The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 1-4 December, 2022. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by New Wave Research in Hebrew and Arabic between  6-13 December 2022. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler and Dr. Alon Yakter from Tel Aviv

University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin.

 MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups. 

In the current survey, only 33% of Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews support the general concept of the two-state solution before testing the details of the plan; 66% of Palestinians and 53% of Israeli Jews are opposed. Two years ago, 43% of the Palestinians and 42% of Israeli Jews supported this solution. Among Israeli Arabs, support stands at 60%, compared to 59% two years ago, bringing the current total Israeli average to 39% compared to 44% in 2020. As seen in Figure 1, among Jews, support for the two-state principle has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, from 51% to 44%, rose to 52% in June 2017, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline in July 2018, in September 2020, and in the current poll. It is worth noting that the drop in support for the two-state solution during the past two years, by almost a quarter for both sides, is greater than the decline between 2016 and 2018 when support for both sides dropped by only one fifth. Surprisingly, support between 2018 and 2020 did not change. The reason for the current greater drop might be explained by the significant rise in armed clashes between Palestinians and Israelis in 2022 and the electoral success of extreme right-wing forces in Israel.

Unlike previous surveys, support for the general two-state solution among Palestinians is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 40% and 28% respectively (though support has generally been higher in Gaza for the detailed package). Indeed, the decline in support for the two-state solution occurred entirely in the West Bank strengthening the speculation that the drop was triggered by the great rise in armed clashes between Palestinians and Israelis. Support for the two state solution remains higher among Fatah voters and those who define themselves as “not religious” or “somewhat religious.”

Among Israelis, as in the past, the most significant variations are found between Jews and Arabs, and within the Jewish community, between the ideological and demographic groups, particularly by levels of religious observance. Israeli Jews are highly polarized along ideological lines: 83% of those who consider themselves left-wing support the two-state solution in a general question, while only 16% of Jewish right-wingers support it. The findings among the left represents a drop of 8 points in two years but, support among the left rebounded by five points compared to the 2018 findings. Jewish Israelis who define themselves as centrist show support for this solution by 56%, a drop of six points compared to 2020, but still a consistent majority among the Israeli center in favor of this approach.

Demographic differences are found most visibly between levels of religious observance. A firm majority (57%) of secular Jews support the two-state solution, though this represents a 9- point drop in two years. The next “level” of religious observance, traditionalists (masorti), show the opposite trend – only 20% support a two-state solution, a 12-point drop in two years, and 64 percent are opposed (the remainder did not take a position). Only 14 percent and 8 percent of national religious and Haredi Israelis, respectively, support a two-state solution while strong majorities, 76 percent of the religious and 85 percent of Haredi respondents, oppose this approach.

Further, over roughly the last decade, there has been a consistent trend of more right-leaning attitudes among younger Jewish Israelis compared to older groups. Accordingly, just 20 percent of those 18-34 years old support the two-state solution, an 8-point drop in two years, while 68 percent oppose it. The portion of supporters is 17 points higher (37%) among the 35-54 group, while 47% of Israeli Jews over 55 years old support it, over twice as many as the youngest Israelis; 38 percent of older Israeli Jews oppose two states.  One of the main reasons for this trend is the higher levels of religious observance among young Israeli Jews. Among 18–24-year-olds, just 21% identify as secular, compared to 53% among Jews 55 and up. Twice as many of the youngest Israeli Jews are either religious or Haredi, as the oldest group. Therefore, among secular young people, 34% support the two state solution, the same as the total Jewish average (but still less than those over 35); but just 13% of all other young Jews support it (including traditional, religious and Haredi).

Arab Israeli respondents show similar differentiation of support by age, in which younger people are less supportive, although with somewhat less polarization. Among 18-34 year old Arab respondents, half (51%) support the two-state solution, and one-quarter (25%) oppose it – a large portion, 23 percent say they do not know. Among the older age group, from 35 to 50, 71 percent support two states. Significant variation by levels of religiosity is observed among Israeli Arabs: 45 percent support two states among those who are religious, 60 percent among the somewhat religious, and 73 percent among the non-religious support the two-state solution.

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 7% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 70% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a large majority of 88 percent believe the chances are low or very low – this is higher than 2020 and 2018 when 78 percent and 81 percent respectively thought that. Among Israeli settlers, 89 percent believe the chances of establishing a Palestinian state are low or very low. Arab respondents in general are somewhat more optimistic, but still a large majority of 68 percent view the chances as low or very low; 20 percent give “medium” chances. Among all Israelis and all sub-populations, only 3 percent give high or very high chances to the creation of a Palestinian state over the next five years. 

As in the past, respondents were asked if they believe that the two-state solution is still possible, in light of recent political developments and the settlement spread. Among Israeli Jews, the findings indicate a rise in the percentage of those who believe it is no longer feasible, from 45 percent two years ago to 53% today. However, among Arab respondents, those who believe the two-state solution is still viable remains stable, 46% today compared to 45% two years ago. As a result, the Israeli total at present has become more pessimistic: 34 percent think the solution is still viable, and 49 percent believe it is not (the remainder don’t know). In September 2020, 43% thought it was viable and the same amount thought it was not.

The change in perceptions of viability is more pronounced among Palestinians. Since June 2017 the portion who believe this solution is no longer viable has been rising fairly steadily, and reaches a peak of 70% in the current survey while a little over a quarter, 27%, of Palestinians now believe the two-state solution is viable, due to political developments and settlement spread.

Notably, among Israeli Jews there is a stark contrast between younger and older respondents, as on many issues related to the two-state solution. Presumably due to growing up during a time when the idea of reaching a negotiated two-state solution has not been prominent on the political agenda, as well as being generally more right-leaning, just 20 percent of Jews aged 18-34 believe this solution is still possible, while 66% believe it is no longer feasible. While this trend is also true among the oldest respondents, the gap between the optimists and the pessimists is narrower: 38% of Jews aged 55+ believe the two-state solution is still viable, while 44 percent believe it is not. Among Arab Israelis only 36% of the youngest, the 18–34-year-old respondents, believe the solution is still viable, while among all other age groups a majority of 59% believe the solution is viable.

Among Palestinians, there is less variation in responses to the question of viability, but in this case the youngest respondents (18-23 years) are slightly more likely to believe the solution is viable – 29%, compared to 26% of the oldest respondents (55+). This is consistent with our previous findings in 2016, 2018, and 2020 and it probably reflects the refusal of the youth to acknowledge the role of settlement expansion in determining the fate of the two-state solution.  

