PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL No - 50

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (50)

While half of the public favors negotiations with Israel, three quarters reject a permanent settlement if it includes a 10-year transitional phase during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley; and while fewer people believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a state, satisfaction with the performance of Abbas and Hamdallah increases and more people believe that Abbas’ is the best way

19-22 December 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-22 December 2013. The period before the poll witnessed continuation of the friction between Egypt and Hamas’ government in Gaza, the continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the release of more prisoners by Israel, an increase in violent incidents, release of reports on Arafat’s poisoning, and talk about the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as vice president to Abbas.  This press release covers public attitudes regarding the peace process, evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, reports on Arafat’s poisoning, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2013 indicate that half of the public remains willing to give negotiations a chance but about 70% are pessimistic about the chances for success. On the other hand, most of the public supports the two-state solution and believes that if Abbas does reach a peace agreement with Netanyahu, a majority of the public will vote in favor of that agreement. The public however insists that the agreement be permanent and more than three quarters reject a permanent agreement that includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley.

Findings also indicate a continued decline in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip, presumably as a result of the continued political conflict between Egypt and the Hamas government and the continued closure of tunnels and the Rafah crossing. This decline, which we first noticed in our September poll, is now affecting Hamas’ popularity in the Gaza Strip where it dropped significantly. It is worth mentioning however that Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank has not changed. Similarly, despite the continuation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remained unchanged compared to the findings of September 2013.

By contrast, satisfaction with the performance of Abbas in the Gaza Strip has significantly increased and positive evaluation of the performance of Prime Minister Al Hamdallah increased in both areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More importantly, it seems that these changes have affected attitudes regarding whose way is the best to end occupation and build a Palestinian state. Current findings show a significant decrease in the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way and a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way.   It should be noted however that the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way remains higher than the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ is the best.

(1) Peace Process:

• 50% support the current negotiations but 69% expect them to fail; still, if Abbas succeeds in reaching a peace agreement with Israel, 57% believe that a majority of the public will vote in a referendum in favor of that agreement
• 53% support the two-state solution, but 56% believe that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement activities. Nonetheless, two thirds oppose a one-state solution.
• More than three quarters of the public reject a permanent agreement that includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley
• A majority believes that settlement activities and the number of checkpoints have increased or remained as they were before the start of the current negotiations and that economic conditions have remained the same or have become worse
• 46% support and 53% oppose a package of compromises along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but 50% say they will vote in favor of such package if Abbas presented it in a referendum
• 43% support and 56% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity
• After reaching a peace agreement, 51% support and 47% oppose reconciliation between the two peoples
• A majority of 77% is worried that it might be hurt by Israelis in its daily life and 83% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all Palestinian territories and expel its population or deny it its political rights 

Findings show that 50% of the public support and 47% oppose the president’s decision to resume direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But 69% expect these negotiations to fail in reaching a peace agreement and only 27% expect them to succeed. If negotiations do succeed and Abbas reaches a peace agreement with Israel, 57% believe that a majority of the Palestinian public will vote in a referendum in favor of the agreement; only 35% expect a majority to vote against it.

A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it. But 56% believe that that solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non-existent. Yet, 66% of the public oppose and 32% support the one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equality in one state. Support for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (54%) than in the Gaza Strip (51%), in towns and villages (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (53% and 43% respectively), among men (56%) compared to women (50%), among  those whose age is over 50 years (65%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (48%), among supporters of Fatah and third powers (74% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%), among the somewhat religious (59%) compared to the religious (45%), among supporters of the peace process (68%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (27%), among non-refugees (55%) compared to refugees (50%), and among farmers, retirees, merchants, and employees (69%, 62%, 61%, and 58% respectively) compared to students and laborers (47% and 46% respectively).

A majority of 76% opposes a permanent settlement if it includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley; 21% support it. Opposition to this agreement is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (65%), among supporters of Hamas and third forces (92% and 81% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (62%), and among those who oppose the peace process (90%) compared to those who support the peace process (71%).

Only a small minority believes that conditions have improved since the start of peace talks while a majority believes that conditions have become worse or remained the same. Only 11% believe that economic conditions have improved; 49% believe they have become worse and 37% believe they have remained the same. Only 17% believe that restrictions and checkpoints have decreased; 46% believe they have increased and 32% believe they have remained the same. Only 4% believe that settlement construction has decreased; 78% believe that it has increased and 15% believe it has remained the same. 41% however believe that international support has increased, 19% believe it has decreased, and 35% believe it has remained the same.

Findings show that 46% support and 53% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 43% in December 2012. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost fourteen years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic stalemate throughout 2012. 

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects three items in the package and accepts three. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 52% support or strongly support and 48% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2012, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 53% and opposition at 45%.

(2) Refugees: 46% support and 52% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2012, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 56% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 32% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2012, an identical compromise obtained 29% support and 70% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2012, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 52% support and 48% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2012, 46% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 53% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 63% support and 36% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2012 were 59% support and 39% opposition. 

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2013

If President Abbas presented this package for a vote in a referendum, 50% say they will vote in favor and 49% say they will vote against it. If the package includes an Israeli acknowledgement of responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem, about one quarter of those opposed to the package would change their mind and accept it. Moreover, if the package includes an Israeli acceptance of the Arab Peace Initiative, 18% of those opposed to the package would change their mind and accept it. But if the US Administration intervened in order to pressure the two sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis, to accept and implement this package, a majority of 60% believes that the Palestinian side should reject this American intervention while 37% believe that the Palestinian side should accept the American intervention.  A majority of 65% believes that most Palestinians would reject such American intervention but a similar majority (63%) believes that a majority of Israelis would accept the American intervention.

After reaching a peace agreement, 51% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 47% would oppose it. But 68% believe that reconciliation will not be possible or that it will be possible only after few generations.  Support for reconciliation between the two peoples is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (44%), among residents of villages and towns (62%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (50% and 44% respectively), among supporters of Fatah and third forces (72% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%), among the somewhat religious (56%) compared to the religious (45%), and among supporters of the peace process (66%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (24%).

Findings show that three quarters of the public (77%) are worried and 23% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Moreover, 83% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. When asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 66% said that it is to recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and 26% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories or defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population.

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Haniyeh, and Abbas, the first receives 40%, the second 31%, and the third 26%.
• 73% support and 20% oppose the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as vice president
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 40%, Hamas 29%, all other electoral lists combined 8%, and 23% are undecided.

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If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 52% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 62%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 51% and Haniyeh 42%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 48% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 39%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 70%. In our September 2013 poll Barghouti received 58% of the vote and Haniyeh 35%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (40%) followed by Haniyeh (31%), and Abbas (26%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 74%. In our previous poll last September, Barghouti received 35%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 27%. 

73% support and 20% oppose the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as a vice president to Abbas. Support for this appointment stands at 79% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. Support for Barghouti as vice president increases in the Gaza Strip (79%) compared the West Bank (69%), among Fatah supporters and supporters of third forces (91% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (63%), and among supporters of the peace process (80%) compared those who oppose the peace process (58%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 33% and in the West Bank at 26%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 41%. These results indicate a sharp decrease in support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip from the 39% it had last September. In the West Bank however Hamas’ popularity increased by one percentage point during the same period. Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the West Bank by two percentage points and in the Gaza Strip by one percentage point during the same period.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops further to 16% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 30%
• 77% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 68% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 30% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 24% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55%  and in the Gaza Strip at 62%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 39%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises to 53% 
• 59% believe that Israel is responsible for poisoning Arafat

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Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop reaching 16% in this poll compared to 21% three months ago and 36% six months ago. 65% say conditions in the Gaza Stip are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 30%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad decreases from 44% to 36% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 77% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 68%.  22% say there is, and 46% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 38% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  30% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 62%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 55% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Last September these percentages stood at 45% and 26% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37%.Three months ago it stood at 36%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank increases from 29% three months ago to 39% today.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises from 49% three months ago to 53% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with Abbas’ performance stands today at 45%. 

59% believe that Israel is responsible for poisoning former president Yasser Arafat and 21% believe that a Palestinian party or group or a joint Palestinian-Israeli party or group is responsible for Arafat’s death by poisoning. Belief that Israel has poisoned Arafat increases in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (57%), among supporters of Fatah and third forces (69% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (50%), and among supporters of the peace process (60%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (52%).

(4) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today stands at 16%
• 48% support and 49% oppose holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time
• 25% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 31% believe that the government of Abbas-Hamdallah is the legitimate one
• 39% believe that Hamas’ way is the best for ending occupation and building a state and 36% believe that Abbas’ way is the best

Given the continued deterioration in relations between Hamas and the Egyptian government and the ups and downs in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains low reaching 16%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge drops from 41% three months ago to 37% in this poll. 43% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time.

The largest percentage (38%) believes that the PA, with its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 26% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (14%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

25% believe that the Haniyeh government in the Gaza Strip is the legitimate Palestinian government while 31% believe that the Abbas-Hamdallah government in the West Bank is the legitimate one; 11% believe that the two governments are legitimate. 27% believe that both governments are illegitimate. These findings indicate a drop in the percentage of those who believe that the two governments are illegitimate compared to the situation three years ago when in December 2010 that percentage stood at 34%. Other findings remained unchanged: 23% said at that time that Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one, 29% said the Abbas-Fayyad government was the legitimate one, and 10% said the two governments were legitimate. But the public is split over the necessity of holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time: 48% believe it to be necessary to hold such separate elections and 49% believe it to be unnecessary. 

Compared to the situation a year ago, findings show a drop in the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a Palestinian state and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way. In December 2012, in the aftermath of the Gaza war and the entry of Khalid Mishaal into the Gaza Strip, 60% believed that Hamas’ way and that of the resistance groups was the best to achieve the vital goals of the Palestinians while only 28% said Abbas’ was the best. Today, in the aftermath of the recent developments in Egypt and their ramifications to the Gaza Strip and in the aftermath of the return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the release of some prisoners, the percentage of those who believe Hamas’ was is the best way drops to 39% while the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way rises to 36%. The current findings show that 25% (compared to 13% a year ago) believe that other ways are better or do not know which way is the best way. It is worth mentioning that the 2012 question refer to “Hamas’ and the resistance groups’ way” while the current question refers to “Hamas’ way.”  Belief that Hamas’ way is the best is higher in the Gaza Strip (42%) compared to the West Bank (36%), in refugee camps and cities (41% and 40% respectively) compared to villages and towns (30%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 (42%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (36%), among Hamas supporters (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third forces (14% and 22% respectively), among the religious (49%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), and among those opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (27%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 33% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 27% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 25% view the continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem.

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 45% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal and 29% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the public while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 10% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings..... Full Report