Table of Contents:

1. For Polls conducted between 1993-2000: Please visit CPRS Polls .
   
   
2. PSR Index of Polls: Polls conducted since the year 2000:
   Palestinian Public Opinion Polls:



• Poll #1: Camp David Summit, Chances for Reconciliation and Lasting Peace, Violence and Confrontations, Hierarchies of Priorities, and Domestic Politics 27-29 July 2000


Poll #2: The Mitchell Report, Cease Fire, and Return to Negotiations; Intifada and Armed Confrontations; Chances for Reconciliation; and, Internal Palestinian Conditions 5-9 July 2001


• Poll #3 :Palestinians Support The Ceasefire, Negotiations, And Reconciliation Between The Two Peoples But A Majority Opposes Arrests And Believe That Armed Confrontations Have Helped Achieve National Rights, 19-24 December 2001



• Poll #4 :Palestinians Give Less Support For Bombings Inside Israel While Two Thirds Support The Saudi Plan And 91% Support Reforming The Pa, But A Majority Opposes Arrests And Opposes The Agreements That Led To Ending The Siege On Arafat's Headquarter, Nativity Church, And Preventive Security Headquarter 15-18 May 2002



• Poll #5 : While Sharply Divided Over The Ceasefire And Bombing Attacks Against Civilians, An Overwhelming Majority Supports Political Reform But Have Doubts About The Pa's Intentions To Implement It. 18-21 August 2002 - (Pressrelease)



• Poll #6 : While Indicating Important Shifts In Palestinian Public Attitudes Toward The Intifada And The Peace Process, Psr Poll Shows Significant Support For The Appointment Of A Prime Minister And Refusal To Give Confidence In The New Palestinian Government. 14-22 November 2002 - (Press Release)



• Poll #7 :Appointment of Prime Minister, Political Reform, Roadmap, War in Iraq, Arafat's Popularity, and Political Affiliation. 03-07 April 2003 - (Press Release)



• Poll #8 : While Support For Abu Mazin Drops, Support For A Ceasefire Increases With A Majority Supporting Ending The Armed Intifada And Agreeing To A Mutual Recognition Of Israel As The State Of The Jewish People And Palestine As The State Of The Palestinian People. 19-22 June 2003 - (Press Release) and (Joint Palestinian-Israeli Press Release)



• PSR Polls on Palestinian Refugees: Results Of PSR Refugees' Polls In The West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan And Lebanon On Refugees' Preferences And Behavior In A Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement. January - June 2003



• Poll #9 : With Arafat's Populairty Reaching Its Highest Level In Five Years, Three Quarters Of The Palestinians Support The Maxim Resturant Suicide Bombing And Two Thirds Believe The Roadmap Is Dead. Nonetheless, An Overwhelming Majority Of 85% Supports Mutual Cessation Of Violence, Two Thirds Support Return To Hudna, And 59% Support Taking Measures Against Those Who Would Violate A Ceasefire. 07-14 October 2003 - (Press Release)
• Poll In PDF Format.


• Poll #10 : While A Majority Opposes The Geneva Document, Palestinian Attitudes Vary Regarding Its Core Components: A Large Majority Opposes The Refugee Solution And The Restrictions On Palestinian Sovereignty, But A Majority Endorses Equal Territorial Swaps And The Deployment Of A Multinational Force 04-09 December 03 - (Press Release) and (joint Palestinian Israeli press release).
  • Poll In PDF Format.
  
  
• Poll #11 : While Three Quarters Of The Palestinians Welcome Sharon's Plan Of Withdrawal From Gaza And While Two Thirds See It As Victory For Armed Struggle Against Occupation, 58% Of The Palestinians Prefer To See The Palestinian Atuhority And Israel Negotiate The Withdrawal Plan And 61% Believe Sharon Is Not Serious And Will Not Withdraw 14-17 March 2004 - (Press Release)
  • Poll In PDF Format.


• Poll #12 : In The Context Of The Sharon Disengagement Plan, Wide Support For The Egyptian Initiative And For Various Forms Of International Presence, But Ending Armed Attacks From The Gaza Strip Is Contingent On A Full Israeli Withdrawal From It 24-27 June 2004 - (Press Release) and (joint Palestinian Israeli press release).
  • Poll In PDF Format.
  
