an arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2013, similarly, 37% supported this arrangement and 56% opposed it.

### (4) Refugees

**Among Palestinians** 40% support and 58% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2013, 46% agreed with an identical compromise while 52% opposed it.

**Among Israelis** 36% support such an arrangement and 48% oppose it. In December 2013, 39% supported it and 50% opposed.

### (5) End of Conflict

**In the Palestinian public** 61% support and 37% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2013, 63% supported and 36% opposed this item.

**In the Israeli public** 64% support and 27% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2013, similarly, 66% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

### (6) Security Arrangements
In the Palestinian public 46% support and 53% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In comparison, in December 2013, 52% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 48% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 49% support and 37% oppose this arrangement compared to 52% who supported it and 39% who opposed it in December 2012.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 38% support and 60% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2013, 46% supported and 53% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 50% support and 40% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2013, 54% supported and 37% opposed such a package.

We asked the Palestinians who opposed the full package how they would react if Israel, as part of the permanent peace package, also accepted the Arab Peace Initiative and the Arab states supported in return the peace treaty. 23% said they would in this case change their mind and accept the full package and 68% said they would not change their mind.

(C) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Saudi Plan

- 27% of the Israelis and 43% of the Palestinians support the Saudi peace plan, 63% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians oppose it. In June 2014, 29% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi peace plan, 64% of the Israelis and 46% of the Palestinians opposed it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

- Dismantling settlements - 42% of the Israelis support and 50% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

- 58% of Israelis and 48% of Palestinians support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution and 37% of Israelis and 51% of Palestinians oppose it. In June 2014, 62% of Israelis supported a two-state solution and 34% opposed it; 54% of Palestinians supported it and 46% opposed it.
Mutual Recognition - As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 54% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 36% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 39% support and 60% oppose this step. In June 2014, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll, 52% of the Israeli public supported such a mutual recognition and 38% opposed it. Among Palestinians, 40% supported and 59% opposed this step.