Sources of Distrust

 Palestinians and Israelis distrust and fear each other. Evidence from joint Palestinian-Israeli survey research indicates that distrust and fear are detrimental to peace-making. It is suspected that school education, daily life experiences-- including economic costs related to the continuation of the status quo-- and exposure to mutual violence are critical sources that contribute to the very high levels of distrust and fear. 

The overall objective of this research is to map out, identify, and explain how and why each of these sources impede the efforts toward a successful peace process and what must be done, by both sides, to dry up or neutralize them. 

Specifically, we seek to:

(1) identify and map out the top three critical socio-political and economic elements the feed existing distrust thereby contributing to widespread misperception, unwillingness to compromise, and a stagnation in the peace process;

(2) empirically demonstrate a direct or indirect relationship between these sources and the high levels of mutual distrust and fear; and,

(3) building on our research findings, as well as experiences of other conflict areas in Europe and other places-- in which critical policy decisions related to school education, daily life experiences, such as movement, access, and economic opportunity, and modes of resistance were made—outline evidence-based policy recommendations that can potentially reduce mutual distrust/fear.

Palestinian-Israeli Joint Poll on Sources of Mutual Distrust: Mutual Palestinian-Israeli distrust, found at the core of peace failure, is generated by socio-psychological forces heightened by daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and widespread negative perceptions about the other side’s educational system

September 15, 2021 --------- Palestinian and Israeli public support for peace stands at the lowest point since the beginning of the peace process 28 years ago.  Just completed joint Palestinian-Israeli research reveals an unequivocal finding: extremely low level of mutual trust among the two publics is the most important explanation for the declining support of the peace process. The joint research sought to map out the sources of distrust and recommend policy measures to address the problem of the continually declining mutual trust.

The research was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) and the Macro Center for Political Economics during the past three years with funding from the European Union (EU). One of the surveys conducted for the project was funded by the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah and the Japan Representative Office to Palestine through the UNDP/PAPP.

The joint research relied on surveys conducted in the second half of 2020 among representative samples of the two publics, survey experiments among those hardest-hit by the prolonged conflict and military occupation, educational and classroom experiments among students, all complemented with more than a dozen focus groups with students and those paying the highest cost of the conflict. The research was supplemented by case studies, review of textbook, the development of “objective” textbook passages, and a review of the recent history of peace education in Europe and elsewhere. The report on the historical review focused on the lessons learned from previous international examples and was discussed in a workshop for Palestinian, Israeli, and international professionals who spent years exploring this sensitive topic.

The Joint polls were conducted between August and November 2020 among representative samples of the two publics. Survey research experiments were conducted in January and February 2021 with focus groups soon after. A poll in the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse series, was conducted in August 2020 among a Palestinian sample of 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations and the margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic The margin of error is +/-3.34%. 

The joint poll on trust and the peace process was conducted among a Palestinian sample size of 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample included 1201 adults, of which 272 were youth, interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

Our survey research and experiments among the general public, residents of hard-hit areas, and students indicate the following (for project reports and documents, visit PSR and Macro’s websites):

• The contexts of the two societies, the Israeli and the Palestinian, are very different, leading to different results. The findings of the Israeli surveys show that trust is mostly determined by the psychological repertoire of beliefs, attitudes and emotions that are imparted and shaped in the political, educational and social culture that can be viewed as a culture of conflict. Israelis are less affected by the difficulties of daily life and violent events because their lives take place in a very different context and they lead routinized life – a normal life in the conflict
• Findings among the Palestinians show a correlation between the widespread mutual distrust on the one hand and the daily life hardships, exposure to violence, and negative perceptions of the educational system on the other side on the other hand.
• The research unveils other roots of distrust: socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that both side are carrying,  such as ethos of conflict and negative stereotyping relating to historic experiences and narratives. These variables indicate that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he or she holds regarding Palestinians or Israeli Jews, the more he/she finds the other side worthy of trust and therefore supports the peace process.
• The youth are more likely to hold hardline views, to indicate less trust, and to adhere to beliefs of ethos of conflict and hold stronger negative stereotype of the other.
• When linking support for peace with trust level, strong positive correlation emerges: the higher the trust, the higher the support for peace and the lower the trust, the lower the support for peace. Here is an example from our August 2020 joint poll: Palestinian support for the two-state solution stood at 60% among those who trust Israeli Jews and only 41% among those who distrust them; Israeli equivalent stood at 81% among those who trust Palestinians and only 34% among those who distrust them.  
• A dozen Educational and classroom experiments indicated that students are more likely to trust the other side and to have a more positive attitude toward peace when the classroom text presented by the teachers were “objective” or presented the other side in a positive light.
• Six survey research experiments found residents in areas of great hardships are more likely to distrust the other and to oppose the peace process.
• A dozen focus groups among students and residents of areas of great hardships confirmed the project findings and helped to articulate the link between trust and peace and the role played by the sources of distrust.

Recommendations: It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation. Yet as our research demonstrates, progress toward peace is linked to the restoration of trust and hope. A major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. It should be accompanied by change in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies.  Additional interim measures are needed: change the reality on the ground, stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing, increase contact between People, deliberately use mass media to inform and enlighten, use the school system with the goal of changing the collective psychological repertoire of society; and encourage joint projects in less sensitive areas such as health, science, and agriculture.  

