Special Public Opinion Poll Among Palestinians of East Jerusalem

The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed the electoral victory of the Likud and extreme right wing parties in the Israeli parliamentary elections and the beginning of negotiations to form a purely right wing government. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, a UN resolution asked the International Court of Justice to express its views on the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation. The period also witnessed the formation of armed groups in the Jenin and Nablus areas of the West Bank dedicated to resisting Israeli military incursions into Palestinian territories. The number of such incursions increased considerably during this period and consequently the number of Palestinian casualties increased. The period also witnessed the continuation of home  demolition and the attempts to force East Jerusalem residents to evacuate their homes because the land belonged to Jews before 1948. Tension rose in the al Haram al Sharif and al Aqsa Mosque due to increased number of visits by religions Jews, some of whom prayed in the full view of the Israeli police who did not stop them.       

The poll has two goals:

(1) To identify current problems and concerns of East Jerusalem Palestinians under existing political and living conditions and to identify their views and likely patterns of behavior in a future political settlement. For this purpose,  

respondents  have been asked about satisfaction with levels of service delivery, the nature of problems they confront in daily life, views on various peace proposals, and probable behavior under various peace scenarios.

(2) To compare the findings of the two surveys, the one conducted in 2010 and the current one. For this purpose, the questions in the two polls were identical. The comparison seeks to identify areas of change and their political implications.

The current findings show clear absence of trust in the policies and plans of the Jerusalem municipality and a strong belief that there is discrimination against the Arabs. But they also show a significant rise in the level of satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality and other aspects of life in East Jerusalem. Also, there is a significant rise in the percentage of those who, when confronting problems, seek help from Israeli government agencies or institutions. But East Jerusalemites continue to view the wall that separates them from the West Bank as a big problem. The same applies to Israeli military checkpoints, the level of corruption in the municipality, and the threat posed by the Israeli police and settlers.

The findings show what amounts to a consensus in which East Jerusalemites indicate unwillingness to participate in future Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections leading to a significant rise in the rate of nonparticipation compared to 2010. Similarly, there is a consensus against participation in the Jerusalem municipal elections even if the Palestinian Authority (PA) encouraged them to vote. There is a significant rise in the level of worry when contemplating a scenario in which East Jerusalem comes under Palestinian sovereignty in a permanent peace agreement. This increased

worry led to a significant decrease in the percentage of those who prefer to become Palestinian citizens in such agreement and a significant increas

e in the percentage of those who prefer to become Israeli citizens. Perhaps the most likely explanation for this development is the distrust in the PA and its institutions as well as the completion of the construction of the separation wall. The completion of the wall forced East Jerusalemites to turn to West Jerusalem for employment and business in order to avoid crossing the wall and the checkpoints which impedes their movement and transportation. This change tied East Jerusalem to the Israeli economy in an unprecedent manner leading to other highly important changes affecting living conditions and administrative and educational aspects of the lives of East Jerusalemites.

Findings also indicate that there is a near consensus among East Jerusalemites to refuse to participate in the future Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, as there has been a remarkable increase in the percentage of rejection compared to the situation in 2010.  There is also near unanimity in refusing to participate in the Jerusalem municipal elections even if the PA asks them to participate.  It also points to a significant increase in the level of anxiety and concern among the population in the event of a permanent settlement in which East Jerusalem is placed under Palestinian sovereignty. This increase in concern is reflected in several things, the most important of which is a significant decrease in the percentage of those who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship in the permanent settlement and a significant increase in the percentage of those who prefer to hold Israeli citizenship.

