ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. This report is restricted to findings related to Palestinian perception of governance. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the third in a series covering the results of the current eighth wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine (AB8). The first report reviewed the findings regarding the internal balance of power and Palestinian-Israeli relations before and after October 7, and the second report reviewed Palestinian perceptions and beliefs regarding various international and regional actors and other international issues. The current report addresses one important issue covered by AB8: Palestinian perception of governance. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding this topic, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier.

This third report of the eight wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine addresses five issues, all related to governance: (1) the top challenges facing Palestinians, (2) trust in PA leaders, government, courts, municipalities and other local councils, and societal forces, (3) satisfaction with service delivery in critical areas as well as public assessment of the performance of the government in three areas: provision of security, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, and keeping the prices down, (4) government responsiveness to what people want and public perception of the most effective means to influence PA decisions, and (5) perception of corruption at the national and local levels. 

Challenges: Palestinians identify four challenges facing Palestine as the most critical: economic conditions, instability, corruption, and settler terrorism. Most of those were cited by Palestinians in AB7 in 2021. While Gazans focused on the economic challenge, West Bankers focused on corruption and settlers’ violence. 

Trust: AB8 asked about trust in the PA leadership as well as various PA institutions. Trust in the PA president has declined in the West Bank and increased in the Gaza Strip. In total, AB8 found that about one in five Palestinians expresses trust in president Mahmoud Abbas. Almost identical findings, as those for the president, have been found regarding trust in the PA government. But the decline in trust in the PA government is evident in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When specifically asked about trust in Hamas’ government, two-thirds indicated that they do not trust it. But Palestinian trust in the PA national security forces is higher, with just fewer than four-in-ten expressing trust.

Trust in the courts and the legal system is down by seven points; today, two thirds of the Palestinians express lack of trust in the courts and the legal system. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to express trust. Trust in local government has dropped in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; almost 70 percent of all Palestinians express distrust in their municipalities and local councils.

Trust in civil society organizations is low, having dropped from about a third to about a quarter in two years. Trust in religious leadership has dropped in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, the trust level is very low but has essentially remained unchanged. Trust in Hamas has also declined in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the eve of October 7, less than a quarter expressed trust in it. Finally, as in AB7, the current wave in Palestine indicates that one-in-ten 10 people expresses the belief that “most people can be trusted.”

Satisfaction with service delivery: findings show differences in the level of satisfaction between West Bankers and Gazans. In the West Bank, the highest level of satisfaction went to the provision of electricity, followed by civil defense, access to the internet, water supply, the healthcare system, trash collection, the education system, the quality of the street, and finally government performance overall. The most significant 2023 decline in satisfaction, compared to the findings in 2021, was regarding government performance overall, dropping by eight points to slightly less than a third.

In the Gaza Strip, the highest level of satisfaction went to access to internet services, followed by civil defense, the educational system, trash collection, the quality of the streets, the healthcare system, and finally, as the case for West Bankers, the lowest level of satisfaction went to the government performance overall. It is worth noting that the overall trend among Gazans today is to show less satisfaction with almost everything we have asked about in AB7. The most significant decline in 2023 was regarding the healthcare system, dropping by eight points to 38 percent. 

We asked Palestinians to assess the performance of the government in providing security, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and keeping prices down. While 36 percent said the performance in providing security is good or very good, only 15 percent said the same about narrowing the wealth gap, and only 12 percent said the same about keeping prices down. It is worth noting that the current figures represent a drop ranging between seven and 12 points. It is also worth noting that the drop is evident in both areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Government responsiveness: Only one fifth of Palestinians, compared to a quarter two years ago, think the PA government responds to what people want. Gazans are a little more likely than West Bankers to think the government is responsive. Use of family connections with government officials and participation in a protest were cited as the most effective in influencing government decisions. The findings show that working with a political party is seen as the least effective when compared to several other means of influence; nonetheless, Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to view it as effective.

Perception of corruption: As we found in AB7 in 2021, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians think corruption exists in the PA either to a large or to a medium extent. Almost all West Bankers (94 percent) think there is corruption in the PA while the percentage in the Gaza Strip shows a drop to little over 70 percent. When asked if the PA government is working to combat corruption, about four-in-ten expressed the belief that it does so to a large or medium extent. This represents an improvement compared to our findings 2021.

