Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (40) 

Palestinians want Abbas’ and PLO’s policy to be the platform of the reconciliation government and Fayyad to be its prime minister; an overwhelming majority wants a real state in September, one that exercises sovereignty in area C and at the international crossings with Jordan; and a majority wants to participate in big peaceful demonstrations that would breach checkpoints and block roads of Israeli settlers and army

 

16-18 June 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16-18 June 2011. The poll was conducted after the signing of the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas and during the continued turmoil and revolt in the Arab World including the popular uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Libya. This period witnessed increased PA official statements indicating insistence on going to the UN for recognition of a Palestinian state in September. This press release covers Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of the reconciliation agreement, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. It also covers issues related to the peace process and the expected September process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

 

Main Findings:

 

Findings of the second quarter of 2011 show that the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas has triggered important changes in public attitudes and perceptions. Indeed, the agreement has removed, almost completely, the issue of the split between West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the list of critical problems in the minds of the public. But the fading of the problem of the split led to the emergence of a new problem: the concern that the agreement, once implemented, and a majority believes that it will indeed be implemented, it will bring back international political and financial sanctions and boycott. For this reason, and while findings show that Hamas has benefited considerably from signing the agreement, a clear majority of the public wants the new Palestinian government of specialists, once formed, to implement the president’s and the PLO’s peace program and policy rather than that of Hamas. Most importantly, the largest percentage wants Salam Fayyad, Fateh’s candidate, to be the next prime minister. Indeed, only a small minority wants Jamal Khodari, Hamas’ candidate, to be the next prime minister. Perhaps the public believes that if Fayyad stays as prime minister and if he continues to implement Abbas’ peace agenda and policies, the threat of boycott and sanctions would diminish or disappear.

Findings show a split in public attitude regarding the Obama proposal for terms of reference for the peace process on borders and the national identity of Israel and Palestine, both supported by half of the public. But three quarters of the public oppose Obama’s suggestion that the Palestinian state should be non-militarized and about two thirds reject the US position that going to the UN in September to seek recognition of a Palestinian state would be a mistake.  Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians support an exercise of sovereignty over the so-called area (C) including the deployment of Palestinian security forces in those areas in the context of the UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. Similarly, three quarters support exercise of Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby international crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing. Findings indicate that a majority wants to participate in big popular peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and to block roads used by Israeli settlers and army.

 

(1) The future of the reconciliation agreement:

  • A majority of 59% is optimistic about the chances that the reconciliation agreement will be implemented, but a similar majority (55%) expects the return of international financial sanctions after the establishment of a reconciliation government
  • A plurality prefers Fayyad as prime minister and a majority wants the new government to follow the policies of the PA president and the PLO rather than the policy of Hamas
  • The public is divided over the factors that led to the reconciliation agreement and half believes that both Fateh and Hamas emerged winners from the agreement

A majority of 59% believes that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 37% believe they will fail. But a majority of 55% expects the return of international boycott and financial sanctions after the formation of a new reconciliation government and 37% do not expect that. Perhaps to reduce the probability of such a development, a plurality prefers Abbas’ candidate for the prime minister position over Hamas’ candidate: In a choice between Salam Fayyad and Jamal Khodari, 45% of the public favors the former and only 22% favor the latter. 12% favor other candidates and 21% remain undecided. Perhaps for the same reason, a majority of 61% wants the new government of reconciliation to follow the peace policies and agendas of President Abbas and the PLO rather than Hamas’. Only 18% want the new government to follow the peace policy and agenda of Hamas.

Belief that the new government should follow the policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (38%), among those who are “somewhat religious” (65%) compared to those who are “religious” (54%), among supporters of Fateh (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%). Preference for Fayyad as the prime minister of the reconciliation government increases among men (49%) compared to women (41%), among the “somewhat religious” (50%) compared the “religious” (39%), among supporters of the peace process (45%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among supporters of Fateh (80%) compared to supporters of Hamas (10%) and supporters of third parties and those who remain undecided (51% each), and among holders of preparatory certificate and illiterates (48%) compared to college and university graduates (42%).  Half of the public (50%) says that both Fateh and Hamas came out winners from the reconciliation agreement, 12% say Hamas came out the winner, 11% say Fateh came out the winner, and 20% say neither came out a winner. 29% believe that the reason a reconciliation agreement was signed has to do with the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt while 27% believe it was the youth demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that was responsible for forcing the two sides to sign the agreement. Moreover, 21% believe the reason was the failure of negotiations with Israel while 12% believe it was the eruption of youth demonstrations against the Syrian regime.

