ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30^th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the first in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB.  It addresses two important issues covered by AB8: the domestic balance of power in the Palestinian territories and the state of Palestinian-Israeli relations. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these two topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in two of its regular polls, one conducted before AB8 and one after it. The poll conducted after AB8 came several weeks after the launch of Hamas’ October the 7^th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

Domestic Balance of Power: On the eve of October the 7^th war, Arab Barometer 8 in Palestine found the Palestinian domestic setting favoring nationalist groups, such as Fatah, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the national level, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined, more than 2 in 5 favored the nationalists, such as Fatah and third parties, while only 1 in 5 favored Islamists, such as Hamas, and the rest disliked both.  Even in the Gaza Strip, which is traditionally more religious and Islamist, support for Hamas was slightly higher than a quarter while support for nationalists stood at half. When looking at the findings of PSR’s earlier poll, conducted immediately before the AB poll, the trend in both areas, but more clearly in the Gaza Strip, was decidedly moving against Hamas. The October 7 war reversed that trend leading to a great rise in Hamas’s popularly and a great decline in Fatah’s in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, support for Hamas did not reach a majority in either area; only slightly more than 2 in 5 favored Hamas by early December 2023. Furthermore, as shown in all previous PSR polls, Hamas’ increased popularity during wars begins to erode soon after the wars end, eventually returning to where it was before the war.

But the nationalist’s Achilles heel lies in its ruling leadership. Long before October the 7^th, the current PA president lost public support as the overwhelming majority demanded his resignation. Even within his own political party, the majority wanted him out. The events in October, exposed the tremendous public dissatisfaction with the performance of that leadership. One of the most important ramifications of that loss of public satisfaction with the PA leadership has been the unwillingness of the nationalist public to vote in an election in which he would compete against a Hamas candidate thus ensuring a resounding victory for the Islamist. Nonetheless, the nationalists do have a leader who cannot lose regardless of who the other candidate is: Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti, currently serving several life sentences in an Israeli jail. Even after October the 7^th, he is still able to defeat Hamas’ most popular leader, Ismail Haniyeh.

Palestinian-Israeli relations AB8 explored attitudes of Palestinians toward various solutions that would put an end to the conflict. The poll offered three solutions: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the one-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis, and a confederation between the two states. Respondents can select one of the three or alternatively reject all three and select “other” solutions. The poll found a slim majority favoring the two-state solution followed by “other” solutions, one-state solution, and the confederation. Palestinian youth and those who support Hamas are more likely to oppose the two-state solution while older Palestinians and those who support all other factions are more likely to support that solution.

This is the second time that AB has asked this question. Two years ago, the findings were greatly similar to the current ones. Nonetheless, the current level of support for the two-state solution is much higher than the support documented by PSR when the question is about support and opposition to that solution. This report argues that one reason for this has to do with substance, the fact that while the regular support-opposition question omits any reference to the borders of the state, the single most important attribute of statehood for Palestinians, the question on the three solutions defines these borders as those of the 1967 lines. A second reason has to do with the formal framing of the question. While the regular support-opposition question forces respondents to oppose the two-state solution if they prefer some other negotiated ones, the three-solution framing forces respondents to select their most preferred negotiated outcome or alternatively select their own preferred solutions. As pointed out in the report, PSR regualr polls conducted before and after the eruption of the October 7 war shows that support for the two-state solution in its regular format did not decline; to the contrary it slightly increased.

The report shows that those who support the two-state solution in its regular framing (support-opposition), tend to overwhelmingly support the two-state solution in its three-solution framing. Most other two-state supporters prefer one of the other two negotiated solutions, i.e., the one-state and the confederation. Most importantly however, some of those who oppose the two-state solution in that regular framing, change their mind and support it, presumably because that solution now defines the borders as those of 1967. AB8 asked about Palestinian priorities. We crosstabulated the answers to this question with those of the three-solution question. As expected, the findings show that those who prioritize Palestinian statehood and a system of rights and freedoms over other Palestinian goals, such as the right of return and religious society, tend to favor the two-state solution by the largest percentage. AB8 also asked about perception of Israeli discrimination against Palestinians. Here too, we crosstabulated the answers to this question with those of the three-solution question. Is seems that the concern about potential discrimination against Palestinians in a future one-state solution might have deterred respondents from supporting that solution. 

The domestic balance of power between the various Palestinian political parties has been explored in two ways: party preferences and electoral behavior. To explore the popularity of Palestinian figures, we asked about vote in hypothetical elections in which the contest was between the current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the two most popular rivals, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas.

PARTY PREFERENCES

• On the eve of the October the 7^th war, AB8 asked about public preferences for the various political parties: when asked which party is closest to you, respondents selected Fatah by 30% (same percentage in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and Hamas by 21% (17% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip); and third parties by 12% (6% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). The largest percentage, 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip), selected “none of the above.”