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 7% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 70% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a large majority of 88 percent believe the chances are low or very low – this is higher than 2020 and 2018 when 78 percent and 81 percent respectively thought that. Among Israeli settlers, 89 percent believe the chances of establishing a Palestinian state are low or very low. Arab respondents in general are somewhat more optimistic, but still a large majority of 68 percent view the chances as low or very low; 20 percent give “medium” chances. Among all Israelis and all sub-populations, only 3 percent give high or very high chances to the creation of a Palestinian state over the next five years. 

As in the past, respondents were asked if they believe that the two-state solution is still possible, in light of recent political developments and the settlement spread. Among Israeli Jews, the findings indicate a rise in the percentage of those who believe it is no longer feasible, from 45 percent two years ago to 53% today. However, among Arab respondents, those who believe the two-state solution is still viable remains stable, 46% today compared to 45% two years ago. As a result, the Israeli total at present has become more pessimistic: 34 percent think the solution is still viable, and 49 percent believe it is not (the remainder don’t know). In September 2020, 43% thought it was viable and the same amount thought it was not.

The change in perceptions of viability is more pronounced among Palestinians. Since June 2017 the portion who believe this solution is no longer viable has been rising fairly steadily, and reaches a peak of 70% in the current survey while a little over a quarter, 27%, of Palestinians now believe the two-state solution is viable, due to political developments and settlement spread.

Notably, among Israeli Jews there is a stark contrast between younger and older respondents, as on many issues related to the two-state solution. Presumably due to growing up during a time when the idea of reaching a negotiated two-state solution has not been prominent on the political agenda, as well as being generally more right-leaning, just 20 percent of Jews aged 18-34 believe this solution is still possible, while 66% believe it is no longer feasible. While this trend is also true among the oldest respondents, the gap between the optimists and the pessimists is narrower: 38% of Jews aged 55+ believe the two-state solution is still viable, while 44 percent believe it is not. Among Arab Israelis only 36% of the youngest, the 18–34-year-old respondents, believe the solution is still viable, while among all other age groups a majority of 59% believe the solution is viable.

Among Palestinians, there is less variation in responses to the question of viability, but in this case the youngest respondents (18-23 years) are slightly more likely to believe the solution is viable – 29%, compared to 26% of the oldest respondents (55+). This is consistent with our previous findings in 2016, 2018, and 2020 and it probably reflects the refusal of the youth to acknowledge the role of settlement expansion in determining the fate of the two-state solution.  

Two competing alternatives to the two-state solution: one democratic and one undemocratic state

The joint poll sought to ascertain the level of support for other solutions to the conflict and in doing so, ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding two alternatives to the two-state solution: one democratic state with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians and one state in which one side or the other dominates the entire region and the other side is denied equal rights. In the survey, each respondent was asked each question separately. Among the Palestinians, as shown in the following figure, support for the two-state solution, at 33%, remains higher than the support for the one unequal state, at 30% compared to 36% two years ago, and the one equal or democratic state, at 23%, compared to 27% two years ago. Among all Israelis, support for the two-state solution, at 39%, is higher than the one equal or democratic state at 26% (statistically unchanged from to 27% in 2020). Among Israeli Jews, support for this one equal state stands at 20%, compared to 44% among Israeli Arabs. But, as shown in the following figure, current support of Israeli Jews for one unequal or non-democratic state, at 37%, compared to 35% in 2020, is higher than the current support for the two-state solution. Israeli Arabs were asked the same question as Palestinians, about support and opposition for one unequal and undemocratic state of Palestine in which Jews do not have full citizen rights.: 20% of Israeli Arabs expressed support and 46% opposition; 34% did not know or did not provide an answer. 

Figure 2: Support for the two-state solution and two alternatives among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, in 2020 and 2022

Our next step was to examine the support for the equal and unequal state as alternatives to the two-state solution. In the following analysis, all respondents who support a two-state solution are excluded from the next categories of support (for one equal state, and one unequal or undemocratic state) to avoid overlap, and the remaining public is assigned one alternative after the other, each time eliminating overlap, to ascertain the size of each constituency. As the two pies in Figure 3 show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Among those who do not support two states, the public splits between the two alternatives (one equal democratic state, or one non-equal non-democratic state. The confederation approach is not included in this analysis as it is rather an alternate version of two states.) The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.”

The findings among the Palestinians differ significantly from those of 2020 as the largest group now are those who did not support any of the three options, standing at 47%, followed by those in favor of the two-state solution, at 33 percent; 12 percent supported a unequal non-democratic state and 8 percent supported one democratic state. In 2020, support for the two-state solution stood at 42%, one unequal non-democratic state at 22%, one democratic state at 10%, and others at 27%.  The fact that this category, others, is the largest among the Palestinians indicates a growing trend in public thought: that there is no political framework, at least from among those options offered by our survey, that is viewed as an acceptable resolution of the conflict.

Israeli Jews show no change in the percentage of those who did not select any of the three options, standing at 27% while those supporting the two-state solution dropped from 43% to 34%. Support for the option of a single democratic state remained essentially unchanged among Israeli Jews, from 9% to 10%, but support for an unequal non-democratic state increased almost two folds, from 15% to 29%.    

On the Palestinian side, as indicated earlier, there is a difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution. But, as Figure 4 below shows, the two areas are almost identical in the way they view the two proposed alternatives, one democratic state and unequal or non-democratic state, with about 8% for each, which is almost exactly what we found in 2020. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of West Bankers (52%) supports unidentified alternatives or do not know, referred to in the chart below as “other,” while 40% of Gazans selected this “other.”  As the chart also indicates, religiosity affects support for the two-state solution and the “other” solution or solutions. As in the 2020 poll, religious respondents are less likely to support two states (29%) and the “not religious” are more likely to support it (60%). Unlike previous polls, the current one did not find significant variation associated with the various age groups. Support for the two-state solution stands at 31% among the 18-29 years old compared to 33% among those whose age is 30 and above. Similarly, only minor differences are found in the level of support for the two alternatives and “others.”

Figure 4: Support among Palestinians for the two-state solution and two alternative options by region and religiosity, 2022

Gaps also emerge when looking at the Palestinian political affiliation or vote preferences (Figure 5), with likely voters of Fatah and third parties showing majority support for the two-state solution (54% and 53% respectively) while supporters of Hamas standing at 14% and unaffiliated and undecided at 38%.  It is worth noting that the highest support among Hamas voters (61%) goes to “other” solutions followed by an unequal non democratic state. Among likely voters who are Fatah supporters, 34% did not support the options offered and fall into the “other” group. 

Figure 5: Support among Palestinians for the two-state solution and two alternative options by political affiliation

As in all previous surveys, the Israeli public is extremely divided internally over the two-state solution. Compared to other solutions, such as one democratic state or a two-state confederation, the two-state solution still enjoys a higher level of overall support, 39% among all Israelis and 34% for Israeli Jews. However, in the elimination analysis shown in the pie chart (Figure 3), the next largest portion is “unequal nondemocratic state” followed by “others,” referring to those respondents who did not support two states, but declined to choose an answer for any of the other options.

As in 2020, the portion of those who choose an unequal non democratic state (after the implementation of the elimination process that removed all respondents who supported the two-state solution and the those who supported the one-democratic state) is highest among the Haredi and the religious sectors, 57% and 50% respectively. Those who refrain from choosing any solution is highest, at 37%, among the traditionalist Jews. Similarly, as in 2020, secular Israeli Jews were the only community in which a majority, 57%, prefers a two-state solution to any other.

Figure 6: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution and two alternative options by religiosity, 2022

When looking at the political spectrum, a majority of support for the two-state solution is found among the left and the center but not the right (see Figure 7). Among the “moderate right,” 23% support the two-state solution compared to only 7% among the right, a distinction that has been consistent over time between these two groups of right-wingers. Those who define themselves as “right” support the unequal or non-democratic state by 53% followed by “others” (31%). It is worth noting that the size of the moderate right category in this poll is 31%, the right 31%, the “center” 24%, the moderate left 9%, and the left 4% of the Jewish sample. 

Figure 7: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution and two alternative options by ideology, 2022

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie in Figure 8 shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is high, at 59% followed by “other” at 28% and one democratic state at 13%.

Figure 8: Support for the two-state solution and two alternative options among Israeli Arabs, 2022

In the current survey, we asked both sides if they think Palestinians should demand the right to vote in elections for Israeli Knesset and to form their own political parties that compete with Israeli parties if Israel establishes full formal control over the entire West Bank. While the largest percentage of Israeli Arabs, 47%, said they should, only 20% of Israeli Jews gave the same positive answer. Surprisingly, only 29% of the Palestinians said yes. One quarter of Israeli Arabs (25%) said they should not, and over 70% of Jews (71%); two-thirds of Palestinians (66%) opposed Palestinians demanding the right to vote and compete in Israeli elections.

Furthermore, we asked the Palestinians if they would actually vote in the elections if the West Bank comes under full Israeli control and the Palestinians are given equal rights to those of Israeli Jews. Consistent with the responses to the earlier question above, only 19% of the Palestinians said they would indeed participate in these Israeli elections and 78% said they would probably or definitely not. But when we asked Israeli Jews if they think the Palestinians would actually vote in such a scenario, a majority of 58% said yes and 29% said no.

Confederation:

The alternative of a two-state confederation has been tested in the joint survey since December 2016, when it was asked in a general way with minimal explanation, then in later surveys with somewhat more detail. Since testing began, support rose among the Israeli public from 28% in December 2016, to a high of 39% in late 2017. In the 2020 survey, this support reverted back to 30% among Israelis, almost precisely the range of support among Palestinians from December 2017 onwards (28% in December 2017 and 29% in 2020). In 2020, support among Israeli Jews stood at 28% and among Israeli Arabs at 44%. At present, total support among all Israelis is 28% in favor (although support has rebounded to nearly 60 percent among Arabs), and 22% among all Palestinians.

The current survey used a different approach from the previous surveys. In 2022, the questionnaire provided significantly more details of the two-state confederation plan. Indeed, the plan was presented in five main components and we asked the public about support and opposition for each, only then asking about their attitudes regarding the entire plan. The five components and support for each one on both sides is as follows (the findings relate to all Israelis, Jews and Arabs):

1. Freedom of movement for all within the confederation, while citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections: 27% support among the Palestinians and 29% among Israelis.
2. Jews in the diaspora will have the right of return and will become Israeli citizens, like today. There will be right of return for Palestinian refugees, who will become citizens of Palestine: 20% support among the Palestinians and 32% among Israelis.
3. Citizens of Israel and Jewish settlers, can remain in Palestine as residents if they accept the law and sovereignty of the Palestinian state. Citizens of Palestine, including 1948 refugees, can reside in Israel as residents, if they accept the law and sovereignty of the Israeli state: 23% among Palestinians and 23% among Israelis.
4. Jerusalem remains undivided and shared by all, with its western part serving as the capital of Israel and its Eastern part as the capital of Palestine: 14% support among Palestinians and 29% among Israelis.
5. The states will establish joint authorities for civic issues such as infrastructure and the economy, and will cooperate on security issues similar to the current situation today: 29% support among the Palestinians and 54% among Israelis.

As shown in figure 9, findings indicate that support for the combined confederation package is higher among the total Israelis than among the Palestinians, 28% and 22% respectively. But significant variations emerge among Palestinians and Israelis: while only 15% of West Bankers support the package, 34% of Gazans indicate support. Among Israelis, only 21% of Jews support it while a majority of 59% of Israeli Arabs support it. Opposition to the package among Palestinians stand at 75% and among Israelis at 60% (70% among Israeli Jews).

Figure 9: comparing support for the confederation package, WB, GS, total Israel, Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs

As figure 10 below indicates, support among Palestinians, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs varies based on each component. A majority of Israeli Arabs support four of the five components of the confederation while the highest Israeli Jewish support goes joint authorities to address the civic issues (50%) and the lowest to the proposed idea that each side can live in the other side (18%). The highest Palestinian support (29%) goes to the joint body to address civic matters and the lowest (14%) to the united Jerusalem.  

Figure 10: comparing Palestinian and Israeli Jewish support for five components of a two-state confederation

Among Israeli Jews, ideology and religiosity plays a significant role. The only populations that support the confederation approach with a majority are left-wing Jewish Israelis – among this group, support has been rising steadily since testing began – Palestinian non-religious respondents and Israeli Arabs (These first two are small portions of each population: Left wing Israeli Jews are 12%, non-religious Palestinians  are just 3 percent of the total Palestinian population). However, it is interesting to note a very consistent and robust increase in support for this approach among Israeli left-wing Jews, which rose 10 points over the last two years (to 66% at present) and fully 30 points from 2016.

