

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS)

Public Opinion Poll NO (24)

The Peace Process, Performance of the PNA, Performance of the PLC, September 1996

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This is the twenty-fourth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU), now part of the newly established Parliamentary Research Unit (PRU), at the Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS). It covers the topics of the peace process, during and after the violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, evaluation of the three branches of the Palestinian government and the police and security services, corruption in PA institutions and the economy.

The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to current events. The CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions it reaches. It is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to the study of Palestinian politics. Toward this end, poll results provide a vital resource for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls also give members of the Palestinian community an opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision-makers on issues of concern to them.

The following is an analysis of the results obtained in the twenty-fourth opinion poll conducted by the SRU.

General Background

This poll was preceded by major political events. Moreover, it was conducted during and in the aftermath of the violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and police forces on one hand and Israeli soldiers on the other. In 27, August, 1996 Israeli authorities ordered the demolition of "al-Laqlaq tower" building inside Jerusalem's old city. This decision led to several nonviolent confrontations in the city between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli police. The Israeli government continued its policy of confiscating the Jerusalem ID's from the city's Arab residents. Ramallah was closed by the Israeli army for several days after Palestinian security personnel detained a Palestinian Jerusalemite for questioning. A general strike was declared to protest the continued Israeli settlement policy and land confiscation.

Inside the Palestinian areas, several incidents took place highlighting the continued deterioration in human rights conditions. Several confrontations between demonstrators and Palestinian police

took place in Nablus and Tulkarem in which one Palestinian was killed by the police. The chief justice of the supreme court in the West Bank was forced into retirement after he issued an order demanding the release of Bir Zeit university students detained for several months without charges being made against them. Earlier, Dr. Iyad al-Sarraj, head of the Independent Palestinian Citizen Right Commission, was arrested after making severe criticism against the PNA. In Nablus, a prisoner, Mohammed al-Jumail, died under torture in a Palestinian jail. A book by Edward Sa'id was temporarily banned in some Palestinian cities. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government was showing signs of strain after the president's refusal to respond to the legislative council demand for signing the basic law which had passed the first reading in the council.

Meanwhile, Mr. Arafat met during this period with the Israeli prime minister, but the meeting failed to produce tangible results. The peace process was stalled as the new Israeli government demanded to re-negotiate some aspects of the Palestinian Israeli agreement on the Hebron Re-deployment.

On 25, September, 1996, the Israeli government ordered the opening of a tunnel beneath the walls of al-Aqsa mosque. The wailing wall tunnel was perceived by Palestinians as a step toward the Judization of the city and as a threat to al-Aqsa mosque. This Israeli action led to the irruption of major violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians throughout the West Bank and Gaza cities leading to death of over 70 Palestinians. Sixteen Israeli soldiers also died in the clashes. Israeli forces imposed extreme restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank. Tanks were deployed at the outskirts of major Palestinian cities.

Methodology

The questionnaire used in this poll was designed by CPRS researchers. Prior to the polling dates, the questionnaire was pre-tested on 50 respondents in the Nablus area. As in all of our polls, it includes a large number of demographic and attitudinal variables. (See Table 1 for the demographic distribution of the sample and the attached list of questions.) Usually, interviews are conducted within a three-day period (Thursday, Friday and Saturday). For this poll, however, the survey was administered over a twenty-one day period, 26 September-17 October 1996, because clashes and closures prohibited fieldwork. SRU was able to conduct its fieldwork in the Gaza Strip within the scheduled three-day period (26-28 September); for the West Bank, however, the period was extended from 26 September-17 October. The total sample is 1,233 persons, with 777 from the West Bank and 465 from the Gaza Strip.

Sample Distribution

Table 1

Demographic Distribution & Characteristics of Sample, percentages & counts

Characteristic	% of Total	Count	Characteristic	% of Total	Count
Region			Education		
West Bank	63.0	777	Up to 9 years	25.6	316
Gaza Strip	37.0	456	10-12 years	53.9	664
Total	100.0	1,233	2 years College	7.6	94
			University*	12.9	159
Area of Residence			Marital Status		
City	30.7	373	Single	21.5	264
Town/Village	50.8	618	Married	75.9	933
Refugee Camp	18.5	225	Divorced or Widowed	2.7	33
Age			Occupation		
18-22	17.2	210	Laborer	9.1	111
23-27	19.3	236	Craftsman	10.7	131
28-32	14.6	178	Housewife	41.2	502
33-37	13.6	166	Specialist**	1.9	23
38-42	10.6	129	Employee***	12.1	147
43-47	5.8	71	Merchant	5.7	69
48-52	5.1	62	Student	5.8	71
53+	13.9	170	Farmer	2.5	30
Refugee Status			Retired	1.6	19
Refugee	36.5	448	None	9.5	116
Non-Refugee	63.5	779			
Gender			Religion		
Male	50.0	617	Moslem	96.4	1187
Female	50.0	616	Christian	3.6	44

* Includes all post-secondary degree holders.

** Specialists are defined as Professors/University Instructors, Engineers, Doctors, Lawyers, Pharmacists or Executives.

*** Employees are defined as School Teachers, Government Employees, Nurses, Lower-Level Company Employees.

Sample Selection

The sample in this poll was obtained using a multi-stage sampling technique. There are four stages in the process of randomly selecting units of the population into the sample. These are the following:

1. selecting population locations with probabilities proportional to size of sample (PPS);
2. selecting one or two random blocs from each location;
3. selecting a household using systematic random sampling; and
4. selecting a person 18-years or older from the household.

We used 120 population locations in this poll, from which 1,233 respondents were selected into the sample. At the first stage of sampling, CPRS fieldworkers and researchers create maps of the localities for the population centers randomly selected into the sample. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these areas. They are further divided into a number of sampling units (blocs), with each bloc comprising an average of 100 housing units.

Households are selected based on a systematic sampling procedure. For example, if the fieldworkers estimate the number of houses in the sampling unit to be 100 and were assigned 10 interviews, the fieldworkers divide 100 by 10, obtaining 10. The fieldworkers then conduct the first interview in the 1st household, the second in the 20th and so forth. Fieldworkers start their sample selection of households from a well recognized landmark such as a post office, mosque or business. They are instructed to report the direction of their sampling routes, and play an active role in drawing maps of each locality as well as estimating the number of housing units in each bloc.

Data Collection

Prior to the survey, our fieldworkers participate in a number of workshops and training sessions where we discuss the aims and methods of the poll. The topics we cover are household interviewing techniques, confidence building, mapping and sampling procedures. Four special training seminars were held prior to the poll which were attended by a total of 75 fieldworkers.

Fieldworkers are grouped into teams of two who are supervised by senior CPRS researchers. Senior researchers make random visits to interview locations to discuss the research process with the teams. More than fifty percent of our fieldworkers are female, so as to ensure the

representation of women in the sample. To allow for careful interviewing, fieldworkers are assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 17 per team).

The non-response rate for this sample is approximately 8%. This is higher than the 3% usually obtained in past surveys. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their views out of fear or disinterest in the present political circumstances.

Data Analysis

The data were processed through SPSS, a computer program that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies.

For this poll, we estimate the margin of error to be $\pm 3\%$.

Results

Unemployment

The results of this poll show that the total unemployment rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 38%, which indicates no change since June 1996 ([Poll #23](#)), but an 11-point decrease since March 1996 ([Poll #22](#)). As consistently found in previous polls, unemployment in the Gaza Strip (45%) is higher than in the West Bank (34%). The high rates can be mainly attributed to the continued closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the February and March 1996 bombings. Note, these figures are based on respondents 18-years or older and on a definition of unemployment used by the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Overview

Attitudes toward the peace process, generally indicate a high level of support for its continuation. This finding is surprising given that this attitude was measured during and after a period of intense violent clashes between Palestinian civilians and security forces and Israeli military forces and settlers. Moreover, the poll also found that most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip think that the peace process has negatively affected the economy; and barely a majority think that it will lead to a state in the near future.

These poll results, point to a possible explanation for this contradiction: Support for the continuation of the peace process with Israel remains high because support for a political leadership which in turn supports the process is high. In other words, positive evaluation for the Palestinian leadership, particularly for the Executive branch, is one of the most highly explanatory

intervening variables in the relationship between people's perception of the economy and their expectations for the future and support or opposition for the peace process.

Future of the Peace Process

Although this poll was conducted during violent clashes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the end of September, 70% of all respondents support the continuation of the peace process with Israel. This support has decreased 11-percentage points, however, from its highest level (81%) in June 1996 (see [Poll #23](#)). Opposition to the continuation of the peace process rose from 12% to its highest level of 24.8%, during this same period. Also, despite such high support, general optimism does not exceed 53%; while 41.6% of all respondents are pessimistic about the future. Barely a majority (50.9%) of the respondents believe that the peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the near future, and 33.5% do not expect such an outcome. Table 2 summarizes the demographic distribution of responses toward of continuation of the peace process, expectations of a State and outlook for the future.

Table 2
Support for the Continuation of the Peace Process, Expectation for State and Future Outlook by Selected Demographic Variables, percentages & counts*

	Continuation		Expect a State		Future	
	Support	Oppose	Yes	No	Optimistic	Pessimistic
Total	69.8 (856)	24.8 (304)	50.9 (624)	33.5 (410)	53.0 (652)	41.6 (512)
Region						
West Bank	67.8 (524)	26.4 (204)	49.4 (382)	37.0 (286)	51.4 (399)	44.1 (342)
Gaza Strip	73.3 (332)	22.1 (100)	53.5 (242)	27.4 (124)	55.7 (253)	37.4 (170)
Gender						
Male	67.1 (412)	27.7 (170)	48.4 (296)	38.6 (236)	51.9 (319)	44.4 (273)
Female	72.5 (444)	21.9 (134)	53.4 (328)	28.3 (174)	54.1 (333)	38.9 (239)
Education						
Illiterate-						
Elementary	80.3 (252)	15.0 (47)	61.3 (193)	20.6 (65)	52.5 (166)	39.2 (124)
Preparatory-						
Secondary	68.8 (454)	26.4 (174)	52.1 (343)	33.6 (221)	55.1 (365)	39.9 (264)
2 Years						
College	67.7 (63)	21.5 (20)	41.9 (39)	46.2 (43)	46.8 (44)	48.9 (46)
B.A.-						
Post Graduate	54.7 (87)	39.6 (63)	30.8 (49)	50.9 (81)	48.7 (77)	49.4 (78)

* The Don't Know category is excluded from Table 2, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

The results presented in Table 2 indicate that although general support for the continuation of the peace process is high, there are significant differences between Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, men and women and finally educational levels. As with many attitudinal variables, a consistent pattern of responses can be detected. That is, West Bankers, men and higher educated Palestinians tend to be more critical and pessimistic than their counterparts.

For example, educational level of the respondents is strongly correlated with support or opposition to the peace process, expectations for a State in the near future and general optimism or pessimism. In nearly inverse proportion, respondents with less education have more positive views on these key issues than respondents with higher education levels. There is also a significant difference between men and women, but these differences disappear when educational level is controlled. In other words, women and men with similar educational levels, with a few exceptions, tend to also share similar attitudes toward most issues.

Interestingly, for this poll which was conducted during a time of intense clashes in the Gaza Strip and in the aftermath of closures throughout Palestine, Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to support continuing the peace process, have more optimism and expect the current negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians to lead to a State. This finding is surprising but not unusual. As in past polls, Gazans are usually more supportive and optimistic. Yet, unemployment rates in the Gaza Strip are consistently much higher than in the West Bank. Moreover, as displayed in Table 3, this poll finds that Gazans assess their economic conditions since the peace process as more negative than West Bankers.

Table 3
Economic Conditions by Selected Demographic Variables, percentages & counts*

	Effect of Peace Process on Palestinian Economy				
	Very Positive	Positive	Between	Negative	Very Negative
Total	2.9 (29)	8.7 (107)	19.4 (239)	38.9 (479)	27.5 (338)
Region					
West Bank	1.7 (13)	8.3 (64)	17.8 (138)	40.9 (317)	28.1 (218)
Gaza Strip	3.5 (16)	9.5 (43)	22.2 (101)	35.6 (162)	26.4 (120)
Gender					
Men	2.3 (14)	8.9 (55)	15.8 (97)	39.5 (243)	31.9 (196)
Women	2.4 (15)	8.5 (52)	23.1 (142)	38.4 (236)	23.1 (142)
Education					
Illiterate-Elementary	2.5 (8)	9.5 (30)	18.4 (58)	38.0 (120)	27.5 (87)
Preparatory-Secondary	2.4 (16)	8.5 (56)	20.6 (136)	38.3 (253)	27.4 (181)
2 Years College	3.2 (3)	10.6 (10)	24.5 (23)	33.0 (31)	25.5 (24)
B.A.-Post Graduate	1.3 (2)	6.9 (11)	13.8 (22)	47.2 (75)	28.9 (46)

* The Don't Know category is excluded from Table 3, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Overall, the plurality of respondents (66.4%) think that the peace process has had a 'negative' or 'very negative' affect on the Palestinian economy. When these categories are combined, the difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is substantial, as 69% of West Bankers and 62% of Gazans assess their economic conditions as negative or very negative. Men (32%) are also more likely than women (23%) to think that the economy has been 'very negatively' affected. Educational levels of the respondents, which are usually highly correlated with income levels, seem to have no discernible affect on their assessment of the economy. This could indicate that the problems of the economy (both in perceived and actual terms) are widespread, affecting all groups relatively similarly, rather than any group in particular.

These findings contradict conventional wisdom and one of the main premises of the peace process. That is, simply put, economic development will increase support for the peace process. What partly explains this contradiction, as indicated by the results of this and previous opinion polls, is that respondents' attitudes toward continuing the peace process are related to their assessment of the performance of their leadership and governmental institutions. It is the case that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be broken (analytically) into roughly two groups: those that support the continuation of the peace process and favor their government and those who are critical of both.

Performance of the Government and Its Institutions

Generally, most respondents assessed the performances of the Legislative Council, Judicial, the Executive (including the President and his Cabinet) branches of the Palestinian Authority between a range of good and fair. The most positive overall evaluation was for the performance of the President, with 72% of all respondents considering his performance to be 'good' (42.8%) or 'very good' (29.2%). The second highest evaluation of was given to the Executive Cabinet, which is closely affiliated with the Presidency, with 48.9% rating it as 'good' and 20.2% as 'fair'. Respondents evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council mainly as 'good' (37.9%) but a quarter consider it 'fair' (25%). The PLC also was the least likely to receive the highest evaluation and the most likely to receive the lowest evaluation of all the branches (see Table 4). The Judicial branch of PA obtained the lowest overall evaluation, with 38.6% of all respondents considering its performance as 'good' and 18.5% as 'fair'(see Table 4).

Table 4
Evaluation of Performance of the Four Branches of Government, percentages & counts

	Evaluation of Performance					
	V. Good	Good	Fair	Bad	V. Bad	No Opinion
President	29.2 (358)	42.8 (525)	12.1 (149)	6.5 (80)	3.2 (39)	6.2 (76)
Cabinet	13.7 (168)	48.9 (597)	20.2 (247)	7.2 (88)	2.5 (31)	7.4 (91)
Legislative	9.6 (118)	37.9 (467)	25.0 (308)	8.7 (107)	4.6 (57)	14.3 (176)
Judicial	11.1 (136)	38.6 (474)	18.5 (227)	8.6 (106)	3.8 (47)	19.4 (239)

Please note, there is also a pronounced tendency for respondents to have 'no opinion' on the performance of a particular branch of government and their evaluation of its overall performance. In other words, the branches that are ranked the highest to lowest also correspond to an increasing level of respondents with no opinion. For example, the percentage of people with 'no opinion' on the President's performance is nearly three times lower than that for the Judicial branch.

There are some notable demographic differences between respondents in their evaluations of the performance of their government; in many ways similar to the 'no opinion' response pattern. It is the case, as discussed above, that Gazans, women and lower educated Palestinians give higher evaluations of each of the branches than West Bankers, men and higher educated Palestinians. (Please see the [appendix](#) list of questions and distribution of responses for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as the following discussion is not summarized in a separate table in the text.) It is also the case, moreover, that among these groups, there is greater polarization between responses as positive assessments of performance increase. For example, there are no significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except in one notable category. Palestinians from the Gaza Strip are more likely to assess the performance of each branch as government as 'very good' than respondents from the West Bank (see Table 5).

Table 5
Very Good Evaluation of Performance by Region, percentages, counts & differences*

	Very Good Performance			
	President	Cabinet	Judicial	Legislative
West Bank	24.2 (187)	10.5 (81)	9.4 (73)	8.2 (64)
Gaza Strip	37.6 (171)	19.3 (87)	13.8 (63)	11.8 (54)
Difference	13.4	8.8	4.4	3.6

* The Don't Know category is excluded from Table 5, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

As shown in Table 5, West Bankers are more critical in their assessment of the branches of government than Gazans. Also note, the difference between the Gaza Strip and West Bank tends to decrease in relation to the overall assessment. For example, the difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the greatest for the President (13.4 percentage-point difference) but steadily declines to its lowest level for the Legislative Council (3.6 percentage-point difference).

A similar trend can be detected for Palestinians with different educational levels. Table 6 shows the assessment of the government by education level, with the categories of evaluation collapsed into three: very good/good, fair and bad/very bad. For a basis of comparison, also included in Table 6 is the percentage point difference between the highest (B.A.-Post Graduate) and lowest (Illiterate-Elementary) educational levels.

Table 6

Evaluation of Performance of Government by Education Level, percentages, counts & differences*

	Very Good/Good	Fair	Bad/Very Bad
President			
Illiterate-Elementary	78.9 (247)	9.9 (31)	5.1 (21)
Preparatory-Secondary	73.9 (590)	11.3 (75)	9.4 (62)
2-Year College	64.9 (61)	11.7 (11)	14.9 (14)
B.A.-Post Graduate	54.1 (85)	20.4 (32)	13.4 (18)
Difference	24.8	10.5	8.3
Cabinet			
Illiterate-Elementary	65.1 (205)	17.8 (56)	6.3 (20)
Preparatory-Secondary	65.4 (429)	19.8 (130)	8.2 (54)
2-Year College	62.8 (59)	18.1 (17)	13.8 (13)
B.A.-Post Graduate	46.9 (72)	27.0 (44)	19.0 (32)
Difference	18.2	9.2	12.7
Legislative			
Illiterate-Elementary	50.6 (160)	19.6 (62)	9.2 (29)
Preparatory-Secondary	51.1 (349)	25.6 (170)	11.9 (79)
2-Year College	34.1 (71)	35.1 (33)	18.1 (17)
B.A.-Post Graduate	33.9 (54)	27.0 (43)	24.5 (39)
Difference	16.7	7.2	15.3
Judicial			
Illiterate-Elementary	51.8 (163)	16.9 (51)	7.9 (25)
Preparatory-Secondary	50.7 (336)	17.8 (118)	12.8 (85)
2-Year College	48.9 (46)	22.3 (21)	14.9 (14)
B.A.-Post Graduate	35.1 (65)	23.6 (37)	25.7 (29)
Difference	16.7	6.7	17.8

* The Don't Know category is excluded from Table 6, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

For each branch of government there is a strong negative relationship between educational levels of the respondents and their overall assessment of performance. In each case, lower educated respondents are more likely to give positive evaluations than higher educated respondents, who in turn are more likely to give negative evaluations. This trend is particularly pronounced for the President, for example, as there is a nearly 25-percentage point difference between the highest and lowest educational categories for positive performance evaluation. Also note that only 5.1% of the respondents who obtained a B.A. or higher level of education, but 13.4% of the lowest educated, similarly assessed the President's performance as 'very good'. The gap between educational levels

narrows, however, from its highest level for the President, and continues to descend for the Cabinet, to the Council to its lowest point for the Judiciary.

The Executive Branch: The Presidency and the Cabinet

Positive overall assessment of the Executive branch, including the President and the Cabinet, is also reflected in the evaluations for particular areas of government. 'Very good' and 'good' evaluations were especially high for the fields of education (78.4%), followed by health (66.5%) and safeguarding the security of citizens (65.4%). The percentage of respondents who give positive evaluations decline, however, in the areas of promoting democracy and protecting human rights (41.4%) and improving the economy (20.8%). See Chart 1 below for a graphic depiction of the evaluation of the government.

Chart 1

Evaluation of Areas Of Government, percentages

As with performance evaluations of the separate branches of government, discussed above, there are significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip for particular areas of government, especially in the highest evaluation category (Very Good). It is the case that Gazans are nearly twice as likely than West Bankers to give the highest level of evaluation in the areas of education (43.2% and 28.8%, respectively), security (30.5% and 16.1%, respectively) and health (31.1% and 15.4% respectively). For promoting democracy and human rights as well as the economy, however, there are no significant regional differences. There are also no significant differences in the evaluations of higher and lower educated respondents, except in one area. Lower educated respondents are much more likely than higher educated respondents to give positive evaluations to their government in the area of democracy and human rights (see Table7).

Table 7

Evaluation of Government's Performance in the Area of Democracy & Human Rights by Educational Level, percentages & counts

	Promoting Democracy & Protecting Human Rights					
	V. Good	Good	Fair	Bad	V. Bad	No Opinion
Illiterate-Elementary	6.1 (19)	39.3 (123)	15.0 (47)	16.3 (51)	8.0 (25)	15.3 (48)
Preparatory-Secondary	7.6 (50)	35.9 (237)	22.2 (147)	18.6 (123)	9.7 (64)	6.1 (40)
2-Years College	8.5 (8)	26.6 (25)	25.5 (24)	21.3 (20)	16.0 (15)	2.1 (2)

B.A.-Post-Graduate	1.9 (3)	27.2 (43)	21.5 (34)	29.7 (47)	15.2 (24)	4.4 (7)
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The difference between educational levels and the assessment of the government in terms of human rights and democracy, is also reflected generally in the expectations for the direction of government. As a little as one-third of all respondents believe that the Palestinian government is moving toward a democratic system with respect for human rights, whereas 38% believe that it is moving toward a combination of a dictatorship and democracy. On the positive side, only 17% believe that it is moving toward a dictatorship. Once again, there is a strong relationship between educational level and attitudes toward the direction of the government, as indicated in Table 8.

Table 8
Direction of Palestinian Government by Educational Level, percentages & counts

	Direction of Government			
	Democracy	Combination	Dictatorship	No Opinion
Illiterate-Elementary	36.2 (113)	32.4 (101)	11.5 (36)	19.9 (62)
Preparatory-Secondary	34.1 (226)	38.5 (255)	16.9 (112)	10.6 (70)
2-Years College	26.6 (25)	37.2 (35)	26.6 (25)	9.6 (9)
B.A.-Post Graduate	17.7 (28)	50.0 (79)	25.3 (40)	7.0 (11)

Although most respondents agree that the government is not heading toward a democracy, 62% of those who have had direct experiences with the police and security services think that its performance is 'good' or 'very good', 13.4% 'fair' and 23.5% 'bad' or 'very bad'. (Note, these percentages are derived from only 19.6% of total respondents who said that they have had direct experience with the Palestinian police and security services.) Gazans, who have had direct experiences with the police and security services, are more likely than West Bankers to give positive evaluations (66.7% and 58.8%, respectively); while Palestinians in the West Bank are more likely to give negative evaluations (27.2% and 18.6%, respectively). Women also tend to be far less critical than men; and once again there is a negative correlation between education level and attitudes toward the police and security services.

The results of this poll show that there is a widespread belief among Palestinians that corruption exists in their government. Nearly a majority (49.3%) of all respondents believe there is corruption in the institutions and agencies of the Palestinian Authority; while only 27.1% think that there is no corruption. Moreover, of the respondents who think that there is corruption, 40.1% think it will increase, 10% think it will remain the same in the future, while 40.5% believe it will decrease. Unlike other salient issues, there is no difference in opinions between the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see attached questions), except that Gazans (42.4%) are more likely than West Bankers (37.1%) to think that corruption will decrease. Men tend to be more critical of the government on this issue than women. Respondents with higher levels of education tend to be the most critical of all, as 70.7% of respondents with a B.A. or higher degree of education think that corruption exists

in the PA. There is no significant relationship, however, between educational level and expectation for corruption to increase, remain the same or decrease (see Table 9).

Table 9
Corruption in the PA by Educational Level , percentages & counts

	Corruption in PA Institutions & Agencies			
	Yes	No	Will Increase/Remain	Will Decrease
Illiterate-Elementary	34.1 (107)	36.6 (115)	46.5 (65)	32.1 (45)
Preparatory-Secondary	49.4 (327)	28.9 (191)	44.6 (139)	40.2 (158)
2-Years College	64.1 (59)	16.3 (15)	47.8 (32)	43.3 (29)
B.A.-Post Graduate	70.7 (111)	7.0 (11)	48.0 (60)	40.0 (50)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 9, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Despite a low evaluation of the government in the areas of democracy, the economy and the perception that there is corruption in PA institutions, most people in the West Bank (50.5%) and Gaza Strip (55.5%) agree that the President's popularity has increased since election day. On the other hand, a sizable percentage of the total population believes that his popularity has remained the same (20.4%) or decreased (21.3%).

Perceptions on the President's popularity are strongly related to people's attitudes toward continuing the peace process with Israel, expectations that the negotiations will lead to a State in the near future and general optimism or pessimism (see Table 10).

Table 10
President's Popularity and Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Statehood and General Outlook, percentages & counts*

	President's Popularity Since his Election		
	Increased	No Change	Decreased
Continue Peace Process			
Support	78.6 (502)	73.1 (182)	48.3 (125)
Oppose	17.2 (110)	20.9 (52)	46.7 (121)
Expect Palestinian State			
Yes	63.2 (402)	49.4 (123)	25.8 (67)
No	23.4 (149)	32.1 (80)	60.8 (158)

General Outlook			
Optimistic	62.5 (400)	48.2 (120)	34.1 (89)
Pessimistic	33.6 (215)	44.6 (111)	61.3 (160)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 10, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

As indicated in Table 10, respondents who think that the popularity of the President has increased since his election are also more likely to support the continuation of the peace process, expect a State and have optimism toward the future. The relationship is inverted for those who think his popularity has decreased. They are, overall, more critical and pessimistic. Interestingly, however, support or opposition toward the peace process is not related to the perception that the President's popularity has decreased since the elections, as nearly the same percentage of supporters (48.3%) and opponents (46.7%) think his popularity has declined. The respondents who think that the President's popularity has not changed tend to be slightly more optimistic, have higher expectations that the negotiations will result in a State, and by a wide majority, support continuing negotiations with Israel.

There are even stronger and clearer linear relationships between attitudes toward these same issues and the evaluation of the Presidency, as a branch of government. This could indicate that respondents' personal feelings toward President Arafat, as a leader, are less critical than their attitudes toward the Presidency as an institution. In other words, the division between supporter and opponents of continuing negotiations with Israel becomes clearer when respondents are asked to evaluate the Presidency as an institution of the Palestinian Authority (see Table 11).

Table 11
Evaluation of the Presidency and Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Statehood and General Outlook, percentages & counts*

	Evaluation of Presidency		
	Very Good/Good	Fair	Bad/Very Bad
Continue Peace Process			
Support	80.7 (709)	52.7 (78)	27.1 (32)
Oppose	15.1 (133)	40.5 (60)	66.9 (79)
Expect Palestinian State			
Yes	60.5 (531)	50.0 (74)	17.8 (21)
No	24.3 (213)	20.3 (30)	70.3 (83)
General Outlook			
Optimistic	59.1 (521)	42.3 (63)	29.4 (35)
Pessimistic	36.3 (320)	53.0 (79)	66.4 (79)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 11, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Noting the strength of the statistical and numerical relationships presented in Table 11, it is clear that Palestinians who support the continuation of the peace process, expect a State in the near future and are optimistic evaluate the President's performance positively. Conversely, those who assess the performance of the President negatively, are more likely to oppose continuing negotiations with Israel, not expect a State and be pessimistic. In other words, and to summarize, the President's popularity, as well as the assessment of the Executive branch of government, is strongly related to Palestinians' position on the peace process. The more a person favors the President, both as a national personality and as the representative of government, the more likely s/he is to be in support of continuing negotiations.

The Palestinian Legislative Council

As discussed above, the overall evaluation of the Legislative branch of government is low, compared to the Executive branch. Moreover, the public's relatively negative evaluation of the Council's performance is reflected in the evaluation of the performance of district representatives. Specifically, positive evaluations did not exceed 46%. By district, Jericho came first in first in terms of positive assessments, followed by Ramallah, Bethlehem, Central and South Gaza. Third came Nablus, Hebron, Jerusalem and North Gaza, while Tulkarem and Jenin are ranked fourth with the lowest positive evaluations. An examination of the evaluations given to the Council, may point out its areas of weakness and strengths in reaching out to the public, both nationally and at the district level.

It is the case that the Council does receive very high evaluations on particular issues, mostly pertaining to current events, such as defending Jerusalem and land against settlements as well as its relationship with the Executive. The Council obtained lower positive evaluations and greater negative evaluations on issues that may not have receive media attention during the time when the poll was conducted, such as enacting democratic laws, the Council's role in negotiations with Israel and resolving citizens' problems. (Chart 2 presents a summary of evaluations.)

Chart 2

Performance of the Legislative Council by Issues, percentages

Chart 2 suggests that the Palestinian public approves of the Council, especially in regard to issues on which it is informed about the Council's activities. It also suggests, furthermore, that the media are key in communicating the activities of the Council. On this point, 54.8% of all respondents (51.7% in the West Bank and 60.1% in the Gaza Strip) say they are interested in following the activities of the Council, 24.2% say they are sometimes, while only 18.2% expressed no interest. As more than a plurality are interested in the Council's activities, 41.8% think that the press coverage of the PLC is very good (9%) or good (32.8%); 24.2% say it is fair; and 17.7% believe it is bad (13.6%) or very bad (4.1%). Moreover, there is a strong relationship between evaluations of the Council, and media coverage on the Council (see Table 12).

Table 12**Evaluation of Media Coverage of the Council by Overall Evaluation of the Council's Performance, percentages & counts***

	Evaluation of Media Coverage on Council				
	Very Good	Good	Fair	Bad	Very Bad
Very Good/Good	79.2 (88)	63.6 (257)	39.3 (107)	26.8 (45)	15.7 (8)
Bad/Very Bad	3.6 (2)	6.2 (25)	10.7 (32)	36.3 (61)	51.0 (26)

* The Don't Know, No Opinion and 'Fair' evaluation categories are excluded from Table 12, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

As displayed in Table 12, there is a strong linear relationship between evaluation of press coverage on the Council and overall assessment of its performance. For example, 79.2% of all respondents who think the coverage is very good also positively assess the Council's performance. On the other hand, 51% who think that the coverage is very bad also think that the performance is very bad. Although the findings are not presented in a table, evaluation of the media coverage of the Council is also strongly and similarly related to evaluations of the Council's activities discussed above, such as defending Jerusalem, responding to citizens' problems and so forth.

To lend more evidence to the observation that Palestinian citizens who are informed of the Council's activities tend to give more favorable evaluations, Chart 3 shows that even the frequency of following the news bolsters the Council's ratings.

Chart 3**Performance of the President and Palestinian Legislative Council by Frequency of Following the news**

Presented in Chart 3 are the mean scores of the evaluations for the Presidency and the Council. (Note, scores are based on the weighted average of the performance ratings.) For the President, the frequency of following the news has no affect on its overall performance score. In other words, citizens give the President a relatively high evaluation regardless of how frequently they follow the news. For the Council, however, there is a significant positive relationship between the frequency of respondents following of the news and their evaluation of the Council. Respondents who sometimes follow the news give the lowest performance score of 57. Scores increase as frequency of following the news increase from to 60 for respondents who follow the news often, to 62 for those who always follow the news.

Although the public tends to favor the Presidency more than the Council, there is wide support (60%) for the view that the Executive branch of the Palestinian Authority should implement all decisions taken by the Legislative Council. This is particularly the case for the Gaza Strip (66%). It is noteworthy that most supporters of this view are not affiliated with the opposition; where support amounts to 68% within Fatah, only 51% within Hamas and 56% within the PFLP. As for the draft law for the anticipated municipal elections, presently under discussion in the Council, the

vast majority of Palestinians (85%) support the proposal that inhabitants of refugee camps should participate in these elections. The level of support for the participation of camp residents rises to 87% and 89% among refugees and camp residents, respectively.

Political attitudes are also strongly related to Palestinian citizens' evaluation of the Council and its activities. As with the evaluation of the President's performance, Palestinians who are supportive, expect a State and optimare more likely to give positive evaluations to the Council. Conversely, those who are critical on all these issues tend to assess the performance of the Council negatively. (Please see Table 13).

Table 13
Evaluation of the Council by Position on the Peace Process, Expectations for a State and General Outlook, percentages & counts*

	Evaluation of the Legislative Council		
	Very Good/Good	Fair	Bad/Very Bad
Continue Peace Process			
Support	82.6 (481)	67.0 (205)	41.4 (67)
Oppose	13.4 (78)	28.1 (86)	54.3 (88)
Expect Palestinian State			
Yes	63.3 (368)	45.2 (138)	25.2 (41)
No	23.2 (135)	37.0 (113)	63.2 (103)
General Outlook			
Optimistic	64.2 (375)	47.7 (146)	31.7 (52)
Pessimistic	31.2 (182)	47.7 (146)	65.9 (108)

* The Don't Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 13, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Although the strength of the relationships are not as great as for the President, Table 13 indicates that position on the peace process, expectations for a State to result from the negotiations and general outlook affect the Council's performance evaluation. In other words, a person who opposes the process is much more likely than a supporter to give a negative evaluation to the Council.

Political Affiliation

SRU has tracked political affiliation over time by asking respondents to directly state their affiliation (*i.e.*, party or faction). For this poll, there are no notable difference between the distribution of response since June 1996 (See [Poll #23](#)). Moreover, there is an overall stability in the structure of political affiliation since December 1994, with three notable exceptions. One, affiliation with Hamas has declined from 16.6% in December 1994 to 8.1% in this poll, averaging 9.5-percentage points. Two, affiliation with Fateh, the largest political party among Palestinian, has also declined from a high of 55.3% in December 1995, down 12-percentage points, to 43.6%

in this poll. Three, there has been a steady increase in respondents with 'None of the Above' political affiliation. This group has grown from a low of 11.7% (in December 1995) to its highest point of 28.1% in June 1996, but has decreased slightly to 25.9% in this poll. Once again, the distribution of responses of all other parties are stable (see Table 14).

Table 14
Political Affiliation, percentages & counts

	December 1994	December 1995	March 1996	June 1996	October 1996	Average (%)
Hamas	16.6 (177)	9.7 (110)	5.8 (73)	7.8 (76)	8.1 (100)	9.6
PPP	0.8 (9)	1.8 (21)	1.7 (22)	2.4 (23)	1.7 (21)	1.7
PFLP	6.7 (72)	3.8 (43)	2.1 (26)	4.0 (39)	4.0 (49)	4.1
Fateh	43.1 (460)	55.3 (628)	47.5 (597)	43.3 (424)	43.6 (535)	46.6
Fida	0.8 (9)	0.4 (5)	0.2 (2)	0.7 (7)	0.4 (5)	0.5
Islamic Jihad	2.6 (28)	2.0 (23)	1.0 (13)	1.9 (19)	2.4 (29)	2.0
DFLP	1.4 (15)	1.5 (17)	1.1 (14)	0.8 (7)	0.8 (10)	1.1
Independent Islamist	3.7 (39)	3.6 (41)	4.4 (55)	3.7 (36)	4.6 (56)	4.0
Independent Nationalist	4.9 (52)	3.2 (36)	6.0 (75)	4.5 (44)	5.5 (68)	4.8
None of the Above	11.7 (125)	13.8 (157)	25.0 (314)	28.1 (275)	25.9 (318)	20.9
Others	7.7 (82)	4.8 (55)	5.3 (67)	2.9 (28)	3.0 (37)	4.7
Total	100 (1068)	100 (1136)	100 (1258)	100 (980)	100 (1228)	---

In this poll, there are some notable demographic differences between the three largest political groups (Fateh, Hamas and None of the Above) among Palestinians. For example, male and the less educated respondents in the sample tend to be more supportive of Fateh. Also, more women (68.0%) than men (32.0%) identify their political affiliation with Hamas. (See Table 15.)

Table 15
Political Affiliation with Fateh, Hamas and None of the Above by Selected Demographic Variables, percentages & counts

	Fateh	Hamas	None of the Above
Total	43.6 (531)	8.1 (100)	25.9 (318)
Gender			
Male	53.5 (286)	32.0 (32)	47.5 (151)
Female	46.5 (249)	68.0 (68)	52.5 (167)
Education			
Illiterate-Elementary	27.9 (148)	26.5 (26)	27.4 (87)
Preparatory-Secondary	56.3 (299)	58.2 (57)	51.4 (163)
2-Year College	14.7 (78)	14.3 (14)	20.2 (64)
B.A.-Post Graduate	1.1 (6)	1.0 (1)	0.9 (3)

As discussed above, most respondents assess the performance of the Legislative Council, Judicial and the Executive (including the President and his Cabinet) branches of the Palestinian Authority between a range of good to fair. It is the case that these evaluations are strongly related to political affiliation. That is, political groups and parties associated with the opposition to continuing the peace process with Israel, tend to give lower evaluations to the government and its institutions. Conversely, those who support the government tend also to support the peace process.

As can be expected, respondents affiliated with Fateh give the highest overall evaluations for each branch of the government. Moreover, they give the highest evaluation to their President (83 mean score), then to his Cabinet (75 mean score), dropping ten-points for the Council (65 mean score). Hamas affiliates, on the other hand, express their evaluations on the lower end of the scale: President (65 mean score), the Cabinet (62 mean score) and finally the Legislative Council (53 mean score). Respondent with None of the Above political affiliation straddle Fateh and Hamas in terms of their evaluation scores. (See Chart 4 for a graphic comparison of evaluations for the President and Legislative Council by political affiliation of respondents).

Chart 4
Performance of the President and the Palestinian Legislative Council by Political Affiliation, mean scores

As shown in Chart 4, the President tops the evaluation scores, receiving higher scores, even from the opposition, than the Palestinian Legislative Council. The greatest difference between evaluations of the President and the Council is within Fateh, followed by Islamic Jihad. It should be pointed out, however, that respondents affiliated with Islamic Jihad are the most critical of both the President and the Council than any other political group or party, where as supporters of Fateh give the highest approval ratings. Political parties and groups, considered left of center in Palestinian politics, tend to give high evaluation scores for both the President and the Council. Those parties and groups to the right of center, on the other hand, tend to evaluate all branches of

the government lower than the average but also give the highest scores to the President and lower scores for the Council's performance.

To summarize, the results of this poll show a strong relationship between approval of the Palestinian Authority, its branches of government and institutions, and support or opposition to the peace process with Israel. The relationship is evident in several attitudinal variables, regarding expectations toward a State, outlook toward the future and on specific issues such as defense of Jerusalem and land against confiscation. That is, those who support the continuation of the peace process tend to also be less critical toward domestic issues than those who oppose it. Moreover, although a sizable percentage of the population opposes the continuation of the peace process and is critical of the PA, on the whole most respondents endorse the continuation of the peace process and are mainly satisfied with their government, especially the President and his Executive Cabinet.

Appendix

	Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Unemployment	38.0%	34.0%	45.0%

1. How often do you follow the news?

Always	38.0 (467)	38.3 (297)	37.5 (170)
Often	16.9 (208)	17.4 (135)	16.1 (73)
Sometimes	40.9 (502)	40.6 (315)	41.3 (187)
Not Sure	4.2 (51)	3.6 (28)	5.1 (23)

2. Generally, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

Optimistic	53.0 (652)	51.4 (399)	55.7 (253)
Pessimistic	41.6 (512)	44.1 (342)	37.4 (170)
Not Sure	5.4 (66)	4.5 (35)	6.8 (31)

3. Do you support or oppose the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis?

Support	69.8 (856)	67.8 (524)	73.3 (332)
Oppose	24.8 (304)	26.4 (204)	22.1 (100)
Don't Know	5.4 (66)	5.8 (45)	4.6 (21)

4. In your opinion, how has the peace process affected the Palestinian economy?

More Positively	2.4 (29)	1.7 (13)	3.5 (16)
Positively	8.7 (107)	8.3 (64)	9.5 (43)
Between	19.4 (239)	17.8 (138)	22.2 (101)
Negatively	38.9 (479)	40.9 (317)	35.6 (162)
More Negatively	27.5 (338)	28.1 (218)	26.4 (120)

5. Do you expect that the peace process will lead to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the coming years?

Yes	50.9 (624)	49.4 (382)	53.5 (242)
No	33.5 (410)	37.0 (286)	27.4 (124)
Not Sure	15.6 (191)	13.6 (105)	19.0 (86)

6. How do you evaluate the press coverage of the activities of the PLC?

Very Good	9.0 (111)	6.8 (53)	12.7 (58)
Good	32.8 (404)	31.9 (248)	34.2 (156)
Between	24.2 (298)	23.6 (183)	25.2 (115)
Bad	13.6 (168)	16.2 (126)	9.2 (42)
Very Bad	4.1 (51)	4.0 (31)	4.4 (20)
No Opinion	16.3 (201)	17.5 (136)	14.3 (65)

7. Are you interested in the activities of the PLC?

Total	West Bank	Gaza Strip
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Yes	54.8 (673)	51.7 (400)	60.1 (273)
Sometimes	24.2 (297)	23.1 (179)	26.0 (118)
No	18.2 (224)	21.7 (168)	12.3 (56)
No Opinion	2.8 (34)	3.5 (27)	1.5 (7)

8. Generally, how do evaluate the performance of the PLC?

Very Good	9.6 (118)	8.2 (64)	11.8 (54)
Good	37.9 (467)	38.0 (295)	37.7 (172)
Between	25.0 (308)	25.1 (195)	24.8 (113)
Bad	8.7 (107)	8.5 (66)	9.0 (41)
Very Bad	4.6 (57)	5.1 (40)	3.7 (17)
No Opinion	14.3 (176)	15.1 (117)	12.9 (59)

9. How do you evaluate the performance of the PLC in the following areas:

a) Defending human rights

Very Good	12.6 (155)	10.9 (85)	15.4 (70)
Good	39.2 (483)	39.6 (308)	38.4 (175)
Between	20.9 (258)	19.9 (155)	22.6 (103)
Bad	13.6 (168)	14.5 (113)	12.1 (55)
Very Bad	4.4 (54)	4.8 (37)	3.7 (17)
No Opinion	9.3 (115)	10.2 (79)	7.9 (36)

b) Defending land against settlements

Very Good	21.9 (270)	19.0 (147)	27.0 (123)
Good	38.0 (468)	40.1 (311)	34.4 (157)
Between	12.9 (159)	12.3 (95)	14.0 (64)
Bad	13.6 (167)	13.9 (108)	12.9 (59)
Very Bad	7.2 (89)	8.1 (63)	5.7 (26)
No Opinion	6.3 (78)	6.6 (51)	5.9 (27)

c) Adopting laws that enhance democracy

Very Good	7.1 (87)	4.7 (36)	11.2 (51)
Good	35.3 (434)	35.5 (275)	35.0 (159)
Between	19.0 (233)	16.0 (124)	24.0 (109)
Bad	16.1 (198)	18.0 (139)	13.0 (59)
Very Bad	5.4 (66)	5.7 (44)	4.8 (22)
No Opinion	17.1 (210)	20.2 (156)	11.9 (54)

d) Relationship with the Executive authority

Very Good	11.7 (144)	8.3 (64)	17.6 (80)
Good	40.1 (492)	39.8 (307)	40.7 (185)
Between	12.7 (156)	12.6 (97)	13.0 (59)
Bad	7.0 (86)	7.9 (61)	5.5 (25)
Very Bad	1.9 (23)	2.1 (16)	1.5 (7)
No Opinion	26.5 (325)	29.4 (227)	21.6 (98)

e) Defending Jerusalem

Very Good	38.3 (472)	32.0 (248)	49.1 (224)
Good	32.5 (400)	35.8 (278)	26.8 (122)
Between	9.7 (119)	9.3 (72)	10.3 (47)
Bad	8.1 (100)	9.4 (73)	5.9 (27)
Very Bad	5.7 (70)	6.8 (53)	3.7 (70)
No Opinion	5.8 (71)	6.7 (52)	4.2 (19)

f) Prisoners

Very Good	19.6 (241)	15.9 (123)	25.9 (118)
Good	31.3 (385)	32.3 (251)	29.4 (134)
Between	15.3 (189)	14.4 (112)	16.9 (77)
Bad	16.0 (197)	16.9 (131)	14.5 (66)
Very Bad	11.6 (143)	13.9 (108)	7.7 (35)
No Opinion	6.2 (76)	6.4 (50)	5.7 (26)

g) Negotiations with Israel

Very Good	12.3 (151)	10.3 (80)	15.6 (71)
Good	29.6 (365)	31.0 (241)	27.3 (124)
Between	20.4 (251)	19.0 (148)	22.6 (103)
Bad	19.5 (240)	19.2 (149)	20.0 (91)
Very Bad	7.6 (94)	7.9 (61)	7.3 (33)
No Opinion	10.6 (130)	12.5 (97)	7.3 (33)

h) Resolving citizens' problems

Very Good	9.4 (115)	7.4 (57)	12.7 (58)
Good	32.1 (394)	32.3 (249)	31.9 (145)
Between	19.2 (235)	18.3 (141)	20.7 (94)
Bad	20.1 (246)	20.6 (159)	19.1 (87)
Very Bad	10.1 (124)	10.4 (80)	9.7 (44)
No Opinion	9.1 (112)	11.0 (85)	5.9 (27)

10. Generally, how do evaluate the performance of your district representative to the PLC?

Very Good	12.5 (151)	10.5 (79)	15.9 (72)
Good	33.5 (405)	35.1 (265)	30.8 (140)
Between	20.4 (247)	18.3 (138)	24.0 (109)
Bad	11.9 (144)	12.5 (94)	11.0 (50)
Very Bad	7.0 (85)	7.8 (59)	5.7 (26)
No Opinion	14.6 (177)	15.9 (120)	12.6 (57)

11. How do evaluate the performance of the government in the following areas:

a) Education

Very Good	34.1 (419)	28.8 (222)	43.2 (197)
Good	44.3 (543)	47.3 (365)	39.0 (178)
Between	10.4 (128)	11.0 (85)	9.4 (43)
Bad	6.1 (75)	7.3 (56)	4.2 (19)
Very Bad	1.5 (19)	1.3 (10)	2.0 (9)
No Opinion	3.5 (43)	4.3 (33)	2.2 (10)

b) Health

Very Good	21.3 (261)	15.4 (119)	31.1 (142)
Good	45.2 (554)	44.7 (345)	45.8 (209)
Between	14.7 (180)	15.2 (117)	13.8 (63)
Bad	10.4 (128)	13.5 (104)	5.3 (24)
Very Bad	3.9 (48)	4.7 (36)	2.6 (12)
No Opinion	4.6 (56)	6.5 (50)	1.3 (6)

c) Economy

Very Good	2.5 (31)	2.1 (16)	3.3 (15)
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Good	18.3 (225)	18.9 (146)	17.3 (79)
Between	23.6 (290)	21.8 (168)	26.8 (122)
Bad	34.9 (428)	35.7 (275)	33.6 (153)
Very Bad	16.9 (207)	16.5 (127)	17.5 (80)
No Opinion	3.7 (46)	5.1 (39)	1.5 (7)

d) Democracy & Human Rights

Very Good	6.5 (80)	5.2 (40)	8.8 (40)
Good	34.9 (428)	33.9 (261)	36.6 (167)
Between	20.6 (252)	20.9 (161)	20.0 (91)
Bad	19.7 (241)	20.3 (156)	18.6 (85)
Very Bad	10.4 (128)	9.7 (75)	11.6 (53)
No Opinion	7.9 (97)	10.0 (77)	4.4 (20)

e) Security of Citizens

Very Good	21.5 (263)	16.1 (124)	30.5 (139)
Good	43.9 (538)	45.2 (348)	41.7 (190)
Between	13.7 (168)	13.9 (107)	13.4 (61)
Bad	12.3 (151)	14.0 (108)	9.4 (43)
Very Bad	5.3 (65)	6.4 (49)	3.5 (16)
No Opinion	3.3 (41)	4.4 (34)	1.5 (7)

12. Do you believe that the Executive authority should implement all of the decisions made by the PLC?

Yes	60.0 (734)	56.2 (433)	66.3 (301)
No	23.6 (289)	25.8 (199)	19.8 (90)
No Opinion	16.4 (201)	17.9 (138)	13.9 (63)

13. In your opinion, what direction is the government heading toward?

Democracy	31.9 (392)	29.2 (226)	36.6 (166)
Dictatorship	17.4 (213)	18.9 (146)	14.8 (67)
Combination of both	38.3 (470)	39.1 (303)	36.9 (167)
Not Sure	12.4 (152)	12.8 (99)	11.7 (53)

14. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the judicial authority and courts?

Very Good	11.1 (136)	9.4 (73)	13.8 (63)
Good	38.6 (474)	37.6 (291)	40.1 (183)
Between	18.5 (227)	18.4 (142)	18.6 (85)
Bad	8.6 (106)	7.8 (60)	10.1 (46)
Very Bad	3.8 (47)	3.5 (27)	4.4 (20)
No Opinion	19.4 (239)	23.3 (180)	12.9 (59)

15. Have you had any direct experience with the Palestinian police and security services? (if yes, go to #16)

Yes	19.6 (241)	17.9 (138)	22.7 (103)
No	79.1 (971)	81.2 (628)	75.6 (343)

16. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian police and security services?

Very Good	25.2 (60)	25.7 (35)	24.5 (25)
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Good	37.0 (88)	33.1 (45)	42.2 (43)
Between	13.4 (32)	13.2 (18)	13.7 (14)
Bad	13.4 (32)	16.9 (23)	8.8 (9)
Very Bad	10.1 (24)	10.3 (14)	9.8 (10)
No Opinion	0.8 (2)	0.7 (1)	1.0 (1)

17. Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions? (if yes, go to 18)

Yes	49.3 (604)	49.7 (383)	48.7 (221)
No	27.1 (332)	28.8 (222)	24.2 (110)
Not Sure	23.6 (289)	21.5 (166)	27.1 (123)

18. Will this corruption in PA institutions increase or decrease in the future?

Increase	40.1 (242)	39.5 (151)	41.2 (91)
Remain as it is	10.0 (60)	10.7 (41)	8.6 (19)
Decrease	40.5 (244)	42.4 (162)	37.1 (82)
No Opinion	9.5 (57)	7.3 (28)	13.1 (29)

19. Currently, the PLC is discussing municipal election laws for villages and cities. It is suggested that refugees should participate in these elections. Do you

Support	84.5 (1038)	82.7 (639)	87.7 (399)
Oppose	9.4 (116)	10.7 (83)	7.3 (33)
No Opinion	6.0 (74)	6.6 (51)	5.1 (23)

20. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian government (the Cabinet)?

Very Good	13.7 (168)	10.5 (81)	19.3 (87)
Good	48.9 (597)	49.4 (381)	47.9 (216)
Between	20.2 (247)	20.6 (159)	19.5 (88)
Bad	7.2 (88)	8.2 (63)	5.5 (25)
Very Bad	2.5 (31)	3.0 (23)	1.8 (8)
No Opinion	7.4 (91)	8.3 (64)	6.0 (27)

21. Generally, how do evaluate the performance of the institution of the Presidency?

Very Good	29.2 (358)	24.2 (187)	37.6 (171)
Good	42.8 (525)	43.8 (338)	41.1 (187)
Between	12.1 (149)	13.0 (100)	10.8 (49)
Bad	6.5 (80)	8.3 (64)	3.5 (16)
Very Bad	3.2 (39)	4.1 (32)	1.5 (7)
No Opinion	6.2 (76)	6.6 (51)	5.5 (25)

22. In comparison to election day, do you believe that Arafat's popularity has

Increased	52.4 (641)	50.5 (389)	55.5 (252)
No Change	20.4 (250)	17.8 (137)	24.9 (113)
Decreased	21.3 (261)	25.5 (196)	14.3 (65)
No Opinion	5.9 (72)	6.2 (48)	5.3 (24)

23. Which political party do you support?

PPP	1.7 (21)	1.6 (12)	2.0 (9)
PFLP	4.0 (49)	4.1 (32)	3.7 (17)
Fateh	43.6 (535)	41.8 (323)	46.6 (212)
Hamas	8.1 (100)	8.3 (64)	7.9 (36)
DFLP	0.8 (10)	0.9 (7)	0.7 (3)

Islamic Jihad	2.4 (29)	2.5 (19)	2.2 (10)
Fida	0.4 (5)	0.5 (4)	0.2 (1)
Independent Islamists	4.6 (56)	5.6 (43)	2.9 (13)
Independent Nationalists	5.5 (68)	6.2 (48)	4.4 (20)
No One	25.9 (318)	24.7 (191)	27.9 (127)
Other (specify)	3.0 (37)	3.9 (30)	1.5 (7)