For more information or interviews: contact Khalil Shikaki, PSR director, at kshikaki@pcpsr.org or 02-296 4933, and.Roby Nathanson, General Director, MACRO at roby@macro.org.il or 03-5251057

(1) Review selections of textbook material to be used in classroom experiments, the organization of at least a dozen classroom experiments on each side, the Palestinian and the Israeli, involving selected material and students, and the organization of at least a dozen focus groups with each side with teachers and students in various school types, religious, governmental, private, etc.;

(2) two major surveys on each side among representative samples, with added samples for youth, to measure overall public and youth exposure to violence, hardships, as well as personal tragedies and examine the ramifications of the findings with focus groups, particularly the youth;

(3) specially designed survey research experiments and case studies in which respondents under different levels of stress and hardship are observed and interviewed and compared to similar respondents who are exposed to no or less suffering and hardships;

(4) evaluate experiences and review lessons learned from other conflict areas, particularly in Europe through background research and meetings and workshops with experts and historians; 

(5) prepare, publish and disseminate reports of findings of research and recommendations to the public and various beneficiaries, including the publication of proposed textbook material that can be used by both sides to supplement existing textbooks; and

(6) workshops with and briefings for various local and international policy making bodies, particularly among the final beneficiaries.

1) Educational Experiments and Textbook Passages for Sustainable Peace Education: 

Two rounds of educational experiments were conducted during the period of the project. Each round included three experiments with students from the three selected classes in the three types of schools. The goal of the experiments was to explore the impact of school curriculum, in three varieties, “nonpositive,” meaning one that focused on pain, suffering, and costs of conflict to one’s own side, “positive,” meaning one that focused on the benefits of peace and diplomacy and the need to reach out to the other side and understand its fears, and “objective” passages, meaning one that focused on the two sides of the coin, the positive and the negative in a balanced manner. The project sought to document the impact of these types of texts on the students’ perception of the other side and on the attitudes regarding the question of peace and the two-state solution.

Each experiment involved the following:

1) Student participation: between 12 and 24 students, males and females, participated in each experiment in the three levels or grades. The consent of the students and their parents was secured before the sessions were held.

2) A selected text was presented by a teacher in a classroom setting. In the first round, three experiments are conducted, with students from the three types of schools. the passages used, (positive and nonpositive) are those selected from the existing textbooks. In the second round, three experiments are conducted with the same students from the three types of schools. The passages used by the teachers in the second round were those designed by PSR’s team and labelled “objective.” Each experiment of the first round was divided into two sessions. The nonpositive text was used in the first session and the positive text was used and in the second session. In the second round of experiments, the teachers used the “objective” texts drafted by PSR’s team. Only one session was conducted in the second round.

3) Teachers and locations: for the two rounds, PSR asked the teacher of each subject to teach the chapter to his or her class in the same way it is normally thought. However, while some of the sessions were held at the schools (government, private, and Islamic), others were held at PSR. The purpose of each session was explained to the teacher of each subject.

4) Questionnaire: students participating in all the sessions in the two rounds were asked to fill out a questionnaire that aimed at measuring student perception of the other (the Israelis), level of trust, and attitudes regarding the peace process and the two-state solution.  The data was entered and analyzed in order to compare findings in the two rounds and in the two sessions in the first round.

Description of the experiments:

Each educational experiment has 18-24 student. Each educational experiment started with an introduction by the teacher. Then, each teacher presented and explained two lessons of the selected (one positive/one nonpositive) text book to his/her students. After each lesson, the students filled a questionnaire. 

Three experiments were conducted in the first round: :

1. The first experiment involved 22 students (males and females) from a government school and was held in two sessions. The first session was held on 17 September 2020 at PSR. The positive text used was on fulfilling commitments from a religion textbook for the 9^th grade. The nonpositive text used in the second session of the first experiment was on the grandfather’s memory from an Arabic textbook for the 9^th graders.

2. The second experiment was conducted inside the classroom with 18 female students from an Islamic school, the Islamic Society School in Ramallah. The students came from two grades, the 10^th and the 11^th and the session was held on 4 October 2020. The positive text addressed the issue of traditional life in Palestine from the Arabic subject for the 9^th grade. The nonpositive text address the killing of Palestinians by an Israeli sniper; the subject is also Arabic.

3. The third experiment was conducted with students from a private school, the American School, with a total of 24 male and female students. The positive text dealt with personal hygiene from the Arabic subject for the 9^th grade. The nonpositive text addressed the issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, also from the Arabic subject for the 9^th grade. 

Three additional educational experiments and three new focus groups were conducted in the second round of the educational experiments.

1. In the first experiment, 15 students from a governmental school participated in a session at PSR on 18 January 2021. The objective passage addressed in this session reviewed the recent history of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

2. In the second experiment, 14 female students form an Islamic school participated in a session at the school for students from the 10^th and 11^th grades. The session was held on 27 January 2021. The topic from the subject of religion addressed the common elements in the three Abrahamic religions.

3. In the third experiment, 12 students from a private school, the same American school used in the first round, participated in a session held on 9 February 2021. The objective text in civics address the issue of historic narratives of Palestinians and Israelis.

Findings:

Findings of the first round showed clearly that students attitudes and perceptions regarding trusting the other side changed based on the text presented to them. The positive text produced greater trust in the other side compared to the level trust when the nonpositive text was produced.  Findings showed that 78% of the students had a low trust level and 19% had a medium trust level and only 3% had a high trust level when discussing the nonpositive text. The distrust level went down considerably from 78% to 23%, the medium trust went up from 19% to 56% and the high trust went up from 3% to 20% when discussing the positive text. Other findings confirmed this trend: the belief that the best means of ending the Israeli occupation is reaching a peace agreement stood at 53% among those who have a high level of trust on the other side declining to 17% among those with low level of trust. 