Figure 11: comparing Israeli Jewish support for the confederation package by ideology, religiosity, and age

Similarly, support among the Palestinians varies based on political affiliation. At 41%, Fatah's support is the highest followed by third parties, or others. Only 10% of Hamas supporters give support to the confederation. Religiosity also plays a role with a majority of the “not religious”  indicating support (58%) followed by the somewhat religious and the religious. Young Palestinians are more likely to support the confederation than older Palestinians, 26% and 19% respectively.

Figure 12: comparing Palestinian support for the confederation package by political affiliation (Fatah, Hamas, third party, undecided), religiosity, and age

Compared to support for two states, support is lower for a confederation; but the overall trend is the same – declining support for both: The support of the Palestinians and Israeli Jews declines from 29%-28% to 22%-21%, respectively.

Since the confederation was not a well-known approach when testing began, support has been erratic and seems to follow the general pessimistic mood regarding political solutions to the conflict.

Support for this plan remains similar to overall support for one democratic equal state and lower than overall support for an unequal nondemocratic state, where one side annexes the whole land and the other side is given only limited rights.

Peace and violence. When given four possible options regarding what should happen next in Palestinian-Israeli relations, findings show similarities between the preferences of Palestinians and Israeli Jews in preferring to “reach a peace agreement,” standing at 31% and 30% respectively. Two years ago, 34% of Palestinians and 41% of Israeli Jews preferred this outcome. Support for this outcome among Israeli Arabs stand at 58%. Palestinian preference went for a second option, “waging an armed struggle,” stands at 40%, compared to 37% in 2020. Among Israeli Arabs, who were asked to respond to the options provided to the Palestinians rather than Israeli Jews, stands at only 4%. Among Israeli Jews, the preference for “waging a definitive war against the Palestinians” stands today at 26%, a 7-point increase compared to 2020. A third option, “waging an unarmed resistance,” was chosen by 16% of the Palestinians and 6% among Israeli Arabs while annexation, which was offered to Israeli Jews was chosen by 10%, compared to 12% in 2020. Finally, 8% of the Palestinians, 7% of Israeli Arabs, and 13% of Israeli Jews chose “maintain the status quo.”

We asked the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs about the extent to which the continuation of armed resistance against Israel harm or not harm Israel and harm or not harm the Palestinians. By contrast, we asked Israeli Jews about the extent to which the continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinians harm or not harm the Palestinians and harm or not harm the Israelis. Among the Palestinians, a majority of 60% said Palestinian armed attacks against Israel do not harm or slightly harm the Palestinians while 39% said they harm the Palestinians. More Israeli Arabs, 53%, thought these Palestinian attacks harm the Palestinians while only 18% said they do not harm or slightly harm the Israelis. By contrast, three quarters of the Palestinians said these attacks harm Israel; only 23% said they do not harm or slightly harm Israel. An Israeli Arab majority of 56% shows similar results to those of the majority of the Palestinians in viewing armed attacks as harm Israel while only 14% think they do no harm or slightly harm Israel.

Among the Israelis, almost half (49%) say Israeli control over the Palestinians in the West Bank does not or slightly harm Israel while 39% say it harms Israel.  Surprisingly, a majority of 52% of Israeli Jews thinks Israeli control over the West Bank does not or slightly harm the Palestinians while 36% think it harms them.

Finally, we asked Palestinians and Israeli to speculate about the future of the current wave of armed attacks by Palestinians on Israeli targets and whether they think this is the beginning of a new Palestinian intifada. Palestinians and Israeli Jews think the answer is yes, 61% and 65% respectively, while only 37% of Israeli Arabs agree with this assessment. Among the Palestinians, the West Bankers, probably due to the significant rise in the number of armed clashes with the Israeli army in their area in 2022, are more likely than Gazans to think the current wave is the begging of a new intifada, 68% and 51% respectively.

Peace and the Abraham Accords: When asked about the impact of the Abrahm Accords, between Israel and several Arab countries, on the chances for solving the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the largest percentage on both sides, 50% of all Israelis (56% among Israeli Jews) and 49% among the Palestinians said the Accords will not affect these changes. However, a larger percentage of Israelis (26%) and Israeli Jews (24%) than the Palestinians (12%) thought these normalization agreements between Israeli and several Arab countries will advance the chances to solve the conflict. By the contrast, more Palestinians than Israeli Jews, 30% and 5% respectively, thought they will harm the chances for solving the conflict.

It is worth noting that those Palestinians and Israelis who think the Accords are good for peace are actually more likely to support the two-state solution while those who think they will harm conflict resolution or will have no impact on the prospects for peace are less likely to support the two-state solution. For example, 56% of the Palestinians and 54% of Israeli Jews who think the Accords will advance peace support the two-state solution. By contrast, 35% of the Palestinians and 38% of Israeli Jews who think they will harm the chances for peace support the two-state solution. Similarly, only 27% of Palestinians and 28% of Israeli Jews who think the Accords will have no effect on the changes for peace support the two-state solution. Findings show the same trend among Israeli Arabs with support for the two-state solution among the three groups standing at 78%, 62% and 55% respectively.

Peace and following the news: When asked about the extent to which they follow the news about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a majority of Israeli Jews (52%) and over one-third (38%) of the Palestinians said they do so to a large or to some extent. Similarly, while only 17% of Israeli Jews said they do not follow the news or do so only to a small extent, the equivalent percentage among the Palestinians was 30%. About one third of the Palestinians (32%) and a similar percentage of Israeli Jews (29%) said they follow the news but they do so neither to a small nor to a large extent.

Here too, we examined the impact of following the news on attitudes regarding the two-state solution. Surprisingly, the findings show a different impact on the Palestinians than on Israeli Jews: Jews who do not follow the news support the two-state solution by the lowest rate while on the Palestinian side the opposite it true, those who do not follow the news support the two-state solution by the highest rate. For example, support for the two-state solution was highest, standing at 38%, among those Israeli Jews who follow the news neither to a small nor to a large extent followed by those who follow the news to a large or some extent (34%) and finally only 27% of those who do not follow the news or follow it to a small extent support the two state solution. By contrast, Palestinian support for the two-state solution is highest (39%) among those who do not follow the news or follow it to a small extent while only 32% support it among those who neither follow the news to a small or large extent and 29% among those who follow the news to a large or some extent. 