 

(2) Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, performance of the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, and presidential and legislative elections

  • Increase in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but positive evaluation of West Bank condition remains higher than that of the Gaza Strip
  • Positive evaluation of freedom of the press in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip and the same is true in regard to ability of citizens to criticize the government without fear
  • But perception of personal safety and security is higher among residents of the Gaza Strip than among residents of the West Bank
  • Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas increases from 46% to 52%
  • If new presidential elections where to take place today, Abbas would receive 54% of the popular vote and Haniyeh 38%; but if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter 33%
  • If new legislative elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 28% of the participants’ vote and Fateh 42%. All third parties combined would receive 10% and the undecided stands at 19%
  • Three quarters support Abbas’ decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences
  • 70% support Fateh’s decision to expel Dahlan from its ranks

25% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in March 2011, 21% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 56% said they were bad or very bad. It is worth noting that a year ago, in June 2010, only 9% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good. Today, 37% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 29% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 33% and 33% respectively. As can be seen in the following table, a year ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 35%.

 

Table (1): Positive evaluation (good or very good) of conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

 

 

West Bank

Gaza Strip

June 2011

37%

25%

March 2011

33%

21%

December 2010

35%

17%

September 2010

33%

11%

June 2010

35%

9%

March 2010

31%

11%

December 2009

31%

9%

September 2009

34%

14%

June 2009

31%

10%

March 2009

25%

7%

December 2008

26%

6%

September 2008

27%

8%

June 2008

25%

5%

March 2008

21%

5%

 December 2007

31%

8%

September 2007

27%

8%

 

 

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. But 61% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 34% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 47% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 41% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 31% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These findings reflect an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip and a slight decline in the West Bank compared to where things stood three months ago. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip. This is the first time since the split that we have seen an increase in the percentage of those who believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear. The change may be due to changing perceptions of Hamas’ behavior in the Gaza Strip after the signing of the reconciliation agreement.

 

Table (2): belief that people can criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip without fear since the split between the two areas

Date

Ability to criticize authorities in the West Bank

Ability to criticize authorities in the Gaza Strip

June 2011

31%

25%

March 2011

33%

19%

December 2010

27%

19%

September 2010

30%

24%

March 2009

37%

29%

August 2008

47%

42%

September 2007

56%

52%

 

  

Perception of safety and security stands at 56% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. This finding indicates a large increase in the perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip compared to March 2011 when it stood at 67%. The difference may reflect a perception change in light of the reconciliation agreement. Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 39% and Salam Fayyad’s at 43%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 31% and 39% respectively. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries stands at 40%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 37% and 21% respectively, which means that the signing of the reconciliation agreement, despite the public support, has nonetheless brought back concerns about international sanctions and boycott.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 52% while 45% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These percentages reflect an increase in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the president, which stood at 46% three months ago while the level of dissatisfaction stood at 51%. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. The increase in the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas may be an outcome of the signing of the reconciliation agreement.  If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 60%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives in this poll 51% and Haniyeh 44% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 34%. These results are similar to those obtained in our pervious poll three months ago. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 33% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 56% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 29%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago.  Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (22%), Salam Fayyad (17%) Mustafa Barghouti (9%) and Saeb Erekat (4%).  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. These results indicate an increase of two percentage points to each of Fateh and Hamas compared to our results three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 36 % and in the West Bank 24%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip is 43% and in the West Bank 42%.