Finding of round 2 reflected the fact that the only texts that were presented to the students were “objective” and were designed by the project team based on the lessons learned from the findings of round 1 and the other work that was generated by that time from other project activities, such as the work on lessons learned from the previous experiences in Europe and elsewhere in peace education.  These texts focused on what the research team labeled “facts” and reflected views that are shared by many Palestinians and Israelis. The findings of the survey that was conducted among the students in this round showed that 54% of the students continued to have a low level of trust in the other side while 21% showed high level of trust; a little over a quarter (26%) expressed a medium level of trust.  As we found in the first round, the increase in the level of trust led to a parallel increase in the acceptance of peace agreements as the best means of ending the conflict. For example, half of those with a high trust level endorsed peace agreements while the equivalent percentage stood at 11% among those with a low level of trust. The following table show the impact of text on the level of trust in the two rounds.

 In the second round of the educational experiments, three experiments were conducted with the same schools and classes of the first round between December 2020 – February 2021, 10-15 students each, at PSR in Ramallah except the Islamic school that took place at the school premises in Ramallah. In this round the teachers presented and explained a short (alternative) passages of textbooks material that were designed by PSR’s researchers. And as in the first round, one questionnaire was filled out by the students after presenting the designed textbooks material.

In the first year, after reviewing existing textbook material for the various grades between the 6^th and the 12^th, PSR’s team identified areas where vacuum exists. Initial draft covering three subjects, history, religion, and civics, were prepared. During the second year of the project, the team revised the initial drafts in consultation with students, school teachers, and administrators. Along with other beneficiaries, the team  came to the conclusion that these passages must be perceived at “objective,” reflecting the reality of conflict while aspiring to serve as texts useful for peace education. Emphasis was therefore placed on ensuring that the students are exposed to perspectives of the two sides, the costs of war and the benefits of peace, the cup half full and the cup half empty. Various drafts were tested on small groups of students. Semi-final draft were prepared by the end of the second year.

During the third year, further adjustments were made based on the findings of the first round of the educational experiments and the report on lessons learned from the European and other experiences. Three passages were finalized and used in the second round of the educational experiments.  Copies were exchanged with the body in the Palestinian Authorities responsible for the development of curriculum. Copies were also shared with the UNRWA leadership.

These are the titles of the three passages:

   Looking at the Other’s Viewpoint: Historical Narratives of Palestinians and Israelis Sustainable Peace Education 

Palestinians and Israelis use their different historical narratives to prove their rights or the basis of their presence in this country. Each party claims that it has proven the truth concerning its connection to this land, the land of historical Palestine. At the same time, this raises controversy and clashes between successive generations on both sides.

  The Oslo Agreement: The Difficult Road to Palestinian-Israeli Peace  Sustainable Peace Education

The peace process faced many obstacles on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The Israeli government did not commit to transferring powers in accordance with the deadlines stipulated in the agreement, and continued to sponsor settlement activity in the Palestinian territories. The process also faced strong opposition from internal Palestinian parties, where some expressed their opposition by boycotting elections or refusing to participate in the PA authority. Others carried out bombing attacks against Israeli targets.

  Guidance and Light: The Doctrine of Monotheism in Revealed Religions Brings People Together and does not Divide Them Sustainable Peace Education

The basic idea in the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is centered on the doctrine of monotheism. This doctrine is derived from our prophet Ibrahim Al–Khalil, father of the prophets. The doctrine of monotheism is based on an established religious belief in one God with no second god and no partner. 

Focus groups:

Focus groups were used extensively in this project, particularly in our efforts to understand the impact of various educational texts on students’ perceptions of the other side. In addition to educational experiments, focus groups were used in our research into the impact of daily living conditions on perception of the other.

Focus groups for Educational Experiments, Round 1: The focus group for the first educational experiment in round (1) was conducted with the same students who participated in that experiment. It was held on 18 September. The purpose of the focus group session, which was held at PSR, was to discuss the findings of the questionnaire that the students had filled out during the experiment. The focus group of the second experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It took place on 5 October 2020. The focus group of the third experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It was held on 13 October 2020.

Round 2 of the educational focus groups: For round two, the focus group for the first experiment was held at PSR on 19 January 2021. The focus group of the second experiment was held on 28 January with the same students who took part in that experiment. The focus group of the third experiment was held with the same students who took part in that experiment. It was held on 10 February 2021.

Findings:

As indicated earlier, three types of schools participated in the focus groups. The finding of the focus group sessions in all of them were similar. When discussing the nonpositive text and the findings based on the answers of the students after that session, it was clear that the ideological tendencies among the students were compounded by the emotional responses generated by  the text contributed to the greater tendency to distrust the other: “they do not want peace; they want to demolish our homes, take away our land, expel us from our homeland, wage wars against us, and imprison and torture us.”

However, when reviewing the findings after the positive text, the emotional outbursts of the students were rare and the students were much more willing to engage in a more reasoned debate. In this environment, it was possible for the students to accept the concept of peace with the other. Students emphasized the importance of peace as the means to ensure security. Their demands now focused on the need for an honest implementation of agreements. When offered various scenarios to test willingness of the students to treat the other as a fellow human being the students showed remarkable openness and willingness to empathize and to emphasize the universal nature of human rights. 

Following the second round of the educational experiments, three focus groups were conducted with the the same schools and classes between January-February 2021. Each focus group has 10-15 student.

