19 February 2024

Report II: Palestinian perception of international actors and international relations

Palestinians see the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine and their most preferred countries are Turkey, Qatar, and China. In a comparison between China's and U.S. foreign policies, the Palestinian public views China's policies more positively than those of the U.S. on all issues at hand. Wide-ranging opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remains as strong as it was two years ago, but most express optimism about the world's solidarity with the Palestinians, and the vast majority expresses opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.  

28 September and 8 October 2023

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the first in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB.  It addresses two important issues covered by AB8: the domestic balance of power in the Palestinian territories and the state of Palestinian-Israeli relations. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these two topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in two of its regular polls, one conducted before AB8 and one after it. The poll conducted after AB8 came several weeks after the launch of Hamas’ October the 7th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

Methodology:

 

The Arab Barometer interviews were conducted face-to-face during the period between 28 September and 8 October 2023 with a random sample of 1,189 adults in 120 residential locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The interviews in the Gaza Strip were completed on October 6, one day before the start of Hamas's offensive on the Gaza periphery, which Hamas called the "Al-Aqsa Flood." The sample size in the Gaza Strip is 399 people and in the West Bank 790, and the margin of error is +/-3%.

The other two surveys that are cited frequently, for comparative purposes, in this report, were conducted before and after this AB poll. The first was conducted than a month before AB8, between 6-9 September 2023, and the second was conducted less than two months after the AB poll, between 22 November and 2 December 2023. Respondents in the first poll were interviewed face-to-face and the sample size was 1,270 adults randomly selected in 127 residential locations with a margin of error of +/-3%. For further details on the methodology and findings of this survey, see PSR’s report here: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/955

The third poll in this report, the one conducted after the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop, had a sample size of 1,231 people, of whom 750 were interviewed in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip.  All interviewed for this poll were conducted face-to-face in 121 randomly selected locations. The sample was representative of the residents of the two areas. Because of the fact that residents had to abandon their homes during the war, interviews with residents of the northern cities and localities of the Gaza Strip were conducted in 24 UNRWA or government shelters. The margin of error for this poll was +/- 4%. The increased margin of error for this poll, despite the large sample size, reflects the lack of reliable information regarding the number of individuals who did not leave their homes in the northern Gaza Strip and were therefore not included in the sample.  For further details on the methodology and findings of this survey, see PSR’s report here: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963

 

Main Findings:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The following are some of the main conclusions of the current wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine: (1) Palestinians identify the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine; (2) the most favorite countries to Palestinians are Turkey, Qatar, and China; (3) indeed, in a comparison between the foreign policies of China and the United States, the former is viewed much more positively than the latter on all issues; (4) Opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remain as solid as it was two years earlier; (5) most Palestinians express optimism about world solidarity with the Palestinians, and (6) a great majority expresses opposition to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The focus of this report is on public perception of international actors and issues. Five areas are covered: favorability of and satisfaction with major international and regional powers, threat perception of various developments, attitudes regarding the foreign policies of major powers, most importantly the US, views on foreign aid and where it should go, and preferences for economic relations with major international and regional countries. In addition to these areas, AB8 asked about three specific recent developments in the region and the world: Arab normalization with Israel, world solidarity with the Palestinians, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

As in AB7 two years ago, findings in late 2023 show that the most favored country remains Turkey. Qatar comes second followed by China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, the UK, and finally the United States. It is worth noting that satisfaction with, or favorability of, Saudi Arabia increased significantly compared to the findings of AB7. The most likely explanation for this change is the fact that AB7 was conducted during a year that witnessed additional normalization agreements between Israel and some of the Arab countries. Saudi Arabia was seen a driving force behind this development. The favorability of the US and the UK in 2023 remained identical to that of 2021.

It is also worth noting that PSR’s December 2023 poll, conducted less than two months after the completion of AB8 and the eruption of October 7 war found that satisfaction with the performance of most of those international players has declined significantly compared to the satisfaction or favorability obtained in that AB8 poll. Few findings are worth highlighting: a majority expressed satisfaction with Qatar’s performance; satisfaction rate with Iran after the eruption of the war was higher than satisfaction before it; Saudi Arabia saw the greatest decline; and satisfaction with China, the US, the UK saw significant decline.

We asked about various sources of potential threats to the national security of Palestine. As would be expected the continued Israeli occupation remained the most critical. But the threat perception was high for other developments including Iran’s nuclear program, the development of American economic power, and Iran’s political influence in the region. Three other threats were not seen as critical: climate change, the development of China’s economic power, and the Saudi political influence in the region. 

We also asked the public about the foreign policies of major international and regional leaders. The responses paralleled those of attitudes on favorability or satisfaction with the major powers. As in AB7, Erdogan’s foreign policy came on top. The Chines leader, Xi Jinping, came second followed Mohamed bin Zayed, Mohammad bin Salman, Putin, Ali Khamenei, Biden, and, at the bottom, Syria’s Bashar al Asad. As the case with the earlier issue of favorability, a significant change in the evaluation of the foreign policy of the leaders of UAE and Saudi Arabia is probably due to the fact that AB7 was conducted much closer to the normalization developments between some Arab countries and Israel. The increased support for the Chines and Russian leaders is probably to the increased tensions between these leaders and the US leadership. 

