Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll

PressRelease  

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, in partnership with and support from the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and with funding from the European Union (EU).

STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

• A small majority of Palestinians (51%) and Israelis (58.5%) supports the two-state solution.
• Support for a permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is much lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 39% of Palestinians and 46% of  Israelis support a peace agreement package that comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. In general, support for all parameters of a permanent peace deal is highest among Israeli Arabs (see Tables of Findings). However, as their demographic share of the entire Israeli adult population is only around 16%, their contribution to the pro-peace bloc in Israel is limited.
• A quarter of  Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to  reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's  principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public).
• In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (44%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (40%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, or an UN-led forum –  are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
• A quarter of Israelis and 35% of Palestinians support a one-state solution.
• Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.
•  A majority (68%) of Palestinians admire Israeli democracy while only 10% of the Israelis see positively Palestinian democracy.
• A majority (62%) of Palestinians blame the collapse of peace negotiations on the Israelis. A somewhat smaller majority (52%) of Israelis blame the Palestinians for this collapse.  However, significant minorities (on both sides 43%) believe that the majority on the other side wants peace.

Findings show significant Palestinian-Israeli mutual misperception and that this mutual misperception is positively correlated with hardline views. In contrast, clarity/accurate perception about the views on the other side is positively correlated with greater willingness to compromise.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 2 and 4, 2016. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,184 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 7 and 14, 2016. The margin of error is 3%.  The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Tamar Hermann, the academic director of IDI’s Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs and between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.  

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution: Today, majorities on both sides – 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that both sides underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side: among the Palestinians, 47% said a majority opposes it; among the Israelis, 57% said the majority opposes it. Worse yet, both sides underestimate the level of support for the two-state solution on the other side and think that there is a majority that opposes the two-state solution. Some 49% of the Palestinians believe a Jewish majority opposes it; on the Israeli side, 44% said a Palestinian majority opposes it.

Permanent status package: We presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. The majority on both sides, 55% of Israeli Jews and 59% of Palestinians, opposed the combined package. A minority – 46% of Israelis (39% among Israeli Jews and 90% among Israeli Arabs) and 39% of the Palestinians (37% among West Bankers and 43% among Gazans) – support the combined package.

A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package:

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (40%) and a majority among the Israelis (68%; 64% among Israeli Jews and 91% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.

2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (20%; 27% in the Gaza Strip and 16% in the West Bank) and a majority (61%) among Israelis supported this item.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (36%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (58%) supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 33% (26% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 42% (38% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs).

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (35%) among the Palestinians (28% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip), and a small majority (52%) among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews only 49% supported it).

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (39% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) and 49% of Israelis, supported it. (The Israeli Jews were actually split in the middle: 46% supported it while 45% opposed it).

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 30% and among the Israelis 39% (32% among Israeli Jews and 75% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (31%) among Palestinians (24% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) and a similar minority (39%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 73% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 49% (43% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 27% (17% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

We asked the public to assess the attitudes of their side and that of the other side toward the combined package. Both sides assessed correctly that a majority on their side and a majority on the other side would oppose the package; only 23% of Israelis and 35% of Palestinians believed that a majority on their side would support the package. Similarly, 35% of the Israelis (30% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) and 40% of the Palestinians (32% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) thought that a majority on the other side would support the package.

It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 40% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 56% compared to 36% among traditionalists, 10% among the religious, and 9% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox).

Support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: 88% on the left, 83% on the moderate-left, 59% on the center, 26% on the moderate-right, and 10% of the right support the package. Significantly, support for the package is much higher among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (64% to 33%). Support is much higher among those Israelis who perceive Palestinian long-term aspirations as least threatening (see the following section for details on Israeli threat perception), standing at 74%, compared to those (22%) who perceive Palestinian long-term aspirations as most threatening (see the following section for details on Israeli threat perception).

Among the Palestinians, as we saw earlier, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. It is worth noting that 70% of the residents of the Gaza Strip are refugees while only 28% of the residents of the West Bank are refugees. Part of the explanation for greater Gazan support is the fact that support for the package is higher among Palestinian refugees (43%) than non-refugees (37%). Surprisingly, however, those refugees living in refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 35% compared to 40% among residents of cities and rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (63% and 41%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (57%) compared to Hamas voters (25%). As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (48% vs. 33%). Also, as in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who perceive Israeli long-term aspirations as least threatening, standing at 61%, compared to those who perceive Israel’s long term aspirations as most threatening, standing at 31% (See the following section for details on Palestinian threat perception). 

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews and Arabs and Palestinians opposed to the package were offered seven different incentives. Only the first three of the incentives offered to the three sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining four sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns.  In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:

Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 26% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.