The focus groups in the second round discussed the significance of “objective” texts and the findings of the surveys that were conducted after each experiment. The findings confirmed what we saw when reviewing the impact of the positive texts> students were more considerate of other views and more open to new ideas. Students were more willing to emphasize the benefits of peace: “leads to restoration of rights and provides security to both sides.” But some were also interested in exploring the impact of peace failure: “what if it gave us a failed state? Will the settlers be removed? Will the state be truly sovereign and independent?” When discussing the importance of understanding the narrative of the other side, students distinguished between knowing and accepting  the other’s view of history: “while knowing the narrative of the other helps to reduce distrust, accepting the narrative of the other side is unacceptable because it means rejecting our own right to our land or accepting to be the scapegoats that pay the price for the oppression of the Jews throughout history.”

Survey Research Experiments and Case Studies The survey research experiments aimed at exploring the impact of daily living conditions, the hardships and suffering and exposure to violence, under a prolonged conflict. In order to select the areas, groups, and topis that would be the focus of the experiments, the Palestinian research team examined existing literature on life under occupation. Moreover, the team gained additional insights from the findings of the optional survey. Three areas/topics were selected: the H2 area in Hebron for their suffering from settlers’ attacks; the areas directly impacted by the location of the separation barrier; and those Palestinians residing in area C and denied building permits or see their homes and properties destroyed.

PSR has selected 243 participants for its three survey experiments in the following manner:

1)  80 people were selected for each area or experiment. Before the interviews were conducted, the respondents gave an oral consent. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses and were assured that they could stop the interview at any time and could refuse to answer any of the questions. The interviews were conducted between 25 January – 3 February 2021.

2) In the selected areas/topics, three localities were selected in which two were areas in which our optional and comprehensive surveys have shown significant hardships and one in which it indicated little or no significant hardships.  3) 27 individuals were selected in each locality.

3) Half of the sample comprised young respondents between the ages of 18- and 29-year-olds.

4) In areas of hardships, the coordinators have surveyed the area and asked local people before determining the plan for the selection of the respondents. After setting the plan, interviewers selected the homes, explained the purpose of the research to the selected adult respondents, asked if the criteria of hardships apply to the selected respondents. Once criteria confirmed, the interview was conducted with that person after obtaining his or her consent.  Once completed, the interviewers proceeded to the next home determined randomly by the plan. All respondents were asked to identify other areas in their neighbourhoods with similar level of hardships.

5) In areas where people were not expected to suffer from significant hardships, respondents were not asked to identify other potential areas with a similar low level of hardships. The selection of the homes was done randomly based on existing maps

6) Respondents were asked to identify themselves for two reasons: they compensated in the amount of NIS 50 per respondent (respondents have had to sign a receipt for that amount) and because they might be potentially selected for the focus group discussion and therefore, they needed to provide a phone number so that they can be called later to arrange for the focus group.  

Findings:

The survey experiments demonstrate the validity of our hypothesis on the Palestinian side: the greater the hardships, the greater the level of distrust and the opposition to the peace process.  The areas selected did indeed show greater hardships with 78% to 100% of the respondents in those areas indicating extreme hardships and or exposure to violence, particularly when compared to those living in area A, where the level of hardships diminished to only 40%. 

Findings show that the level of distrust in Israelis stood at 86% in areas of high hardships declining  to  77% in areas of low hardships. And 82% in areas of medium hardships. High support for the peace process among those with low level of trust stood at 3% and medium support at 21%. By contrast the equivalent percentages were 35% and 29% respectively among those with a medium level of trust. For those expressing a high level of trust, support for the peace process stood at 100%.  Findings have also shown that high support for the peace process stood at 13% among those with the highest level of hardships, 21% among those with the medium level of hardships, and only 7% among those with the highest level of hardships. 

Two focus groups were conducted   at PSR, both on 1 March 2021 with 12 participants in each group from among those who participated in the survey research experiments. Participants’ difficulties were the result of the building of settlement, the building of the separation barrier in the West Bank, and those residing in the H2 area of Hebron or area C. We also invited people with much less exposure to such difficulties and violence, such as those living in area A of the West Bank.

Findings of these focus groups showed significant lack of trust in Israelis among those with the highest level of difficulties. Similarly, those with the highest level of distrust showed little confidence in and support for the peace process. While some of the attitudes expressed by participants reflected ideological predispositions, others reflected the experiences of living through daily hardships or being witnesses to violence and hardships.

One participant expressed anger and hate: “My own land was confiscated to allow for the building of the separation barrier; I saw my own land, the one that has been in my family for generations, being taken away from me and my children without justification. On top of that, I was then arrested and thrown in jail. How can I not distrust and hate?” One participant from area A expressed the view that such Israeli practices must stop if peace is to prevail. One participant from expressed the view that “settlers’ violence, checkpoints, and army attacks make life a living hell, ensures there will never be peace. This comes from our own daily life experiences; we see violence every day. We therefore do not trust the state of Israel.” One of the participants whose land is located behind the separation barrier described daily life in the following terms: “Every day, I spend at least one hour of my time waiting at the gate each way. How can I trust Israelis and be convinced they want peace?”   

Three case studies were written based on the findings of the survery experiments, focus groups, and other projects surveys. The purpose of the case studies is to use specific examples and dynamics generated by the prolonged conflict that can illustrate and demonstrate the correlation between exposure to hardships and violence on one hand and diminished trust in the other on the other hand. The case studies are selected with that goal in mind. The evidence they rely on are based on various tools utilized in the project: surveys, survey research experiments, focus groups, and interviews with victims, activists, and policy makers. In describing the hardships, these case studies rely not only on the findings demonstrated by these tools, but also on existing evidence gathered by local and international agencies. Here below is a description of the six Palestinian and Israeli case studies.

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Life in areas adjacent to the separation wall as a case study 

This case study focused on studying one of the areas where suffering is high, those directly impacted by the construction of the Israeli separation wall, with the consequent barriers and restrictions on the residents, and how this affected the attitudes and perceptions of the people residing in the area towards the Israelis and the peace process.