Findings show that an overwhelming majority of 75% supports and 19% oppose PA president decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences. 70% support and 21% oppose the decision by Fateh’s Central Committee to expel Mohammad Dahlan from Fateh and transferring his file to the Attorney General’s office. Support for the decision is similar in the West Bank (71%) and the Gaza Strip (68%) but opposition to the decision increases to 28% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 17% in the West Bank. Moreover, support for the decision is higher among supporters of Hamas (90%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%). 61% believe that differences of opinion within Fateh regarding Dahlan reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement while 33% believe they reflect a minor disagreement.  Differences of opinion that erupted within Hamas after the signing of the reconciliation agreement reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement in the views of 42% of the public while 48% believe that they reflect minor disagreements.  

 

(3) Palestinian attitudes and expectations towards September

  • 65% support going to the UN to seek recognition of Palestinian statehood despite American warning not to do so
  • If Palestinians go to the UN General Assembly, 57% believe they will obtain recognition of their state from two thirds of the members, but 76% believe the US will use its veto power in the Security Council
  • 48% believe that Palestine will become a UN member in September and 44% do not believe so
  • Two thirds expect Israeli occupation to become harsher in response to the UN vote
  • The public is split over the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation: about a third believes in armed attacks, another third believes in peaceful resistance, and 26% believe negotiation is the answer
  • 76% want the PA to exercise sovereignty in September including the opening of highways, an airport, and the deployment of security forces in area (C) and 75% want Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such step leads to the closure of the crossing
  • 52% say they will participate in peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and block roads after the UN recognition of the state of Palestine
  • A majority of 58% believes that most of the European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September; despite this, a similar percentage believes that the position of the EU member states is closer to the Israeli position

President Obama stated that it would be a mistake for the Palestinians to go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state. Despite the Obama statement, 65% of the Palestinians believe the PA should go to the UN in September and 31% believe it should not. Support for going to the UN despite the American warning is higher among supporters of the peace process (71%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (51%), among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (61%), and among university and college graduates (70%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (58%).

 

A majority of 57% of the Palestinians believes that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed in obtaining a two thirds majority; 36% of the Palestinians believe they will not succeed. A majority of Palestinians also believes that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 76% of the Palestinians think so, while 18% think that the US will not use its veto power. Palestinians are split with regard to the question whether a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September: 48% of the Palestinians think this will happen while 44% do not believe so.

Two thirds believe that if the UN recognizes the state of Palestine, Israel will respond by making the occupation worse and by increasing settlement building while 18% think Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail. 13% of the Palestinians think conditions in the occupied territories will become a little better.  We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state. Palestinians are split: 34% think armed attacks on army and settlers, 32% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw, and 26% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw.

The preference for peaceful resistance increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (28%). But support for armed resistance is also higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (32%). In the West Bank, support for negotiations stands at 30% while in the Gaza Strip it stands at 17%. Support for peaceful resistance increases among men (36%) compared to women (29%), among supporters of third parties (42%) the undecided (38%) and supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to supporters of Hamas (24%). Among supporters of Hamas, preference for armed resistance is high, standing at 55%, while this percentage stands at 27% among supporters of Fateh, 23% among supporters of third parties, and 21% among the undecided. Support for peaceful resistance increases among students (40%) compared to housewives (25%), and among users of the internet (36%) compared to those who do not use the internet (29%).

We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 76% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 20% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 75% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 20% think the PA should not do that. Support for the exercise of sovereignty at the Allenby Bridge crossing even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (76%). Similarly, support for the exercise of sovereignty in area (C), including the opening of roads and the deployment of security forces, is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (77%).

A majority of 58% of the Palestinians think that most European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September, while 37% think that most European countries will not recognize it. A majority of Palestinians (56%) thinks the position of the EU countries regarding the peace process is closer to the Israeli position.

After the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close Israeli army and settlers' roads, 52% of the Palestinians say they think they will participate in them and 46% say they think they will not. Willingness to participate in peaceful demonstrations increases among residents of villages and towns in the West Bank (62%) and refugee camps (55%) compared to cities (48%), among men (59%) compared to women (45%), among supporters of third parties (71%) and supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%) and the undecided (54%), among those who intend to participate in future elections (60%) compared to those who do not intend to participate in future elections (36%). It also increases among students (60%) compared to housewives (42%), among college and university graduates (59%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (48%), and among those who use the internet (57%) compared to those who do not use it (48%).