Detailed peace packages for implementation  

As in all six previous surveys of the current series of joint polls, Palestinians and Israelis were asked in this survey to support or oppose a detailed combined peace package based on the two-state solution, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The package included 11 items addressing all issues of the so-called permanent status negotiations, such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees and several other matters, such as mutual recognition, end of conflict, external guarantees, and the Arab Peace Initiative.

Palestinians and Israelis were asked to respond first to each item separately, as component parts; following the 11 items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements.

• Total Israeli support is almost identical to that of 2020, standing today at 37% compared to 38% two years ago. But support among Israeli Jews dropped by 5 points, from 36% to 31% during that period (see Figure 13 below). The total average remained steady due to a significant recovery of support by Israeli Arabs, which had dropped dramatically in 2020. Jewish Israelis’ support however has declined relative to both the original and enhanced plan examined in July 2018: at that time, the “original” package that did not incorporate the strong incentives received 46% support from all Israelis, while the enhanced detailed two-state agreement – the one tested in the current survey – was supported by a majority of 53% among all Israelis (45% of Israeli Jews). Therefore, support among the Israeli population for the identical plan fell 15 points in 2020 and 20 points in 2022.
• The decline is seen among the Jewish respondents only: support among Jews fell from 45% in 2018 to 36% in 2020, and 31% today. As noted, among Arabs, support increased dramatically from 49% in 2020 to 62% in the current survey, but these results are much lower than those obtained in mid-2018 when support among Israeli Arabs stood at 91%.
• Palestinian support for the package, standing at 26%, has remained essentially unchanged, compared to 27% two years ago.  But it is significantly lower than the 2018 findings when support stood at 42%.  Today, a majority of 72% oppose the package.  As the chart below shows, the current level of support for the package is the lowest since it has been first presented to the Palestinians in June 2016.
• By contrast to general support for the concept of a two-state solution, there has generally been more support in Gaza for the detailed package, than in the West Bank. The dynamic remains consistent in 2022, with 38% of Gazans supporting the package, fully 20 points higher than West Bank respondents. The lower support among West Bankers is probably due to an increase in hardline views generated by the increased number of armed clashes with the Israeli army during 2022. The higher levels of support among Gazans is probably due to desire to find a way out of the current status quo even if the cost is too high.

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the twelve components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs).

• Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 63% of Israeli Jews support this item.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 28% of Palestinians support mutual recognition and 62% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

• The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 13% of Palestinians support this (11% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip).  Among Israeli Jews, 47% support this item and among Israeli Arabs 37% support it.
• The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 33%.  Among Israeli Jews: 60% support this, and 70% of Arab respondents.
• A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 34% support this component; Israeli Jews support stands at 53% - a 6-point drop from 2020, and Israeli Arab support at 57%.
• The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 20% of Palestinians support this. Among Israeli Jews 33% support it and among Israeli Arabs, 43% support this item.
• The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange of similar size. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 24% of Palestinians support this (16% among West Bankers and 37% among Gazans). 30% of Israeli Jews and 41% of Arabs support it.
• West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (19%) of Jews support this item. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 16% of Palestinians support this (12% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). 51% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

• In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 18% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. 16% of Palestinians support the division of the Old City (10% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip). 50% of Israeli Arabs support this.

• Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  43%of Palestinians support this (37% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip). This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: just 11% of Jews  support the arrangement on refugees, and among Israeli Arabs 63% support it.
• The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 34% (26% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip). Israeli Jews support this item by 45%. 64% of Israeli Arabs support it this item.
• The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states. Among the Palestinians, support stands at 35% (31% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip).  58% of Israeli Jews support this, and 69% of Israeli Arabs support it. 

Perception of social support for package.  After considering all the detailed items included in a two-state peace plan and being asked to support or oppose each one, as well as the total package, each side was asked how they perceive the support of majority of their fellow citizens for the two-state package. On both sides, respondents perceive their own society’s support for the original plan to be low. 

Israelis were asked whether they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support or oppose it – just 14% said they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support it. Settlers living in the West Bank showed a lower rate, with just 6% who believe Jewish Israelis support it. But a much larger minority of Israeli Arabs, 44%, expressed the view that a majority of Israeli Jews support it.  These assessments have declined somewhat from previous surveys since 2016. In 2020, 18% had optimistic impressions compared to 23% in 2018 and 36% before that. However, the perception of majority support is lower than reality; in fact, 31% of Jews support the total two-state package in the current survey – more than double the portion who believe a majority of Jews support it.  In other words, the minority of Israeli Jews who support the package thinks it is much smaller than it is in reality.

When Palestinians were asked if most Palestinians would support the plan, 25% stated that most would support it. This is exactly the same percentage obtained two years ago and it is much closer to the real support in the Palestinian society.

Regional and demographic trends. The internal breakdowns of each population show which sub-groups respond differently to the peace plan. Among Palestinians, there are variations in responses primarily by region, political affiliation and levels of religious observance (see Figure 14 below).

• As in previous surveys, Gaza respondents are more supportive of the agreement. 38% of all Gazans supported the new plan. Among West Bank respondents, 18% supported the plan. It is worth noting that support for the two-state solution concept among Gazans in the current survey is also higher than it is among West Bankers, as indicated earlier. However, in both regions, support for the concept of the two-state solution is higher than the support they give to the detailed package.
• Among Fatah supporters, 46% support the package, an 8-point increase compared to our findings in 2020. Support among Hamas voters dropped  from 25% in 2020 to 13% in the current poll.
• Support for the package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” about half (49%) support the package. Support among the religious stands at 23%.
• Young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years of age, which in past surveys were associated with hardline views, show greater willingness to support the package than older age groups.

Among Israelis, as shown in Figure 15, the internal breakdowns of the population show variations similar to those related to the general question about a two-state solution. These patterns are consistent over the years, with higher support among the left, low support on the right; higher support among secular Jews, but only a minority who support it among all other more religious groups. Arabs in general support the detailed two-state package at a higher rate than Jews.

• A majority of left-wing Israeli Jews (86%) and among centrist Jews (52%) support the total package. Among the Jewish right-wing, just 14% supports the detailed package
• The religiosity divide remains strong among Jews: Among seculars, a 52% majority support the plan, but just 18% among traditionalists (masortim) and fewer among the religious and ultra-orthodox (12% and 6% respectively).
• Consistent with attitudes towards the general two state solution, there is a significant age gap: 20% of the youngest Jewish Israelis (18-24) support it, and more than twice as many, 43% of Jewish respondents 65 and above support the detailed package.