The paper is intended to be a policy paper, discussing ways to alleviate the difficulties of life experienced by citizens in the areas adjacent to the wall, in an attempt to present a set of recommendations to the Palestinian government, Palestinian civil society, the international community, and the Israeli government that can be built upon in an attempt to enhance trust between the two parties if they want to move forward, in a serious peace process that ends all outstanding issues.

The paper utilized the findings of two public opinion polls conducted in the second half of 2020 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) on trust in the other side as well as  three survey experiments conducted in January 2021 among a sample of 243 individuals, including 162 who live in areas of severe hardships due to the wall and other hardships of daily life under occupation, and 81 individuals from areas of less suffering that are more remote from areas of friction. One of the three survey experiments was conducted om the residents directly affected by the separation wall or barrier. We also held two focus groups to discuss the results of the two surveys and the survey experiments to explore perceptions of individuals directly affected by daily life difficulties in the selected hardships areas. The paper also relied on many interviews with decision-makers, specialists, and citizens, and on several press reports that dealt with the subject, in addition to reports issued by Palestinian and international institutions.

The findings of this case studies provide evidence confirming the basic hypothesis of the project. Here is one example from the case under investigation. The results of the surveys and experiments conducted among the residents of those areas adjacent to the wall indicate that the greater the difficulties, the less the trust in the Israelis and the less support for the peace process. For example, 86% of those who suffer from high difficulties say they have low trust in Israeli Jews, only 1% of them have high trust, and 13% have medium trust. Trust increases slightly among those who suffer from fewer difficulties, as 23% of them have medium trust and 77% have low trust. This is also reflected in support for the peace process. While 73% of those who suffer from high difficulties have low support for the peace process, 58% and 61%, respectively, of those who have moderate or little difficulties have low support for the peace process. 

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Settlers’ attacks in H-2 areas of Hebron as a case study  

This case study aimed at studying the difficulties caused by the settlers’ attacks on Palestinian residents of H2 area in the city of Hebron, which is one of the areas in which daily suffering and life difficulties increases dramatically as a result of the prolonged occupation and the settlers’ attacks in particular, and how this affects the attitudes and perceptions of the people of the area towards the Israelis and the peace process. As in the other two cases, this one too shows that the difficulties of daily life and the exposure to violence resulting from the conflict play an important role in reducing trust and increasing opposition to the peace process.

Also, like the other two, this case study relied on the findings of the surveys and experiments conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) on trust in the other party. The survey experiment specific to this paper was conducted in January 2021. The paper also relied on the findings of two focus groups that were organized by PSR to discuss the results of the attitudinal surveys and the survey experiments. Moreover, interviews with decision - makers, specialists, and citizens were conducted for a better understanding of the underlying forces at play in areas of increased suffering and hardships. We also relied on a set of press and documentary reports that dealt with the subject in addition to reports issued by Palestinian and international institutions.

Most of the residents of H2 are more likely than others to be subjected to violence by settlers and the occupation. The results obtained from a survey conducted for the residents of those areas indicate that the greater the difficulties, the less trust in the Israelis and the less support for a peace process between the two sides. The results of surveys among young people (18-29) also showed that there is a close relationship between difficulties and trust. The greater the difficulty, the lower the trust. The same applies to the elderly (30 and over), but to a lesser degree. Findings also show higher levels of distrust among those who have been exposed to more violence at the hands of the Israelis, reaching 87% among those who have been exposed to the highest levels and declining to 82% among those who have been subjected to a lower degree of violence.

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Home demolition and denial of building permits as a case study  

This case study examined the impact of the Israeli policies in denying Palestinian’s housing improvement. It aims to examine the impact of the difficulties in obtaining building permits and the policy of house demolition in Area C on the level of Palestinians’ trust in the Israeli side, and the extent of its impact on the level of support for the peace process with the Israelis.  The paper relied on the same data as the other two case studies. One of the survey experiments was carried out among residents living in areas suffering the most from house demolitions and denial of building permits. Focus groups and interviews helped to shed greater light on the relationship between hardships and distrust.

It is worth pointing out that the results of the survey experiment conducted by PSR, unlike the findings in the other case studies, indicate that there are no significant differences in the levels of trust in the Israelis among Palestinians who were refused a building permit or had their homes demolished compared to Palestinians who were not. However, about 78% of those who were refused building permits or had their homes demolished say that they have experienced high difficulties, compared to 40% of those who live in areas that do not experience difficulties in obtaining building permits from the Israeli authorities or demolishing homes. 

Joint Palestinian-Israeli public opinion polls on trust

Two surveys were conducted for this project: 

After finalizing the questionnaire, PSR conducted four training sessions for its fieldworkers: three trainings sessions in the west bank (north, middle and south), and one training session in Gaza. The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 12-26 August, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic 12 August and 3 September 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler from Tel Aviv University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin.