The majority of the Palestinians think wasta, or personal connections, is essential if one is to get a job. But when asked about the role of wasta in getting legal documents from public institutions, the majority said it was not necessary. When asked about the need for rashwa, or bribery, to get a job, the percentage of those who said, “yes, frequently” was lower than those who said the same about wasta by nine points. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to think rashwa is used frequently. When asked about the role of rashwa in getting legal documents from public institutions, the percentage of those who said “frequently,” was lower than those who said the same about wasta by five points.

The perception that corruption exists in municipalities and local councils is less widespread compared to the perception that it exists at the national level in the PA institutions, a gap of 15 points. The findings show that only 70 percent believe corruption exists in local councils and municipalities to a large or medium extent. In this regard, only minor differences exist between West Bankers and Gazans.

We asked the public to describe the most important challenges facing Palestine today. Four challenges were mentioned the most: the economic situation was cited by 29% followed by instability (22%), corruption (18%), and settler terrorism (13%). The top four challenges cited in AB7 in 2021 included the economic situation (31%), Covid-19 (21%), corruption (19%), and instability (15%). It is worth noting that Gazans, at 41%, are twice as likely today to cite the economic situation than West Bankers (21%). On the other hand, West Bankers are much more likely today than Gazans to cite settler terrorism, 20% to 1% respectively, and corruption, 21% and 13% respectively. It is also worth noting that Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to cite additional challenges, such as foreign interference (7% and 2% respectively); emigration (7% and 2% respectively); and public services (4% and 0% respectively).

Trust in government and leaders

Trust in the PA president declines slightly from 24% to 22%. The decline comes from the West Bank only while Gazans expressed greater trust in 2023 than in 2021: in the West Bank trust declined from 27% to 19% while increasing in the Gaza Strip from 21% to 27%. Distrust in the PA president in 2023 stood at 73%, 75% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.

About three quarters (74%) indicate that they do not trust the Palestinian government or do not have a lot of trust in it while only 22% indicate that they have a great of deal of trust or a quite a lot of trust in the Government. Two years earlier, in AB7, trust in government stood at 27%. Trust in the Gaza Strip stands at 29 (compared to 35% in AB7) and in the West Bank at 17% (compared to 21% in AB7).  

When West Bankers were specifically asked about trust in the PA government in the West Bank, 19% said they trusted it while 76% expressed distrust. Two years earlier 29% of West Bankers expressed trust and 69% expressed distrust. When Gazans, in the AB8, were specifically asked about trust in the Gaza government, 29% said they trusted it while 67% said they did not trust it.

Trust in the PA national security forces stands at 37% and distrust at 58%.  Two years earlier, trust stood at 41%, a 4-point decline. The decline is greater in the Gaza Strip, from 55% to 41%, while the West Bank witnessed a slight rise in trust, from 32% to 34%. Distrust in PA national security forces stands at 58%, 61% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip.  Trust in police stands at 39% and distrust at 58%. The level of trust is identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, about 39% each.

But when asked “how would you rate the safety of your neighborhood,” 76% said it is very or somewhat safe and only 24% said it is very unsafe or somewhat unsafe. Perception of safety in one’s neighborhood was slightly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 79% and 74% respectively.

In that context, when asked about the frequency of robberies in one’s neighborhood, 72% said never or rarely and 28% said frequently or sometimes. The percentage of those who said frequently or sometime is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 33% and 24% respectively. Similarly, when asked about the frequency of street violence and fights, 57% said never or rarely and 43% said frequently or sometimes. The percentage of those who said frequently or sometime is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 45% and 40% respectively.

Two thirds of the Palestinians express lack of trust in the courts and the legal system while trust stands at 29%. Two years ago, 36% expressed trust in the courts and the legal system. Trust in the Gaza Strip stands at 33% (compared to 46% in AB7) and in the West Bank at 27% (compared to 29% in AB7). Distrust stands at 66% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip.

Trust has also declined in local government, from 32% two years ago to 28% today. While Gazans express greater level of trust in their local government, the findings show a decline in trust in both areas, the West Bank (from 29% to 25%) and the Gaza Strip (from 37% to 33%). Distrust in local government stands today at 69%, 71% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip.