  
• Poll #13 : After Four Years Of Intifada, An Overwhelming Sense Of Insecurity Prevails Among Palestinians Leading To High Level Of Support For Bombing And Rocket Attacks On One Hand And To High Levles Of Demand For Mutual Cessation Of Violence And Questioning Of The Effectivness Of Armed Attacks On The Other 23-26 September 2004 - (Press Release).
  • Poll In PDF Format.
  
  
• Poll #14 : In an environment of increased realism and hope, in which the popularity of Fateh greatly increases while that of Hamas decreases, a close presidential race between Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) and Marwan Barghouti 01-05 December 2004 - Press Release of overall survey Or (Press Release on Elections - Rleased December 6th).
  
  • The joint Palestinian - Israeli press release.
  • Poll In PDF Format.
  
  
• Special Poll - Pre Elections:
  • One Week Before Palestinian Presidential Elections:65% for Mahmud Abbas and 22% for Mustafa Barghouti. (Press release) 31 Dec.04 - 2 January 2005
  
  
  • In the Post Arafat Era, Palestinians are More Willing to Compromise: For the First Time Majority Support for Clinton's Permanent Status Settlement Package.30 and 31 December 2004
  
  


• Special Poll - Results of PSR Exit Polls For Palestinian Presidential and Local Elections: In The Presidential Elections, Mahmud Abbas Won Because He Was Perceived As Most Able To Improve The Economy And Make Progress In The Peace Process; In The Local Elections Hamas Won Because Its Candidates Were Seen As Uncorrupt December 2004 - January 2005
  


• Poll #15 : SHARP DECREASE IN SUPPORT FOR SUICIDE BOMBINGS INSIDE ISRAEL AND SATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF ABU MAZIN, BUT HAMAS' POPULARITY INCREASES WHILE FATEH'S DECREASES 10-12 March 2005 - (Press Release) and (joint Palestinian Israeli press release).
  • Poll In PDF Format.
  
  
• Poll #16 : Despite Negative Evaluation Of Palestinian Conditions Since The Election Of Abu Mazin, And Despite The Continued Rise In The Popularity Of Hamas, Expected Elections' Outcome Gives Fateh 44% And Hamas 33% Of The Seats Of The Next Plc 09-11 June 2005 -
  • Poll In PDF Format.
• 
  
Poll #17 : On The Eve Of The Israeli Withdrawal From The Gaza Strip, 84% See It As Victory For Armed Resistance And 40% Give Hamas Most Of The Credit For It; But 62% Are Opposed To Continued Attacks Against Israelis From The Gaza Strip, 60% Support Collection Of Arms From Armed Groups In Gaza, Fateh's Electoral Standing Improved At Hamas' Expense (47% To 30%), Optimism Prevails Over Pessimism, And 73% Support The Establishment Of A Palestinian State In The Gaza Strip That Would Gradually Extend To The West Bank 07-09 September 2005 -
• Poll In PDF Format.



• Special Poll - Results of PSR Exit Poll For Palestinian Local Elections: Amid Widespread Belief that Corruption Exits in Existing Local Councils, and in Parallel with the Split Within Fateh, PSR's Local Elections' Exit Poll in the cities of Nablus, Ramallah, al-Bireh, and Jenin Shows First Signs of Crack in Fateh's Standing in the Legislative Elections 15 December 2005
  


• Poll #18 : With Optimism Fading, and Three Months After the Completion of the Israeli Unilateral Disengagement from the Gaza Strip, Support for a Permanent Settlement along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative Drops, but a Large Majority Continues to Support the Hudna and Fateh's Popularity Increases - 06-08 December 2005
  
• Poll In PDF Format.


• Special Poll Before the Start of the Election Campaign, and About One Month Before the Elections, a PSR Pre Election Poll Shows Fateh List Winning at the National Level While Showing a Tie Between Candidates of Fateh and Change and Reform in the Electoral Districts 01 January 2006
  


• Special Poll Few Days Before the Legislative Elections, a PSR Pre Election Poll Shows Hamas Impoving its Position at the National Level, but Fateh and Hamas Remain Tied in the Districts 21 January 2006
  


• Special Poll - Results of PSR Exit Polls For Palestinian PLC Elections: On the Election Day for the Second Palestinian Parliament: A Crumpling Peace Process and a Greater Public Complaint of Corruption and Chaos Gave Hamas a limited Advantage Over Fateh, but Fragmentation within Fateh Turned that Advantage into an Overwhelming Victory 15 February 2006
  
• Poll In PDF Format.

Poll #19 : On The Eve of the Formation of the New Palestinian Government, Hamas' Popularity Increases and Fateh's Decreases, but a Majority of the Palestinians Wants the Continuation of the Peace Process and the Implementation of the Road Map and Supports a New Negotiated, rather than a Unilateral, Israeli Disengagement in the West Bank - 16-18 March 2006.
• Poll In PDF Format.

Poll #20 : In An Environment of Increased Pessimism, Greater Support for Violence and Decreased Support For a Permanent Status Agreement Similar to the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Document, Three Quarters Agree with the Prisoners' Document, but only 47% would Actually Vote for it if a Referendum is to Take Place Today - 15-18 June 2006.
• Poll In PDF Format.

Poll #21 : Despite Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the Hamas Government, Especially Regarding Salaries, and Despite Public Preference for a National Unity Government in which Fateh and Hamas are Equal, Hamas' Popularity Remains Largely Unchanged and the Majority does not Think it Should Recognize Israel - 14-16 September 2006.
• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.

Poll #22 : With Increased Public Dissatisfaction with the Performance of the President and the Hamas Government and with a Widening of the Gap Between the Popularity of Fateh and Hamas in Favor of the Former, a Majority Supports the Holding of Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, and is in Favor of the Arab (Saudi) Initiative, and Prefers a Comprehensive Settlement over an Interim Political Track - 14-16 December 2006.
• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.

Poll #23 : An Overwhelming Majority is Satisfied with the Make-Up of the National Unity Government but the Public is Split into Two Equal Halves with Regard to its Acceptance of the Quartet Conditions and Almost Three Quarters are in Favor of the Saudi Initiative - 22-24 March 2007.

• Press Release

• Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #24 : Anger and lack of confidence prevails in the Palestinian Street: While Popularity of Hamas Decreases, and Status of Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmud Abbas Declines, and While the Public Loses Confidence in its Leadership, in Most of the Security Services, and in the Various Armed "Brigades," Three Quarters Demand Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and 63% support the American Security Plan - 14-20 June 2007.
• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.


• Poll #25 : While Three Quarters of the Palestinians Reject Hamas's Military Action in the Gaza Strip and While Fateh and President Mahmud Abbas Gain Popular Support as a Result of Hamas's Step, and While a Majority Supports the Presidential Decree Regarding Election Law and Supports Early Elections, 40% Want the Government of Ismail Haniyeh to Stay in Power and Half of Gazans Feel They and Their Families are Secure and Safe in Their Homes - 06-08 September 2007.
• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.


• Poll #26 : A Total Lack of Confidence in the Annapolis Process Keeps Hamas's Popularity Stable despite Worsening Conditions in the Gaza Strip - 11-16 December 2007.
• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.


• Special Poll : Mass Rafah Border Crossing Consolidates Hamas's and Ismail Haniyeh's Standing and Weakens Fateh's and Mahmud Abbas's - 23 January - 03 February 2008.



• Poll #27: With Increased Dissatisfaction with the Performance of Mahmud Abbas and with the Government of Ismail Haniyeh Seen as Having Greater Legitimacy and Better Performance than the Government of Salam Fayyad, and with Confidence in the Negotiations with Israel Collapsing, Hamas's and Haniyeh's Popularity Increase and Fateh's and Abbas's Decrease While Support for Rocket Launching and Suicide Attacks Increase - 13-15 March 2008.
• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.

 

• Poll #28: With Abbas Regaining Some of his Popularity and Hamas losing some of its popularity, and despite widespread support for a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians opposes a ceasefire that does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt - 5-7 June 2008
  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.
• Poll #29: As the gap between Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh widens in favor of the former, a majority supports continuation of the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel and prefers peace negotiations to free Palestinian prisoners but shows little confidence in diplomacy and supports kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in order to exchange them with Palestinian prisoners 28-30 August 2008

• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.   

• Poll #30: Palestinians want legislative and presidential elections in early 2009 to resolve Fateh-Hamas power struggle and want a strong intervention from the Obama Administration to resolve the conflict with Israel 3-5 December 2008

• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.
   
• Poll #31: With the popularity of Abbas and Fayyad declining sharply and the popularity of Haniyeh and Hamas increasing significantly, the public becomes more hawkish and pessimistic about the peace process and the overwhelming majority believes Palestinians after the war on Gaza are worse off than before the war 5-7 March 2009
  
• Press Release


• Poll In PDF Format.