Here are some of the relevant findings of the first survey:

• Levels of trust in the other side are very low: 90% of Palestinians and 79% of Israeli Jews think the other side is not trust worthy. When asked about the role of leadership in fostering distrust: 40% of Israeli Jews, 44% of Israeli Arabs, and 34% of the Palestinians expressed the view that their side’s leadership diminishes trust with the other side. By contrast, two thirds of Israeli Jews, 38% of Israeli Arabs, and 78% of Palestinians think the leadership on the other side diminishes trust.
• When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 34% of the Palestinians (49% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip) 41% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a decrease in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians and Israeli Jews compared to only 41% and 45% respectively who chose this option in 2018.  37% of Palestinians (compared to 27% two years ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 19% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians” compared to 20% in 2018.
• Support for the two-state solution remains relatively stable at 43% among Palestinians and among Israeli Jews declines just slightly from 43% in mid-2018 to 42%. Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 44% in total support the two-state solution. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among Israeli Jews, and all Israelis, since the beginning of the Pulse, in June 2016. Still, fewer people on both sides support two possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights and one state without rights.
•  Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in mid-2018 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times during the past four years. Findings show significant drop in support among the two publics. Only 27% of Palestinians (compared to 42% in mid-2018, a 15-point drop) and 36% of Israeli Jews (compared to 45% two years ago, a 9-point drop) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 49% of Israeli Arabs. In total, 38% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a regional agreement along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Fifty one percent of all Israelis (56% of Israeli Jews) and 70% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.
• The survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested zero-sum incentives on the level of support for the peace package. Drawing on six such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits but also costs for each side. This is the second time that we have conducted this experiment. In this experiment, which was conducted among half the sample, we changed the pairs that were tested as the goal has been to pair incentives that received similar levels of success in previous test. Findings in the previous experiment, in mid-2018, showed significant success among Israeli Jews but very little success among the Palestinians. The current findings show significant potential for success among both publics, but the success among Israeli Jews remains greater: six of the six pairs generated higher levels of support for the peace package among Israeli Jews while on the Palestinian side only four generated higher levels of support. As a result, three pairs caused a majority of Jewish Israelis to say they were more likely to support the package while none of the paired incentives convinced a majority of Palestinians to say they were more likely to support the detailed two-state package.
• Moreover, the current joint poll conducted a second experiment among the other half of the sample. In this one, we sought to understand the hierarchy of priorities for the two publics: what were their most important demands and what concessions were the most difficult for them to make versus those that were less difficult. Broadly, for Israelis the top priority for demands involved symbolic recognition of the Jewish connection to the land, and the demand that Palestinians imprison those involved in violence. However, a plurality did not believe Israel should have to make concessions in return for its own demands, indicating that Israeli demands should be unconditional. Similarly, on the Palestinian side, a majority declined to choose a specific concession Palestinians should make in return for its negotiators’ demands. Yet the top demand Palestinians prioritized was the release of Palestinian prisoners; the main concession they accepted – those who chose one – was removing incitement from textbooks.
• A second peace package was tested in this poll: Trump’s peace plan, or the deal of the century. Like the peace package we have tested over the years, this one was broken into its most important components. The public was asked about each one and the package as a whole. Findings are dramatic: 93% of the Palestinians opposed the plan and 5% accepted it. Among Israelis, a majority of Israeli Jews (51%) accepted it, 30% rejected it, and 19% did not know or were uncertain. A large majority of Palestinians (69%) thought that Israeli Jews would accept the plan. On the Israeli side, two thirds thought the Palestinians would reject the plan.  

Second Survey:

PSR and its new partner, MACRO, reviewed the comprehensive survey questionnaire that was prepared by PSR during the first and the second year of the project and agreed on major modifications. Before the end of the third year, the two teams agreed on a final version.  Before conducting the survey, four training sessions were conducted by PSR in October 2020 to PSR’s fieldworkers: three training sessions in the West Banks (North, Middle and South), and one training session in Gaza.

The Palestinian sample size was 1560 adults, including 592 youth, interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 29 October to 1 November, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 1201 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Rafi Smith in Hebrew and Arabic on 00 November 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli and Palestinian data files have been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of the various groups and ages in the Palestinian and Israeli societies, and to reflect, for Israeli Jews, current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error for the Israeli poll is +/-3.34%. 

Findings:

Here are some of the main findings of the joint comprehensive survey:

Israeli and Palestinian Support for Peace: Our most unequivocal finding shows that trust is the most important predictor of support in the peace process among respondents from both sides.

On the Israelis side, we found additional socio-psychological variables such as ethos and stereotyping, which indicated that the less a person adheres to ethos of conflict and the less negative stereotypes he holds regarding Palestinians, the more he/she supports the peace process.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about support for the concept and details of the two-state solution. But peace has also been defined in term of support and opposition to an agreement based on many associated compromises as well as expression of attitudes consistent with that solution. For example, we examined attitudes regarding related topics: violence vs. diplomacy and perceptions of the other and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does. We also probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. These and other relevant questions informed our peace indicator building. The indicator of peace, has three levels: high, medium, and low. The peace indicators’ building exercise showed that support for peace is predominantly low in the two joint polls, but most significantly in the October poll, when an expanded set of 13 questions were used to build this peace indicator while only four were used to build the August indicator.

Israeli and Palestinian Distrust: On the Israeli side, the results indicate a low level of trust towards Palestinians, expressed by the Jewish samples. However, Israeli Arabs expressed somewhat a higher level of trust towards Palestinians. Both groups did not differentiate significantly in trust towards Palestinians in general and towards their leaders. The results of the Jewish sample in the survey study 2 show that most of the Jewish respondents (34.1%) attributed their lack of trust to the “Palestinian education system, which incites against Jews”.

Among the Palestinians, findings of our two joint surveys indicate that the levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. A solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. For trust, the building of the indicator went through three steps: the first step was to build an indicator based on measuring direct questions about willingness to trust the other side. The second step was based on a set of indirect questions about trust. In the third step, we combined the two indicators into one. Findings show mostly low levels of trust for all three trust indicators, but more so in October and in trust indicator #3 (the combined trust indicator). A large set of questions (15 direct and indirect questions) was used to build the October trust indicator while only five direct and indirect questions were used to build the August indicator.