A month earlier, in early-September when respondents in one of PSR’s regular polls were asked “which political party you prefer, 26% selected Fatah (26% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), 22% selected Hamas (12% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip, 13% (12% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip) selected third parties, and 40% (52% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) selected “none of the above.”

A third poll was conducted in late November and early December 2023, about six weeks after the Hamas launch of its October 7 offensive. The poll, one of PSR’s regular polls, was conducted during the ceasefire period in which West Bank women and children held prisoners by Israel were exchanged for Israeli civilian hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Respondents in this post-Gaza War poll were asked “which political party you prefer?" Finding of that post-Gaza War poll indicated a dramatic rise in the popularity of Hamas in the West Bank and a slight rise in the Gaza Strip. Support for Hamas in the West Bank increased considerably by more than three times to 44% but increased slightly in the Gaza Strip to 42% for a total of 43%.  Support for Fatah dropped considerably to 17% only (16% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip). The preference for third parties and others dropped by one percentage point to 12% (4% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of those who selected “none of the above” dropped by11 points to 28%.

Figure (1): Party Preference before and after the eruption of the October 2023 Gaza War

“AB8: Which party is closest to you?” or “PSR polls: Which party you prefer?”

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:

1. Parliamentary Elections

The 8^th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored electoral behavior: how respondents would vote in new parliamentary elections, AB8 shows support for Fatah standing at only 24% (23% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip), while support for “Change or Reform,” i.e., Hamas stood at only 15% (9% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip); 8% supported known third parties that participated in the last parliamentary elections in 2006; and 10% did not support any of the parties.

The reason for the decline in the percentage of those willing to vote for Fatah and Hamas compared to the percentage of favorability or preference, mentioned above, is the fact that a large number of respondents decline to participate in the elections. The percentage of those refusing to participate in the elections in early October stood at and 41% (51% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 51% of the entire public either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, support for Fatah rises to 40% (46% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) and support for Hamas rises to 25% (18% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided rises to 21%.

In early September 2023, the vote for Fatah stood at 23% (22% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), Hamas at 21% (13% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), third parties at 6% (5% in the West Bank and 7% in the Gaza Strip), and the undecided at 13% (14% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of those who declined to participate in these elections stood at 36% (46% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 49% either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, vote for Fatah rises to 36% (40% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) and vote for Hamas rises to 34% (24% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided rises to 21% (26% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip).

The October 7 war dramatically changed the hypothetical electoral behavior. Vote for Fatah declined by 10 points to 13% (11% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) while the vote for Hamas rose by 14 points to 35% (31% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip), and third parties received the vote of 3% (2% in the West Bank and 5% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided stood at 17% (18% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) and the percentage of those who declined to participate stood at 31% (38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 48% either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, i.e., 69% of the eligible voters, Fateh receives 19% (18% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Hamas' Change and Reform 51% (50% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), all other lists combined 5% (3% in the West Bank and 6% in the Gaza Strip), and 25% (28% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip) select “none of the above.”.

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support among the voters for Fatah and Hamas is higher among those 30 years of age or older (43% and 26% respectively) compared to only 35% for Fatah and 22% for Hamas among those between 18 and 29 years old. The percentage of youth is higher among those voting for third parties or those undecideds (17% and 26% respectively) while the percentage for older voters stand at 12% and 19% respectively. Religiosity is an important driver of the vote: support for Hamas among the religious stands at 37% compared to 18% among the somewhat religious and zero among the not religious. By contrast, support for Fatah among the religious stands at 35% compared to 45% among the somewhat religious and 41% among the not religious. Support for third parties stands at 11% among the religious, 11% among the somewhat religious, and 44% among the not religious. The undecided receives 18% from the religious, 26% from the somewhat religious, and 15% among the not religious.  

2. Presidential Elections

Like other PSR polls, Palestine’s AB8 found that Marwan Barghouti is the most popular presidential candidate. If elections took place on the eve of the October Gaza war, 34% (35% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) would have voted for him. Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would have come second, with 16% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank). Current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, receives 8% (12% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank). The rest of the public, 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip declined to participate in the elections.

When restricting the vote distribution to those participating, Barghouti receives 57% (66% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip); Haniyeh receives 27% (21% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip, and Abbas receives 14% (10% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip). About a month earlier, in early September, the vote for Barghouti stood at only 49% (63% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), while 36% (25% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) voted for Haniyeh, and 13% (10% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) for Abbas. In other words, Barghouti became more popular and Haniyeh less popular on the eve of the October Gaza war. In that September The war reversed this trend. By the end of November and early December, the vote for Barghouti declined to 47% (55% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) while the vote for Haniyeh increased significantly to 43% (39% in  the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip), and the vote for Abbas declined by about half to 7% (3% in the West Bank and 13% in the West Bank).