Figure 15: Israeli support for the combined package based on selected indicators, 2022

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. The perception of viability is important.  Among Israelis who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 67% support the two-state solution; among those who think it is not viable due to political developments and settlement spread, only 20% support it, Similarly, as shown in Figure 16, the perception of viability is also clearly linked to support or opposition to the detailed package for a two-state solution: 63% of Israelis who believe the solution to be feasible, also support the package, but just 14% of those who think this solution is no longer viable.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 44% support the package declining to 19% among those who believe it is no longer viable. Nonetheless, the fact that a majority of those who think this solution remains feasible is still opposed to it demonstrates the significant hardening of attitudes among the Palestinians in the current poll.

Figure 16: Support for the peace package linked to feasibility of the two-state solution (TSS)  

INCENTIVE PAIRS

As in our 2020 joint poll, the current survey includes an experiment that aimed at testing the value of incentives. We separately paired some of the reciprocal incentives in order to determine their benefits as well as the harm they might inflict on the support for the peace package.  For the third time, we considered a new mode of testing incentives. In the first four surveys of the Pulse, most of the incentives proposed were developed specifically for one side or the other. To offset the possibility that an incentive for one side, such as the zero-sum, or one-sided measures, might alienate the other side, in the June 2018 and September 2020 surveys, and in the current one we paired incentives to show reciprocal benefits to each side. The incentives were paired based in part on the priorities attached to them by the two publics, drawing on seven items, representing some of the top-ranked incentives from the previous surveys of the Pulse.  Three of the current pairs were tested in 2020 and were relatively successful among Palestinians and Israelis. Four new pairs replaced the three pairs that were less successful in generating greater support for the peace package.

Respondents were asked directly if these pairs – an incentive to their own side coupled with a benefit to the other side – raised or lowered their support for an agreement. All respondents were asked these questions, not only those who rejected the agreement. The goal was to see whether, in a real situation where people are likely to learn of all benefits/incentives offered to all sides, respondents of either disposition would switch: would supporters defect and oppose an agreement, would rejectionists possibly switch towards support? And for those who had not made up their mind, could the mutual incentives convince them to support an agreement, or push them to oppose it?

The following is the list of pairs tested:

1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence: The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces, and Israel in return will agree to end its military presence in the territories of the Palestinian state

2. Combat incitement: The state of Palestine and the state of Israel will agree to combat incitement against the other and if necessary make changes in school textbooks to remove any such incitement, and to call for tolerance and reconciliation and to fight against violence

3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories: Israel will allow an agreed number of Palestinian laborers to continue to work in Israel if they wish to do so, and Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory if they wish to do so

4. Historic links, character, and equal rights: State of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine and recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people while affirming equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel

5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees: Jews who had to leave Arab countries following the establishment of the state of Israel will receive monetary compensation; Palestinian refugees in camps and in the Palestinian state will receive monetary compensation as well as homes and land in their country of residence that will allow them to be settled and rehabilitated

6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force: Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners after the full implementation of the agreement, and Palestinian leadership will commit to consolidating all armed factions into one single security force while disarming any other faction

7. Settlers and refugees: Jewish settlers will be allowed to stay in their homes with dual Israeli-Palestinian citizenship, while the same number of Palestinian refugees will be allowed to receive dual citizenship and live in Israel

Since all respondents, both those who supported the package and those who opposed it, received these questions, those who said the item raised their support but who already supported the initial agreement were set aside, and the same for those who were initially opposed and remained opposed following the incentive question. Focusing on those who switched sides, we then calculated new levels of predicted support following each pair.

Comparing just those who opposed the plan in the current survey, the average responses for the paired, mutual incentives is as follows:

Among Israeli Jews, respondents displayed wide variation in their assessment of the incentive pairs. Broadly speaking, those who opposed the detailed two-state peace package at the start reacted in similar ways to those who supported the two-state peace package: The strongest incentive pairs, those that were most successful in convincing the opposition camp, were also the least likely to cause supporters of the initial plan to defect.

As seen in the table below, the incentive of combatting incitement and changing textbooks if needed – in both the Palestinian and Israeli state – was the most attractive to the opposition respondents: nearly six-in-ten said this made them more likely to support the two-state package agreement. Just a small segment of the initial supporters would defect based on this condition (5%).

From a measure viewed as highly symbolic, the next most successful incentive pair was allowing Israeli factories to remain inside the West Bank, while allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel – a very pragmatic, concrete policy item. A significant minority of 46% of those originally opposed said this would make them more likely to support a two-state package agreement, while just a small minority of supporters said it made them less likely to do so (13%). 

Thus overall, an average of 30% of Israeli Jews, compared to 45% in 2020, changed their minds from rejection of the full package to support based on the incentive pairs, but this average contains wide deviation among the different items offered.

Among Palestinians, the average portion of those who changed from rejection to support is just 12%, with significantly less variation in response to the different incentives. In 2020, 21% made the switch from rejection to support based on incentive pairs.  

The following table summarizes the change generated by the incentive pairs for those who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:

This finding reflects the fact that each side is offered a benefit but it comes packaged together with an item for the other side, which apparently dampens enthusiasm compared to the original incentives. At the same time, the fact that on both sides and for each incentive-pair, some portion of opposition switched to support means that there is some potential.

Therefore, the next valuable comparison is the original level of support in the current survey, or baseline support and opposition, for the permanent status package, among the two societies, compared to the new levels of support following each pair. In other words, the analysis below calculated all defections from support to opposition, along with switchers from opposition to support, to determine the new levels of support or opposition. The graphs in Figure 17 show the findings for the Israeli Jewish side.

On the Israeli side, as in the 2020 experiment, the shift to more support among the opposition and defections among supporters based on the pairs ultimately shows a fairly successful set of incentives. This relative success of the pairs is seen in the fact that five of the seven pairs generated higher levels of support (those who said the item raised their support for the current plan) than the initial level for the comprehensive plan, among Israeli Jews. While support for the detailed plan stood at 31% for the, even the least successful pair caused 34% to say the incentive (coupled with an incentive for the Palestinians side) made them more likely to support the plan. Furthermore, two paired incentives increased the level of support for the package to a large majority. On the other hand, two paired incentives brought the level of support way below the baseline.