Conclusions: The present study unveils the roots of distrust in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study shows that although exposure to violence related to the conflict, experience of violence and hardships, and negative perceptions of the educational system of the other side have some effect on trust, particularly among the Palestinians who live under the harsh reality of military occupation, the primary determinants, particularly among the Israelis, are the socio-psychological variables representing the repertoire that Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs are carrying. This repertoire includes beliefs, attitudes and emotions. Among Israeli Jews, these beliefs and attitudes of the conflict take the form of stereotypes, ethos of conflict, concerns about antisemitism and holocaust and political orientation. They lead also to cognitive closure, reflected in refusal to acquire information from a Palestinian. This socio-psychological repertoire influences what information receives attention and the way in which it is mentally coded and organized. Next, it functions as an interpretive framework, influencing evaluations, judgments, predictions and conclusions drawn by Israelis. This repertoire is the key determinant of trust. For example, Israeli Jews, who negatively stereotype Palestinians and even delegitimize them, while adhering to ethos of conflict as their ideology, show distrust towards Palestinians.

What should be of great concern is the well-established findings showing that this repertoire is acquired at the very early age. This is unavoidable, as children learn this repertoire from all agents of socialization, including parents, leaders, television, literature, teachers, social media and schoolbooks. The beliefs and attitudes regarding the conflict learned by children at an early age remain in their socio-psychological repertoire and may have latent influence later on. These contents serve as fertile ground for the later development of conflict attitudes. They may constitute a part of children’s general worldviews which remains relatively constant across time. Eventually, these will pose a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution.

Recommendations

Living under military occupation, Palestinians experience hardships and exposure to violence on daily basis. We suggest that these are some of the reasons for such strong distrust of Israeli Jews. On the Israeli Jewish side, some of these reasons also lies in the cultural-societal-political climate of the Israeli society, as reflected in the information provided by leaders, mass-media, schools, ceremonies, memorial days, the imparted collective memory and existing dominant political ideologies. On the Palestinian side, changing the reality on the ground and restoring hope for peace and the two-state solution is essential for restoring some level of trust. On the Israeli Jewish side, a major societal change is needed to change the state of mind that is supporting distrust. On both sides, conflict supporting narratives need to be addressed before any trust can be restored.

1. Change the new reality on the ground: For Palestinians, the reality on the ground worsen by the day as land is confiscated, homes demolished, movement and access restricted, and settlers’ violence increases. The siege and blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip and the frequent eruption of massive violence and destruction of civilian infrastructure make the Strip a big prison for the two million Palestinians living in it. Israelis too, but particularly those who live in the south suffer the occasional barrages of rockets from the Gaza Strip while settlers who live in the occupied West Bank, face occasional violence and rock throwing. Although Palestinian and Israeli authorities coordinate with each other on essential civil and security matters, no dialogue takes place on how to ease daily living conditions, stop the building of settlements, or eradicate violence. To be effective in reducing distrust and hate, coordination between the two sides need to cover all these additional areas of daily friction and difficulties and search for ways to deliver security to both sides. It goes without saying that only the ending of occupation and the building of permanent peace can bring about a real restoration of trust and begin the process of reconciliation.
2. Stop incitements and minimize negative language and phrasing: Various formal and informal sources in Israel, present the Palestinian school textbooks, teachers, mass media and the leaders as inciting against Israel, Zionism (Jewish Nationalism) and as being anti-Semitic. This practice can be found also on the Palestinian side. It is exaggerated and augmented serving the struggle between the two contradicting and rival narratives.
3. Contact between People:  Contact between members of the two societies is one of the most researched methods to change beliefs, attitudes, and emotions in order to improve the relations between them.
4. Use of mass media: Mass media is one of the most powerful agents that provides information and shapes public opinion. Mass media should stop presenting the other side in negative way and develop peace journalism.  It can supply major information about the other group; it can supply major information about the culture of the other- with films, theatrical plays, or entertainment programs; it can enlighten in a balance way, the eruption of the conflict, its major events and costs that have been paid for continuation of the conflict.    
5. Education: In the long run, education constitutes one of the most important methods for eradicating distrust. This method involves using the school system since this system is often the only institution of which the society can make wide scope use to change the psychological repertoire of society members. Education for building trust must begin at an early age and continue through the years of schooling. Also, it is possible to a establish joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to examine existing textbooks and curricula to eliminate any derogative expressions.  
6. Joint Projects: Joint projects of various kinds, but particularly those that are less sensitive, can serve as a method for building trust. They can be in different areas such as health, agriculture, or science. Joint projects can foster links between members of the two groups at different levels of society, such as elites, professionals, as well as grass roots. This method provides opportunities for personal encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations.

The following material represent the publications of our joint research.

 Questionnaire of the first joint poll 

Questionnaire of the second joint poll

Table of findings of the first joint poll

Table of findings of the second joint poll coming soon

Summary Report of findings of the joint polls 

Combined Report of findings of the joint polls

Palestinian Report of findings of the joint polls

Israeli Report of findings of the joint polls

Sustainable Peace Education: Report on lessons learned from Europe and elsewhere

This report studies the practice of peace education. It offers an introduction into the way peace education has developed over time and how it is addressed academically. It draws from concrete examples mainly from Europe, while considering lessons from successful experiences for Israel/Palestine. 