 

• Poll #32: While Abbas’s popularity improves and while a majority of Palestinians accepts Fateh’s position that a national unity government must accept agreements signed with Israel, and while a majority supports the two-state solution, pessimism prevails regarding the future of the peace process and the chances for Fateh-Hamas reconciliation  21-23 May 2009   

• Press Release
• Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #33: While the popularity of Abbas and Fateh increases and the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas decreases, and while the public shows some enthusiasm for a strong American role in the peace process and greater support for the Arab Peace Initiative, Palestinians are pessimistic about the chances for the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and are less willing to accept concessions in a permanent settlement  13-15 August 2009   
   

• Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #34: While the status of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad improves a little, the majority supports Abbas’s decision not to run in the next elections and opposes return to negotiations before the implementation of a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction and about 40% support return to armed intifada as an alternative to negotiations 10-12 December 2009   

• Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #35:While a majority of Palestinians supports holding local elections and while a majority supports the two-state solution, an overwhelming majority opposes the proximity talks in the absence of a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem and the popularity and legitimacy of the president weaken in light of corruption reports and in light of the ending of his electoral term 4-6 March 2010

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #36: In the aftermath of the Free Gaza flotilla incident, Turkey is the most popular regional country, but Hamas’s popularity remains unchanged while Salam Fayyad and his government gain greater public support, and while support for compromise increases, two thirds remain pessimistic about the future of the peace process and the majority does not believe in the efficacy of alternative options to negotiations such as popular resistance or unilateral declaration of statehood. 10-13 June 2010  10-13 June 2010  

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #37: A confused and uncertain public:  While the Majority Opposes Return to Negotiations Under the Shadow of Settlement Construction, and While the Majority Opposes Alternatives to Negotiations Such as Violence, the Dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or the Adoption of a One-State Solution, and While the Majority Supports Alternatives Such as Going to the UNSC, a Unilateral Declaration of Statehood, and Resort to Non-Violent Resistance, the Overwhelming Majority has no Confidence in the Efficacy of any of the Alternatives it Supports.  30 September- 02 October 2010   

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Special Public Opinion Poll Among Palestinians of East  Jerusalem  

  With a Total Absence of trust in the Intentions of Israel, the Netanyahu Government, and the Jerusalem Municipality Coupled with a Firm Belief in the Existence of Discrimination against Arabs, a Solid Majority Prefers Palestinian or International Sovereignty Over East Jerusalem. Yet, with High Levels of Satisfaction with Israeli Basic Services, and Significant Worry about Losing Israeli Medical Services, Free Movement Inside Israel, and Loss of Freedom of Expression in the Permanent Settlement, three Quarters of East Jerusalemites Prefer to See East and West Jerusalem as an Open City and One Quarter Prefers to Hold Israeli Citizenship  16 - 30 July 2010  

  • Poll In PDF Format.

 

• Poll #38: In the fourth quarter of 2010: While demand for holding local elections increases, and while pessimism regarding the chances for reconciliation increases, and while criticism of the PA for suppression of freedoms increases, credibility of the authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip diminishes, support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative decreases, and two thirds oppose return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction despite the fact that a majority believes Israel would be the first to benefit from no negotiations. 16-18 December 2010  

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #39: While youth revolts in the Arab World pose a threat to Hamas and its government in the Gaza Strip, al Jazeera leaks of PLO documents recording Palestinian-Israeli negotiations pose a threat to Fateh and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and the US use of its veto power against the UNSC resolution denouncing Israeli settlements destroys much of American credibility in the peace process 17-19 March 2011

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #40: Palestinians want Abbas’ and PLO’s policy to be the platform of the reconciliation government and Fayyad to be its prime minister; an overwhelming majority wants a real state in September, one that exercises sovereignty in area C and at the international crossings with Jordan; and a majority wants to participate in big peaceful demonstrations that would breach checkpoints and block roads of Israeli settlers and army 16-18 June 2011

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #41: Massive support for going to the UN, but a majority expects US and Israeli financial and political sanctions and three quarters want an actual exercise of sovereignty throughout the West Bank 15-17 September 2011

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #42: While Hamas wins greater public confidence and appreciation in the aftermath of the prisoner exchange deal, likely vote for the group remains unchanged and while the public opposes return to negotiations without terms of reference and a settlement freeze, support for a permanent status compromise increases 15-17 December 2011

