

Public Opinion Poll #10
Elections, Economic Conditions, Palestinian Prisoners, Palestinian Police, and Jerusalem
June 30, 1994

This is the tenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. This poll focuses on elections; Palestinian perceptions of Israeli commitments to the agreements, performance of Palestinian police and PLO negotiators; and expectations regarding economic conditions in the future and the final status of Jerusalem. SRU conducts a monthly public opinion poll to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. The poll results are published independently and with unit analysis in both Arabic and English. They provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, SRU strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (see Appendix A).

General Background

This poll was conducted on Thursday, June 30, 1994. June was the second month in the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement signed in Cairo on May 4, 1994. Palestinians got an opportunity during this month to get an initial glimpse of autonomy in action, the most visible institution of which until this point has been the police force. The issue of Palestinians still incarcerated in Israeli prisons was at the forefront of Palestinian concerns this month, and was the subject of many demonstrations and strikes. Rumors of Yassir Arafat's visit to the area throughout the month culminated in an announcement on the day of the poll of his imminent arrival. Another issue during this period was the delay in disbursing promised funds to the Palestinian authority on the part of the donor countries.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with local and international experts. The format was changed during this poll in order to expedite the coding and data entry process. Researchers were asked to mark respondents' answers in boxes next to the questions, making it possible to enter the coded data directly from the questionnaire and eliminating the need for code sheets. Besides saving time, this process increased accuracy since it eliminated a step with potential for clerical error. While a separate coding step was no longer necessary, coders did check each questionnaire to ensure that they were completed properly prior to the data entry.

Polling Districts

As in last month's poll, the West Bank was divided into eight polling areas (Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, Jericho, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron) which were in turn divided into eighteen polling districts. Gaza was divided into six polling areas. CPRS created a list of all locations in Gaza, and a random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from lists that divided the locations according to population size, type of locality (city, camp, village) and degree of development. The division utilized promotes the random nature and representation of the sample.

The sample that we obtained through this system of division enabled us to understand political positions and voting patterns in :

1. The Occupied Territories as a whole (West Bank and Gaza)
2. The West Bank and Gaza separately
3. Polling areas separately
4. Polling districts separately

We received 1974 questionnaires from the West Bank and Gaza, of which 1307 are from the West Bank and 667 are from Gaza.

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Area of Residence		Following the News			
West Bank "including Jerusalem"	66.2%	City	38.0%	Always	33.1%
Gaza Strip	38.8%	Town	08.7%	Often	27.1%
		Village	31.2%	Sometimes	36.2%
		Refugee Camps	22.1	Never	03.6%
Age		Sex		Education	
18-22	21.5%			Up to 9 years (elem./prep)	30.2%
23-26	18.6%			Up to 12 years (Tawjihi)	32.6%
27-30	16.4%	Males	58.8%	2 year College	16.5%
31-35	12.4%	Females	41.2%	University (BA)	19.2%
36-42	12.1%			MA + Phd.	01.5%
43-50	09.2%				
51+	09.8%				
Refugee Status	Marital Status	Area		Occupation	
		Nablus	10.4	Laborers	15.0%
		Tulkarem	08.6	Merchants	08.6%
		Jenin	08.4	Craftsmen	10.1%
	Single	Jericho	01.9	Students	12.8%
Ref. 44.4	Married	Ramallah	10.5	Housewives	20.6%
NonRef. 55.6	Divorced & Widowed	Hebron	12.3	Farmers	02.1%
		Bethlehem	06.8	Employees*	18.6%
		Jerusalem	07.2	Specialists**	04.0%
		Gaza A	06.2	Unemployed	07.7%
		Gaza B	06.0	Retired	00.5%

Gaza C	05.8
Gaza D	05.3
Gaza E	06.0
Gaza F	04.6

* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

** Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

***A new question for the demographic section as an initial attempt to measure information access and basis for Palestinian opinions.

****Gaza A) Jabalyia, al-Nazla; B) Rimal; C) al-Zaytoun, Sabra; D) Deir Balah, Bureij; E) Khan Younis Area; F) Rafah.

Data Collection

To complete the data collection process, the choice of interview stations was based on our previous experience in the last nine polls. To ensure the representation of Palestinians in all districts, the focus was on areas that attracted villagers and refugee camp residents. Data collectors carried with them an exhaustive list of villages and refugee camps in each district. This allowed them to reach their target sample as efficiently as possible. The method for sample selection during data collection was changed slightly in an effort to reduce interviewer bias. Instead of choosing a respondent based solely on an enumeration system, data collectors were instructed to choose a specific point in their interview area (a utility pole, crosswalk, etc) and interview the first person to cross that point. At exactly 10 minutes after the beginning of the interview (the average interview takes six or seven minutes), the fieldworker was to choose the person crossing their landmark as their next respondent. In addition to reducing choice of respondent for the interviewer, this method is more conducive to monitoring since any observer could easily determine the system being used and then monitor to see that it is consistently followed. It appears that the system increased the representative nature of the sample, as **the percentage of women and older individuals in the sample was higher from previous polls.** The system did have a few limitations, however. Female fieldworkers, particularly in Gaza, found it difficult to stand in a single place for long periods of time without drawing unwelcome attention. Also, most fieldworkers, regardless of gender, faced a problem of drawing a crowd because they were not able to move around in their general area and thus avoid attracting attention from curious people in the area.

In the Gaza Strip, fieldworkers visited randomly selected towns, villages, and refugee camps. Here, around 50% of the interviews were conducted in households to ensure the representation of women. The rest of the interviews were conducted in public places.

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on sampling techniques, survey methods, scientific research, and fieldwork. Two special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers. The first, on Sunday, June 5, was held in Gaza for the Gaza area fieldworkers, and the second, on Monday, June 6, was held at Birzeit University for all West Bank fieldworkers. Expert consultants for these sessions were Roz Tartaglione, designer and supervisor of fieldworker training for the first national public opinion poll in Nepal, and David Pollock of USIA, author of *Polling in the Arab World*. Topics covered during the workshops included the importance of sound methodology in survey research and

examples of interviewer bias, using visual aides and simulation exercises. Another three training sessions were held last month in Gaza, Nablus, and Birzeit. These were sponsored by the International Republican Institute and attended by Lauren Ross of the same institute. Expert consultant for these sessions was Dr. Mark Tessler.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. All interviews took place on the same day and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 35) to allow for careful interviewing. In general, the public forum of interviews contributed to a 10% non-response rate which was not included in the sample. A large number of non-respondents were women not accustomed to talking to strangers in public places, probably due to cultural constraints. Some non-respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political affiliation out of fear or ambivalence.

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%, and the confidence level is higher than 95%.

Remarks

Elections

According to the DoP, elections for PISGA should take place July 13, 1994. However, the date for elections has been postponed until October, according to Sa'ib Iraqat, the head of the official Palestinian election commission. This postponement did not dampen Palestinian enthusiasm for elections, as 76% chose elections as the best means to choose the members of PISGA. Only 14.8% of the respondents felt that the PLO should select the members of PISGA. The poll shows that the majority of the supporters of all groups prefers elections to appointments as the means to select the members of PISGA (See Table 1).

Table 1

Relationship Between Political Affiliation and Preferred Means to Select PISGA Members

	PLO Appointment %	Appointment by Faction Quota%	Elections %	Other %
PFLP	2.5	10.8	84.2	2.5
DFLP	9.8	7.3	78.0	4.9
Hamas	6.9	7.3	83.5	2.3

Isl. Jihad	11.7	10.0	75.0	3.3
Fateh	26.5	3.4	68.8	1.3
Feda	9.1	12.1	78.8	---
H.al-Sha'b	---	10.8	89.2	---
Isl. Ind.	2.2	3.3	93.5	1.0
Nat'l Ind	5.2	6.7	86.7	1.4
Other	12.2	10.2	71.4	6.2
No one	9.0	4.7	71.9	14.4

Support for elections can be found among men (79.3%) more than women (71.5%). This is due, in part, to a high level of education among men, where the poll results show that there is a correlation between education and attitude towards elections, where those with the most education show the highest support for elections.

The poll also shows that professionals are least supportive of the PLO leadership appointing the members of PISGA, with only 6.6% of them indicating their support. In contrast, we find that 22% of the housewives surveyed support appointment by the PLO. There is also a correlation between awareness of the news and views on elections. A total of 78.4% of those who always follow the news chose elections as the best means to select the members of PISGA, whereas only 12.5% of the same group prefer appointments by the PLO. In contrast, we find that 63.8% of those who do not follow the news chose elections and 23.2% of them chose appointment by the PLO leadership.

The majority of Palestinians (67.8%) intend to participate in elections if and when they are held. The poll confirms that as the date for elections gets closer (originally July, but postponed until October of this year), support for participation in elections rises, especially in Gaza. In October 1993, 60% of Gaza respondents said that they will participate in elections, compared with 72.1% in June 1994.

It seems that the implementation of the DoP in Gaza and Jericho has generated higher confidence levels in the on-going political process which resulted in higher levels of willingness to participate in elections resulting from the agreement. We find that the intention to participate in elections for PISGA is highest in Jericho (83.3%) and Gaza (72.1%). The aforementioned argument does not fully apply to the rest of the West Bank. In the Hebron area, for example, only 59.7% declared that they want to participate in elections.

The intention to participate is as low as 56.3% in the Jerusalem area. This may be attributed to a lower rate of support for Fateh in this area and a higher support for "independents" and "others". The residents of Jerusalem express uncertainty about the future (as indicated by the poll question on the future of Jerusalem). This uncertainty leads many of the area residents to be apprehensive about participating in elections.

Intention to participate in elections for PISGA is correlated with political affiliation. The largest percentage of the supporters of all political groups showed an intention to participate. A total of 90.9% of Feda supporters, 86.9% of Hizb el-Sha'b supporters, and 84.6% of Fateh supporters intend to participate, compared with 55.7% of Islamic Jihad supporters, 54.8% of Hamas supporters, 53.7% of DFLP supporters, and 42.6% of PFLP supporters.(see Table 2)

Table 2**Intention to Participate in Elections by Political Affiliation**

	Yes %	No %	Not Sure %
PFLP	42.6	32.8	24.6
DFLP	53.7	46.7	----
Hamas	54.8	30.0	15.2
Isl. Jihad	55.7	29.5	14.8
Fateh	84.6	5.6	9.8
Feda	90.9	6.1	3.0
H.al-Sha'b	86.5	2.7	10.8
Isl. Ind.	64.1	14.2	21.7
Nat'l Ind	67.9	10.4	21.7
Other	79.6	10.2	10.2
No one	41.6	38.4	20.0

Economic Conditions

Palestinians were asked two questions with regard to economic conditions. First, they were asked if they are currently able to meet their basic monthly household expenses. Also, they were asked about their expectations with regard to changes in their standard of living under Palestinian self-rule. These questions were important for two reasons. Palestinians are discussing a deteriorating economic situation, possibly due to a sharp increase in unemployment following the closure of the West Bank and Gaza, and researchers felt that it was important to measure the extent of economic hardship among Palestinians; also, the issue of expectations needed to be measured as much as possible. There is a sense that Palestinians felt that their living standards would improve under Palestinian rule. If this in fact turned out to be the expectation, then whether or not such improvement materialized would be important with regard to satisfaction and frustration levels in the community vis-a-vis the authority.

The results of the poll show that as much as 44.5% of Palestinian households are unable to meet their basic monthly household expenses. As expected, economic hardship is a characteristic of the Gaza Strip (with a majority living in the refugee camps) more than the West Bank. The majority of Gaza households surveyed (52.5%) indicated that they are unable to meet their basic monthly household expenses. This is compared with 40.5% in the West Bank. Another 40.2% of Gazans indicated that they are able to meet these expenses. This higher than expected percentage could be due to the fact that for many Gazans, particularly those living in refugee camps, receive UNRWA assistance in meeting their housing, education, and health needs.

At the same time we find that expectations for a better standard of living are higher in Gaza than in the West Bank. A total of 45.1% of Gazans expect that the implementation of self-rule will result in better living conditions. In comparison, 31.4% of West Bank respondents felt the same way. Our previous polls have consistently shown that Gazans are generally more optimistic about the future than West Bankers. Economic desperation in Gaza combined with the changes on the ground due to the initial implementation of the agreement yields a situation of higher expectations.

We also notice that respondents from areas such as Jerusalem and Hebron, with the lowest levels of hardship (as indicated by the results of the household expense question) have the lowest expectations as to improvement in living conditions with the implementation of self-rule. In contrast, respondents from areas such as Gaza and Jericho with high levels of hardship (as indicated by the results of the household expense question) have the highest expectations. These high expectations may also be due to the fact that a Palestinian authority is in place in these areas and that many of the residents trust that this authority will be able to improve economic and living conditions. These high expectations can only add to the pressure on the Palestinian National Authority in these areas.

The ability to meet basic economic needs is correlated with education where we find that 40.2% of respondents with 9 years of education or less indicating that they are able to cover their basic monthly expenses, compared with 53.8% of those with a bachelor's degree. A higher level of education (Master's or PhD) has a drastic influence on respondents' perceptions of their living conditions. A total of 80% of those with high degrees indicated that they are able to cover their basic monthly expenses.

Future of Jerusalem

The question of Jerusalem was raised for a number of reasons. Clashes between Israeli and Palestinian leadership through the media during the month kept the issue very much on the forefront. Also, previous poll results (September 1993) indicated that the majority of Palestinians are against the postponement of discussion of Jerusalem's status. The closure of Jerusalem, seen as a political siege by most Palestinians and the recently-elected Likud city government's policies concerning changes in the city seen as harmful to the Arab residents of the city, made Palestinians feel that the Israeli government is trying to impose a status quo arrangement for the city.

This tension was reflected in the responses of Palestinians to the question on the future of Jerusalem. The largest percentage (43.8%) of the respondents indicated that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations will not lead to an acceptable solution to the issue of Jerusalem. The comparatively high figure should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of resignation on the part of Palestinians to the fate of the city. It may be an indication of frustration with the status quo. A definition of what is "acceptable" was not supplied to respondents, which may also explain, in part, the pessimism reflected in their answers.

There is a difference between the West Bank and Gaza, where more Gazans trust that negotiations will bring about an acceptable solution to the issue of Jerusalem. This may be attributed to higher levels of confidence among Gazans in the negotiation process and in the PLO itself as reflected in the responses to other questions in this poll. Also, geography plays a role in this regard. Israel separates Jerusalem from Gaza and therefore fewer Gazans have had an opportunity to visit Jerusalem than West Bankers. The residents of Bethlehem, Jericho, and Jerusalem are most pessimistic about the future of the city. A total of 63.7% of Bethlehem residents, 56.84% of Jericho residents, and 52.1% of Jerusalem residents felt that Palestinian negotiations will not generate an acceptable outcome.

Palestinian Police Force

The Palestinian police force has now been deployed for two months in Gaza and Jericho. However, the geographic limit of their presence did not prevent Palestinians in the rest of the West Bank from forming opinions with regard to their performance. Many Palestinians have heard accounts of the police activities through the media and some have visited the area under their authority.

The poll shows a positive evaluation of the performance of Palestinian police. A total of 69.7% of the respondents believed that the performance of the police is either "good" or "acceptable." Only 13.5% indicated that the performance of the police is either "weak" or "bad." Here, we also note a difference in attitudes between the West Bank and Gaza. A total of 57.3% of Gaza respondents gave the police force a "good" grade, compared with 29.6% of the West Bank respondents. A total of 16.7% of West Bank respondents said that the performance of the police is either "weak" or "bad," compared with 7.1% in Gaza. In Jericho, 47.2% of the respondents gave the police force a "good" grade, and another 30.6% said that its performance is "acceptable." In contrast, 19.4% said that it is "weak."

Some West Bankers think that it is too early to make a judgement because of the lack of direct contact with the police. A total of 23.5% of West Bank respondents said that they did not know how to evaluate the police force, compared with 3.6% of Gaza respondents.

It was noticeable that 52.1% of Hamas supporters, 45% of Islamic Jihad supporters, and 44% of PFLP supporters gave the police a grade of "good" or "acceptable."

The perceived urgent need for law, order, and justice in the Occupied Territories may have prompted Palestinians to think positively of the police and its role. Furthermore, many Palestinians in the West Bank are not necessarily basing their evaluation on the actual performance of the police, but on their symbolic role and expectations of future activities, particularly since it is really too early to evaluate their performance at this point. Also, many police stationed in Gaza have family there, which increases the sympathy of the population for the returning police officers. The results indicate that Palestinians are giving the police the benefit of the doubt at this early stage.

Perceptions of Israel's Commitment

Palestinians are doubtful about Israel's commitment to the Oslo and Cairo agreements. A total of 56% of the respondents felt that Israel's commitment is either "weak" or "bad." Although most respondents are doubtful about Israel's commitment to Oslo and Cairo agreements, a significant minority (32.3%) rated Israel's commitment as "acceptable" or "good". The high percentage of doubters is understandable and expected. It reflects the prevailing attitude among Palestinians that Israel is blocking the implementation of many articles of the Cairo and Paris agreements, such as Palestinian access to Israeli markets, the granting of safe passage between Gaza and Jericho, and the presence of Palestinian Police, flag, and passport control at the crossings in Rafah and the Alenby bridge. On the other hand, an approval rate of 32.3% reflects a level of trust undetected previously among Palestinians. As expected, the results indicate that this process

is more developed in Gaza than in the West Bank. Almost 40% of Gazans evaluated Israel's commitment as good or acceptable, compared with 29% in the West Bank. Gazans have witnessed Israeli army withdrawal and assumption of control by Palestinians, while West Bankers, except the residents of Jericho, have not yet seen any changes on the ground to justify higher levels of optimism regarding Israel's commitment.

Palestinian Prisoners

There was a lot of discussion regarding the issue of Palestinian prisoners during this period. Prisoners began a hunger strike and there were a number of large demonstrations and strikes throughout the West Bank, including Jericho. Statements issued by prisoners advocate groups blamed the PLO for their plight. Prisoners are required to sign a special document as a condition for their release. The required document states that prisoners to be released must refrain from the use of violence or "terrorist" activities. These prisoners were also required to support the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. We asked Palestinians to evaluate the performance of the PLO in the negotiations over the release of prisoners from Israeli jails. The results of the poll show that while the majority of Palestinians (55.1%) evaluated the performance of the PLO positively, a large group (41.8%) think that it is "weak" or "bad." Dissatisfaction with the PLO's performance is higher in the West Bank, as it reaches 46.2%, compared with 33% in Gaza. The majority of opposition group supporters are dissatisfied with the performance of the PLO. For example, 60.1% of Hamas supporters and 75.4% of PFLP supporters said that PLO performance in this regard is either "weak" or "bad." This can be compared with 25.7% of Fateh supporters and 27.3% of Feda supporters who felt similarly. We also notice that the residents of Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Hebron are most critical of the performance of the PLO regarding Palestinian prisoners (see Table 3).

Table 3

Perception of PLO Performance Regarding Prisoners by Area of Residence

	Good %	Acceptable %	Weak %	Bad %	Don't Know %
Nablus	36.4	22.3	24.3	11.7	5.3
Tulkarm	28.6	23.8	28.0	17.9	1.8
Jenin	36.1	18.7	22.3	15.1	7.8
Jericho	37.8	27.0	29.7	5.4	---
Ramallah	22.1	18.8	30.8	26.0	2.4
Hebron	20.7	28.1	30.2	16.9	4.1
Bethlehem	28.4	29.9	27.6	12.7	1.5
Jerusalem	16.9	17.6	23.2	40.8	1.4
Gaza Strip	37.7	26.9	20.2	12.8	2.4

Furthermore, the poll results show that evaluation of PLO performance is correlated with education, where 62.1% of those with 9 years of education or less feel that PLO performance is either "good" or "acceptable." This is compared with 43.9% approval among individuals with higher degrees (Master's or PhDs). A total of 51% of those with bachelor's degrees felt that the PLO performance is inadequate (see Table 4).

Table 4**Evaluation of PLO Performance Regarding Prisoners by Education**

	Good %	Acceptable %	Weak%	Bad %
Don't Know %				
Up to 9 years 4.7	38.1	24.0	20.4	12.8
Tawjihi 2.5	33.7	22.7	25.0	16.2
2 year college 1.9	28.5	24.0	26.3	19.2
bachelor's 2.5	19.1	27.6	27.3	23.5
degree				
Master's ---	15.4	38.5	23.1	23.1
degrees & PhD				

Satisfaction with the PLO performance in relation to the release of Palestinian prisoners is high among housewives, farmers, and the retired. Dissatisfaction with the PLO negotiators' performance, however, is high among professionals, employees, and students. This is probably due to higher levels of education and expectations.

Furthermore, the poll results show a direct correlation between the level of awareness of the news and perception of PLO performance regarding prisoners, where those who follow the news are more critical than those who do not. (See Table 5)

Table 5**Following the News by Perception of PLO Performance Regarding Prisoners**

	Good %	Acceptable %	Weak %	Bad %	Don't
Know %					
Always	28.8	24.6	23.8	21.1	1.7
Often	24.9	25.5	29.2	18.7	1.7
Sometimes	35.8	24.0	22.5	13.3	4.4
Never	42.3	15.5	21.1	7.0	14.1

Comparing the above-mentioned statistics with the events of last month, we find ourselves facing what seems to be a contradictory situation. The majority of Palestinians gave a positive evaluation of the PLO performance, but at the same time, last month's events (general strikes, hunger strikes by the prisoners, large demonstrations) show that the issue of prisoners is at the top of the Palestinian agenda. One explanation for such a contradiction is that many Palestinians, in answering this question, were in fact evaluating the PLO and the negotiations process in general, thus resulting in positive responses. Also, Palestinians may be evaluating positively the PLO performance because of the large numbers of prisoners who have already been released

since the DoP was signed. At the same time, the poll results show that most respondents adhered to the position of the political group that they support. The fact that the largest group of respondents supported Fateh led to a positive evaluation of the PLO. It could also be argued that many Palestinians feel that the responsibility to release Palestinian prisoners (most of whom are members of opposition groups) lies mainly with the Israeli authority.

Political Affiliation

We notice that support for Fateh has slightly declined from last month. A total of 41.7% of Palestinians surveyed indicated that they would elect Fateh candidates in a general political election, compared with 44.4% last month. Support for Fateh is consistent in the West Bank, at 40.1%. In Gaza, however, Fateh support declined from 52.4% to 45.2%. This month's figure is more consistent with previous results. Support for Hamas and PFLP is relatively consistent with last month, at 13.7% for Hamas and 6.4% for PFLP.

The second largest category for political affiliation this month is "none of the above," at 14.8%. This is an increase from last month of 3.7%. This phenomenon is noticeable in Gaza more than the West Bank, which could be an indication of uncertainty of political affiliation during the changing circumstances or possibly of fear on the part of some individuals to state their political affiliation at this stage.

Affiliation with Fateh is correlated with area of residence where support for Fateh is 10% higher on the average in Gaza, the north of the West Bank (Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin), and Jericho than the middle and south of the West Bank (Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron) (see Table 5). In the case of Hebron, a coalition of the "opposition" groups (Hamas, PFLP, Islamic Jihad, DFLP, and Islamic independents) has a higher percentage, 47.5%, than a coalition of the "support" groups (Fateh, Feda, Hizb el-Sha'b, and Nationalist independents), at 40.5%. Of course, without knowing who the independent candidates are, it is not possible to determine their position on issues. However, previous poll results indicate that supporters of Islamic independents tend to support attitudes more in line with the declared opposition, whereas the opposite is true for supporters of Nationalist independents.

Hizb el-Sha'b, PFLP, and Feda all have more presence in the West Bank than in Gaza, according to the results of this and previous polls. Willingness to elect independent candidates is higher in the West Bank as well.

Table 5

Political Affiliation by Place of Residence

Nat	DFLP %		H.el-Shab %	Hamas %	Feda %	Isla. Jihad %	Fateh %	PFLP %	Isla Inds %
	O'er	No							
		one %							
Nablus	3.5	2.0	13.4	1.0	3.0	45.3	6.0	3.5	
4.5	4.0	13.8							

T'lkrm	3.6	0.6	12.6	1.2	1.2	49.1	2.4	4.2
11.4	3.0	1.7						
Jenin	2.5	---	9.6	1.3	1.9	45.8	1.9	4.5
4.5	3.2	10.8						
Jericho	6.3	3.1	18.8	3.1	3.1	43.8	---	---
3.1	9.4	9.3						
Ram.'h	1.9	2.4	11.5	1.0	5.3	35.1	6.3	5.3
13.5	2.4	15.3						
Hebron	2.5	2.1	21.9	2.9	4.5	28.5	10.7	7.9
7.0	1.7	10.3						
B'hem	1.5	7.7	9.2	3.1	3.8	35.4	10.8	5.4
6.2	1.5	15.4						
J'salem	4.4	3.7	8.8	4.4	1.5	34.6	8.1	6.6
10.3	1.5	16.1						
Gaza A	00.9	2.6	13.9	3.5	5.2	48.7	2.6	4.3
2.6	4.3	11.4						
Gaza B	0.7	2.1	14.4	---	3.4	47.9	8.9	2.7
4.8	0.7	14.4						
Gaza C	---	---	10.9	1.5	1.5	29.9	9.5	8.0
11.7	3.6	23.4						
Gaza D	---	---	18.8	---	---	46.4	4.3	4.3
---	2.9	23.3						
Gaza E	0.8	---	16.1	---	5.1	52.5	3.4	0.8
3.4	1.7	16.2						
Gaza F	3.5	---	15.8	1.8	1.8	52.6	5.3	1.8
3.5	---	13.9						

Appendix A

1. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

	Total West Bank Gaza		
a. Appointment by PLO leadership	14.8%	14.2%	15.9%
b. Appointment by political groups on a quota basis.	05.4%	05.3%	05.6%
c. Political Elections	76.1%	76.8%	74.7%
d. Other	03.7%	03.7%	03.8%

2. Will you participate in the election for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority?

a. Yes	67.8%	65.7%	72.1%
b. No	18.0%	19.2%	15.6%
c. Not sure	14.2%	15.1%	12.3%

3. Can you (or the head of your household) meet all basic monthly household expenses (food, housing, medical care, education)?

a. Yes	48.2%	52.3%	40.2%
b. No	44.5%	40.5%	52.5%
c. Not sure	07.3%	07.2%	07.3%

4. With the implementation of self-rule, do you believe that your standard of living _____?

a. Will improve	36.0%	31.4%	45.1%
b. Will worsen	13.0%	15.5%	08.1%
c. Will remain the same	17.4%	19.2%	14.0%
d. Don't know	33.6%	33.9%	32.8%

5. Do you believe that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations over Jerusalem will lead to an acceptable solution for the Palestinians?