Ending incitement on both sides was the most effective of all incentive pair, consistent with findings from the previous two experiments in 2020 and 2018. At that time, the net shift led to 74% support for the plan; at present, out of all respondents, fully 69% said it made them more likely to support the two-state detailed package.

As in 2020, the second most effective pair was the notion that Israeli owned factories could remain in the new Palestinian state, while Palestinian workers would be allowed to continue coming to Israel – this caused fully 60% of all Israeli Jews to say it made them more likely to support the plan. In 2020, 71% said this paired incentive made them more likely to support the peace package.

The pair containing symbolic and non-symbolic incentives, involving Israeli recognition of Palestinian historic and religious attachment to the land, Palestinian recognition of Israel’s Jewish character, and assertion of equal rights for Israeli Arabs received significant support but could not bring about a majority support for the package. Similarly, the pair that ensured continued security cooperation but called for the Israeli army’s withdrawal from the Palestinian state met the same limited success, as only 46% were willing to support the peace package when this pair was added to it.

One pair was met with a slight acceptance, increasing support to 34% only, was the one in which Israeli Jews from Arab countries were compensated for lost property while Palestinian refugees were provided with financial compensation as well as homes and lands in the country of their permanent residence. Two pairs led to a significant decline in the level of support, lowering it to 21%, in the case of the pair that allowed settlers to stay in their current homes while allowing an equal number of Palestinian refugees to live in Israel, and to 15%, in the case of the pair that required Israel to release Palestinian security prisoners while requiring the Palestinian side to have monopoly over force in the future state.

Among Palestinians, the pairs were significantly less successful than they were among the Israelis as only two out of the seven paired incentives proved effective in increasing support for the package from the baseline of 26%. This outcome indicates significant hardening of Palestinian attitudes as the three pairs that were tested in 2020 and in the current experiment produced less success compared to two years ago: mutually combating incitement, Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories, and security cooperation and Israeli army withdrawal. As indicated earlier, total support for the package stood at 26%. While all three repeat pairs produced tangible gains in 2020 beyond the baseline, only one, laborers and factories, added more support beyond the baseline, adding 5-points to the baseline (compared to 18-points in 2020). The second successful pair proposed, Palestinian prisoners and Palestinian unification of armed forces, raised the baseline by 1-point only. All other pairs failed to increase support. In fact, four did the opposite, diminishing support to the package to 13%, a 13-point drop, in the least successful pair, the one linking settlers to Palestinian refugees

It is worth pointing out that the most successful pair for the Palestinians, laborers and factories, is the second most successful for the Israelis as can be seen in the comparative figure below. The same figure also shows that both sides view highly negatively the linkage between settlers and refugees. The greatest level of polarization is produced by the pair on combating incitement, as it increases the gab in support between the two sides from 5-points, in the baseline, to 49-points. 

We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about their support for a list containing confidence building measures that the Palestinian and the Israeli sides can jointly take to improve the Palestinian-Israeli environment and promote healthy conditions for a resumption of viable peace negotiations:

1. ICC and area C: Palestinians will stop going to the International Criminal Court and Israel will allow the PA to build new cities in area C of the West Bank
2. Payments to prisoners and release of prisoners: Palestinians will replace the current system of payments to security prisoners and families of those killed in conflict with a social security system based on family needs and Israel will release to the Palestinian Authority hundreds of Palestinian prisoners among those who are sick, those that have already spent most of their prison terms, female prisoners, and others who do not pose a security threat
3. Textbooks and PA elections: Palestinians will revise their current school textbooks to remove any incitement against Jews and Israeli will allow Palestinians in East Jerusalem to participate in the PA elections in accordance with the terms of the Oslo agreement
4. PA security deployment and Israeli incursions: Palestinian security services will enter all areas under the PA control to arrest and disarm any armed Palestinians and those planning to carry out attacks against Israelis and the Israeli army to stop its incursions into area A of the Palestinian territories

Among Palestinians, none of the measures examined has received significant support. On the other hand, among Israeli Jews, two measures were found that received great support: Textbooks and PA elections (54%) and PA security deployment and Israeli incursions (51%).  

Figure 20: support for confidence building measures among Palestinians and Israeli Jews

Among Palestinians, the support for CBMs in general is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, among Fatah voters, non-religious and 18–39-year-old. The two items that received higher support are "ICC and Area C" and "Payments to prisoners and release of prisoners ".

Among Israeli Jews, "Textbooks and PA elections" is the measure with the highest support across all groups. Among Israeli Arabs all CBMs get high support without significance difference between them.

Worry and Fear: Most Palestinians (60%) expressed worry and fear that they or a member of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished or that they would be expelled or prevented from reaching their land behind the separation barrier or wall; 40% are not worried. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 79% indicated that they are worried or very much worried about the future of the Palestinian people.  These percentages are almost identical to those obtained two years ago.

In the current survey, 61% of Israeli Jews said they “greatly or very greatly” agree with a statement that “I fear being harmed by a Palestinian terror attack, rocket fire or war.” 38% responded that they share this concern only a little or not at all. These findings show significant increase in Israeli worry compared to 2020 when only 42% said they were worried.

Moreover, 56% of Israeli Jews indicated that they are worried or very much worried about losing the Jewish majority in Israel and losing the Jewish character of the state; 44% are not worried. The anxiety about losing Jewish majority is compatible with the significance that Jewish Israelis attach to this value, as seen later in our findings. 

Experiencing conflict-related violence: A majority among Palestinian participants (63%) said they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict once (16%) or more than once (47%).

We asked the Jewish-Israeli side about witnessing of casualties related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are considerable differences between Jewish settlers and non-settlers regarding the question of being hurt in such incidents. As shown in Figure 21, 35% of non-settler Jews reported they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once (17%) or more than once (17%), while more than half (53%) of settlers have witnessed such casualties once (11%) or more than once (42%).  Compared to Palestinians, fewer non-settler Jews were exposed to conflict-related violence, while settlers – who are the immediate neighbors of Palestinians – report similar levels to those of Palestinians. It is worth noting that while the percentage of Palestinians who witnessed injuries and deaths many times is 27%, the equivalent percentage among the settlers is 7%, and among Israeli non-settler Jews 3%.