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #43: With a majority objecting to return to negotiations without an Israeli acceptance of Palestinian conditions, and while a majority reaches the conclusion that the two state solution is no longer viable, domestic conditions - such as the financial crisis, the electricity crisis, and the failure of reconciliation - contribute to internal frustration and weaken the standing of PA leadership and all Palestinian factions 15-17 March 2012

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #44: While the popularity of Fateh and President Abbas drops, and while Hamas' popularity improves, popular criticism of crackdown on freedoms increases and opposition to a two-state solution rises 21-23 June 2012

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

• Poll #45: Mixed news for the PA: satisfaction with Abbas, Fateh, and Fayyad are down, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank is lower than positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip, and three quarters believe protests in the West Bank will continue and escalate, but about 70% side with Abbas in opposing return to negotiations before Israel freezes settlement construction and accepts the 1967 lines with swaps as a base for negotiations and almost three quarters support a UN bid seeking international recognition of Palestinian Statehood 13-15 September 2012

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

   

• Poll #46: In the aftermath of the Gaza War: Hamas’ way is preferred by the majority over Abbas’ way as the most effective in ending occupation and building a Palestinian state and Haniyeh defeats Abbas in a presidential election 13-15 December 2012

  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.
•  Poll #47: Popularity of Hamas and Haniyeh drops and the popularity of Fateh and Abbas rises but pessimism regarding reconciliation prevails once again and a majority believes the new Obama administration will not succeed in reviving the peace process.  28-30 March 2013
  • Press Release
  • Poll In PDF Format.

Joint Press Releases - Joint Palestinian-Isreali Public Opinion Polls:

• ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION BUT ARE LESS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE THAN THEIR LEADERS. - July 2000



• 'PESSIMISM' UNDERSCORES FINDINGS OF NEW ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL - July 2001



• IMPORTANT BUT FRAGILE PRAGMATIC SHIFTS IN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE INTIFADA AND THE PEACE PROCESS - November 2002



• Stable majorities of the Israeli and Palestinians publics support the Quartet's roadmap. Abu Mazin's nomination as Prime Minister increases optimism about return to negotiations. - April 2003



• MAJORITY SUPPORT AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS FOR ROADMAP AND FOR A MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT EACH PUBLIC MISPERCEIVES THE POSITION OF THE OTHER - June 2003



• ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ARE LUKEWARM AND FAR APART ON THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE GENEVA DOCUMENT - December 2003



• ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE GAZA STRIP AFTER ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL AS PART OF SHARON'S DISENGAGEMENT PLAN. - July 2004



• FIRST SERIOUS SIGNS OF OPTIMISM SINCE THE START OF THE INTIFADA - December 2004

• In The Post Arafat Era, Palestinians And Israelis Are More Willing To Compromise: For The First Time Majority Support For Clinton's Permanent Status Settlement Package. January 2005
  


• PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS DISAGREE ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS - March 2005



• WHILE ISRAELI SUPPORT FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT DROPS, ISRAELIS SEE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT PROJECT IN THE WEST BANK, WHEREAS PALESTINIANS EXPECT IT TO GROW - June 2005



• TWO THIRDS AMONG PALESTINIANS, ISRAELI JEWS AND ISRAELI ARABS SUPPORT THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. - September 2005



• STABLE MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR CLINTON'S FINAL STATUS PACKAGE AMONG ISRAELIS BUT DECLINE IN SUPPORT AMONG PALESTINIANS: Large support in both publics for the extension of the cease fire - December 2005



• OVERWHELMING MAJORITY AMONG ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS FOR NEGOTIATED RATHER THAN UNILATERAL FURTHER DISENGAGEMENTS 60% of the Israelis support negotiations with Abu Mazin over a final status settlement - March 2006



• WITH SUPPORT FOR A PERMANENT DEAL ALONG THE CLINTON PARAMETERS DROPPING AMONG ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS, ONLY 46% OF THE ISRAELIS SUPPORT OLMERT'S REALIGNMENT PLAN AND ONLY 47% OF THE PALESTINIANS WOULD APPROVE THE PRISONERS' DOCUMENT IN A REFERENDUM - June 2006



• IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN LEBANON, PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR HAMAS UNCHANGED WITH GREATER PRAGMATISM AMONG ISRAELIS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS- September 2006



• STRONG PREFERENCE AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OVER AN INTERIM POLITICAL TRACK - December 2006