Perhaps the main reason behind this development, in addition to the lack of confidence in the institutions of the PA and the future state and its various capabilities, is the transformation brought about by the completion of the construction of the wall separating East Jerusalem and the West Bank, forcing the residents of the Palestinian city to turn to West Jerusalem, instead of the West Bank, for work and trade, in order to avoid passing through the wall and its military entrances that impede movement and transportation. All of this change forced East Jerusalem residents to tie themselves to the Israeli economy in an unprecedented manner. This was followed by other important administrative, daily life, educational and other transformations that kept East Jerusalemites away from Palestinian public institutions in the West Bank. Israel's decision to prevent East Jerusalemites from participating in the Palestinian general elections in 2021, and the PA's acquiescence and capitulation to that decision by cancelling the elections instead of fighting to force Israel to allow East Jerusalemites to participate in these elections, have added further frustration among East Jerusalemites and increased their beliefs that their fate will remain tied to and under Israeli control for the foreseeable future.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the thing most liked by East Jerusalemites about their city is al Aqsa Mosque (mentioned by 57% of respondents) and the thing most disliked is the occupation and related measures like settlements, wall, siege, and other restrictions (49%) followed by issues of daily living conditions such as crowdedness and high prices, selected by 17% and 6% respectively. 

The following summary covers five main issues addressed by the poll: (1) satisfaction with municipal services, (2) the Wall and the che

ckpoints, (3) political participation, (4) permanent settlement, (5) goals of the Jerusalem Municipality, home demolition, and forced evacuation. 

Residents of East Jerusalem are satisfied with many aspects of their life in the city but they are dissatisfied with others. For example, they are satisfied or very satisfied with service delivery in areas of health services (83%), water (82%), electricity (75%), the ease with which they can reach al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (74%), sewage system (73%), the speed with which fire emergency services arrive (70%), and the speed with which ambulance services arrive (69%). They are also satisfied with access to transportation to Israel (64%), the ease with which they can obtain official birth certificates or other papers from government offices (60%), garbage collection in their neighborhoods (60%), living conditions in general (56%), the ease with which they obtain travel documents to travel through Ben Gurion airport (52%), and adding the names of their children to their IDs (52%). By contrast, the level of dissatisfaction is very high with other services, such as obtaining building permits, to which 73% express dissatisfaction, level of law enforcement (49% dissatisfaction), residence taxes/Arnona (69% are dissatisfied), conditions of roads in their neighborhoods (47% dissatisfaction), and access to West Bank (32%).  

Figure (1): Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of Jerusalemites with service delivery- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

These results indicate an increase in the percentage of satisfaction with 21 services, the most important of which is an increase of more than 20 percentage points in the speed of access to fire and other emergency services, the speed of arrival of ambulance services, the ease of obtaining a passport or document to travel through Ben Gurion Airport, the standard of living in general, and the ease of access to the West Bank. On the other hand, there is a decrease in satisfaction with five services, including the availability of electricity, the sewage system, access to workplaces, income tax, and Arnona tax, as indicated in the following table.

An overwhelming majority of Jerusalemites (87%) believes that discrimination against Arabs exists in municipal service delivery.  The largest percentage (30%) says the discrimination is noticeable in all areas of service delivery while 9% believe it is evident in personal treatment they receive from municipal officials; 7% say it is in areas of basic infrastructure, such as roads; 6% say it is particularly evident in access to health services, and 3% say it is evident in access to building permits. When comparing current results with those obtained 12 years ago, it is clear that the perceptions of discrimination in services remain very high despite falling by nine percentage points (as indicated in Figure 2). Belief that there is no discrimination increases from 7% to 13% during the same period.

When identifying key areas of discrimination, the main differences between the current results and those we found in 2010 lie in the significant increase in the percentage of those who say discrimination covers all the services we asked about, from 17% twelve years ago to 30% in the 2022 survey. But it is also clear that there is a decrease, as we can see in Figure 3, in the percentage of those who say that there is discrimination in health services, which decreased by 9 percentage points. The percentage of those who say that there is discrimination in personal treatment decreased by 5 percentage points, and the percentage of those who say there is discrimination in issuing building permits decreased by 4 percentage points. Despite this decline, it is not at all certain that these results in their entirety indicate an improvement in the area of discrimination in these specific areas, as the percentage of those who say that there is discrimination in all these areas has increased by 13 percentage points, as mentioned above. 

A majority of East Jerusalemites (59%) say that the Israeli stipulation that requires Jerusalem to be the “center of life” in order to receive some services, such as social security or insurance, affects them negatively and 18% say it affects them positively. This finding indicates an 8-point drop in the percentage of those who view the effect negatively and a 9-poiint rise in the percentage of those who view it positively.