Figure (4): vote in presidential elections; voters only

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support for Barghouti, when competing about Haniyyeh and Abbas simultaneously, is almost the same regardless to age and gender. But it is higher among the somewhat religious (63%) compared to the religious (51%). Surprisingly, 66% of Fatah voters give their vote to Barghouti. Also, surprisingly 70% of those who select “none of the above” vote for him. He receives more votes from those voting for third parties (73%) and receive only 9% of Hamas voters.

3. Demand for the resignation of president Abbas:

The 8th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored other aspects of the domestic balance of power, most importantly the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, the ability of the Palestinians to hold elections and the reasons why national elections have not been held since 2006.

• AB8 found the demand for the resignation of president Abbas on the eve of the Gaza October 7 war standing at 78% (85% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip). A month earlier, PSR found 79% (78% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip) demanding the resignation of president Abbas. The October 7 war increased the demand for the resignation of Abbas to 88% (92% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip).

Figure (5): Demand for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas in three polls

“If it were up to you, would you want to have Abbas resign or not resign?”

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support for the resignation of Abbas is almost the same among the young and the olde, the men and the women. But it does show that support for that resignation is highest among the religious (82%) declining to 77% among the somewhat religious, and 59% among the not religious. Surprisingly, a majority of 54% of those voting for Fatah, among those taking part in hypothetical parliamentary elections, demand the resignation of Abbas. The demand for Abbas’ resignation is much higher among voters of third parties, those selecting “none of the above” and those voting for Hamas: 77%, 80%, and 95% respectively.

• The public is almost evenly split on whether the Palestinians can today elect their own national leadership, with 48% saying “yes” and 50% saying no. In the Gaza Strip, 58% said “no” compared to 46% in the West Bank. Among those who said “no,” the largest percentage (33%) said the Palestinians cannot elect their own national leadership due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip making it difficult to hold elections in the two areas simultaneously. This belief is slightly stronger in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 36% and 32% respectively.  Another 29% of those who said the Palestinians cannot elect their own national leadership said the reason for that is the fact that the PA leadership in the West Bank is afraid of losing the elections. This view is stronger in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 36% and 20% respectively.
• A majority of 60% of the Palestinians believe the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people while 37% believe it is an accomplishment. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans, 66% and 52% respectively, think the PA is a burden.
•  

The 8^th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored aspects of Palestinian-Israeli relations, most importantly the support for various solutions to end the conflict, the place of Palestinian statehood in Palestinian priorities, solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and the extent of racial discrimination in the Israeli control over the Palestinians. It should be pointed out that PSR has asked about support for the two-state solution in two different manners. In all regular poll, the traditional manner has been to ask about support and opposition to that solution. Occasionally however, the question was more specific allowing respondents to opt for other negotiated solutions, such as the one-state solution, or reject all solutions and state their own preferences. The following analysis reviews the findings for both, the regular support-opposition and the three-solution questions.

Three solutions to end the conflict: AB8 offered Palestinians three possible solutions to the conflict with Israel, solutions that would help end the conflict between the two side, and asked them which one they prefer. All three solutions offered were possible outcome of peace negotiations, but respondents could opt for some “other” solution, if they so wish. The three included a two-state solution, one-state solution, and confederation. It should be noted that the “one-state solution” did not specify that the two sides would have equal rights. Therefore, theoretically one could select this solution regardless of whether Israeli Jews or Palestinians would receive equal rights. The two-state solution received the largest support (51%) with Gazans showing a little more support than West Bankers, 54% and 49% respectively. The one state solution received 10% and the confederation received 7% support. One quarter, 28% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip opted for “other” and 7% said they do not know or gave no answer. In other words, 32% did not support any of these three proposed solutions.  

It is also worth noting that support for the two-state solution in this AB8 poll is higher among those who are 30-year-old or older compared to youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years, 54% and 45% respectively.  It is also higher among voters of third parties and voters of Fatah, as well as those who select “none of the above,” 61%, 55%, and 47% respectively, compared to the voters of Hamas, 34%.

Palestine’s AB7 asked the exact same question two years earlier, in October 2021. The findings are greatly similar to those obtained in the latest AB wave of October 2023. Support for the two-state solution stood at 53% (49% in the West Bank and 58% in the Gaza Strip) while support for the one state solution stood at 8% (10% in the West Bank and 4% in the Gaza Strip), and support for the Palestinian-Israeli confederation stood at 6% (3% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip). Those opting for “other” and those who did not provide an answer stood at 34% (38% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

The same three-solutions question was asked in PSR’s December 2020 and June 2021 regular polls. Support for the two-state solution stood at 49% (44% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) in December 2020. About a third (31%) selected “other” or did not give any answer. Six months later, one month after the May 2021 Hamas-Israel fourth war, support for the two-state solution dropped slightly to 46% (41% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) while support for “others” and those who did not select an answer rose to 38% (48% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).

Figure (6): support for three possible solutions to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict:

“Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Understanding the high level of support for the two-state solution in AB8: As indicated above, the three solutions presented to respondents in the four polls mentioned above, including in AB7 and AB8, are negotiation-based solutions of which respondents are forced to select one or alternatively reject them all and describe one they favor. The alternative and more regular manner in which we asked about the two-state solution was asked in the September and December 2023 but not in AB8. The findings in September showed that about one third (32%) supported and two thirds opposed the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. It is worth mentioning that three months before that, in June 2023, support for that solution stood at 28%. The December 2023 poll showed that despite the October the 7^th war and the significant rise in support for Hamas and for armed struggle, support for the two-state solution did not drop. In fact, it increased slightly to 34% and opposition dropped from 67% to 64%.  As shown below, in figure (7), support for the two-state solution in December 2023 was the highest in that year.

Figure (7): Support and opposition to the two-state solution throughout 2023

“Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution”

A crosstabulation between this three solution-question and the regular question normally asked in PSR’s surveys, on support and opposition to the two-state solution, reveals that more than three quarters of those who support the two-state solution in the regular question tend to favor that same solution in the three solution-question and the majority of those who oppose the two-state solution in the regular question tend to opt for “other” or refuse to answer when forced to choose a negotiated solution.  

As shown in the figure below, the vast majority of those who supported the two-state solution in PSR’s regular June 2021 poll question (76%) gave their support to the two-state solution when forced to choose one of the three negotiated solutions, while 9% of them supported the one-state solution, and 6% supported the confederation solution. In other words, some of the supporters of the one state and the confederation solutions, in the three-solution question, were forced in the regular question (about support or opposition to that solution) to select that solution despite the fact that they preferred these two other solutions. By contrast, the majority (56%) of those opposed to the two-state solution in the regular PSR question opted to select “other” or refused to answer when asked to select one of the three negotiated solutions. Moreover, 5% of those opposed to the two-state solution preferred a one-state solution and 12% preferred the confederation solution. Nonetheless, 27% of those who expressed opposition to the two-state solution opted to select that solution when forced to choose one of three negotiated solutions. The reason why this might have happened has probably to do with the fact that while the regular question about the support and opposition to the two-state solution does not describe the borders of the Palestinian state while the three-solution question define that solution as one based on the 1967 borders.  

Figure (8): Crosstabulation of support and opposition to the two-state solution “Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution” with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Linking Palestinian priorities to support for the two-state solution: AB8 finding that a slim majority of the Palestinians support the two-state solution, under the two conditions outlined above, i.e., when the borders of the Palestinian state are defined as those of 1967 and when respondents are forced to choose one of three negotiated solutions, is supported by other findings of that October survey. When asked to select the most vital Palestinian goal, 46% (50% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) selected the building of a Palestinian state along the lines of the 1967 while 32% selected the “right of return for the refugees,” 11% selected the establishment of a system with Palestinian rights and freedoms and another 11% selected the building of a pious religious society that applies Islamic teaching. In other words, the percentage of those prioritizing the Palestinian state and its democratic nature stands at 57%. As the figure below indicates, when the hierarchy of priorities is crosstabulated with the support for the various solutions, the greatest support for the two-state solution comes from those who prioritize Palestinian statehood followed by those who prioritized a system of rights and freedoms, 64% and 43% respectively.

Figure (9): Crosstabulation of the hierarchy of Palestinian priorities/goals “which in your view should be the first most important one most important goal that the Palestinian people should strive to achieve? with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Role of perception of Israeli discrimination against the Palestinians and the low level of support for the one-state solution: Finally, in the context of public attitudes toward the three negotiated solutions, it is worth looking into the reason for public reluctance to embrace the idea of “one state for Palestinians and Israeli Jews” when two other alternatives are offered, i.e., the two-state solution and the Palestinian-Israeli confederation.  AB8 provides one possible explanation: when asked about the extent to which racial discrimination by Israelis against Palestinians exists today, 92% said yes, it does exist to a greater or medium extent while only 8% said it exists to a small extent or does not exist at all. As indicated earlier, this solution did not specify that it would be based on equal rights for the two national groups. Therefore, this concern about potential discrimination against Palestinians in a future one-state solution might have deterred respondents from selecting it.  The figure below shows that the greater the extent of perceived discrimination, the smallest the support (8%) and the absence of perceived discrimination leads to the greatest level of support for that one state solution (24%).

Figure (10): Crosstabulation of perception of Israeli discrimination against Palestinians “To what extent do you believe racial discrimination by Israelis against Palestinians is a serious problem in the West Bank and Gaza? with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”