Societal trust:

Trust in civil society organizations declines from 33% to 27%; in the West Bank from 29% to 27% and in the Gaza Strip from 38% to 27%. Distrust in CSOs stands today at 68%; 67% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip.

Trust in religious leaders stands today at 26%, 19% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip. These figures indicate a slight drop of 6-points compared to our findings in AB7 in 2021. The decline in trust comes from the Gaza Strip, which witnessed an 8-point drop while the West Bank saw only 1-point drop. Distrust in religious leaders stood in 2023 at 69%, 76% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip.

The current poll found that trust in Hamas is in decline. Only 22% expressed trust in Hamas, 18% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. Trust in Hamas in 2021 stood at 29%, 23% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip.  Distrust in Hamas in 2023 stood at 71%, 75% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip.

When asked about trust in people, 90% expressed the belief that one “must be careful,” while only 9% think “most can be trusted.” No change when compared to AB7. West Bankers’ societal trust stands at 5% only while in the Gaza Strip at 15%.

We asked about satisfaction with the overall government performance as well as its performance in specific areas: the educational system, the healthcare system, the quality of the streets, and trash collection, access to internet services, provision of electricity, water supply, and civil defense:

1. Satisfaction with the government’s performance overall stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 64%. This represents a 7-point drop in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction dropped in both areas: it stands at 36% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 43% in AB7) and 32% in the West Bank (compared to 40% in AB7). 

2. Satisfaction with the educational system stands at 48% and dissatisfaction at 51%. This represents a 6-point drop in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction dropped in both areas: it stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 60% in AB7) and 44% in the West Bank (compared to 51% in AB7). 

3. Satisfaction with the healthcare system stands at 47% and dissatisfaction at 52%. This represents a 2-point drop in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction dropped 8 points in the Gaza Strip, standing today at 38% while increasing two points in the West Bank, standing today at 53%. 

4. Satisfaction with the quality of the streets in Palestine stands at 41% and dissatisfaction at 57%. This represents a 2-point increase in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction in the Gaza Strip, at 42%, is identical to that of 2021. It increased 2 points in the West Bank, standing today at 40% 

5. Satisfaction with trash collection stands at 53% and dissatisfaction at 46%. This represents a 2-point increase in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction in the Gaza Strip, at 53%, represents a drop of 5 points. In the West Bank satisfaction stands also at 52%, a 6-point increase compared to 2021.  

6. Satisfaction with access to internet services stands at 64% and dissatisfaction at 34%. The level of satisfaction is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 68% and 58% respectively.

7. Satisfaction with the provision of electricity stands at 52% and dissatisfaction at 46%. The level of satisfaction is much higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 73% and 19% respectively.

8. Satisfaction with water supply stands at 54% and dissatisfaction at 45%. The level of satisfaction is a little higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 55% and 50% respectively.

9. Satisfaction with civil defense stands at 64% and dissatisfaction at 31%. The level of satisfaction is much higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 71%% and 55% respectively.

Assessment of governmental performance: We asked the Palestinians to assess the performance of the government in three areas: provision of security, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and in keeping the prices down:

1. The share of those who think performance of the government in providing security is good or very good stands at 36% and those who think it is bad or very bad stand at 62%. This represents an 11-point drop in positive evaluation compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of positive evaluation dropped in both areas: it stands at 40% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 64% in AB7) and 33% in the West Bank (compared to 36% in AB7). 

2. Positive evaluation of the government’s performance in narrowing the gap between rich and poor stands at 15% and negative evaluation at 81%. This represents a 6-point drop in the positive evaluation compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of positive evaluation dropped in both areas: it stands at 20% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 29% in AB7) and 12% in the West Bank (compared to 17% in AB7). 

3. Positive evaluation of the government’s performance in keeping prices down stands at 12% and negative evaluation at 85%. This represents an 8-point drop in the positive evaluation compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of positive evaluation dropped in both areas: it stands at 19% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 31% in AB7) and 7% in the West Bank (compared to 12% in AB7). 