A majority of 51% of the Palestinians thinks that if such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation. But a majority of Palestinians (64%) does not think that if a peaceful popular revolt, like in Egypt or Tunisia, were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation; 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation. It is worth mentioning that an overwhelming majority of 89% of the Palestinians sympathizes with the demonstrators against the Assad regime in Syria and 90% sympathize with the demonstrators against the regime in Yemen.

 

(4) The Peace Process

  • 50% support and 46% oppose the Obama proposal to consider the 1967 borders with mutually agreed swaps to be the basis for setting borders of Palestine, but two thirds oppose Obama’s proposal to the have the state non militarized
  • 51% support and 47% oppose Obama’s proposal calling for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as a Palestinian state
  • A majority of 61% opposes Obama’s call for the Palestinians to return to direct negotiations without a settlement freeze or an Israeli acceptance of the principle of the 1967 borders with swaps
  • 88% believe the US position as outlined in the Obama speech is closer to the Israeli position while 8% see it closer to the Palestinian position
  • 63% believe that it is Israel that determines US policy regarding the peace process and 32% believe it is the US that determines the Israeli position
  • 58% support and 38% oppose the Saudi Initiative
  • 62% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be low or non existence and 37% believe it to be high or medium
  • Perception of threat among Palestinians is very high: 81% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the West Bank and expel its inhabitants or deny them their political rights. Moreover, 70% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis

A majority of 50% of Palestinians supports President Obama’s call for a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with territorial swaps; 46% oppose it. With regard to the security issues, Palestinians oppose Obama’s proposal that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, it will have no airplanes, tanks, missiles, or any other heavy armaments, and the Israeli army would carry out a full and phased withdrawal from the Palestinian state. 66% of the Palestinians disagree with this principle, and only 31% support it.  President Obama also said that a permanent peace should be based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the state of Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people, each would have the right to self determination, mutual recognition, and peace. 51% of the Palestinians support this principle, while 47% oppose it.

Support for Obama’s call for the 1967 borders with swaps to be the terms of reference for setting the borders of the Palestinian state increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among city residents (53%) compared to residents of villages and towns (40%), among men (52%) compared to women (48%), among the “somewhat religious” (52%) compared to the “religious” (47%), among supporters of the peace process (55%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (34%), among supporters of Fateh (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas (39%), and among those whose age is 40 or higher (53%) compared to those whose age is between 18-28 (49%).

President Obama also called upon the Palestinians to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu declared during his stay in Washington DC that Israel will not freeze settlement construction and refuses to accept the principle of returning to the lines of 1967 with swaps. 61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept the call to return to negotiations.  In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians thinks the US position is closer to the Israeli position, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position.  Considering the two speeches by Obama and Netanyahu during Netanyahu's visit to the US, we asked Palestinians whom they think decide what the other should do regarding the peace process. 63% said Israel decides what the US should do and 32% said the US decides what Israel should do. 2% said neither decides what the other should do.

58% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 38% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. Inreturn, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our March 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan.

A majority of 62% of Palestinians regards the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as non-existent or low, 30% regard these chances as medium, and only 6% regard these chances as high. Moreover, 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.  The level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

 

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

  • Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital is the most vital Palestinian goal in the eyes of 48% of the public while 26% believe that the most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return
  • The primary problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by the continuation of the Israeli occupation and settlement construction, corruption, and the continued siege over the Gaza Strip

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 26% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The largest percentage (40%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages. 25% believe that the second goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 19% believe that the second goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 16% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 36% of the public while 30% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 18% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 11% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings. Only 2% mentioned the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split which was mentioned by 28% in our previous poll in March 2011. It is clear that the signing of the reconciliation agreement and the belief of the majority that the agreement will indeed be implemented has removed this issue from among the list of main problems as perceived by the public......Full Report