In a comparison between American and Chinese policies on various issues, Palestinian respondents saw the Chinese policy as better than that of the US in all issues under examination, not just on addressing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and maintaining regional security, but also on the promotion of economic development and the protection of freedoms and rights. But it is worth mentioning that the largest percentage said that the policies of the two countries are equally bad when it comes to the first two issues of addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and maintaining regional security.

When asked about their preferences for what the US priorities should be in the Middle East, the Palestine question came first followed by economic development. Terrorism, infrastructure, and human rights were deemphasized. It is worth noting that while West Bankers increased their emphasis on the Palestine question in AB8 compared to AB7, Gazans increased their emphasis on economic development.

When asked about their preference for areas that should receive foreign aid, economic development followed by building infrastructure, and education came on top. All other areas, including environment, women rights, protecting rights, and civil society development received little preference. 

When asked about future economic relations with the countries listed in the question about favorability, it is worth noting that the responses were highly consistent with Turkey coming on top and the United States at the bottom. 

As in the past, we asked about the quality of products in various Western and non-Western countries. As in AB7, the highest quality products in AB8 are found in Germany followed by those of Turkey. Others countries, including the UK, France, and Italy did not do well at all. When the question turned to the country whose companies should be contracted to do business in Palestine, the responses followed those on quality.

AB8 asked about three recent developments, Arab normalization with Israel, solidarity with the Palestinian cause since the World Cup in Qatar, and the war in Ukraine. Findings show that public attitudes regarding Arab normalization remain as negative as they were in 2021. Yet, the public expressed a great optimism about solidarity with the Palestinian cause since the World Cup in Qatar. On Ukraine, AB8 shows an overwhelming opposition to the Russian invasion of that country, with no notable differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

 

(1) Favorability of major international and regional powers before the October 7 war and satisfaction with the performance of major powers during the war:

 

 

 

AB8 asked about favorability of 8 countries. The most favored is Turkey, followed by Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, the UK, and finally the United States. As indicated in the chart below, five of these countries were among the countries we asked about two years earlier, in AB7. Four out of those five received added favorability while one, Turkey, witnessed a limited decrease in favorability. Turkey’s favorability dropped in 2023 by 4 points, China’s increased by 9 points, Saudi Arabia’s increased by 14 points, Russia’s increased by 2 points, and the US increased by 4 points. Among the three countries we asked about in Wave 8 but not in Wave 7, Qatar emerged as the most favored, at 61%, followed by Iran, at 28%, and finally the UK. The favorability of the US and the UK in 2023 is identical, standing at 19%.

Figure (1): Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the following country (AB8):

In comparing these findings on favorability to those we obtained in late November and early December 2023, more than 6 weeks after the eruption of the October 7 war, on satisfaction with the performance of international, regional, and Arab actors, we found that satisfaction with Qatar, at 56%, tops the list even though that percentage is lower than that of favorability before the war. The only country in which satisfaction after the war is higher than favorability before the war is Iran, 35% and 28% respectively. Saudi Arabia’s image suffered the greatest drop, with satisfaction with their performance during the war standing at only 5% compared to their favorability standing at 38% prior to the Oct 7 war. Additionally, levels of satisfaction with all other countries were lower than what was measured for their favorability before the war by substantial margins, including for Turkey, China, the US, the UK, and Russia.

Figure (2): Now I will ask you about your satisfaction with the role of a number of Arab and international actors in this last war: said they are "satisfied"

(2) Regional and international threat perception:

 

 

When asked about various sources of possible threats to the national security of Palestine, the continued Israeli occupation remained the most critical, with 85% selecting it in AB8 and AB7, today and two years ago. Iran’s nuclear program emerged as a critical threat, with 58% citing it, followed by the development of American economic power, 55%, Iran’s political influence in the region, 47%, climate change, 46%, the development of China’s economic power, 29%, and the Saudi political influence in the region, 28%. 

Figure (3): To what extent do you see each of the following as a threat to the national security interests?

(3) Attitudes regarding the foreign policies of major international and regional powers:

 

 

Public attitudes are also consistent when it comes to the preference of foreign policies of various international and Arab leaders. Turkey’s Erdogan comes on top on both AB8 and AB7, with a slight decline in public preference similar to the decline in favorability of Turkey we saw above. The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, comes second followed by leaders of the UAE (Mohamed bin Zayed), Saudi Arabia (Mohammed bin Salman), Russia (Putin), Iran (Ali Khamenei), the United States (Joseph Biden), and finally Syria (Bashar al Asad). The hierarchy of foreign policy preferences is similar to what we saw two years earlier, but it is worth highlighting the change between the two waves: UAE leader gained 14 points, the Saudi leader gained 12 points, the Chinese leader gained 9 points, the Iranian leader gained 5 points, and the Russian leader gained 4 points. The significant change in the evaluation of the foreign policy of the leaders of UAE and Saudi Arabia is probably due to the fact that AB7 was conducted much closer to the normalization developments between some Arab countries and Israel which was started by the UAE with the support of Saudi Arabia. The increased support for the Chinese and Russian leaders is probably due to the increased tensions between these leaders and the US leadership. 