• IN THE BACKDROP OF THE GAZA TAKEOVER BY HAMAS, ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SHARE GRIM EXPECTATIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CHANCES FOR THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS- June 2007



• SKEPTICAL ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ARE SPLIT HALF IN SUPPORT FOR A FINAL STATUS PACKAGE ALONG THE CLINTON PARAMETERS- December 2007



• THREATENED ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS DISENCHANTED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORT FURTHER VIOLENCE- March 2008

 

• Israelis strongly oppose cease-fire with Hamas if agreement does not include release of Gilad Shalit; Palestinians strongly oppose such an agreement if it does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt - June 2008

• Sweeping majority of Israelis support release of Marwan Barghouti in return for Gilad Shalit; three-fourths of Palestinians back soldier kidnappings in exchange for Palestinian prisoners Among other findings of joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support continuation of cease-fire agreement with Hamas - September 2008
  

• Following Obama’s Election, Palestinians and Israelis Seek a more active role of the US in Moderating the Conflict Among other findings of the joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support continuation of the cease-fire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Only about a quarter of Israelis support reoccupation of the Gaza Strip if shelling of Israeli communities continues - December 2008

• In the aftermath of Israel’s military operation in Gaza and the February elections, Israelis and Palestinians share hawkish positions and gloomy expectations regarding the peace process Among other findings of the joint Truman PSR poll: Both Palestinians and Israelis believe that given the outcome of the Israeli military operation in Gaza, Palestinians are worse off than before the operation. Two thirds of Israelis believe that Israel stopped its military operation in Gaza too early, but only 30% think that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if shelling of Israeli communities continues -  March 2009

• Pessimism among Israelis and Palestinians regarding the prospects for a settlement and a Palestinian state in the next few years, but majorities on both sides support a two-state solution.Following Obama’s Cairo speech, Israelis’ pessimism decreased somewhat and support for the two-state solution increased slightly - June 2009

• Israelis are more apprehensive and Palestinians somewhat more favorable about US involvement in the Peace Process compared to their expectations last December after Obama's election.  August 2009

• In Israel: A slim majority (52%) believes Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war.In the PA: If released from jail, Marwan Barghouti would beat Ismail Haniyeh for Presidency by a large margin.   December 2009

• Majority of Palestinians and Israelis prefer two-state solution over binational state or confederation  March 20, 2010

• Despite the Gaza Flotilla incident, Rise in Willingness to compromise among Palestinians and Israelis, but two-thirds on both sides remain pessimistic about the future of the peace process June 2010

• PALESTINIANS BELIEVE THEY ARE OF GREATER NEED OF SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAELIS THINK BOTH SIDES NEED IT EQUALLY, BUT BOTH PUBLICS ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THEIR SUCCESS. October 2010

• A majority of Israelis opposes intolerant steps toward Arab citizens. Palestinians incorrectly believe that the majority of Israeli Jews supports such steps  December 2010

• In the backdrop of the demonstrations in the Arab world, neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider such demonstrations to be capable of ending occupation in the West Bank - 6 April 2011
  
  

• Palestinians are determined to go to the UN in September and not to return to negotiations with Netanyahu, in line with Israelis’ expectations - June 2011
  
  

• Over 80% of the Palestinians support turning to the UN to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state. About 70% of Israelis think that if the UN recognizes a Palestinian state Israel should accept the decision - September 2011
  
  

• Increase in Palestinians’ and Israelis’ willingness to compromise amidst climate of feud and mistrust - December 2011
  
  

• In the aftermath of the exploratory talks in Amman, Israelis reject Palestinians’ conditions for returning to negotiations, and Palestinians oppose returning to negotiations unconditionally - March 2012
  
  

• Israelis are split and Palestinians oppose a new Israeli unilateral plan designed to encourage settlers to move back to Israel in order to bolster the two-state solution and the Israeli government’s ability to reach a peace solution with the Palestinians. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians think that the plan is likely to be implemented by the Netanyahu government - June 2012
  
  

• Around 80% of Palestinians and of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, a major regional war will erupt. However a majority of Israelis do not believe that Israel will strike and the climate of opinion is against it - September 2012
  

• Given the outcome of the Israeli operation in Gaza and the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, Palestinians move towards Hamas’ over Abbas’s way, whereas Israelis stand steadfast in their evaluations and preferences. - December 2012
  
  

 

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