Figure (21): Palestinians, settlers, and non-settler Jews who witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

We asked the two sides about perceptions of the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust the other side. We probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. The overall findings show a marked decline in perceptions of the other side’s commitment to peace and in the level of trust.

Does the other side want peace?

Among Palestinians, 17% agree that most Israeli Jews want peace, almost the same as the September 2020 finding but a significant decrease from 39% in June 2018 and much less than our findings in June 2017 when 44% of Palestinians gave this response. In this poll, 82%, compared to 76% in 2020, expressed the view that they do not think most Israeli Jews want peace. Among Israeli Jews just 12% agree that Palestinians want peace, a significant drop from 19% in September 2020 and from 35% in July 2018. In December 2016, 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017, making the current survey among the poorest results in terms of Israeli perceptions that Palestinians want peace.

What does the other side want?

The expectations of both sides are that the other side will start a "definitive war" or “armed struggle.” As the figure below indicates, the largest percentage of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, 44% and 52% respectively think the majority on the other side prefers to use force. Only one fifth on each side thinks the other side wants to reach a peace agreement. But findings show that the assessment of the two sides is mostly incorrect. For example, while 44% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Israelis prefers a "definitive war," in practice, only 26% of Israeli Jews prefer it. Similarly, while a majority of Israeli Jews think the majority of the Palestinians prefer “armed struggle,” only 44% of the Palestinians prefer it.

Is the other side a partner for peace?

A majority on Israeli Jews and Palestinians, 84% and 61% respectively, think it has no partner on the other side. This represents a 14-point increase among Israeli Jews and 11-point decrease among Palestinians compared to our findings in September 2020.  Similarly, 82% of Israeli Jews and three quarters of the Palestinians think the other side will never accept the existence of an independent Palestinian/Israeli State. Both sides agree, 87% among Israeli Jews and 75% among the Palestinians, that the Palestinian Authority does not have the capacity to reach and implement a peace agreement with Israel. Indeed, only 12% on each side believes that in case of a peace agreement, the other side will honor the agreement. When asked to speculate about the conditions that will most likely prevail after PA president Mahmud Abbas, the largest percentage among both sides, 69% among Israelis and 46% among Palestinians, expect armed clashes between Palestinian factions. Only a quarter of Palestinians and 13% of Israelis expect Fatah and Hamas to agree on holding elections to elect a new president.

Trust and Zero-Sum Conflict:

As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians, a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (86% - a 4-point drop from the 2020 finding); only 14% thinks Israeli Jews are trust-worthy.  Among Israeli Jews, 85% disagree with a statement “Palestinians can be trusted,” the worst results obtained by the Pulse, and an 6-point rise from September 2020 (when 79% believed that). As shown in the figure below, only 11% of Israeli Jews think the Palestinians are trust-worthy. Israeli Arabs are much more willing to trust Israeli Jews than Palestinians: 50% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, but 31% disagree.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 65% of Israeli Jews currently agree, a 7-point rise from September 2020 (when 58% of Israeli Jews agreed), 46% of Israeli Arabs agree (identical to the 2020 findings), and 71% of Palestinians (compared to 74% in 2020) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. Only 28% of the Palestinians and 25% of Israeli Jews think the conflict is not zero sum.

Who owns the land:

 We asked both publics who they think owns the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river (i.e., the whole land of Israel/Palestine). Participants could respond that they see the land as belonging to one side more than the other by giving it a higher score on the scale of 1 to 6, or giving both a high score thus indicating it belongs to both equally. Our findings indicate that both Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians see the entire land as belonging to their group through high and identical scores (93%). Israeli Arabs however are less certain: only 44% thinks it does not belong the Jews and only 56% thinks it belongs to the Palestinians. The majority among the Jewish and Palestinian publics negate the idea that the land belongs to the other side as well, thus perceiving the territory as exclusive to them. However, while the excluding perceptions are almost consensual among Palestinians (94%), they are less so among Israeli Jews (68%).

When did the conflict begin?

There is no consensus among Palestinians or Israeli Jews about the starting point of the conflict. Yet a majority of Israeli Jews and Palestinians believe the conflict began at some point even before 1948 (52% of Jews and 60% of Palestinians). The largest group of Palestinians mentions the 1917 Balfour declaration as the beginning (37%), about a third of Jewish Israelis mark the 1948 war. In both publics, only a small minority perceives the 1967 as the starting point. However, among Israeli Arabs, there is a majority (51%) that believes the conflict started with the 1948 war, which makes sense since that was the point of time when this group became a distinct one.

Figure (25): " People differ in their assessment of when the Arab-Israeli or Arab-Jewish conflict originated or started? What do you think? Did it start with:"

Victimhood: Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians perceive their people’s suffering as unique in human history, 80%, 69% and 84% respectively. Similarly, all three groups believe that their victimization is the worst compared to other people that suffered from persecution and injustice, 84%, 66%, and 84% respectively. As shown in figure 26 below, the three groups think that their victimization grants them with moral entitlement to take any action in order to survive, 63%, 68%, and 90% respectively.

Figure (26): " To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements regarding the experiences of Jews /Palestinians generally?" (% Agree) 

Willingness to promote peace between the two people: When asking about willingness to take reconciliatory actions, Israeli Arabs express the highest agreement to promote good relations between the two people (70%) and to participate in a workshop that bring them together (65%). A majority among Jewish Israelis are willing to take the first measure (56%) but not the second one (44%), while Palestinians reject these two actions (22% and 20% agreement respectively) which probably symbolize “normalization” for them.

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve.

Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority and democracy are seen as the most important values (44% and 29% respectively; see Figure 28). This reflects a similar trend to what we saw in 2020 in the increased percentages of those who selected the Jewish majority and decreased percentages of those who selected Greater Israel. However, the Israeli Jewish public seems more concerned this time about democracy, which increased by 11 points, given the outcome of the Israeli elections in November 2022 and decreased interest in peace, a drop of 12 points. At present, 7% chose greater Israel. Among settlers, the percentage of those who selected Greater Israel declined further to 16%, and is now in second place, while the portion who chose a Jewish majority increased from 45% to 56%, Democracy was cited by 16% of settlers, and just 10% of settlers cited peace.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with little change over the course of the past four years. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (36%, compared to 34% in 2020) chose this, followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (35%, compared to 28% in 2020), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (19%, a 4 point decrease from 2020), and building a democratic political system (9%, compared to 13% in 2020; see Figure 29).

Figure 29: Palestinian perception of their own vital goals, 2022