Figure (4): Do you think the foreign policies of the following leaders have been very good, good, bad, or very bad for the Arab region?

When asked to compare American and Chinese policies on certain issues, Palestinians viewed the Chinese policy as better than that of the US in all issues under examination including on promoting economic development (33% for China vs. 14% for the US), protecting freedoms and rights (28% vs. 16%), addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (26% vs. 13%), and maintaining regional security (28% vs. 9%). It is worth mentioning that the largest percentage (37%) said that the policies of the two countries are equally bad when it comes to the two issues of addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and maintaining regional security.

Figure (5): For each of the following issues, please tell me if you think Chinese policy is better, American policy is better, Chinese and American policies are equally good, or Chinese and American policies are equally bad.

AB8 asked Palestinians about their preferences for the US priorities in the Middle East and North Africa out of seven priorities. The most cited priority was the “Palestine question,” followed by economic development, stability and security, education, human rights, infrastructure, and terrorism. It is worth noting that Palestinian emphasis on the “Palestine question” remained unchanged in the last two years, though there were notable differences between West Bankers and Gazans on this matter. West Bankers increased their emphasis on the Palestine question in AB8 compared to AB7 while Gazans did the opposite. During the same period, Gazans increased their emphasis on economic development. In the West Bank, the greater prioritization of the Palestinian question and the economic development came at the expense of a lesser emphasis on stability and security.

Figure (6): What do you think should be the Biden administration’s number one priority in the Middle East and North Africa?

(4) Preferences for areas of foreign aid:

 

 

Both AB8 and AB7 asked about the areas most preferred for foreign aid to be dedicated. Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip indicated preference for economic development followed by building infrastructure, and education. All other areas, including environment, women rights, protecting rights, and civil society development received little preference. The responses in both AB waves were highly similar. It is clear however, that while Gazans placed more emphasis on economic development, West Bankers placed more emphasis on education and building infrastructure. Perhaps not surprisingly, given Gaza’s water and sewage concerns, Gazans placed more emphasis than West Bankers on environment and climate control.

Figure (7): To which of the following areas would you most prefer foreign aid to Palestine be dedicated?

(5) Preferences for economic relations with major international and regional countries:

 

 

When respondents were asked about future economic relations with the countries listed in the question about favorability, it is worth noting that the responses were highly consistent. Turkey came on top here too, with 51% saying they want stronger economic ties with it in AB8. But this percentage represents a decline of 10 points when compared to that of AB7 two years earlier. Qatar came next in the list of countries with which Palestinians would like stronger economic relations, followed by China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, UK and finally the United States.

Figure (8): Do you prefer that future economic relations between Palestine and the following countries become stronger, remain the same, or become weaker?

As in the past, we asked about the quality of products of various Western and non-Western countries. As in AB7, the highest quality products in AB8 is perceived to be made in Germany. Turkey follows, with a gap of 12 points, then China and the United States. In both AB8 and AB7, others like the UK, France, and Italy did not do well at all.

Figure (9): Which country would build the highest quality?

When the question turned to the country whose companies should be contracted to do business in Palestine, the responses followed those on quality. Nonetheless, AB8 shows that Turkey would compete with Germany for the first spot despite the fact that it came distant second in quality. The reason for this might have to do with the issue of favorability mentioned above.

Figure (10): Which country would you prefer to get the contract?

(6) Recent developments:

 

 

We asked about three recent developments, Arab normalization with Israel, solidarity with the Palestinian cause since the World Cup in Qatar, and the war in Ukraine. Findings show that public attitudes regarding Arab normalization remain extremely negative with more than 90% expressing opposition. The findings are exactly the same as they were in 2021. 

Figure (11): To what extent do you favor or oppose the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel?

The public expressed a great optimism about solidarity with the Palestinian cause since the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Solidarity with the Palestinian cause at that time was very high and the largest percentage (43%) of Palestinians think it stayed the same. Moreover, 37% think it is even higher today and only 15% think it declined. It is worth noting that West Bankers are more optimistic than Gazans; 22% of Gazans compared to only 11% of West Bankers think it decreased.

Figure (12): Since the World Cup in 2022, do you believe that solidarity with the Palestinians has increased, decreased, or stayed the same?

On Ukraine, AB8 shows an overwhelming opposition, standing at 70%, to the Russian invasion of the country, with no notable differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure (13): To what extent do you approve or disapprove of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine