

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

Public Opinion Poll NO (15)

Armed Attacks, Negotiations, "Separation", Elections, Unemployment, and Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

February 2-4, 1995

This is the fifteenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The following topics are covered in this poll: unemployment, elections, Palestinian-Jordanian relations, Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and armed attacks against Israeli targets.

CPRS has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, CPRS strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine. SRU disseminates the results of the polls through a number of means, including its community outreach program where the results are shared and discussed with a large number of Palestinians.

Here are the main findings of this poll:

- -81% of the Palestinians oppose continuation of negotiations if expansion of settlements does not stop.
- -46% support armed attacks against Israeli targets; 33.5% oppose such attacks.
- -Arafat's popularity reached 53.4% and Fateh's increased to 49.5% for the first time.
- -55.3% expect that negotiations will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- -64.3% see "separation" as retaliatory and vindictive collective punishment.
- -The intensified closure raises the unemployment level in the West Bank and Gaza to 51%.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (see [Appendix](#)).

General Background

Among the more important events in the period immediately preceding this poll was an armed attack against Israeli soldiers on January 22, 1995. The attack resulted in the death of 21 Israelis and the wounding of more than 62, most of whom were soldiers. As a result, the Israeli government decided to tighten the closure of the West Bank and Gaza and prevent all Palestinians from entering Israel. The heightened closure is believed to have heightened economic hardship among Palestinians, especially since it corresponds with the month of Ramadan. An arrest campaign was waged against supporters of Islamist groups and a number of Islamic organizations

were outlawed. The military raided the premises of a Palestinian college and arrested a number of students.

At the same time, Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister of Israel, announced that Israel should proceed in a process of full and permanent separation between the West Bank and Israel.

The issue of land confiscation was the subject of protest marches and confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis. In the meanwhile, a Palestinian-Jordanian summit was convened in Jordan as representatives of the PNA and the Jordanian government signed a number of agreements.

Yassir Arafat and Shimon Peres met in the middle of January to discuss settlements, prisoners, and other issues. However, last month witnessed a lack of activity in negotiations as many on both sides called for suspending them.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution. During this poll, a question where respondents were asked to specify their religion was added to the demographic section. CPRS also added a question regarding marital status that had been used previously but dropped for a period. The section on unemployment that was added in the previous two polls remained in this questionnaire as well.

Household Sample Selection

SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, as shown in Table 1. Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly.

Table 1

Sample Localities Selection

The Following table lists the localities that were included in the sample for this month.

District (Sample Size/ %)	Localities (Type)	District (Sample Size/%)	Localities (Type)
Nablus (109/10%)	Nablus (C), Zouata (V), 'Aqraba (V), Shamaaliya (T), 'Ain Beit al-Ma'	Tulkarm/Qalqilya (89/8.2%)	Burqin (V), 'Azoun (T), Hableh (V), Tulkarm (C), Nur Shams (RC)

Jenin (77/7.1%)	(RC) 'Aja (V), Jenin (C), Ya'bad (T), Jenin (RC), Kufri Dan (V)	Jericho (20/1.2%)	Jericho (C)
Ramallah (105/9.6%)	Silwad (T), Beit 'Anan (V), Beit Laqiyyeh (V), al-Bireh (C), Ramallah (C), al-Amari (RC)	Hebron (119/10.9%)	Hebron (C), Dura (T), Halhoul (T), al-'Aroub (RC), al-Masoua' (T), Beit 'Auwa (V)
Jerusalem (80/7.3%)	Old City, as-Souahra (V), Shu'fat (RC), at-Tur	Bethlehem (70/6.4%)	Bethlehem (C), Tafoua' (V), al-'Aziriyyeh (T), Deheisheh (RC)
Gaza North (100/9.2%)	Beit Hanoun (V), Jabalya (RC), an-Nazlah (V)	Gaza City (140/12.9%)	al-Rimal al-Janubi, ad-Daraj, as-Shati, ash-Shijja'yah
Gaza Middle (90/8.3%)	al-Boureij, an-Nusseirat, Khan Younis (RC), 'Absan al-Kbireh (V)	Gaza South (90/8.3%)	Rafah (C), Rafah (RC)

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be two hundred and is assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 200 by 10, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the second in the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block.

To select the individual within the selected household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice. The first flip was to choose gender of the respondent and the second was to choose whether the respondent is to be older or younger than forty years. When in the household, fieldworkers would conduct the interview with the person who has the characteristics that they selected in this manner.

We received 669 questionnaires from the West Bank and 420 from Gaza, for a total of 1089 interviews. Table 2 provides the reader with data on sample distribution for the present poll where the sample was selected based on household interviews.

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

Area of Residence			
West Bank "including Jerusalem"	61.4%	City	42.1%
Gaza Strip	38.6%	Town	09.4%
		Village	20.4%
		Refugee Camps	28.1
Age		Sex	Education

18-22	15.4%	Males Females	44.2% 55.8%	Up to 9 years (elem./prep)	50.6% 32.2% 09.1% 08.1%
23-26	13.6%			Up to 12 years	
27-30	14.6%			(Tawjihi)	
31-35	15.4%			2 year	
36-42	12.5%			College	
43-50	14.1%			University	
51+	14.4%			Degree	
Refugee Status		Marital Status		Occupation	
Ref.	49.4	Single	19.9%	Laborers	12.0%
NonRef.	50.6	Married	77.0%	Merchants	03.1%
		Divorced & Widowed	03.1%	Craftsmen	07.5%
				Students	05.4%
				Housewives	46.6%
				Farmers	2.0%
				Employees*	07.0%
				Specialists**	2.2%
				None	12.8%
				Retired	1.4%

* Employees: Schoolteacher, Government Employee, Nurse, Lower-level Company Employee, Secretary, etc.

** Specialists: University Teacher, Engineer, Doctor, Lawyer, Pharmacist, Executive, etc.

Data Collection

Data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of sixty-four fieldworkers. Training for data collection was conducted in the field where actual illustrations of the sample selection and interviewing techniques were conducted.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors were female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 15 per day) to allow for careful interviewing.

Interviews took place primarily over a three day period (Thursday, Friday, and Saturday) and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. Household interviews resulted in a lower non-response rate, estimated at 7%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions .

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%.

Results

Unemployment

The poll results indicate a sharp increase in the rate of unemployment, which reached 51%, compared with 32% last month. The increase is spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza, where it is at 57% in Gaza and 48% in the West Bank. This percentage of unemployment represents persons who are part of the labor force and did not work (not even for one hour) the week preceding the poll, who want to work, and are actively seeking work. However, if we look at the people who want to work but are not looking for some reason or another (discouraged labor), the unemployment rate increases to 60%. Among respondents who indicated that they were employed, 80% were employed full-time and 20% were employed part-time.

Unemployment is widespread, especially in refugee camps and villages/towns, as illustrated in table 3.

Table 3

Unemployment by Place of Residence

Refugee Camp	Village/Town	City
58%	56%	43%

It is known that the refugee camps suffer from a bad economic situation more than the other areas since the lack of economic infrastructure in the camps leads to more dependency on work in Israeli markets that became cut off from them due to the heightened closure.

Unemployment is also spread throughout age groups, as shown in Table 4. Previous poll results indicated that the younger respondents were more likely to be unemployed. However, the latest poll reveals the effect of the heightened closure on all age groups.

Table 4

Unemployment by Age

18-22 years	48%
23-26 years	55%
27-30 years	41%
31-35 years	44%
36-42 years	60%
43-50 years	63%
51-64	35%

The largest percentage of the unemployed is comprised of men as there are more men in the labor force. However, if we compare the unemployment rates among men and women, we will find that the percentage is higher for women, as shown in Table 5. (It should be reiterated here that we are only including women and men who are wanting to work and actively seeking work in the unemployment rates. Therefore, the higher percentage for women would not be a function of more women *choosing* to stay home.)

Table 5

Unemployment by Gender

Men	Women
49%	60%

The problem of unemployment is also more widespread among married respondents, who have more commitments, than among single respondents, which intensifies the severity of the unemployment problem among Palestinians. (See Table 6)

Table 6

Unemployment by Marital Status

Married	Single
53%	45%

The poll results show that there is a relationship between educational attainment and unemployment (where as education increases the percentage of unemployment decreases) which further intensifies poverty and the existing differences in society and leads to a large extent to a lowering of the standard of living, particularly among laborers, farmers, and craftspeople. (See Table 7).

Table 7

Unemployment by Education

9 years or less	60%
10-12 years	53%
2 year college	43%
University degree(s)	33%

It should be emphasized that while interviews are conducted in households, and therefore would seem to favor people who are not working, the days and hours of polling are chosen in such a way as to correct for this. Thursday interviews are conducted only after 11 a.m, since many people leave work early on this day. Friday and Saturday are usual weekly days off, Friday for workers in the territories, and Saturday for workers from the territories who work in Israel during times when permits to enter Israel are issued and honored.

Researchers at CPRS are currently studying the details of this topic and the research findings will be published later this year.

Palestinian-Jordanian Relations

A total of 51.4% of Palestinians view positively Yassir Arafat's visit to Jordan, where an agreement between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority was signed. These respondents are of the opinion that the agreement will end the disputes between the two sides. In contrast, 29.7% believe that the disputes will not end because of the agreements. It is believed more in the Gaza Strip than

in the West Bank that relations between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority may be improved. Doubts that the agreement will end disputes between the two sides are higher among the older respondents than among the younger, and among the more educated than the less educated. (See Tables 8 and 9)

Table 8

Attitude Towards Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement by Age

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
18-22	51.2	30.7	18.1
23-26	49.3	33.6	17.1
27-30	43.3	36.9	19.7
31-35	52.4	30.1	17.5
36-42	52.6	23.7	23.7
43-50	52.6	27.0	20.4
51+	57.7	26.3	16.0

Table 9

Attitude Towards Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement by Education

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
9 years or less	49.1	26.5	24.4
10-12 years	53.9	30.0	16.1
2 year college	59.2	32.7	08.1
Univ. degree(s)	48.0	49.5	02.5

There is also a relationship between political affiliation and view of the agreement, where supporters of Fateh and Feda more than any other group believe that the recent agreement will end the disputes between the two sides. (See Table 10)

Table 10

Attitude Towards Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
PPP	43.5	43.5	13.0
Hamas	37.4	41.9	20.6
Fateh	61.7	24.1	14.2
Islamic Jihad	43.2	37.8	18.9
DFLP	41.7	41.7	16.7
PFLP	43.6	46.2	10.3
Feda	66.7	---	33.3
Islamic Inds	35.0	50.0	15.0
Nationalist Inds	52.3	34.1	13.6
Others	50.7	30.1	19.2
No One	35.6	25.2	39.3

Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations

Most of the Palestinians (81.3%) reject continuing the negotiations in the context of continuing settlement expansion. In contrast, 14.1% support continuing the negotiations. This is the highest opposition to continuing the negotiations since immediately following the Hebron massacre. A

CPRS poll conducted in March of 1994 showed that only 7.7% of the respondents supported unconditional continuation of the negotiations. In contrast, 31% stipulated the dismantling of settlements in Hebron as a precondition for continuing the negotiations, and 55.5% opposed continuing the negotiations. The current rejection comes more from the Gaza Strip than the West Bank by a difference of 6.6%. The rejection of negotiations in the context of settlement expansion comes from groups most vocal in society and most active in political life. The refusal to continue negotiations is spread to a large extent among the educated and the younger respondents. (See Tables 11 and 12)

Table 11

Attitude Towards Continuing Negotiations by Education

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
9 years or less	14.7	79.8	05.5
10-12 years	13.6	82.9	03.5
2 year college	12.2	82.7	05.1
Univ. degree(s)	13.1	83.8	03.1

Table 12

Attitude Towards Continuing Negotiations by Age

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
18-22	12.7	86.1	01.2
23-26	15.0	83.7	01.3
27-30	15.8	79.7	04.4
31-35	13.9	79.4	06.7
36-42	15.0	82.0	03.0
43-50	08.6	86.1	05.3
51+	18.2	72.1	09.7

Opposition to continuing the negotiations if settlements continue to expand is not restricted to the supporters of the opposition factions; it also includes supporters of Fateh and Fedta. (See Table 13)

Table 13

Attitude Towards Continuing Negotiations by Political Affiliation

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
PPP	04.3	95.7	---
Hamas	07.1	90.4	02.5
Fateh	19.3	78.3	02.4
Islamic Jihad	05.4	91.9	02.7
DFLP	16.7	83.3	---
PFLP	---	100	---
Feda	16.7	66.7	16.6
Islamic Inds.	15.0	80.0	05.0
Nationalist Inds.	11.4	79.5	09.1
Others	12.3	80.8	06.9
No One	11.2	74.6	14.2

"Separation" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israel

Most Palestinians (64.3%) believe that the idea of separation suggested by Yitzhak Rabin is a form of retaliatory and vindictive collective punishment against Palestinians. Only 15.8% believe that the idea of separation is the beginning of Israeli acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, whereas 19.9% declared that they are not sure about this topic. A higher percentage of West Bank residents than Gaza residents viewed the closure as collective punishment. Also, more educated persons are more likely to view the closure as the beginning of Israeli acceptance of Palestinian statehood, where 24% of those with university degrees chose this option, compared with 13% of those with only primary education. (See Table 14)

Table 14

Attitude Towards "Separation" by Education

	Israeli Acceptance %	Collective Punishment %	Not Sure %
9 years or less	13.9	64.6	21.5
10-12 years	15.3	66.2	18.5
2 year college	21.4	57.1	21.5
Univ. degree (s)	24.0	54.5	21.5

Men are more likely than women to view the idea of "separation" as the beginning of Israeli acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Also, supporters of Fateh more than supporters of other groups view this idea in the same way, where 21% of them choose the beginning of acceptance option, joined by 10.9 from supporters of Hamas, and 18.2 from nationalist independents. (See Table 15).

Table 15

Attitude Towards "Separation" by Political Affiliation

	Israeli Acceptance %	Collective Punishment %	Not Sure %
PPP	13.0	65.2	21.7
Hamas	10.9	73.7	15.4
Fateh	21.2	58.8	20.0
Islamic Jihad	02.7	75.7	21.6
DFLP	25.0	50.0	25.0
PFLP	10.3	79.5	10.3
Feda	---	83.3	16.7
Islamic Inds.	10.0	85.0	05.0
Nationalist Inds.	18.2	72.7	09.1
Others	13.9	66.7	19.4
No One	07.4	60.3	32.4

Expectations Concerning the Establishment of a Palestinian State

Despite the aforementioned, 55.3% of the respondents believe that the peace process which began with the Declaration of Principles will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared with 45.1% expressing such a belief in September of 1993. Those who currently declared that this agreement will not lead to a Palestinian state were 32.6%. There is a clear difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in this regard, where 50.8% of the residents of the West Bank declared that the peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas the

percentage increases to 62.4% in Gaza. This difference can be attributed to the readily apparent existence of the Palestinian Authority and its symbols in the Gaza Strip, whereas the Israeli occupation continues in the West Bank. We notice here that there is a relationship between education and doubts about the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, where the more educated are more doubtful than the less educated. (See Table 16)

Table 16

Expectations of Establishment of a State (as a Result of Peace Process) by Education

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
9 years or less	58.9	27.6	13.5
10-12 years	53.2	34.8	12.0
2 year college	53.1	39.8	07.1
University degrees	49.2	42.1	09.7

Also, older respondents are more likely than younger ones to believe that this peace process will lead to the establishment of a state. (See Table 17)

Table 17

Expectations of Establishment of a State (as a Result of Peace Process) by Age

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
18-22	51.2	37.3	11.4
23-26	49.0	42.9	08.2
27-30	53.8	34.2	12.0
31-35	56.0	34.9	09.0
36-42	60.7	24.4	14.8
43-50	61.2	25.0	13.8
51+	56.4	28.8	14.7

Armed Operations

A total of 46% of the respondents expressed their support for armed operations against Israeli targets, 33.5% opposed these operations, and 20.5% of them had no opinion on the subject. In November of 1994, a similar question was asked in a CPRS poll, and 34.4% expressed opposition to armed operations. The November question divided support into three options: support for armed attacks in the West Bank and Israel, support in the West Bank only, and support in Israel only. The total of these three options was 56.6%. The current support for armed operations is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, whereas the opposition to these acts is the same in both areas. The highest level of support for armed operations is in Gaza Middle (62.2%) and the lowest is in Jericho (35%). (See Table 18).

Table 18

Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Area of Residence

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
Nablus	49.5	27.5	23.0
Tulkarm	37.1	37.1	25.8
Jenin	39.5	34.2	26.3
Jericho	35.0	50.0	15.0
Ramallah	39.4	26.9	33.7
Hebron	47.5	34.7	17.8
Bethlehem	44.9	36.2	18.8

Jerusalem	48.8	38.8	12.4
Gaza North	45.0	35.0	20.0
Gaza City	46.0	37.4	16.6
Gaza Middle	62.2	27.8	10.0
Gaza South	47.2	30.3	22.5

Also, support for armed operations is higher than average among the educated, where 51% of those with university degrees expressed their support for these operations, compared with 44.4% of those with only a primary education. (See Table 19)

Table 19

Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Education

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
9 years or less	44.4	35.6	20.0
10-12 years	47.1	30.9	22.0
2 year college	45.4	35.1	19.5
university degrees	51.0	28.0	21.0

Support for the operations decreases among older respondents, where 40.9% of those older than 50 years said that they support these operations, compared with 54% of those in the 18-22 age group. (See Table 20).

Table 20

Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Age

	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
18-22	51.2	33.1	15.7
23-26	53.4	23.3	23.3
27-30	44.9	36.7	18.4
31-35	42.7	37.2	20.1
36-42	42.5	35.1	22.4
43-50	44.7	29.6	25.7
51+	40.9	39.6	19.5

Also, support for these operations is higher among single respondents (52%) than among those who are married (44%). Support for armed operations comes to a large extent from opposition factions; however, it is also found among Fateh and Feda supporters. (See Table 21)

Table 21

Attitude Towards Armed Operations by Political Affiliation

	Support %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
PPP	30.4	52.2	17.4
Hamas	71.8	10.9	17.3
Fateh	39.7	42.1	18.2
Islamic Jihad	62.2	24.3	13.5
DFLP	33.3	41.7	25.0
PFLP	74.4	15.4	10.3
Feda	33.3	16.7	50.0
Islamic Inds.	55.0	35.0	10.0
Nationalist Inds.	50.0	20.5	29.5
Other	41.1	35.6	23.3
No One	32.8	34.3	32.9

Elections for the PNA President

The proposed electoral law calls for the direct election of the Palestinian president. Therefore, the poll included a question on this topic, asking Palestinians to choose from a list of Palestinian personalities. These included: Yassir Arafat (chairman of the PLO and PNA, head of Fateh), Ahmed Yassin (responsible for the largest of the Islamic movements), Hayder Abdel Shafi (independent nationalist), and George Habash (General Secretary of the PFLP). Respondents were also given the choice of "other" and asked to specify their choice in this case. The results of this poll were in line to a great extent with the two previous polls, in November and December of 1994. We find that Arafat has the highest percentage of support among the four, and especially in the Gaza Strip. He is followed by Ahmed Yassin, Hayder Abdel Shafi, and George Habash, in that order. However, as we notice from Table 22, support for Yassir Arafat has increased continuously during the past three months. This rise might be surprising as the peace process was stumbling in the last two months. However, it is possible that Palestinians are blaming the Israelis for the failure of the negotiations and the lack of achievement on the ground. It is also possible that the expansion of settlements and the participation of some of the leadership in protests against this expansion have led to the strengthening of internal solidarity among Palestinians and sympathy for the Palestinian leadership. The rise in Arafat's popularity has been especially noticeable in the West Bank.

Table 22

Comparison of PNA President Election Results

	Arafat %	Yassin %	Abdel Shafi %	Habash %	Other %
Nov 1994	44.2	19.7	08.9	06.8	20.4
Dec 1994	48.5	18.4	08.6	05.8	18.7
Feb 1995	53.4	14.6	10.0	03.6	18.4

Support for Arafat comes from all areas and it is noticeable that Arafat obtained 50.5% of the votes in Hebron, where in the last two months he did not have higher than 30%. The significant rise in Arafat's support in Hebron is consistent with a similar rise in support for Fateh in the area (See *Political Affiliation* below). As for Jerusalem, he obtained 37.2% of the votes. (See Table 23)

Table 23

Election of PNA President by Area of Residence

	Abdel Shafi %	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Other %
Nablus	08.3	00.9	61.1	12.0	17.7
Tulkarm	11.2	02.2	49.4	12.4	24.8
Jenin	05.3	02.6	60.5	15.8	15.8
Jericho	40.0	05.0	50.0	---	05.0
Ramallah	13.5	01.9	44.2	09.6	30.8
Hebron	08.1	03.6	50.5	21.6	16.2
Bethlehem	11.8	11.8	45.6	13.2	17.6
Jerusalem	19.2	03.8	37.2	14.1	25.6
Gaza N.	10.2	04.1	55.1	13.3	17.3
Gaza City	06.5	02.9	59.7	18.0	12.9
Gaza Mid.	06.7	05.6	53.3	20.0	14.4
Gaza S.	05.6	03.4	65.2	11.2	14.6

As for Ahmed Yassin, his support comes to a large extent from the areas of Hebron, Gaza City, and Gaza middle. Also, his support is higher among women (17.5%) than among men (11%) and is higher in the towns and camps than in the villages and cities. The majority of Yassin's votes come from supporters of Islamic groups, where Arafat receives votes from Fateh, Feda, PPP, and nationalist independents. (See Table 24)

Table 24

Election of PNA President by Political Affiliation

	Abdel Shafi %	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Other %
PPP	34.8	---	47.8	08.7	08.7
Hamas	05.3	02.6	15.8	63.8	12.5
Fateh	06.8	00.4	83.3	02.4	07.1
Is. Jihad	10.8	---	16.2	45.9	27.0
DFLP	16.7	16.7	08.3	16.7	41.7
PFLP	10.3	74.4	10.3	02.6	02.6
Feda	33.3	---	66.7	---	---
Is. Inds	10.0	---	25.0	40.0	25.0
Nat'l Inds.	36.4	---	36.4	---	27.2
Other	11.1	01.4	31.9	09.7	45.8
No One	12.3	00.8	25.4	06.9	54.6

As is the case with Arafat, support for Yassin is higher among the less educated respondents. (See Table 25)

Table 25

Election of PNA President by Education

	Abdel Shafi %	Habash %	Arafat %	Yassin %	Other %
9 or less	05.6	02.1	57.4	14.8	20.1
10-12	14.4	05.2	50.4	16.4	13.5
2 year college	14.4	04.1	53.6	09.3	18.6
University degrees	14.4	07.7	41.5	11.6	24.8

With regard to Hayder Abdel Shafi, the areas of his highest support are Jericho, Ramallah, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem. His support among respondents from cities is at 13.5% and his support increases among the more educated respondents. He enjoys relatively high support from supporters of PPP, Feda, and nationalist independents. As for George Habash, most of his support comes from the area of Bethlehem, and is higher among the younger respondents than the older. His support increases with education and reaches 75% among supporters of PFLP.

Vice President

CPRS polled respondents concerning their choice from among a number of personalities for vice-president of the PNA. For the purposes of comparison, CPRS asked this question in December of 1994 and this month. Despite the fact that the list of names is limited and does not reflect the range of Palestinian politics, as it reflects only mainstream tendencies, the results do give a meaningful indication of the relative popularity of these individuals as potential leaders. The names listed and

their total percentages were as follows, with percentages from this month first and from December 1994 second: Faisal Hussein (15.2%--17.3%), Nabil Sha'ath (12.6%--10.4%), Farouk Qadumi (11.8%--16.3%), Hanan Ashrawi (9.9%--11.5%), and Mahmoud Abbas (6.7%--5.5%). Support for Hussein and Qadumi comes more from the West Bank than the Gaza Strip, the opposite of Sha'ath and Abbas, who have more support in Gaza than in the West Bank. As for Ashrawi, her support comes equally from both areas. In comparison with the previous poll, we find that Hussein has maintained the highest percentage of support. Qadumi has reached in this poll, a percentage of support comparable to that of Sha'ath's. There was no noticeable difference in the percentages of support for Ashrawi and Abbas. It is noticeable that 43.8% of respondents answered "other" or "no opinion." The majority of respondents choosing these options are either supporters of political groups other than Fateh or independents.

Elections

Most respondents (79%) chose general political elections as the preferred means to select the members of the PISGA Council. A further 17.3% chose appointments, whether by the PLO leadership or by the leadership of the various factions on a quota basis. As for participation in elections, 77.1% of the respondents declared that they intend to participate in the elections.

Political Affiliation

The popularity of Fateh increased this month to 49.5% for the first time, compared with 43.1% last month. This increase comes particularly from the West Bank, where support for Fateh last month was at 41.5%, and reached 49% this month. The increase comes partly from respondents declaring themselves last month as "independents." The popularity of PFLP has dropped from 6.7% to 3.6%. The drop was particularly apparent in Gaza, where the group's popularity fell from 9% to 4.5%. It should be remembered that previous poll results have indicated a drop in support for PFLP, where it was 9% in November of 1993, 8.4% in January 1994, and 6.6% in May of 1994. There was also a slight decline in the percentage of support for Hamas, from 16.6% to 14.4%. There is no difference between the West Bank and Gaza in the popularity of Hamas. As for Islamic Jihad, its support did not change during this month, following the Beit Lid suicide attack. We notice a drop in the support for "independents," "others," and "no one" in this poll (25.3%) from the previous poll (28%).

Current poll results confirm that support for Fateh is widespread in the areas of the north of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jericho, but there is a surprising increase in its popularity in the area of Hebron. Fateh's average support in Hebron had been 30% in all the previous polls, but this poll indicates that it has increased to 49.6%, as shown in Table 26. One reason for the change can be found in the important change in the demographic characteristics of the Hebron sample in this poll. Compare to December 1994, the February 1995 sample shows a drastic decrease of respondents with high education. The rate of the "less educated" was 58% in December compared with 80.5% in February. Also the percentage of women has increased from 38% in December to 53% in February. The rise came mainly from an increase in housewives with less education. The increase in the percentage of the less educated, especially women, led to an increase in support for Fateh.

With regard to Hamas, it maintains its large support in the areas of Hebron, Gaza middle, Gaza City, and Jenin. PFLP maintains high support in the area of Bethlehem. (See Table 26)

Table 26

Political Affiliation by Place of Residence

No	PPP %	Hamas %	Fateh %	Is. Jihad %	DFLP %	PFLP %	Feda %	Is. Ind %	Nat Ind %	Other %
Nablus 10.2	02.8	17.6	52.8	00.9	00.9	00.9	00.9	01.9	04.6	06.5
Tulkarm 12.4	04.5	18.0	46.1	02.2	---	01.1	---	02.2	07.9	05.6
Jenin 09.2	---	15.8	60.5	02.6	03.9	---	---	01.3	---	06.6
Jericho 10.0	05.0	05.0	55.0	10.0	---	05.0	---	---	10.0	---
Ram. 'h 23.1	01.9	11.5	42.3	02.9	01.0	02.9	---	01.0	02.9	10.6
Hebron 12.0	01.7	17.1	49.6	05.1	---	02.6	00.9	04.3	03.4	03.4
B'hem 11.6	---	10.1	49.3	01.4	---	11.6	01.4	04.3	05.8	04.3
J'salem 17.5	05.0	07.5	42.5	05.0	05.0	03.8	---	01.3	03.8	08.8
Gaza N 08.0	02.0	11.0	51.0	05.0	01.0	04.0	---	03.0	02.0	13.0
Gaza C 10.0	02.1	15.7	52.1	02.9	00.7	04.3	---	---	05.0	07.1
GazaM 09.0	01.1	21.3	49.4	01.1	01.1	05.6	01.1	02.2	04.5	03.4
Gaza S 16.9	01.1	12.4	47.2	06.7	---	04.5	02.2	---	03.4	05.6

N: North; C: City; M: Middle; S: South

The current poll results, as in previous polls, indicate that there is a relationship between gender and political affiliation, where support for Fateh is higher among men than women, the opposite of that for Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad). (See Table 27)

Table 27

Political Affiliation by Gender

NoOne %	PPP %	Hamas %	Fateh %	Is. Jihad %	DFLP %	PFLP%	Feda %	Is. Inds %	Nat Inds %	O'ers %
Men 09.2	01.7	11.8	51.9	01.7	01.3	05.3	00.8	02.5	05.3	08.6
Women 15.1	02.5	16.6	47.6	04.7	01.0	02.3	00.3	01.3	03.2	05.3

	Total	West Bank	Gaza
*Unemployment rate	51.0%	48.0%	57.0%
1. Do you believe that Arafat's recent visit to Jordan and the signing of the agreement between the Jordanians and Palestinians will end the disputes between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority?			
a. Yes	51.4%	47.1%	58.3%
b. No	29.7%	33.6%	23.6%
c. No opinion	18.9%	19.3%	18.1%
2. Do you believe that the peace process that began with the Oslo Agreement will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?			
a. Yes	55.3%	50.8%	62.4%
b. No	32.6%	37.2%	25.2%
c. No opinion	12.1%	12.0%	12.4%
3. I believe that the idea of "separation" suggested recently by Rabin mainly indicates...			
a. the beginning of Israeli acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.	15.8%	16.8%	14.1%
b. retaliatory and vindictive collective punishment.	64.3%	66.6%	60.6%
c. not sure	19.9%	16.6%	25.3%
4. Do you support continuing the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations while settlements continue to expand?			
a. Yes	14.1%	16.2%	11.8%
b. No	81.3%	78.8%	85.4%
c. No opinion	4.6%	5.0%	3.8%
5. With regard to armed attacks against Israeli targets, I...			
a. Support them	46.0%	43.8%	49.5%
b. Oppose them	33.5%	33.7%	33.3%
c. No opinion	20.5%	22.5%	17.2%
6. In a statement released by the "Local Government and Elections Commission" it was reported that the proposed Palestinian electoral law will state that the head of the Palestinian Authority will be elected directly by the people. If a separate election for the head of the National Authority takes place, and the following nominate themselves, I will choose...			
a. Hayder Abdel Shafi	10.0%	11.8%	07.2%
b. George Habash	03.6%	03.5%	03.8%
c. Yassir Arafat	53.4%	50.2%	58.4%
d. Ahmed Yassin	14.6%	13.8%	15.9%
e. Other (Specify)	18.4%	12.7%	14.7%
7. In your opinion, the best way to choose the members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority is...			
a. Appointment by PLO leadership	12.5%	09.7%	16.9%
b. Appointment by political groups on a quota basis.	04.8%	03.0%	07.6%
c. Political Elections	79.0%	82.5%	73.5%
d. Other	03.7%	04.8%	02.0%
8. Will you participate in general political elections to choose the members of the PISGA Council?			
a. Yes	77.1%	76.3%	78.3%
b. No	13.8%	14.1%	13.4%
c. Not sure	09.1%	09.6%	08.3%
9. If given the chance to choose the vice president of the Palestinian National Authority, you would choose...			
a. Specify (_____)	14.6%	16.7%	11.3%
b. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)	06.7%	04.5%	10.1%
c. Hanan Ashrawi	09.9%	09.9%	09.9%
d. Nabil Sha'ath	12.6%	08.6%	19.0%
e. Farouk Qadumi (Abu Lutfu)	11.8%	13.3%	09.4%
f. Faisal Husseini	15.2%	17.5%	11.6%
g. No Opinion	29.2%	29.5%	28.7%
10. If elections were to be held today, and you decided to participate, you			

would vote for candidates affiliated with:

a. PPP	02.1%	02.4%	01.7%
b. Hamas	14.4%	14.0%	15.1%
c. Fateh	49.5%	49.0%	50.2%
d. Islamic Jihad	03.4%	03.2%	03.8%
e. DFLP	01.1%	01.4%	00.7%
f. PFLP	03.6%	03.0%	04.5%
g. Feda	00.6%	00.5%	00.7%
h. Islamic independents	01.9%	02.3%	01.2%
i. Nationalist independents	04.1%	04.2%	03.8%
j. Other (specify)	06.8%	06.3%	07.4%
k. None of the above	12.5%	13.7%	10.9%