a. Yes	22.8%	19.3%	29.4%
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b. No	43.8%	47.3%	36.9%
c. Not sure	33.5%	33.4%	33.7%
6. How do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian police in Gaza and Jericho until now?			
a. Good	38.9%	29.6%	57.3%
b. Acceptable	30.8%	30.2%	32.0%
c. Weak	10.0%	12.4%	05.3%
d. Bad	03.5%	04.3%	01.8%
e. Don't know	16.8%	23.5%	03.6%
7. How do you evaluate the general Israeli commitment to the Oslo agreement and the Cairo (Gaza-Jericho First) agreement until now?			
a. Good	08.3%	07.5%	10.1%
b. Acceptable	24.0%	21.5%	29.0%
c. Weak	29.7%	31.0%	27.0%
d. Bad	26.3%	26.9%	25.0%
e. Don't know	11.7%	13.1%	08.9%
8. How do you evaluate the performance of the PLO negotiators regarding the release of Palestinian prisoners?			
a. Good	30.8%	27.3%	37.7%
b. Acceptable	24.3%	22.9%	27.0%
c. Weak	24.7%	27.0%	20.2%
d. Bad	17.1%	19.2%	12.8%
e. Don't know	03.1%	03.6%	02.3%
9. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:			
a. DFLP	02.2%	02.9%	00.8%
b. Hizb al-Sha'b	01.9%	02.4%	00.9%
c. Hamas	13.7%	13.3%	14.5%
d. Feda	01.7%	02.0%	01.0%
e. Islamic Jihad	03.2%	03.2%	03.1%
f. Fateh	41.7%	40.0%	45.2%
g. PFLP	06.4%	06.5%	06.1%
h. Islamic independents	04.8%	05.3%	03.9%
i. Nationalist independents	07.0%	08.1%	05.0%
j. Other (specify)	02.6%	02.7%	02.3%
k. None of the above	14.8%	13.6%	17.1%

Appendix B

Polling Districts

The West Bank

The West Bank was divided into 8 areas and 18 polling districts as follows:

District	Population size **	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Nablus city	85,375	65	Tulkarm (North)	105,699	79
Nablus East	81,995	88	Tulkarm (South)	96,738	90
Nablus West	63,638	53	Tulkarm (Total)	202,432	169
Nablus Total	230,998	206			

District	Population size	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Jenin (East)	96,721	97	Jericho	25,957	37
Jenin (West)	100,490	69			
Jenin Total	197,211	166			

District	Population size	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Ramallah (North)	76,983	51	Hebron (North)	82,947	81
Ramallah (South)	77,533	76	Hebron (South)	80,073	81
Ramallah (City)	75,178	81	Hebron (city)	96,545	81
Ramallah Total	229,694	208	Hebron Total	259,565	243

District	Population size	Sample size	District	Population size	Sample size
Bethlehem (City)	68,646	68	Jerusalem (Vicinity)	83,580	73
Bethlehem (Vicinity)	70,273	67	Jerusalem (City)	81,370	69
Bethlehem Total	138,919	135	Jerusalem Total	165,310	142

* (a complete list of villages and camps included in each district may be obtained from CPRS.)

The Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip was divided into 6 polling districts as shown below:

District	Population size	Sample size**	Sample Distribution
Gaza A Village,	141,915	122	Jabalyia Camp, Jabalyia
Gaza B	150,000	118	al-Nazla
Gaza C	151,000	115	Rimal
Gaza D Balah	116,600	105	Zaytoun, Sabra
Gaza E	140,524	118	Deir al-Balah Camp, Deir al-City, Bureij Camp
Gaza F	102,346	90	Khan Younis City, Abbasan al-Kabira
			Rafah Camp

* CPRS estimates are based on the figures provided by *Palestinian Population Handbook* (Jerusalem: Planning and Research Center, 1993).

** The sample distribution in Gaza was based on the population distribution among refugee camps, cities, and villages and not on the basis of population size in the various regions.

*** In addition, interested individuals may obtain the results of the voting patterns in each one of these areas according to place of residence (city, village, and refugee camp) by contacting CPRS.