2. And if free movement throughout Jerusalem – West and East – was insured as if it is one city? 15% of Israeli Jews and 37% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

3. And if Israel was offered by Europe to join the European Union? 12% of Israeli Jews and 37% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people? 26% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

5. And if the US signs a defense treaty with Israel in order to boost Israel’s security? 19% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

6. And if the agreement will not allow Palestinian refugees to return to Israel to exercise a right of return, but they will be compensated by an international fund? 33% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if the exchanged territory that the Palestinians would receive in compensation for the settlement blocs annexed to Israel would be the areas populated today by Israeli Arabs, such as the area known as the Triangle? 22% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on Israeli side: all seven incentive made only a minority of those opposed to a peace agreement package change their minds regarding the combined package.

Palestinian Incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty?  25% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

2. And if free movement throughout Jerusalem, West and East, was insured as if it is one city?  31% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

3. If the state of Palestine was offered by Europe to join the European Union?  32% of Palestinians and an identical percentage of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. If Israel acknowledged its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem? 34% of Palestinians and 26% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

5. If the Palestinian state received $30 billion to $50 billion to help in settling those refugees wishing to live in the Palestinian state and compensating them? 31% of Palestinians and 37% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.

6. And if the exchanged territory that the Palestinians would receive in compensation for the settlements blocs annexed to Israel would be along the Gaza border?  18% of Palestinians and 21% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if the Palestinian state and Jordan become a confederation?  29% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on the Palestinian and Israeli Arabs sides, all seven incentives made only a minority of those opposed to a peace agreement package change their minds regarding the combined package.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least opposed, as 26% of Israeli Jews, 25% of Palestinians, and 42% of Israeli Arabs who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. A one-quarter "defection" from opposition to support for the combined package increases the level of support for it among Palestinians and Israeli Jews from a minority to a majority position (39% to 54%). Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, the most effective proved to be the inclusion, as part of the refugee solution, of an item in which Israel acknowledges its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem; such an inclusion managed to persuade more than one-third of the Palestinians who initially opposed the package to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive proved to be the removal of the line item that allowed 100,000 Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, with one third willing to change their mind and accept the combined package.

Sacred Values: The Pulse also sought to assess the main impediments on the road to peace, the “sacred values” that pull some Palestinians and Israelis away from compromise.  We offered each side four such values comprising aspects of history, national identity, holy places, refugees’ rights, and the 1967 borders.

Findings indicate that for Israeli Jews, the two most important of the four values examined related to history: (1) the demand by 79% for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish character of the state; (2) the demand by 73% for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish roots and history in the land of Israel; (3) the demand by 56% of Israeli Jews that the combined package should not include Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line, or the Green Line; and (4) the demand by 55% of Israeli Jews for the inclusion in the agreement of Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif).

On the Palestinian side, findings show that the two most important of the four values related to history and territories: (1) the demand by 62% for an Israeli recognition of Palestinian roots/history in historic Palestine; (2) the demand by 61% that the agreement entail an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines; (3) the demand by 58% for an Israeli recognition of the refugees’ right of return; and (4) the demand by 57% for Palestinian sovereignty over al Haram al Sharif (the Temple Mount) .

Mutual Recognition of National Identity: We asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of national identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Findings show that a majority (64%) of the Israeli public support such a mutual recognition and among Palestinians, a large minority (43%) support it. We then asked the two sides to tell us whether such recognition should come before or after the signing of a final settlement. For Israeli Jews, the preference is to have the recognition come before: 53% of the Israelis (55% among Israeli Jews and 40% among Israeli Arabs) said it should come before. But the Palestinians are divided into two categories:  39% said it should come before and 41% said it should come after.

We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting from a list of three possible approaches, bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians (44%) and among the Israeli Arabs (54%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 22% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 41% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach. Finally, only 18% of Palestinians and an identical percentage of Israelis selected the unilateral approach, one in which each side takes measures in order to promote its interests.

We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Four models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led multilateral approach; 3) an EU-led approach; 4) and finally, an UN-led approach. Findings show that Palestinians were almost equally open to three of the four (the Arab forum, the UN and the EU approaches), with support ranging between 20-22%, while only 8% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred almost equally an Arab forum (28%) and a US-led effort (26%). Among Israelis Arabs, support was greater for an UN-led approach (36%) and an EU-led one (27%). 

We asked the two sides how they view various conditions on and attributes of the other side, and in some cases on their own side. The questions focused on matters ranging between democracy and rule of law to issues of long-term aspirations and threat perceptions, and, of course, who to blame for the failure to make peace. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are, nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.

Democracy: 68% of the Palestinians (73% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) describe Israeli democracy as good or very good. When Israelis were asked to evaluate democracy in the Palestinian Authority, a solid majority (77%) described Palestinian democracy as bad or very bad. It is worth noting that only 32% of the Palestinians describe Palestinian democracy as good or very good. By contrast, 65% of the Israelis describe Israeli democracy as good or very good.

When Palestinians were asked about the future of democracy in Israel, 38% said it will remain as it is now, 26% said Israel will become more democratic and 28% said it will become less democratic. When Israelis were asked about the chances that a better democratic system will be established in the future Palestinian state, a solid majority (83%) said the chances are very slim or fairly slim.