PSR and Macro commissioned Prof. Dr. Stephan Stetter, from the Bundeswehr University Munich, to prepare a report on lessons learned and evaluate experiences from other conflict areas, particularly in Europe. Stephan Stetter holds the Chair in International Politics and Conflict Studies at the Universität der Bundeswehr in Munich. He has studied political science, sociology and history at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, the Hebrew University of Jersualem and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) where he has received his MSc (with distinction). He holds a PhD from the LSE (2004) and has written his dissertation on EU Foreign and Interior Policies at the LSE and the European University Institute in Florence. From 2003 until 2006 he was a researcher at the Institute for World Society Studies at Bielefeld Universität Bielefeld. From 2007 until 2008 he was a temporary Professor for Political Science at Bielefeld University. He received his Habilitation from the Faculty of Sociology at Bielefeld University in January 2008 with a work on "World Society and the Middle East". Since October 2008 he holds the Chair in International Politics and Conflict Studies at the Universität der Bundeswehr München. Stephan Stetter's main areas of expertise are Middle East politics (with a special focus on Israel/Palestine), theories of world politics, conflicts and globalisation/world society as well as EU foreign policies, in particular Euro-Mediterranean relations. He is the author of "World Society and the Middle East: Reconstructions in Regional Politics (Palgrave, 2008) and "EU Foreign and Interior Policies : Cross-Pillar Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty"(Routledge, 2007). He has published widely in leading peer-reviewed academic journals such as International Organization, Review of International Studies, Mediterranean Politics and Journal of European Public Policy. He is editor of several books such as "Territorial Conflicts in World Society" (Routledge, 2007), "The European Union and Border Conflicts" (Cambridge University Press, 2008, with Thomas Diez and Mathias Albert) and "Der Nahe Osten im Umbruch" (VS-Verlag 2009, with Martin Beck, Cilja Harders and Annette Jünemann). Since 2003 Stephan Stetter is EU-coordinator of the Israeli-European Policy Network (IEPN). In that capacity he has published jointly with Roby Nathanson four books on EU-Israeli relations and is also editor of the IEPN Working Paper Series.

PSR has asked Prof. Stetter to conclude his report with specific recommendations regarding the range of issues covered in the research: 1) how to design an educational system that promotes greater reconciliation, 2) how to remove or mitigate the consequences of hardships inflicted on individuals, groups and communities by the conflict, and (3) how to reverse the consequences of exposure to violence, particularly on the youth.

After reviewing the first draft of Prof. Stetter report by PSR and MACRO, Prof. Stetter revised his report and has prepared a semi-final version of the report that was discussed with experts form Palestine, Israel and Europe in a virtual workshop (due to COVID 19) on 25 January 2021, see below.

The report studied the practice of peace education. It offered an introduction into the way peace education has developed over time and how it is addressed academically. It drew from concrete examples mainly from Europe, while considering lessons from successful experiences for Israel/Palestine. In section 2 of the report, core concepts were presented that are of key importance when dealing with peace education, namely the concepts of “peace education”, “conflict” and “peace” as well as the notions of “(local) peace-building” and “(post-) conflict societies”. Section 3 looked at peace education in detail. It is divided in three sub-sections. It, firstly, offered an overview on how peace education is defined today in key policy documents, mainly from the international level where this concept has become mainstreamed. It secondly provided for an overview on the history of the practice of peace education, a history that dates back to the 19^th century and attempts in that period for pedagogical reforms, on the one hand, and peaceful political relations between nations, on the other. Thirdly, by looking at contemporary practical experiences mainly in Europe this section discussed achievements but also pitfalls of peace education. Special attention was given here to the cases of Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the process of European integration under the umbrella of the EU. Section 4 looked at two specific intervening contexts of relevance to peace education. On the one hand, the role of everyday dynamics and concrete life experience of people in conflict-settings were addressed and how they are fostering or hampering peace education. On the other hand, the impact exposures to violence have on peace education. What was emphasized here is the central role of violence in rendering mutual distrust a fundament of social relations, but also the strategic use of violence that works against peace education. Throughout sections 3 and 4 reference to the Israel/Palestine case was made in order to highlight similarities and differences with European experiences. The paper closed with a summary of successful examples from Europe and policy recommendations for Israel and Palestine.

Here are the links to the publications in English:

1) Three Palestinian short passages of textbook material:
   Looking at the Other’s Viewpoint: Historical Narratives of Palestinians and Israelis Sustainable Peace Education 

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

  The Oslo Agreement: The Difficult Road to Palestinian-Israeli Peace  Sustainable Peace Education

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

  Guidance and Light: The Doctrine of Monotheism in Revealed Religions Brings People Together and does not Divide Them Sustainable Peace Education

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

2) One report on lessons gained from other experiences:

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

3) Three Palestinian case studies:  

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Life in areas adjacent to the separation wall as a case study:

What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education? (pcpsr.org)

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Settlers’ attacks in H-2 areas of Hebron as a case study:

PSR case studies_H2 area_English.pdf (pcpsr.org)

 Impact of Daily Life Hardships on Mutual Trust and Support for Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process: Home demolition and denial of building permits as a case study:

PSR case studies_building permits_English.pdf (pcpsr.org)

4) A joint Palestinian-Israeli report on the findings of the survey research and the survey research experiments on both sides.

Combined Report of findings of the joint polls:

Microsoft Word - Combined Report of Palestinian-Israeli Joint Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

Summary Report of findings of the joint polls:

Summary Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls (pcpsr.org)

Palestinian Report of findings of the joint polls:

Microsoft Word - Palestinian Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

Israeli Report of findings of the joint polls:

Microsoft Word - Israeli Report of Joint Palestinian-Israeli Polls.docx (pcpsr.org)

Questionnaire of the first joint poll:

Joint Poll Questionnaire English_August 2020.pdf (pcpsr.org)

Table of findings of the first joint poll:

Microsoft Word - Table of findings_english Joint Poll 6 June 2020.docx (pcpsr.org)

Questionnaire of the second joint poll:

1 (pcpsr.org)