When problems occur, or when in need for social assistance, the largest percentage (51%) seeks relief from family while 40% say they seek it from Israeli public institutions, 2% say they go to international institutions; 1% say they go to Palestinian NGOs, and 1% say they go to Waqf (Islamic Endowment). These findings indicate a 9- point rise in the percentage of those who seek help from offices of the Israeli government and a similar increase of 7 points of those who seek family help. They also indicate a 4-point drop in the percentage of those who seek help from Palestinian NGOs.

The 2022 findings show that 89% of East Jerusalemites identify as a problem the delays that occur during travel due to the construction of the wall that separates East Jerusalem from the West Bank. Similarly, 87% say the delays and restrictions at checkpoints pose a problem; 66% say corruption of municipal staff poses a problem; 66% describe corruption in the PA as a problem; 65% say Israeli police and border guard pose a problem; 63% view the level of crime in the city as a problem; 61% say settlers pose a problem; and threats from other Palestinians are seen as a problem by 29%.

Compared to the 2010 findings, we see the following:

(1) There is an 11-percentage point increase in the percentage of those who perceive threats and intimidation from the Israeli police and border police; a similar increase (10 points) in the percentage of those who perceive a threat from Jewish settlers; and a 9-percentage point increase in the level of perceived threats and intimidation from Palestinian factions.

(2) There is a significant decrease of 21 points in the perception of threat from the crime level; a decrease of 12 points in the threat perception from the level of corruption in the Jerusalem municipality; and a decrease of 6 points in the percentage of those who feel threatened by the level of delays and restrictions on checkpoints or due to the construction of the wall in East Jerusalem.

Figure (5): East Jerusalemites View Various Issues as problems- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

The overwhelming majority of East Jerusalemites (93%) says it did not participate in previous Palestinian elections and 6% say they did participate. The largest percentage did not participate because they were not impressed by the candidates (41%), they felt their participation was pointless (24%), or because the winners could not possibly make a difference in the lives of East Jerusalemites (14%). A small percentage of 4% say it did not participate due to fear of losing its East Jerusalem identity. These findings indicate a significant rise in the rate of nonparticipation compared to 78% in 2010, most likely due to the fact that many among the 2022 respondents were not adults in 2006. The findings also indicate an increase in the percentage of those who think the candidates were either unimpressive or will not be able to serve the interests of their community, which stood at 33% twelve years ago compared to 55% today, a 22-point increase.

If new Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections are held today, only 6% say they would participate and 92% say they would not. When asked why they would not participate, respondents provided the same explanations for their non-participation as those of 2010: 41% say will most likely see the candidates are unimpressive or that there is no point in the participation (34%) or that the winners will not be able to serve their community (16%). In comparing the current findings with those of 2010, we see a significant decline in the percentage of those who are willing to participate in the elections standing at 33 points (dropping from 39%) and we see a rise in the non-participation rate standing at 36 points (rising from 56%).

With regard to Israeli elections, 3% say they have participated in previous Knesset or municipal elections and 95% say they did not participate. The largest percentage (41%) say they did not participate because they were not impressed by the candidates; 25% say their participation would be pointless; and 9% say they boycotted the elections because East Jerusalem is an occupied city and not part of the Jerusalem municipality or the state of Israel. When comparing the current findings with those of 2010, we see an 18-point rise in the percentage of those who think they will not be impressed by the candidates and a 12-point decline in the percentage of those who say they boycotted the elections because East Jerusalem is an occupied city and not part of the Jerusalem municipality or the state of Israel.

If the PA were to ask them to participate in the Israeli Jerusalem municipal elections, only 3% say they would do so and 92% say they would not. Compared to 2010, these findings indicate a 20-point drop in the percentage of those who say they would comply with the PA request and a 17-point rise in the percentage of those who say they would refuse to comply with the PA request.

Figure (6): Personal preferences of East Jerusalemites regarding sovereignty in East Jerusalem-comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

When Palestinians and Israelis return to negotiations, the issue of the sovereignty over East Jerusalem will be discussed.

What do you prefer? Palestinian, Israeli or international sovereignty?

The preference for Palestinian sovereignty is higher in the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, standing at 46%, declining to 33% in the central and southern neighborhoods.  The preference for Israeli sovereignty is also higher in the northern neighborhoods, standing at 24% and lower in the central and southern neighborhoods, 15% and 17% respectively. The preference for international sovereignty stands at 30% in the central and southern neighborhoods and at 18% in the northern neighborhoods (see appendix 1 for the distribution of East Jerusalem neighborhoods into north, central, and southern). 

When asked if they prefer to have Palestinian or Israeli citizenship in the permanent settlement, 58% (compared to 63% in 2010) said they want Palestinian citizenship and 37% (compared to 24% in 2010) said they want Israeli citizenship. In other words, the demand for Israeli citizenship increased by 13 percentage points between 2010 and 2022 while the demand for Palestinian citizenship decreased by 5 points, as can be seen in figure (7) below. The preference for Palestinian citizenship is higher in the central neighborhoods, standing at 66%, followed by the southern neighborhoods (60%) and the northern neighborhoods (48%). The preference for Israeli citizenship is higher in the northern neighborhoods (44%) followed by the southern neighborhoods (34%) and the central neighborhoods (29%). As will be seen later in this section (see figure 10) when we discuss the impact of rising concerns among East Jerusalemites about the possibility that their neighborhoods would become part of a future Palestinian state in a permanent settlement, the differences between the current findings and those of 2010, point clearly to the nature of the change that has taken place among some East Jerusalemites during the past 12 years and led them to show greater preference for Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. These findings indicate that the more concerned they are about a range of issues (such as loss of freedom of movement within Israel, fear of the level of law enforcement and rule of law in the Palestinian state, loss of Israeli unemployment benefits, loss of retirement benefits, shift from the Israeli healthcare system to the Palestinian healthcare system, and other concerns), the greater the preference for Israeli citizenship. On the other hand, the less anxiety and concerns there is, the lower the preference for Israeli citizenship, and thus the more the preference for Palestinian citizenship, as we will see later in Figure 11.

Moreover, when asked to speculate about the preference of the majority of residents in their neighborhoods, 48% said they are likely to prefer Israeli citizenship and only 43% said they are likely to prefer Palestinian citizenship. When compared to the results of 2010, the percentage of those who say that most people in their neighborhood would prefer Palestinian citizenship increased by only two points, while the percentage of those who believe that residents would prefer Israeli citizenship increased by four points. 

After resolving the issue of sovereignty over East Jerusalem, 74% prefer to keep East and West Jerusalem as an open city, one in which Palestinians and Israelis would have full access while 26% oppose that. These findings are almost identical to those of 2010.

If the neighborhood in which they live is to become part of Israel in a permanent settlement and it was possible for them to move to the Palestinian state, 75% say they would stay in their homes and would not move while 15% say they would move to live in the Palestinian state. These findings indicate a decrease of 5 percentage points among those who would stay in that neighborhood and a limited decline of 4 percentage points among those who would move to live in the Palestinian state. Desire to move to the Palestinian state if the neighborhood falls under Israeli sovereignty increases in the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, reaching 22% (compared to 34% in 2010) and decreases in the southern neighborhoods to 13% (compared to 20% in 2010) and to 9% (compared to 17% in 2010) in the southern neighborhoods.

But if the neighborhood comes under Palestinian sovereignty and it was possible to move to Israel, 69% say they would stay in their homes and would not move to Israel and 18% say they would move to Israel.

Perhaps the most notable difference here with the 2010 results is a 4-percentage point drop in the total number of people moving to Israel.  The percentage of those who want to move to live in Israel if the neighborhood falls under Palestinian sovereignty increases in the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, standing at 24%, compared to 41% in 2010, 22% in the southern neighborhoods (compared to 4% in 2010), and 20% in the central neighborhoods (compared to 14% in 2010). 

If their neighborhood becomes part of Israel and they were to become Israeli citizens, most or at least some East Jerusalemites would worry or be concerned about various aspects of their lives: 64% would worry about discrimination against them because they are Arabs; 43% would worry about losing freedom of movement inside the Palestinian state; 41% would worry about loss of access to al Aqsa or the old city (if they come under Palestinian sovereignty); 36% would worry about losing access to adequate education to their children. When comparing the current results with those of 2010, we find a significant reduction in the level of anxiety in all of the items mentioned, as shown in the following figure below. The largest decrease (31 percentage points) came in the issue of access to the Old City or Al-Aqsa Mosque, followed by the decrease in concern about the possibility of losing freedom of movement within the Palestinian state, which fell 24 points, then concern about losing access to a suitable education for their children, which fell 22 points, and then concern about the possibility of discrimination against them because they were Arabs, Muslims or Christians, which fell 18 percentage points. 

Figure (9): Areas of concern or no concern of East Jerusalemites about their neighborhood becoming part of Israel and they

becoming Israeli citizens- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

By contrast, if their neighborhood were to become a part of the new state of Palestine and they were to become citizens of Palestine, most or some Jerusalemites say they would worry or be concerned about the following things: 79% about changing from the Israeli health care system to a Palestinian health care system; 75% about possible increase in the level of corruption in the Palestinian state; 70% about possible reduction in the level of law enforcement; 67% about possible reduction in the level or quality of city services such as garbage pickup and road repair; 66% about changing from Israeli unemployment benefits to Palestinian unemployment benefits;  66% about changing from Israeli retirement benefits to Palestinian retirement benefits; 65% about possible changes in their ability to write and speak freely; and 63% about access to Jerusalem’s Old City and al Aqsa Mosque (if they come under Israeli sovereignty); and 49% about losing access to adequate education for their children. 

Figure (10): Areas of concern or no concern of East Jerusalemites about their neighborhood becoming part of the

new Palestinian state and they becoming Palestinian citizens- comparing 2022 and 2010 findings (%)

The most significant political implication of the increased level of concern in the event that the neighborhood inhabited by East Jerusalemites becomes part of the future Palestinian state is the decrease in the percentage of those who would prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship and the increase in the percentage of those who would prefer to hold Israeli citizenship in the permanent settlement. As shown in Figure 11 below, the preference for Palestinian citizenship is related to the degree of concern about the conditions in the PA/Palestinian state: the greater the level of concern, the lower the percentage of those who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship and the lower the level of concern the greater the percentage of those who prefer to hold Palestinian citizenship. The same applies to the preference for Israeli citizenship, but in the opposite direction: the greater the level of concern, the greater the preference for Israeli citizenship, and the lower the level of concern, the lower the preference for Israeli citizenship. However, it is necessary to point out the obvious fact that regardless of whether or not there is concern, a majority prefers to hold Palestinian citizenship, ranging between 53% and 69%, as shown in the following figure. 

Figure (11): Preference for Palestinian citizenship vs. Israeli citizenship based on the expressed level of concern by East Jerusalemites if their neighborhood became part of the future Palestinian state

With regard to the goals of the Jerusalem municipality, 64% say it is to demolish Arab homes and neighborhoods, evict Arab residents, and replace them with Jews, 10% say the goal is to reduce the level of municipal services to Arabs, 10% say it is to maintain the current status quo for the Arab residents, 4% say it is to introduce some improvement in the level of municipal service delivery to the Arabs, and 1% say it is to build new residential neighborhoods for the Arabs and improve the level of municipal service delivery to them.

An overwhelming majority of 90% says that the policy of home demolition and eviction aims at punishing the Arabs to force them to abandon the city while only 8% say the goal is to enforce the law.

Almost 70% are sympathetic with the residents threatened with home demolishment or eviction to the extent that they would be willing to participate in demonstrations while 27% say they do not wish to participate in such demonstration.

20% say the EU is indeed sympathetic with the plight of residents threatened with home demolition or eviction and 81% say it is not. As to the US, only 9% say it is sympathetic and 93% say it is not. 

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Appendix (1): Sample Characteristics

Appendix (2): Map of East Jerusalem Neighborhoods

Appendix (3): Table of Findings

Jerusalem Poll: Comparing 2010 and 2022 findings