Rule of Law: When Palestinians were asked if the rule of law in Israel is good, 50% (62% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) replied in the affirmative. By contrast, when Israelis were asked if Palestinian rule of law is good, only 20% replied in the affirmative.

Want Peace: 43% of the Palestinians and identical percentage among Israeli Jews agree that the other side wants peace; 77% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace.

Failure of Peace Efforts – Who to Blame: As expected, Palestinians blame Israelis and Israelis blame Palestinians for the collapse of peace negotiations over the years: 62% of the Palestinians put the blame on the Israeli side and 52% of Israeli Jews put the blame on the Palestinian side. Only 8% of the Palestinians and 12% of Israeli Jews blame their side. A little over a quarter (26%) of the Palestinians and about a third (31%) of Israeli Jews place the blame on both sides to the same extent.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (89%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (68%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides, that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 50% of Israeli Jews, 61% of Israeli Arabs, and 70% of Palestinians agree with this dismal characterization.

Long-Term Aspirations: The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high: 54% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goal is to extend its borders to cover all area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. Some 27% think Israel’s goal is to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Some 35% of Israelis (40% of Israeli Jews and 8% of Israeli Arabs) think Palestinians’ main aspiration is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of its Jewish population; 19% think the goal of the Palestinians is to take over the entire state of Israel.

Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s long-term intention is to withdraw from all (7%) or some (10%) of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 37% of Israelis (33% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Israeli Arabs) think the aspirations of the Palestinians are limited to regaining some (21%) or all (16%) of the territories conquered in 1967.

However, when we asked Palestinians and Israelis to tell us what they think the long-term aspirations of their side are, the picture shows that the two sides perceive much more moderate aspirations on their side than anticipated by the other side. Only 12% of Israelis say the aspiration of Israel is to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there; 18% say that Israel intends to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there. Among the Palestinians, only 10% say that the Palestinian aspiration is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of its Jewish population; 15% say Palestinian aspirations are to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over pre-1948 Palestine.

Fear: Among the Palestinians, 54% do not fear Israeli Jews. By contrast, 65% of Israeli Jews indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians.

Worry: A solid majority (76%) of the Palestinians are worried or very worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Likewise, among the Israelis, 71% are worried or very worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Palestinian attacks in their daily life.

We also asked the Israelis if they are worried that “efforts by Palestinian groups and their supporters, such as the BDS movement, will succeed in delegitimizing Israel in the international community.” Israeli Jews (52%) and Israeli Arabs (83%) say their worry in this regard is low or very low.

Our General Conditions and Theirs: 49% of the Palestinians describe conditions in general in Israel as good, 24% describe them as bad, and 20% say they are so-so. By contrast, 45% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the West Bank as bad, 29% say they are so-so, and 25% describe them as good. As for conditions in the Gaza Strip, 72% describe them as bad.

When asked about their future expectations for conditions in the Gaza Strip in the next three to five years, 41% expect them to be worse and 30% expect them to be better. Expectations regarding West Bank conditions were a little more optimistic: 35% expect them to be better and 31% expect them to be worse.

Among the Israelis, 43% describe Palestinian conditions in the West Bank as bad, 24% describe them as good, and 22% describe them as so-so. With regard to conditions in the Gaza Strip, 68% of the Israelis describe them as bad.

By contrast, 39% of the Israelis describe Israel’s conditions as good, 36% describe them as so-so, and 24% describe them as bad. With regard to future expectations regarding the general conditions in Israel in the next three to five years, 31% of the Israelis believe they will be worse, 26% that they will be better, and 33% believe they will remain about the same as today.

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (35%), followed by peace (32%), democracy (20%), and Greater Israel (10%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (45%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (32%), and building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%).

Expectations: We asked both sides about their expectations for the near future. Findings show that the Israelis are more pessimistic than the Palestinians. Among the Israelis, 44% think that some violent acts or armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations. Some 29% think the two sides will return to negotiations but some violent acts or armed attacks will take place. Some 10% think the two sides will soon return to negotiations. Some 8% think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.  Among the Palestinians, 24% expect that some violent acts or armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations; 34% think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some violent acts or armed attacks will take place; 22% think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations; and 14% think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.  In other words, 73% of the Israelis compared to 58% of the Palestinians expect violence to continue and 39% of the Israelis compared to 56% of the Palestinians expect the two sides to return to negotiations.

Palestinian State? We asked both side about the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years. On this issue, Israeli and Palestinian views are very similar: 77% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians think the chances are low.

One-State Solution: The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 52%). Only a minority among Palestinians (34%) and among Israeli Jews (20%) support this option.

Impact of Palestinian Authority (PA) Collapse on Security:  We asked both sides to speculate about the likely impact of a PA collapse on security conditions. Responses were similar: 63% of Israelis and 60% of Palestinians indicated such a collapse will lead to an increase in Palestinian-Israeli violence.