We asked about the extent to which the government responds to what people want. Only one fifth believes the government is very or largely responsive and 79% believe it is not very responsive or not responsive at all. Gazans are a little more likely than West Bankers to think the government is responsive, 26% to 16% respectively. In 2021, 25% said the government was responsive and 74% said it was not.

We asked about actions that Palestinians think are the most effective to influence a national government decision. Use of family connections with government officials and the participation in a protest received the highest percentage as the most effective, standing at 15% each. Virtual campaigns received 13%; forming a group received 12%; contacting governmental officials in social media received 10%, contacting the media received 9%, and at the bottom came “work through a political party” selected by 6% only. It is worth noting that Gazans were more likely than West Bankers to select “use of family connections,” (18% and 13% respectively) and work through a political party (11% and 3% respectively. By contrast, West Bankers were more likely than Gazans to select “participation in a protest (19% and 8% respectively) and “contact the media (13% and 4% respectively).  The largest percentage (16%) said none of these measures are effective, with Gazans selecting it much more than West Bankers, 22% to 12%. 

This question was asked in a different manner. Using the same list of measures indicated above, we asked Palestinians about the actions that they think are the least effective to influence a national government decision. The largest percentage, 18% (19% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) selected “participation in a protest,” followed by “contacting government officials on social media,” selected by 13; “forming a group” was selected by 12%, virtual campaign by 11%, contact the media by 6%, and work through a political party by another 6%.  (4) Government responsiveness:

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (85%) thinks corruption exists in the PA institutions either to a large (54%) or to a medium extent (31%) and 12% think it exists but only to a small extent (10%) or not at all (2%). This is almost the same as the case was in 2021 when 86% thought corruption existed in the PA and 11% thought it did not exist. But the findings do show an increase in the perception of corruption in the West Bank, now standing at 94%, compared to 90% in 2021, and show a decrease in the Gaza Strip from 81% in 2021 to 72% now.

We asked about the extent to which the government is working to crackdown on corruption. A majority of 61% believed that it does so only to a small extent (24%) or not at all (37%) while 38% believed it does so to a large (11%) or medium (27%) extent. In 2021, 41% believed it does so to a large or medium extent. Here too, there are differences between West Bankers and Gazans. In the West Bank, 35% (compared to 32% in 2021) think the government does so to a large or medium extent while in the Gaza Strip, 43% (compared to 55% in 2021) think the government does so to a large or medium extent.  

We asked about the prevalence of corruption when seeking a job or getting legal document from public institutions. In answer to the question about how often “it is necessary for citizens in Palestine to use wasta (or personal connections) to get a job, a majority of 53% said “frequently,” 22% said “sometimes,” and 24% said rarely or never. In the West Bank, 58% said frequently compared to 45% in the Gaza Strip. When asked about the role of wasta in getting legal documents from public institutions, only 36% said “frequently,” with identical results in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. One third said “sometimes,” and 29% said rarely or never.

We also asked about the role of rashwa or bribery in getting a job or obtaining legal documents from public institutions. In answer to the question about “it is necessary for citizens in Palestine to use rashwa to get a job,” 44% said “frequently,” 28% said “sometimes,” and 25% said rarely or never. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to think rashwa is used frequently, 46% and 40% respectively.  When asked about the role of rashwa in getting legal documents from public institutions, 31% said “frequently,” 33% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. One third said “sometimes,” and another third said rarely or never.

We also asked about the perception of corruption in local government, such as municipalities and local councils. A majority of 54% believe that most (42%) or almost everyone (12%) is corrupt while 41% believe that hardly anyone (11%) or not a lot (30%) are corrupt. These findings are similar to what we found in 2021, when 40% said hardly anyone or not a lot are corrupt. But they represent an improvement in the West Bank and a setback in the Gaza Strip:  a rise of 10 points in the West Bank and a decrease of 8 points in the Gaza Strip in the percentage of those who think that hardly anyone or not a lot are corrupt.

The question about corruption in local government was asked in a different manner, one similar to the question about corruption in PA institutions at the national level: “To what extent do you think there is corruption within the local/municipal agencies and institutions in Palestine?” 70% said corruption existed in local councils and municipalities to a large or medium extent while 28% said it existed to some extent or not at all.  Minor differences exist between West Bankers and Gazans: 71% and 6%7 respectively believe corruption in local government exists to a large or medium extent.